Quarterly Report 1/97

The Incidence of Serious Crime During 1996

Crime Information Management Centre (CIMC)
Detective Service
Head Office
Pretoria

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY : MAIN FINDINGS

1. INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION

2. GATHERING OF STATISTICS/INFORMATION

2.1. THE VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF STATISTICS/INFORMATION
2.2. UNDER-REPORTING OF CRIME
2.3. BACKLOG IN CRIME STATISTICS
2.4. THE FORMER SAP REGIONS AND NEW PROVINCES

3. ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS/INFORMATION

3.1. INTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF CRIME
3.2. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

4. INTERPRETATION OF CRIME STATISTICS

5. DISSEMINATION OF CRIME STATISTICS

6. THE NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL CRIME SITUATION

6.1. THE NATIONAL SERIOUS CRIME PICTURE
6.2. PROVINCIAL BREAKDOWN OF THE 1996 CRIME RATIOS

7. EXPLANATIONS PERTAINING TO THE TRENDS DISCUSSED

7.1. INCREASING TRENDS
7.2. DECREASING OR STABILISING TRENDS

8. THE INVOLVEMENT OF SAPS MEMBERS IN CRIME

9. THE REAL INCIDENCE OF CRIME AND POLICE PERFORMANCE

10. ORGANISED CRIME

10.1 THREAT ANALYSIS
10.2 THE COMBATING OF ORGANISED CRIME

11. COMMERCIAL CRIME

ANNEXURE A: National and Provincial crime statistics 1994 - 1996

ANNEXURE B: Breakdown of crime statistics to provincial and area level 1994 - 1996

• Eastern Cape
• Part 1
• Part 2
• Free State
• Gauteng
• Part 1
• Part 2
• KwaZulu/Natal
• Part 1
• Part 2
• Mpumalanga
• Northern Cape
• Northern Province
• North West
• Western Cape

ANNEXURE C: Contact numbers of CIMC offices

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY : MAIN FINDINGS

• Despite some defects pertaining to the crime information system of the SAPS still remaining, progress has been made in this regard. Whatever the influence of the defects on the reliability of figures, however, these can only affect the depth, but not the direction of tendencies described [see Section 2].
• A comparison of crime ratios pertaining to the twenty most serious crime tendencies (comprising 99.3% of all serious crime) calculated for 1994, 1995 and 1996 respectively, reveals that only four of these tendencies, namely rape, assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm (assault GBH), other robbery and the illegal possession of firearms, (together accounting for 16.9% of all serious crime) increased during 1996 [see Section 6].
• Hypothetical explanations pertaining to the increases mentioned above are provided in section 7.1 of the report.
• A provincial breakdown of the crime ratios surprisingly reveals that the Northern Cape Province suffered the highest rape and assault and the second highest murder ratios among the provinces [see Section 6.2].
• Although explanations pertaining to complex phenomena like crime is a complicated matter, an analysis contained in Section 7.2 seems to indicate that the Annual Police Plan of 1996/97 had a positive effect on the incidence of most of the serious crime tendencies.
• An analysis of the involvement of SAPS members in crime contradicts the popular belief that a large proportion of police officials is involved in crime. The analysis further indicates that most of the crimes investigated against police officials during 1996 may have resulted from the execution of their duties [see Section 8].
• Despite ratio decreases pertaining to most serious crime tendencies, it is important to note that the actual frequency of crime in many cases is still increasing, while the number of police members (especially investigating officers) is decreasing. This boils down to an increasing and actually almost unmanageable work load on the remaining members [see Section 9].
• A brief overview regarding organised crime based on a national threat analysis indicates that organised crime is indeed a phenomenon not to be underestimated in South Africa [see Section 10].
• The importance of envisaged legislation dealing with money-laundering is emphasised by a short review of the incidence of commercial crime. It is believed that such counter-measures will have a disruptive impact on organised crime and the proceeds of crime in general [see Section 11].
• Two Annexures attached to the report contain a detailed breakdown of crime figures down to provincial and area levels.

1. INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION

The Crime Information Management Centre (CIMC), a component of the Detective Service of the South African Police Service (SAPS), defines its mission in part as keeping Government in general, the Police Service as a whole, other role players and the general public informed about developments regarding the incidence of crime in South Africa. The two previous quarterly reports were released during a media conference at Wachthuis, Pretoria on 25 November 1996. On this occasion the Minister for Safety and Security announced that four scientifically based Quarterly reports to be compiled annually by the CIMC will henceforth serve to keep the media and public up to date regarding the crime situation in South Africa.

The aims of the CIMC were discussed in report number 2/96 and it was clearly stated that the strategic research conducted by the Centre purports to, among other things, achieve the following:

• To create greater understanding of the crime phenomenon.
• To establish a more responsible national debate as far as the crime question is concerned.
• To facilitate strategic decision-making regarding the combating and prevention of crime.

At the same conference, as well as during meetings with foreign diplomats and opinion-formers in society on the same day, note was taken of a variety of critical questions concerning the gathering, analysis and interpretation of crime statistics and information. Some of the matters raised in connection with strategic research have either already been addressed since the establishment of the CIMC during January 1996, or received attention since the conferences held in November 1996. However, due to a serious shortage of human resources and funds, as well as the fact that the CIMC does not have a mandate as far as the gathering of data is concerned, all the criticism could not be accommodated overnight.

Prior to any discussion of the crime situation or statistics contained in this report, it may be desirable to obtain an overall view of the progress made with strategic crime research within the SAPS. In this way the "crime picture" presented in the rest of the report can be evaluated against the background of methodological problems experienced. The latter may serve to determine the credibility of the crime picture presented here - whether the information supplied can be considered reliable and valid. The following sections are also important in the sense that the taxpayer will be able to see from the report whether or not any progress is being made regarding the process of crime research.

The research process is basically completed in four phases (although these should not be seen as water-tight compartments/mutually exclusive stages). The four phases of research relate to the gathering, analysis and interpretation of statistics/information, as well as the dissemination of the research product. In the following sections of the report the primary problems experienced during every phase will be identified and progress made in overcoming the problems concerned during the past year will be commented on.

2. GATHERING OF STATISTICS/INFORMATION

2.1. THE VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF STATISTICS/INFORMATION

It is acknowledged throughout the world by statisticians, consultants, planners and researchers that mistakes can always occur as far as statistics are concerned. The larger and more complex the phenomenon being studied and the computer system employed and the more phases involved in the processing done to arrive at statistics, the bigger the mistakes usually made. The experts therefore strive to limit the range and extent of these mistakes to the minimum. The SAPS has not escaped the problems described above. The CIMC, which in reality is only responsible for the task of analysis and interpretation, never was and still is not wholly satisfied with the validity and reliability of the crime statistics received from station and in some cases unit level via National Information Systems. A critical approach towards statistics and information should, therefore, in this regard be considered an asset and should also be maintained in future.

One of the factors which has been identified as contributing to the dissatisfactory state of affairs regarding the validity and reliability of crime statistics is the lack of a strong positive crime information management culture at ground level (that is at stations and units). The CIMC has undertaken as part of its functions to assist in the establishment of operational analytic capabilities at station and unit level. Once these capabilities are established and operational analysis is accepted as an indispensable requirement to effective management by every station commissioner, the validity and reliability of statistics and information used at Provincial and National level will be optimally enhanced.

Despite being ready to start rendering assistance at ground level, the project has been frustrated by a lack of funds. All attempts to obtain funds for this purpose during the 1996/97 financial year proved to be in vain.

In the meantime, an effort was made to enhance the degree of validity and reliability of crime statistics as far as possible, inter alia in the following ways:

National Information Systems are introducing measures to, as far as possible, eliminate all invalid inputs on the computer systems. However, in cases where operators at ground level supply acceptable codes, but register incorrect crime and related information, problems concerning validity and reliability will of course still be experienced. This can only be completely rectified once the members at ground level become fully aware of the importance of their role in pursuit of the common aim of employing valid information for effective crime combating.

The ten CIMC offices (nine Provincial offices and Head Office) work in close collaboration to compile the Quarterly reports. Statistics pertaining to every crime are extracted per station before being added up to arrive at area, provincial and national totals. Face value evaluations of these figures are conducted by experienced personnel at each of the ten CIMC offices and each Quarterly report is improved by more and more mistakes related to validity and reliability being identified and corrected in this way. Evaluations based on a mere analysis of the figures presented at face value have thus proved to be indispensable.

2.2. UNDER-REPORTING OF CRIME

It should constantly be kept in mind that the crime statistics used in this report only reflect the number of reported crimes. It is only logical that crimes not reported to the SAPS will not be reflected in SAPS records or found on its data systems. This difficulty is experienced by analysts and criminologists world-wide. The problem is even more complex if, among other things, it is taken into consideration that under-reporting pertaining to every crime tendency tends to vary over time and in space. Furthermore, a complexity of explanatory variables may be involved. Every variable may also vary over time and in space and may in addition vary in its influence on the other variables affecting a specific crime tendency as well. Victimisation studies including the measurement of under-reporting are usually seen as a magical solution to the problem of under-reporting. However, caution has to be exercised in this regard. The organisational image of the organisation doing the victimisation survey, the fieldworkers involved (eg as far as gender, age, clothing and ethnic factors are concerned) and the formulation of questions, as well as the measure of probing employed during interviews, etcetera, may all have an influence on the respondents' willingness to disclose the non-reporting of crime to the Police to the research organisation involved. This briefly boils down to the fact that, even in a survey on victimisation, under-reporting, and indeed even over-reporting, may occur.

In spite of the difficulties being experienced, the CIMC has now entered into an agreement with the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) to include a number of questions regarding the under-reporting of crime in their country-wide Omnibus survey at least every six months (but preferably on a quarterly basis). The first of these surveys containing questions related to the under-reporting of crime is at present being conducted. It will hopefully be possible to include an indication of under-reporting pertaining to most of the serious crime categories in future quarterly reports.

2.3. BACKLOG IN CRIME STATISTICS

Crime statistics in South Africa started suffering a backlog of up to eight or nine months during the amalgamation process involving eleven police agencies in the RSA between 1995 and 1996. It was, furthermore, impossible to obtain crime statistics pertaining to the new provinces until the middle of 1996. By March 1996, a special task team under the guidance of the CIMC was called upon to address this matter. This task team managed to decrease the backlog to approximately six weeks by the end of 1996. The ideal is to have the crime statistics for a specific month available by the third week of the following month. The SAPS can at present be satisfied with the progress made in this regard, as it performs on par with international standards as far as this aspect is concerned.

The amalgamation process, the resultant backlog in crime statistics and the fact that many of the agencies integrated into the SAPS either did not have or had poorly developed crime information systems, as well as the fact that a criminological crime code list has not been implemented (also see section 3.1.), caused police planners to increasingly rely on alternative and operational systems for their information needs. Over the last three to four years, police spokespersons have therefore released statistics procured from, for example, the Daily Crime Review or the vehicle circulation system to the media and the public. This state of affairs had especially the following three consequences:

• Inaccurate (either deflated or inflated) numbers, due to the fact that stations and units, and especially the former police agencies, did not submit complete reports. The Daily Crime Review never contained a complete picture of the incidence of crime in South Africa. In addition, the circulation systems dealing with the particulars of individual stolen/robbed vehicles, firearms and other goods for inter alia identification purposes, for example, may contain duplications and are administrative and operational systems. These systems were never designed for strategic research purposes.
• Fluctuating figures resulting from the fact that data are continuously being fed into or deleted from operational systems, like for example the Crime Administration System (CAS), circulation systems, etc, causing figures derived from these systems to be continuously adapted. It is therefore quite possible that hijacking figures for a specific period extracted from the CAS at different times may differ from one another, as adaptations regarding the number of registered hijackings may have occurred between the requests. The investigation of cases registered as vehicle hijackings have also revealed that a number of such cases are not in any way linked to actual hijackings, but refer to cases of theft or even fraud. In this process hijacking figures may , for example, either escalate or decrease (although the latter usually occurs).
• Mistrust and doubts regarding the veracity of crime statistics voiced by the media and general public. It is only logical that the consequences accompanying the use of alternative systems referred to above have led to different sets of figures pertaining to the incidence of a particular crime over a given period being released, causing mistrust and doubts regarding crime statistics to emerge.

In order to eliminate the confusion and negative perceptions referred to above, the following steps were implemented:

• The Daily Crime Review was discontinued, as it presented a misleading and deflated image of the incidence of crime and posed a special danger when used as a basis for strategic planning. It was furthermore axed because the human resources invested in it could be utilised in more productive ways, and especially because it tended to obscure the absolute necessity of devising a criminological crime code list and still delays its implementation. Even since its axing on 31 May 1996, various decision-makers within the Police are still depending on ad hoc systems for their information because a criminological crime code list has not yet been implemented. Media spokespersons are also still guilty of releasing figures derived from such systems. It has now finally been decided that until the advent of a criminological crime code list, only the Crime Management Information (CMI) system will be utilised. Any other statistics obtained from alternative and/or operational systems will be accompanied by the necessary cautionary notes and will only be used to explain the CMI system's statistics. It will be noted that this report does not contain any specific sections dealing with attacks on people in or around their homes, the elderly, farms, international tourists, those involved in the taxi industry and police personnel, or with other high profile crime tendencies. These phenomena do not necessarily constitute crimes as such, but result in specific crimes such as murder, rape, assault, etcetera, which are registered as such on the CMI system. Other information pertaining to these phenomena obtained from alternative and ad hoc systems may possibly be inaccurate and can only be used to explain the escalation or decrease in tendencies observed with regard to the CMI figures. The same applies to figures obtained from operational systems.
• The CMI system based on the revised crime code list implemented on 1 July 1995 will thus be the only officially recognised source of strategic crime statistics until a criminological crime code list is implemented and has been operational for at least six months. Figures pertaining to crimes considered to be of a serious nature and registered on the CMI system are listed in Annexure A and are broken down to area level in Annexure B. Provincial CIMC offices will also be supplied with crime statistics broken down to station level. (A list containing the telephone numbers of the various CIMC offices is found in Annexure C.)
• The CMI is also a "live" or variable system and may thus contain fluctuating statistics. The ideal situation will be to overcome this problem by "freezing" every preceding month's statistics on a specific date during every consecutive month and store these statistics on a sub-data base, which will then contain the historical strategic crime statistics. The evaluation of tendencies and comparisons for strategic planning purposes will always be based on this sub-data base. Criticism levelled against this system, alleging that it might also create a mistaken view of the crime situation, may to some extent be justified. However, the CIMC's decision in this regard is based on the following considerations:
• Experience has taught that most amendments to the registrations on the CMI system are made within the first two to three weeks following upon the initial registration; and
• as long as statistics are always "frozen" on the same day during every month and then carried over to the sub-data system, mistakes made during the registration would at least remain constant.

The differences between the monthly "frozen" statistics and the adapted CMI figures over an entire year are an important subject for research and will be discussed in the first Quarterly Report of 1998.

2.4. THE FORMER SAP REGIONS AND NEW PROVINCES

A serious problem concerning validity and reliability experienced until the middle of 1996 was that crime statistics were not processed in conformity with the new provincial borders. Prior to the previous Quarterly Reports released on 25 November 1996, only statistics pertaining to the old SAP regions were available for assessments of the crime situation in South Africa (compare report number 1/96). This caused especially the reliability of crime ratios (crimes per 100 000 of the population) to be seriously affected. The new provincial borders have finally been consolidated on the CMI system. Starting from this report, it now becomes possible to accumulate crime statistics from station to area to provincial to national level. The consolidation of statistics has furthermore been retroactively adapted to include all statistics received since January 1994, which make valid historical comparisons from January 1994 onwards possible - even down to station level.

The crime ratios have been calculated according to population figures based on the 1995 mid-year estimates obtained from the Central Statistical Service (CSS), which have been adapted to arrive at figures for 1996. As soon as the 1996 census figures are made available as a basis for the calculation of ratios, the reliability of national and provincial crime ratios may possibly be increased considerably.

In closing, attention is focussed on the fact that it is not preferable to use population figures as a basis for the calculation of crime ratios in all cases, although this remains the basis of all crime ratios contained in Interpol reports. The ideal is to use the specific "targets" of crime as basis for the calculation of ratios pertaining to various crime categories. Population figures pertaining to a particular area, for example, should be used as the basis for ratio calculations pertaining to the incidence of murder (or rape or assault), vehicle numbers to calculate the incidence of vehicle theft (or thefts from or out of motor vehicles) and the number of domestic stock to calculate ratios pertaining to stock-theft in that particular area. Until now, and despite several attempts made in this regard, efforts proved to be not very successful in obtaining reliable figures pertaining to various crime targets for the different new provinces. The fragmented nature of the old South Africa poses special difficulties in this regard. Until reliable figures pertaining to the targets of crime for the different provinces are obtained, the human population figures therefore remain the only basis for the calculation of ratios.

Note should also be taken of the fact that synchronization between census units and CAS blocks does not exist at present. As a result of this, synchronization between magisterial districts and police precincts also does not exist. Crime ratios can thus only be calculated down to provincial level at present (see Annexure A), while ratios pertaining to areas and stations cannot, for all intents and purposes, be calculated at all (see Annexure B). This state of affairs largely prevents any comparisons among areas and stations - in fact makes it almost impossible. This again makes any prioritizing and reallocation of resources in terms of the Police Plan extraordinarily difficult and may result in arbitrary decisions being made. Investigations have already been conducted into the synchronization of CAS and census blocks. It was found that this will be possible, but will require intensive utilisation of human resources. The matter is further discussed in the following section of this report.

3. ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS/INFORMATION

There are especially two areas of importance as far as the analysis of crime statistics in South Africa is concerned. These are the internal dimensions of the dependent variable and the explanatory variables (eg policing, socio-demographic and socio-economic variables).

3.1. INTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF CRIME

Any analyst of crime will concede that it is totally unsatisfactory to merely refer to crime as a single phenomenon and to attempt to explain crime as such. The minimum requirements of any professional analysis demand that crime be divided into its different categories, like for example murder, assault, rape, housebreaking, etcetera. Attempts can then be made to explain these specific crime tendencies. In developed Western countries, such as Germany, France and the USA, crime analysts are also not satisfied with only having eg murder as a dependent variable. They are concerned with different types of murder. In this way the legal definitions/descriptions of specific crimes (that which determines what an offender is charged with) are further refined by means of a second order of circumstantial/motivational dimensions. Such an analysis eg refers to politically motivated murders (like assassinations), family homicides, murders within households and murders resulting from love triangles, while in South Africa's case murders as a result of taxi related violence, bank robberies, hijackings, gang related violence, etcetera could maybe be added to the list. According to the legal definition of murder, it is known that South Africa suffers approximately 26,000 murders per year at present. Foreigners find this figure totally unacceptable. Judged against the background of the media focus on murders resulting from politically motivated conflict, taxi related violence and hijackings, the incidence of murder is automatically associated with political instability and anarchy, which poses a threat to any potential investments. With a criminological crime code list retaining the first order of legally defined crime codes (eg murder) for the purpose of historical comparisons, but incorporating a second order of criminologically defined codes for the purposes of analysis, it would long ago have been possible to indicate to foreign investors that the largest proportion of murders in South Africa is of a domestic nature and occur within households. The decision-makers in South Africa - and especially the Ministers involved in the NCPS - would also have been able to make more responsible decisions regarding the high incidence of murder. Domestic murders cannot, for instance, actually be prevented by the Police. Active steps by the Departments of Justice (like heavier sentences) and Welfare (like educational programmes) may, for example, actually be the proper strategy to follow in addressing the high murder rate. Yet another example is at present provided by the intense and understandably often highly emotional debate surrounding the incidence of rape, without anybody really knowing what proportion of rape is accounted for by date rapes, gang rapes, rapes related to prostitution or even rapes occurring within marriages, etcetera. Every one of these categories of rape requires a different preventive strategy.

At this stage a criminologically based crime code list is therefore of cardinal importance - if, indeed, not an absolute necessity - for sensible strategic crime research and strategic decision-making (for example as far as Police plans and national crime prevention strategies are concerned). The CIMC has attempted since its establishment to create an awareness among the decision-makers within the SAPS of this need and have also already compiled a concept criminological crime code list. By the middle of 1996 the idea was accepted at the highest level within the SAPS and it was decided to assign this the highest priority for implementation on the available information systems.

However, it is not only a question of having a list transferred onto the information systems. A massive attempt will have to be made to train and re-orientate all police officials with regard to the use of this list. A Police official will as far as possible, in at least the majority of cases related to specific types of crime, have to decide on the type of murder, rape or assault involved upon arriving at the scene of the crime concerned. This is something someone trained not to make premature decisions/judgements will have to adjust to. A lack of human resources, time and money has until now made the implementation of the new code list impossible. The latest indications are that the list may be implemented by the second half of 1997. It will then have to be operational for at least six months before any deductions can be made from the resultant data.

3.2. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

Any social phenomenon, like crime in general, specific types of crime - and then especially the sub-types discussed in section 3.1. of this report, could be analysed in the following ways to eventually reach some explanations:

• National and international literature studies concerning crime, with a view to formulate hypotheses. This is already being done by the CIMC.
• Qualitative studies (in-depth interviews) involving sentenced detainees and investigating officers, also with a view to the formulation of hypotheses and the refinement of existing hypotheses. The CIMC has now initiated such research. The ideal would of course be to conduct surveys of limited extent among detainees (eg like the Drug Use Forecasting Studies in the USA). According to South African law, Police officials cannot conduct these types of study, but can merely facilitate it. However, with assistance from the HSRC, a successful trial run of the DUF was conducted at Hillbrow Police station during July 1996. Attempts are now being made to involve the private sector in these types of study as well.
• Docket analysis: Representative samples of dockets pertaining to different crimes can be analysed with the assistance of pro formas embodying the hypotheses formulated on the basis of knowledge gained by means of the above methods. In this way, the connections between the crimes concerned and other information contained in dockets can be identified. This method of analysis has already borne much fruit during 1996 and various research projects based on docket analysis have been registered at the CIMC. The most prominent stumbling blocks at present are the incompleteness of dockets and the fact that the CIMC has to function at less than 50% of its approved personnel strength. The limited human resources, especially in the provinces, are furthermore heavily burdened by daily requests concerning crime related information from the media, the public and within the SAPS itself.
• Profile analyses of different types of offenders: In the following months more and more attention will be directed at analysing information on the CRIM system pertaining to detainees sentenced by the courts in connection with certain crimes, in order to compile socio-demographic profiles of different types of offenders. This may also contribute to the explanation of crime.
• Multi-variate analysis, during which different crimes are analised according to the different possible variables which may explain the incidence of crime. The second order sub-types of crime (see section 2.1. above) act as dependent variables, while socio-demographic, socio-economic, policing and criminal justice related factors act as explanatory variables. A Geographic Informaton System (GIS) will facilitate this type of analysis. An agreement between the HSRC and the SAPS was signed on 12 December 1996 to work towards this ideal by populating the existing HSRC GIS data base with data pertaining to crime and policing. The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has since also joined the agreement. At this stage of the planning it seems as if the CSIR will primarily be responsible for the development of techonology suiting the needs of multi-variate strategic research and research regarding the use of the GIS as a tool in operational analysis at station and area level. Despite the stumbling block presented by the lack of synchronisation between CAS blocks and census units referred to in section 2.4., which can impede the optimal utilisation of GIS, the project team hopes to complete most of its work during 1997.

4. INTERPRETATION OF CRIME STATISTICS

If the analytical problems, especially with regard to the criminological crime code list, described above can be overcome, only a few problems regarding the interpretation of crime remain.

With the establishment of the CIMC it was decided that the correct "mixture" of analysts to interpret crime statistics/information in depth should consist of an approximately fifty-fifty division between functional police officials (some academically qualified) and academically qualified civilians with a research background. In this way an endeavour was made to ensure that CIMC products maintain the necessary balance between theoretical soundness and designs which could be practically implemented. Built-in civilian oversight regarding the interpretation of crime statistics could also in this way be achieved. This ideal has not been reached, because the moratorium on the enlistment of civilians is still being maintained. To ensure a balance in interpretation and the assessment of priorities, the CIMC also strives to achieve broad representivity in terms of race, gender and opinions. Progress in this regard has already been made during 1996, but is hampered by the moratorium on civilian appointments.

In the meantime, 203 members of the CIMC have already attended a basic research course. New appointments are also required to attend the course. It is furthermore planned to present the first advanced CIMC research course towards the end of 1997. Every member directly involved in the interpretation of crime statistics will be required to attend the advanced CIMC course before the end of 1998, if nothing untoward should happen in the meantime.

If the funds for the development of operational analytic capabilities at station level become available, the CIMC will be able to develop analysis and interpretation skills at that level - exactly where the greatest need is at present experienced.

5. DISSEMINATION OF CRIME STATISTICS

The three main problems regarding the dissemination of crime statistics until now were the following:

• The release of unverified operational data to the media and public.
• Misinterpretation of the unverified operational data referred to above.
• A constant avalance of requests (from within the SAPS and from the public) relating to statistics, which further tie down the already 50% under-resourced CIMC offices. The end result is that research cannot really commence in any sensible way.

The policy of the Minister's Committee concerning the release of crime statistics, read together with the CIMC's own guidelines in this regard, will slowly but surely solve the first two problems referred to above. This process will be further advanced by the development of operational analytic capabilities, including interpretation skills, at station level. Until the necessary funds to do this are made available to the CIMC, a manual for the interpretation of crime statistics wil be compiled and distributed. Although the problem concerning continuous requests will be alleviated by the Minister's Committee decision and the release of Quarterly Reports, it will never really prevent ad hoc requests from being made. Additional personnel to specifically answer such requests are therefore needed.

6. THE NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL CRIME SITUATION

In this section, the 1996 serious crime ratios will be compared to those for 1994 and 1995 to answer the question of whether any improvement in our crime situation can be discerned or whether the situation is deteriorating. Explanations pertaining to the general and specific increases and decreases will also be discussed.

6.1. THE NATIONAL SERIOUS CRIME PICTURE

Figures relating to the twenty most common serious crime tendencies (all showing an annual incidence of more than twenty cases per 100 000 of the population per year) are compared for 1994, 1995 and 1996 in Table 1. These twenty crime tendencies comprise more than 99.0% of the total crime figure accounted for by the twenty-eight serious crime tendencies featured in Annexure A, which contains reported crime figures for 1994, 1995 and 1996, as well as ratios per 100 000 of the population.

An analysis of the figures pertaining to the crime tendencies featured in Table 1 indicates that only four of the twenty tendencies under discussion (ie altogether 16.9% of all serious crime featured in Annexure A) did not experience a noteworthy decrease or stabilisation during 1996. Rape, serious assault(assault GBH), other robbery and the illegal possession of firearms continued to increase. Of these four, it is especially the increase in other robberies which is very significant. (However, it is worth noting that the overall incidence of robbery has declined because of a drastic decrease in the incidence of robbery with aggravating circumstances.) In the case of rape and the illegal possession of firearms the increase is still significant, but in the case of assault GBH it is not really significant any more.

Of the nine crime tendencies featuring decreases (and which represent 47.9% of all the serious crimes listed in Annexure A) the incidence of robbery with aggravating circumstances and drug related crime may decline by 50% before 1999 - compared to 1994 - if the annual rate of decrease observed at present is maintained, while stock-theft, shoplifting and the theft of motor vehicles may experience a decline of 25% before 1999 under the same circumstances. However, it is important to keep in mind that the decrease in drug related crime may not at all be a true reflection of the extent of illegal drug use or trafficking in South Africa. This category of crime is heavily dependent on police action for detection and the decrease might mean that the crime is not effectively combated. In the case of murder, housebreaking at business premises, theft out of/from vehicles and other thefts the decreases are not yet of a significant nature.

The seven crime tendencies which have stabilised, namely attempted murder, common assault, housebreaking at residential premises, commercial crime, arson, malicious damage to property and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, comprise 34.5% of all the serious crimes listed in Annexure A. It is thus clear that the sixteen serious crime tendencies which had either stabilised

or decreased during 1996 represent 82.4% of the total serious crime figure, whereas the four tendencies which continued to increase account for only 16.9% of all reported serious crime.

As far as the national serious crime picture is concerned, the situation can be summarised by stating that there has been a marked improvement of the crime picture in South Africa since the election year of 1994.

6.2. PROVINCIAL BREAKDOWN OF THE 1996 CRIME RATIOS

A provincial breakdown of the 1996 crime ratios pertaining to fifteen serious crime tendencies is given in Table 2 (cf also Annexure A) . Only those provinces suffering higher crime ratios than the national average per crime tendency have been included in the table. For every specific crime category, the provinces are ranked from those suffering the highest ratios above the national average to those featuring the lowest ratios in this regard.

When Table 2 in this report is compared to Table 3 of report 3/96 (which was based on figures for the first eight months of 1996) it is clear that the pattern has not changed much. The only changes are the following:

• Housebreaking at residential premises: The Free State has fallen below the national average since the inclusion of figures pertaining to the last four months of 1996.
• Housebreaking at business premises: The Free State and Gauteng have changed third and fourth positions.
• Murder: The Northern Cape and Western Cape have changed first and second positions, while the Eastern Cape has also risen above the national average to become the fifth province suffering a higher incidence of murder than the national average.
• Assault GBH: Gauteng and the Eastern Cape have changed third and fourth positions.

It is also interesting to note the following:

• Gauteng occupies seven first, two second, three third and two fourth positions in Table 2. The only serious crime in this province featuring a ratio below the national average is stock-theft.
• The Western Cape occupies three first, eight second and one third positions. The three serious crimes featuring ratios below the national average in this province are stock-theft, motor vehicle theft and robbery with aggravating circumstances.
• The Northern Cape occupies five first, two second and five third positions. The three serious crimes featuring ratios below the national average in this province are motor vehicle theft, attempted murder and robbery with aggravating circumstances.
• The Free State occupies one second, two third, three fourth and one fifth positions. The eight serious crimes in the Free State featuring ratios below the national average are housebreaking at residential premises, other robbery, theft of motor vehicles, theft out of/from motor vehicles, fraud, murder, attempted murder and robbery with aggravating circumstances.
• As far as the other five provinces are concerned, the North West Province, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape each feature three serious crimes with ratios above the national average. Mpumalanga features in the table with regard to only a single serious crime, while the Northern Province does not feature in the table at all.

In conclusion, a word of caution seems appropriate with regard to the provincial breakdown of crime featured in Table 2. In the calculation of all the ratios used, the human populations of the provinces served as the basis of calculation. It has already been indicated in section 2.4. that this is not the ideal method to employ as far as property related crimes are concerned. The provincial populations have furthermore been calculated on the basis of estimates based on the figures obtained during the previous census and significant differences may emerge once the 1996 census results become available. These two facts may change the pattern observed in Table 2 quite dramatically.

7. EXPLANATIONS PERTAINING TO THE TRENDS DISCUSSED

The CIMC is conducting explanatory research concerning most of the serious crime trends. However, the initial research will only be completed during the course of 1997. As research findings become available, these will be used to formulate more scientific explanations regarding the crime trends concerned. In this section common sense/popular explanations (backed up by some preliminary findings) will still mostly be used to explain increases and decreases in the crime trends under consideration.

7.1. INCREASING TRENDS

Reference has already been made to the fact that the national crime ratios pertaining to four of the serious crimes featured in Table 1 have increased during 1996.

Explanations concerning these increases are as follows:

RAPE

As in the case of any other crime, the increased rape figure may be due to an increase in the reporting of the specific crime to the Police and/or an increase in the number and/or intensity of factors conducive to the occurrence of rape. The CIMC still believes - and may find support for this in the victimisation study being conducted by the HSRC - that the primary explanation for the increase in the rape figure is a higher, and increasing, reporting figure as far as rape is concerned. Factors facilitating the increased reporting of rape are the following:

• A stronger emphasis on human rights, and specifically women's and children's rights, since 1993.
• More user-friendly Police units and members (eg the Child Protection Unit) which make it easier for victims to report sensitive crimes.
• A strong focus of media and public attention on this specific crime tendency (eg the outrage caused by gang rapes in Johannesburg during the past few months).

This is not to say that the number and/or intensity of conducive factors pertaining to the incidence of rape may not also have increased, although it is very difficult to identify new factors or an increase in the intensity of known factors influencing the occurrence of rape without recourse to research results. At least hypothetically it is possible that the following factors may influence the incidence of rape:

• Rape may be linked to a power struggle between the sexes. The political transition from the old, male-dominated, "apartheid" South Africa to the new, democratic South Africa with its emphasis on equal rights for both sexes and even affirmative action favouring women, may have created a perception among some males that they are being discriminated against. This may have resulted in rape being used by unbalanced individuals to demonstrate male dominance, especially if a macho-man sub-culture is also present.
• The new, democratic South Africa with its new-found freedoms suffered a proliferation of pornography (including child pornography) prostitution and promiscuity. These phenomena may generate conditions favourable to the occurrence of rape in the following ways:
• The perceptions regarding women of at least a proportion of males may have changed quite radically. It may be that women are increasingly seen as objects of pleasure to be acquired when and wherever wanted, even if they do not belong to the sex worker group.
• The proliferation and "decriminalisation" of prostitution may in itself stimulate the reporting of rape in cases where clients default on their transactions with sex workers.
• An increase in actual rape cases may also result from an increase in drug and/or alcohol abuse (cf. Conklin, 1995; Bartol, 1991 and Rocha Silva & Stahmer, 1996)⁽¹⁾.

ASSAULT GBH

The increase in the incidence of serious assault may also be linked to an increase in the reporting of this crime, especially while a large proportion of cases relating to this crime occurs within the domestic sphere (of child battering, wife battering and retaliatory battering), where it had previously been kept a family secret. On the other hand, it may also be that the increasing brutalisation of our people, stress resulting in short temperedness and aggressive behaviour and increasing misuse of alcohol and drugs stimulate the occurrence of serious assault. The preliminary findings of CIMC research into the dynamics surrounding the incidence of murder in the Western Cape, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal indicated that many serious assaults, attempted murders and murders had started off as common assaults, within households or among people known to one another. In this way, for example, a recent analysis of all dockets pertaining to cases of murder reported between 1996-09-13 and 1996-10-20 done by the CIMC, Western Cape Province, indicated the following:

• 63% of all murders reported during the above period occurred over weekends. 65% of the above 63% of murders occurred on Saturdays. In South Africa this day is traditionally associated with parties and drinking, especially in the Western Cape and Northern Cape where farm labourers receive their wages on a weekly basis and utilise Saturdays to do their shopping in the towns.
• In 64% and 24% of cases in which the motive/circumstances surrounding the murders were known, the crimes had respectively been committed after a personal argument and/or during a fight involving alcohol. In only 5% and 4% of cases respectively had murders resulted from gang or taxi related violence⁽²⁾.
• 70% of murders were committed with a knife or sharp instrument, with firearms being utilised in only 18% of the cases.
• In most cases the victim and perpetrator were acquaintances.

The analyses done in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal basically support the Western Cape findings, with the further interesting finding that in Mpumalanga 70% of the murders and 40% of the attempted murders reported during the period under consideration in their study had occurred at shebeens/taverns.

It should also be mentioned that a Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) pilot project at the Hillbrow Police Station on the evenings of 11, 12, 25 and 26 July 1996 indicated a definite link between alcohol and drug misuse and crime. Because this pilot study involved only 90 arrestees, the results would not be published here. However, the pilot study emphasised the urgent necessity for a national DUF study to be undertaken in order to investigate the following hypotheses:

• The existence of a positive relationship between alcohol and drug misuse, anti-social behaviour and the incidence of crimes committed against people (eg murder, rape, assault).
• The existence of a positive relationship between alcohol and drug dependency and the tendency to commit property related and commercial crime.

A national DUF study may also enhance tactical research regarding the presence and distribution of new drugs on the South African market.

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS

As far as the illegal possession of firearms is concerned, the increase may be explained by an actual increase in the availability of stolen firearms and/or firearms illegally smuggled into the country, as well as more effective detection of illegal firearms by the Police (eg as a result of more crime prevention operations and road-blocks being conducted). It will be noticed that the illegal possession of firearms is classified among those crimes heavily dependent on Police action for detection in Table 1. The three crimes in this category, dealing with illegal firearms, drugs and driving under the influence respectively, should ideally all be increasing, as a decrease may indicate that the Police are not very effective in detecting these crimes.

On the other hand, it may well be true that there is a massive influx of weapons of war from Mozambique and Angola and a proliferation of stolen and lost firearms in circulation becoming available to criminals.

OTHER ROBBERY (MOSTLY UNARMED STREET ROBBERY)

The very significant increase in the incidence of this crime may be explained by the socio- economic situation, especially as far as unemployment is concerned. Although it is difficult to obtain reliable unemployment figures, and despite expectations that the socio-economic situation in general may slowly but surely be improving, the unemployment rate may still increase for some years to come, mainly as a result of the existing backlog in the creation of employment and the influx of illegal immigrants.

7.2. DECREASING OR STABILISING TRENDS

It is also important to try to find some explanations for the decreases and/or stabilisation observed with regard to sixteen of the crime tendencies featured in Table 1. An obvious question in this regard is whether the 1996/97 annual Police Plan has had any effect on the crime situation?

In Quarterly Report number 2/96 (cf section 8.2., pp 79 - 89) the argument was advanced that, although many factors accompanying the transition in South Africa are conducive to crime, other factors inhibiting the growth of crime are also present. All these factors should be evaluated within the context of a complex equilibrium model of crime. Increases, stabilisation or decreases pertaining to different crime trends will be determined by the relative weights attained by the conducive and inhibiting factors on the equilibrium scale.

Some of the factors mentioned on the conducive side of the equilibrium model (cf Report number 2/96, pp 80 - 83) were the following:

• Rapid and high levels of urbanisation with a resultant growth in squatter areas which are difficult to police, urban unemployment, the loss of family support structures, a growth in relative deprivation and the development of new urban needs and expectations.
• Ineffective policing, inter alia brought about by a low police-population or police-crime (docket load) ratio, estrangement between communities and the police which may result in a lack of cooperation and diminished access to and flow of information between the two parties, lack of experience and motivation, and management problems resulting from the outflow of experience and the complexity of and stress associated with managing rapid change.
• A penal system which does not provide enough deterrence to criminals, a situation which is further compounded by a lack of especially experienced judicial staff and a shortage of jail accommodation.
• The opening up of South Africa to the international community, providing new opportunities for international organised crime.
• The indirect effects on crime of the influx of millions of illegal immigrants, and especially their contribution to the high level of unemployment.
• The free availability of drugs and especially illegal firearms in South Africa.

On the inhibiting side the following factors were mentioned:

• Improved intelligence and information gathering, processing and application, including operational analysis at station level for day to day operational planning and optimum resource utilisation; tactical analysis focussed on the combating of organised crime; and strategic analysis facilitating scientifically based decision-making at macro level.
• Improved combating of transnational organised crime through sub-continental (SARPCCO) and international (INTERPOL) cooperation.
• Immense private sector/business initiatives against crime since the second half of 1995.
• The socialisation of the new generations within a milieu of greater acknowledgement of authority, greater tolerance, more respect for human rights and less brutality; with more opportunities to employ their energy in a constructive manner than the youths of the 1970's and 1980's.
• Increasing awareness among members of the public regarding crime prevention.
• Increasing political stability (eg in KwaZulu-Natal).

To this can be added the increased cooperation and coordination among departments responsible for the administration of the criminal justice system brought about by the National Crime Prevention Strategy, and the implementation of the first annual Police Plan.

It is probable that all the factors mentioned above, and even some unknown factors not mentioned here, may have had an influence on the twenty crime trends featured in Table 1. In Report number 3/96 several problems regarding analysis/interpretation are mentioned which make it difficult, if not impossible, to determine the impact/effect of a specific plan (like the Police Plan), strategy (like the NCPS) or operation (eg Operation Urban Strike) on crime tendencies. The complexity of factors mentioned above which may influence a complex phenomon like crime is one of those problems. Other problems associated with analysis/interpretation mentioned in Report number 3/96 ( pp 3 - 6) were the following:

• The natural cycle of crime.
• Long-term or medium term increases or decreases.
• Variations in the under-reporting of crime.
• The history of operations/actions/plans and strategies.
• Crimes heavily dependent on Police action for detection.

The above problems, added to the complexity of crime and its explanatory variables, make it virtually impossible to determine the effect of the 1996/97 annual Police Plan on the incidence of crime. Despite these problems, an analysis was still made regarding the possible effect on crime of the implementation of the said plan, without losing sight of the problems mentioned above. (However, the first two difficulties mentioned above were fully accounted for in this analysis.)

The crime ratios pertaining to the same twenty serious crimes already featured in Table 1 are given for the periods January to June 1996 (before the implementation of the Police Plan) and July to December 1996 (after the implementation of the Police Plan) in Tables 3 and 4. If the two tables are compared, the following becomes apparent:

• Housebreaking at residential premises featured an increase during the period before the implementation of the Police Plan, but decreased over the period after the implementation of the Police Plan.
• Rape, assault GBH, other robbery, malicious damage to property and the illegal possession of firearms featured an increase during the period before the implementation of the Police Plan, but stabilised during the period following upon the implementation of the Police Plan.
• Robbery with aggravating circumstances, stock-theft, shoplifting, other thefts and drug related crimes continued to decrease after the implementation of the Police Plan, as had been the case during the period before it (January to June). In the case of robbery with aggravating circumstances, stock-theft, shoplifting and other thefts, the decrease after the implementation of the Police Plan was significantly more pronounced than before the implementation of the Police Plan, whereas in the case of drug related crimes the rate of decrease stayed very much the same over both periods.
• Murder, common assault and theft out of/from vehicles, which had stabilised before the implementation of the Police Plan, started to decrease after its implementation.
• The stabilisation observed with regard to attempted murder, housebreaking at business premises, commercial crime, arson and driving under the influence remained unchanged over both periods.
• The only crime negatively influenced since the implementaton of the Police Plan is motor vehicle theft (from a decrease to stabilisation).

From the above analysis it seems clear that the present (1996/97) Police Plan may have had a positive impact on the serious crime trends featured in Tables 1, 3 and 4. However, it should immediately be stressed that some or all of the factors on the inhibiting side of the equilibrium scale mentioned earlier in this section, in addition to the Police Plan and the NCPS, may just as well have had a cummulative impact on crime trends.

8. THE INVOLVEMENT OF SAPS MEMBERS IN CRIME

Questions regarding police involvement in crime are justifiable, especially in view of allegations often made in this regard. The Police, as guardians of safety and security in society, should ideally be beyond reproach and one crime committed by a police official is in any case a crime too many. However, the reality is that police officials are sometimes involved in crimes. The table below contains statistics pertaining to this unfortunate state of affairs.

The following is clear from the above table:

• 2,834 alleged crimes were investigated against members of the SAPS during 1996. These crimes were linked to 2,848 members. An analysis of these figures indicates the following:
• 462 or 16.2% of the above members ( 0,4% of all SAPS members) were either convicted or paid admissions of guilt.
• 441 or 15.5% of the above members ( 0.4% of all SAPS members) were either acquitted or involved in cases the Attorneys General refused to prosecute.
• 63 of the above cases, involving 2.2% of the above members (or 0.1% of all SAPS members), were withdrawn by the complainants involved.
• 1,882 of the above cases, involving 66.0% of the above members (or 1.6% of all SAPS members), are still pending (under investigation, in custody, warrant of arrest issued or awaiting trial).

It should therefore be noted that the larger part of the 2,834 cases at this stage still only concerns alleged crimes.

• A comparison between Police crime ratios and population crime ratios pertaining to the first nineteen serious crimes under consideration in this report indicates that it is especially with regard to murder, attempted murder and driving under the influence of alcohol that police ratios are higher than (in some cases double) the population ratios. Other crimes warranting concern in this regard are common assault and commercial crime (fraud, forgery, malappropriations, etc). It should immediately be asked whether the high ratios observed with regard to police involvement in murder, attempted murder and common assault do not result from the nature of police work? This contention seems to be supported by the fact that 491 cases of negligent/reckless driving (17.3% of all reported cases) and 167 cases related to the pointing of firearms (5.9% of all reported cases) were registered against the police during 1996. These two crimes, as well as common assault and assault GBH, were the crimes most commonly alleged to have been committed by police officials.

9. THE REAL INCIDENCE OF CRIME AND POLICE PERFORMANCE

The effectiveness of the police in managing the crime situation can be measured in two ways, namely with regard to the reporting rate of crime in general and with regard to the clearing rate achieved by the Police in relation to reported cases. Although the incidence of the majority of crimes per 100,000 of the population has either stabilised or decreased during 1996 [see Section 6.1], the total number of cases reported with regard to some of these crime categories has actually increased [see Annexure A for real/raw figures]. Housebreaking at residential premises, for example, increased by 2,375 cases between 1995 and 1996, while the ratio per 100,000 of the population has decreased by 8.1. As far as the workload of the Police is concerned, it is therefore important to consider the number of cases reported rather than the crime ratios calculated per 100,000 of the population.

If figures pertaining to the crime categories contained in Annexure A are regarded as an indication of the number of cases of serious crime reported, it is evident that the number of reported cases decreased by 0.4% between 1995 and 1996, but is still 1.7% higher than in 1994. The question immediately arises as to whether a decrease occurred in the incidence of crime or only in the reporting rate. A glance at the 1996 crime ratios show that, with the exception of other robberies, the ratios pertaining to all the property related crimes have either decreased or stabilised. According to a report in the Sake Beeld of 23 December 1996, the short-term insurance giant SANTAM experienced a stabilising of crime related claims during 1996. This may serve as an indication that property-related crimes had indeed either decreased or stabilised during 1996. It must, however, be borne in mind that a tendency has surfaced which indicates that short-term policy holders no longer submit claims involving small amounts, in order to retain their no-claim bonuses.

At this stage no real indication of the under-reporting rate pertaining to specific categories of crime exists. It is hoped that more light will be shed on the under-reporting rate by the results of the survey being conducted by the HSRC [see Section 2.2]. Nevertheless, whether the decreases experienced can be attributed to a decrease in the incidence of crime or the reporting rate of crime, it still does not alter the fact that the crime rate in South Africa is still at an unacceptably high level and therefore a matter of dire concern.

The number of fingerprints of arrested persons received by the Criminal Record Centre (CRC) serves as an important indicator in determining the performance of the SAPS with regard to the solving of reported cases. It is a matter of great concern that the number of fingerprints received by the CRC again decreased between 1995 and 1996. During 1996, 4% less fingerprints were received than in 1995, contributing to a 10.3% decrease since 1994. An analysis of the fingerprints received during 1996 indicates that 49.3% of those suspects arrested during the past year have had one or more previous convictions. The corresponding figures for 1994 and 1995 are 44.6% and 44.9% respectively. From these figures it is evident that persons with previous convictions often gravitate back to crime. As the creation of a safe and secure environment for all in South Africa is the combined responsibility of the Departments for Safety and Security, Justice and Correctional Services, the following information received from the CRC is noteworthy: According to the CRC statistics, 42 195 persons were either released on parole or received amnesty during 1996, compared to 57,684 such cases recorded during 1995. During 1996, 5,586 persons released on parole were furthermore recorded as having contravened their parole conditions, with the corresponding figure for 1995 standing at 5,805. The decrease observed in this regard corresponds with the decrease in the number of persons released. However, 3,081 persons were re-incarcerated during 1996 after having breached their release conditions, compared to a figure of 2,024 for 1995. A further 7 771 persons were incarcerated for not complying with the conditions of suspended sentences during 1996, with the corresponding figure for 1995 being 11,505 persons. Although some of the statistics above reflect marked decreases, the deterrent effect of punishments laid down by the courts, as well as the degree of rehabilitation achieved by the Correctional Services, remain open to question. On a more positive note, the number of cases of suspects arrested in connection with the crimes of robbery, rape, murder, fraud, assault, all kinds of theft, drug and firearm related crimes and crimes against children reported to the CRC as having breached their bail conditions decreased by 43.7% during 1996, with 18,887 such cases being recorded, compared to the 33,540 cases recorded in this regard during 1995. This can certainly be attributed to more stringent measures implemented by the Department of Justice in the granting of bail.

The clearing rates achieved by the SAPS with regard to reported cases of crime are illustrated in the Table below. These figures are also an important indicator of the effectiveness of the Police in combating crime. For purposes of comparison, the clearing rates pertaining to 1994 (the period before amalgamation) are also included in the table. In determining the clearing rate, the total number of cases disposed of as either referred to court, withdrawn or unfounded is calculated as a percentage of the latter total added to the number of cases disposed of as undetected. A case cannot be disposed of in any other way than those listed above.

From the Table above it is clear that, with the exception of murder, attempted murder, theft out of or from motor vehicles, stock-theft and arson, all the other categories of crime depict a decrease in the clearing rates achieved. The clearing rate pertaining to all the crimes listed in Annexure A also suffered a decrease, namely from 50.1% in 1994 to 48.6% in 1996. It is clear from the above that the share of cases disposed of annually as undetected has increased.

A provincial analysis of the clearing rates achieved during 1996 with regard to the first 17 of the 20 crimes listed in the Table above (the last three crime categories are heavily dependent on Police action for detection) indicates that the clearing rate pertaining to these crimes were lower in Gauteng than the nation-wide average. With the exception of shoplifting, the clearing rates pertaining to all the crimes under consideration were also lower in KwaZulu-Natal than the national average. These low clearing rates reported for Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, which are also the provinces suffering some of the highest reporting rates of crime, have a very negative influence on the national clearing rates. In the case of the clearing rate pertaining to murder, for example, the clearing rate reported for the other provinces range between 94.5% and 78.4%, while the clearing rates achieved in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal stand at 47.6% and 48.4% respectively, bringing the national average clearing rate down to 67.5% in this case.

A matter of great concern is the continuous annual escalation in the number of unresolved cases brought forward from one year to another for investigation. Taking the crimes contained in Annexure A as an example, 398,547 cases were carried over from 1993 to 1994, compared to the 617,578 unresolved cases by the end of 1996 which will have to be further investigated during 1997. This resulted in an increase of 55% in the number of unresolved cases recorded over a three-year period, which boils down to an extra burden being placed on investigators. An analysis of the figures recorded on the Crime Administration System (CAS), which covers approximately 80% of all crime reported in South Africa, shows that 1,833,357 cases of crime were reported during 1996. These cases were booked out for investigation to 12,986 investigators, which means an average of 141 cases per investigator. As these are only the cases reported during 1996, the workload of the investigators is much increased by the addition of cases brought forward from 1995. It also has to be borne in mind that more than one investigator may work on a single case and some cases (eg Masterbond) may take a considerable time to investigate and dispose of.

It is a known fact that the level of experience enjoyed by investigators is at present fairly low, which definitely contributes to the negative trends mentioned above. This unsatisfactory situation is further complicated by the loss of skills and experience suffered by the detective corps as a result of the early retirement/voluntary resignation/taking of severance packages among senior/experienced detectives since the start of the transformation of the SA Police Service. Although constructive measures have already been implemented to increase the level of experience, the shortage of skilled investigators will still pose a serious problem for some time to come. This matter is further complicated by the moratorium on new enlistments.

10. ORGANISED CRIME

10.1 THREAT ANALYSIS

A comprehensive threat analysis pertaining to the extent of organised crime in South Africa has recently been completed and is currently subject to review and refinement. It is therefore envisaged to include a more detailed section dealing with this subject in the next Quarterly Report.

Preliminary findings based on tendencies discussed in the threat analysis indicate that organised crime is a potent reality in South Africa. This threat therefore requires special attention, as it poses the danger of becoming the most destructive force active in the field of crime. Various reasons exist for the importance attached to organised crime by the Police Service. Some of these are the following:

• Organised crime is heavily involved in crimes related to the smuggling of firearms and drugs. The role played by the availability of both firearms and drugs in facilitating the incidence of crime has already been touched upon earlier in this report.
• Enormous cost implications are involved for the country. In addition to the direct damages suffered by the victims of organised crime and its consequences, the losses in terms of revenue, foreign currency and natural resources pose a serious threat to the economy of South and Southern Africa.
• Although the extent of the influence organised crime has on the overall crime rate is extremely difficult - if not impossible - to determine, it is known that "ordinary" criminals and street gangs are often employed by crime syndicates to do their dirty work.
• Organised crime creates conditions conducive to crime by fostering moral decay and corruption in society. In this way it directly impacts on stability and good governance in both the private and public sectors by inter alia utilising such nefarious practices as blackmail.

The extent of organised crime in South Africa is influenced by inter alia the following factors:

• South Africa's strategic location on the trade routes between the East and the West, as well as its accessibility by land, sea and air and its relatively well-developed infrastructure and economy.
• Insufficient control along South Africa's extensive borders and coastline and the detremental effects of inter alia large-scale illegal immigration.
• The availability of technological means to pursue criminal ends, and access to those items usually dealt with in illegal trade, namely weapons, drugs, precious minerals, illegally procured goods like vehicles, endangered species and products derived from such species, etc in the sub-region.
• Contact is increasingly being established between local syndicates and internationally organised criminals, while increasing interest is also shown by the latter in expanding their activities to South Africa and the sub-region. Available information indicates that transnational criminal groups like eg the Russian Mafia, the Chinese Triads and Nigerian criminal enterprises have already established a firm foothold in South Africa.
• A lack of legislation dealing with those activities like money-laundering characteristic of organised crime. (The matter is, however, receiving attention from the Department of Justice and the legislative process.)
• Organised crime is increasing in its efficiency and sophistication.

10.2 THE COMBATING OF ORGANISED CRIME

The combating of organised crime has been declared a national priority of the SAPS. However, doing so is a complex matter and it is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve with the traditional ways of policing.

To combat the threat posed by organised crime, the Organised Crime Investigation Unit (OCIU), consisting of specialist information/intelligence managers and investigators, was established by the SAPS during 1993. The OCIU aims to conduct in-depth investigations with regard to organised crime in conjunction with investigating officers belonging to the different Specialist Units. The following table gives an indication of the scope of the OCIU's work:

The OCIU's success is dependent on the cooperation of the Specialist Units also engaged in the investigation of crimes often linked to organised crime syndicates. The following gives an indication of the performance achieved in this regard:

It should be noted that no integrated system with regard to the reporting of successes (arrests, convictions, confiscations, etc) achieved in the combating of crime exists at present, although steps have already been taken to rectify this matter. It is therefore probable that the successes mentioned above, as well as those referred to in the rest of this section, may be incomplete and also to some extent overlap. These figures also do not refer to organised crime exclusively, as especially the figures cited further on in this section refer to all successes recorded on the systems of the Specialist Units concerned, without regard to any organisational links pertaining to the suspects involved. It is also important to keep in mind that the figures quoted in this section should not be viewed apart, but form part of the overall crime statistics utilised in the rest of the report.

In order to gain a perspective on the crimes organised criminals are frequently involved in, the successes achieved by individual Specialist Units are briefly mentioned below.

• Drug-related offences

According to statistics provided by the South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB), 6,512 suspects were arrested in connection with either the possession of or dealing in drugs during 1996, compared to 7,995 suspects arrested during 1995. The following drugs were also seized during 1996:

• Vehicle theft

A total of 47,083 stolen and hijacked vehicles were registered as recovered on the Vehicle Circulation System of the Vehicle Theft Unit during 1996, compared to 49,859 vehicles recovered during 1995 and, according to the Unit's records, 6,243 suspects were arrested during 1996, which almost equals the 6,648 suspects arrested during 1995.

• Firearms

The Firearm Investigation Unit recorded the seizure of 18,059 firearms during 1996, compared to only 16,228 firearms seized during 1995. In addition, a total number of 154,754 rounds of ammunition were seized during 1996, compared to 148,976 rounds seized during 1995.

• Diamond and gold related crimes

According to statistics provided by the Diamond and Gold Branch, 2,784 suspects were arrested during the investigation of crimes involving precious metals and gemstones during 1996, compared to 3,215 suspects arrested during 1995. The total value of diamonds, gold, other precious metals, cash, etc seized during 1996 amounted to R34,430,427.11.

• Endangered species

The Endangered Species Protection Unit (ESPU) investigated 529 cases and arrested 112 suspects during 1996, compared to the investigation of 119 cases and the arrest of 170 suspects during 1995. Various items related to endangered species of flora and fauna or threats to the environment, ranging from ivory, rhinoceros horn, protected plants, reptiles and even insects to toxic waste, etc, were seized during 1996.

An important fact emerging from investigations into organised and transnational crime, is the absolute necessity of cooperation among the police agencies of different countries in combating this threat. In this regard, various joint operations between the SAPS and its counterparts in the sub-region have already been launched and cooperation also exists with regard to training and the structures established in terms of the SARPCCO initiative. In general terms cooperation provided through Interpol is also vital.

11. COMMERCIAL CRIME

Between January and December 1996, a total number of 54,846 cases involving the amount of R3,834,294,788⁽³⁾ were reported to the SAPS Detective Service: Commercial Crime component. The comparative figures for 1995 are 51,117 cases involving R2,798,235,401, thus depicting an increase of 7.3% (or 3,729) in reported cases and an increase of 37.0% (or R1,036,059,387) in the value involved.

The 7.3% increase in reported cases referred to above is balanced by a 4.3% decrease between 1994 and 1995 and thus boils down to an increase of only 2.6% between 1994 and 1996. However, although the value involved in commercial crime cases increased by 37.0% between 1995 and 1996, the 1996 amount is still 18.3% less than the value involved in such cases during 1994.

From a provincial perspective, commercial crime cases reported in Gauteng during 1996 comprised 41.7% of the national total, with the Western Cape accounting for 18.2% and the Eastern Cape for 11.6% of all cases, as can be seen from the following table.

Fraud in its various manifestations represents the major category of commercial crime, accounting for + 80% of all cases reported during 1996 (as well as during 1995 and 1994). The other + 20% consists mainly of forgery and uttering and contraventions of a vast number of statutory transgressions, eg. the Companies Act, SA Reserve Bank Act, Insolvency Act, Corruption Act and Exchange Control Regulations.

A comparison with regard to the workload carried by commercial crime investigators indicates an increase in the number of cases still under investigation: On 31 December 1996 a total number of 27,819 cases were still under investigation, compared to 25,338 cases under investigation on 31 December 1995. However, the number of cases still under investigation peaked at 30 376 cases on 31 August 1996, indicating a positive decrease during the latter part of 1996.

In more general terms, a number of aspects worthy of consideration are the following:

• The business community seems to have adopted a more positive approach towards the reporting of commercial crime to the SAPS. During 1994 a KPMG Aiken and Peat Forensic Auditors Survey among members of the business community concluded that only 20% of respondents claiming that they had been victims of corporate fraud during the previous year, had reported it to the SAPS. According to a follow-up survey conducted during 1996 by the same firm, 53% of the respondents who had been victims of fraud indicated that they had reported it to the SAPS.
• The much-publicised return of a number of suspects wanted in connection with commercial crime cases, all of whom had left the country during high profile investigations or court cases, as well as the expected extradition of others, have not only given media coverage of commercial crime a boost, but also served as an illustration to prospective criminals tempted by the apparent profitability of commercial crime that a dedication exists within the criminal justice system to bring perpetrators to book.
• At the same time, however, it is of extreme importance to note that requests for the extradition of suspected criminals from other countries will only be successful if the crimes they are accused of are also considered to be crimes in the countries where they have sought refuge. In this regard it has to be pointed out that South Africa has stringent exchange control regulations, which most of especially the developed countries do not have. Many cases involving huge amounts fall within the ambit of contraventions of these regulations and may otherwise not have been considered crimes at all, leading to extradition applications being rejected.
• With the above in mind, South African commercial crime statistics should be treated with the necessary circumspection: Contraventions of the exchange control regulations, for instance, usually involve large amounts, causing figures pertaining to the amounts involved in commercial crime to rocket. In the same vein, RD cheques (a major proportion of reported fraud cases in South Africa) are in many countries dealt with through civil procedures and not regarded as of a criminal nature. These cases contribute substantially to the high number of cases reported in South Africa, thus influencing comparisons with other countries negatively.
• Although not yet promulgated, legislation dealing with money laundering is in an advanced stage of completion at present and this international crime phenomenon would probably be addressed more effectively before the end of 1997. During 1996 the US Treasury Department's Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture has already presented a series of training workshops to SAPS personnel, thus equipping them to deal more effectively with money laundering investigations once the relevant legislation comes into force.
• During 1996, as in previous years, large numbers of counterfeit bank notes were confiscated before being put into circulation. This points to an effective investigation and informer system, which minimises potential damage to the economy.
• Rapid technological developments, like cellular phones and the Internet, create new and increasingly innovative and sophisticated ways and means to commit commercial crime. In order to address this phenomenon, a joint research project between the SAPS and the CSIR concerning computer related crime is envisaged during the course of 1997.
• It is still a matter for concern that the vast majority of commercial crime cases are finalised without any court appearance. During 1996, out of a total number of 48,941 dockets concluded, 76.8% (37,595 dockets) were disposed of without any court appearance. (Reasons for this may have been, amongst others, that charges were withdrawn by either the complainants or the Attorneys General, or that cases proved to be unfounded or were disposed of as undetected). However, 3,363 dockets (or 6.9%) were concluded with at least one conviction being achieved.

Notes:

1. Conklin JE, 1995. Criminology (Fifth Edition). Allyn and Bacon. United States of America.

Bartol CR, 1991. Criminal Behaviour: A Psycosocial Approach (Third Edition). Prentice Hall. New Jersey.

Rocha Silva L & Stahmer I, 1996. Nature, extent and development of alcohol/drug-related crime. HSRC. Pretoria.

2. Ad hoc figures, which may not be complete - see section 2.3. - will only be used here to illustrate the above argument regarding the dominance of domestic and social circumstances related violence. Available figures pertaining to a selection of violent crime tendencies reported for the whole country indicate that these accounted for the following proportions of the murder figure of 25 782 cases reported nationally for 1996:

• Taxi related violence - 1.2% (311 cases)
• Hostel related violence - 0.4% (111 cases)
• Attacks on Police officers - 0.8% (199 cases)
• Attacks on international tourists - 0.0% (1 case)
• Hijackings (figures for Gauteng only) - 0.1% (31 cases)
• Attacks on people in and around their homes - 4.4% (1129 cases)

3. Unless stated otherwise, all monetary values contained in this report are based on initially reported values, ie the total initially estimated loss and not necessarily the subsequently determined actual loss. The monetary value involved in cases could therefore either increase or decrease substantially during the course of investigation. An example of how values can be inflated, concerns a Pretoria woman suspected of stealing a warrant voucher to the value of R44 985 504 issued by the Receiver of Revenue, Department of Finance. The cheque was deposited into her personal bank account. She then tried to withdraw cash against the deposit. No actual loss was suffered. The opposite is also possible, when a case at firsts involving an insignificant amount during the course of investigation grows to eventually involve a substantial amount, as happened during the Masterbond investigation.