As political space between the countries widens, durable commercial ties and strategic interests provide room for a pragmatic bargain.

Despite South Africa’s diplomatic efforts in the United States (US) during last week’s United Nations General Assembly, bilateral ties with Washington remain strained.

In the most recent escalation on 15 September, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced visa restrictions targeting South Africans involved in uncompensated land seizures, race-based discrimination and violence against minorities. This builds on months of disagreement over South Africa's foreign policy leanings and domestic efforts aimed at historic redress, which has led the US to exclude Pretoria from this year’s G20 meetings.

On 29 September, Pretoria formally reprimanded US Ambassador Leo Bozell for his recent criticisms of the government – his second demarche in six months.

But as the political relationship withers, commercial engagements remain surprisingly buoyant. So, does the recent escalation represent a legitimate threat, political theatre or something in between?

US midterm elections are on 3 November (a day before South Africa’s local polls) – and while South Africa is largely a non-issue for the broader US electorate, the timing is critical.

The midterms provide lobby groups already pressing for punitive measures against South Africa with a more receptive political environment. Bilateral disagreements over Israel, China, Russia, land reform and race-based policies can be folded into US campaign narratives.

There are also legislative deadlines, with unresolved bills in Congress aimed at South Africa set to expire on 3 January 2027 unless enacted. The midterms also shape the composition of Congress and its committees, leading more hard-line members to push for action.

This raises Bozell’s now-(in)famous ‘five asks’ – Washington’s checklist of conditions for normalising ties with Pretoria. Importantly, he regards two of these as effectively settled. Pretoria has not obstructed the US’ refugee programme, while ongoing litigation around the Expropriation Act has persuaded Washington to leave the issue to South Africa’s courts.

That leaves three points of contention: condemning the ‘kill the boer’ struggle song, designating rural security a priority crime, and extending equity equivalent investment programmes (EEIPs) to the mining and telecoms sectors.

By Bozell’s own admission in South African media commentary, this muddies US officials’ claims – refuted by Pretoria – that South Africa has failed to adequately respond to Washington. South Africa’s Rural Safety Strategy indicates that this is indeed a priority, and the government has engaged the US on its implementation. The ball is in Washington’s court over what constitutes appropriate action on a priority crime.

On hate speech, Pretoria cannot disregard its own court judgments on the matter. Doing so would spell political suicide for senior government members seen as side-stepping legal processes to kowtow to Washington. This ask is a clear red line (barring further legal action), akin to South Africa requesting Washington to recommit to its domestic diversity, equity and inclusion agenda to help reset bilateral relations.

Finally, concerning EEIP exemptions, President Cyril Ramaphosa has made clear that the country’s broad-based black economic empowerment policy is indeed under review, with particular regard to the sectors flagged by the US.

Pretoria is clearly approaching its ties with Washington with urgency. But without specifics on how the US’ asks can be satisfied, this disconnect will likely persist due to Washington’s shifting goalposts.

The US is doubtless aware of this noisy environment and South Africa’s progress in addressing the five asks. Its assertion that the time for dialogue has now ended is more reflective of efforts to pressure Pretoria, bolstered partly by the approaching midterms.

So where to from here?

Appreciating the substance versus the optics of the relationship is a good start. Regarding the former, progress on the five asks is buoyed by resilient commercial ties. Goods and services trade grew by just over 10% in 2025 (to under US$29-billion) while US foreign direct investment has remained surprisingly stable. And, at least for now, South Africa is still part of the US African Growth and Opportunity Act.

Critical minerals are another strategic factor mitigating against a hard break in relations. South Africa possesses the world’s largest platinum group metal reserves and is a leading supplier to the US. This bolsters Pretoria’s significance to Washington, as competition to secure critical mineral supply chains shows no sign of slowing.

When viewed alongside South Africa’s mining expertise and comparatively sophisticated financial markets and infrastructure, it could be seen as a trump card for Pretoria, providing leverage to continue US negotiations on its own terms and timelines.

Of course, questions remain over the International Relations and Cooperation Department’s ability to pursue a more directed economic diplomacy strategy with the US. Recognition of the utility of such an approach, however, is already in place.

Ambassador Roelf Meyer has championed keeping this economic track moving. He recently pointed to US company Alcoa’s acquisition of the Hillside Aluminium smelter in South Africa, and Microsoft’s R5.4-billion expansion of its South African cloud and AI infrastructure, as evidence of US investor confidence. The US International Development Finance Corporation’s US$50-million backing for the Phalaborwa Rare Earths Project reinforces this.

Optically, however, South Africa still represents a ‘bad deal’ for US President Donald Trump’s administration and an easy country to make an example of. But optics can be finessed, and diplomacy is, after all, the art of finding a workable middle ground. Three possible approaches for South Africa stand out.

First, Pretoria could refuse further US engagement. This would entail acknowledging the US’ sovereign interference and the futility of efforts to appease Washington. Red lines over threats to South Africa’s sovereignty, ideological positions and ties to US adversaries would define this narrative, likely prompting punitive measures that would impact the economy.

A more pragmatic approach could see South Africa lean into commercial diplomacy. Transactionalism would define this narrative, in which the country’s critical minerals stock and market access could help ringfence commercial engagements and temporarily set aside political differences.

Third, Pretoria could lay low and wait for a possible sea change in Washington – especially after the midterms. That could be useful in light of the US’ shifting goalposts regarding its five asks. However, this may be understating the level of bipartisan acrimony towards South Africa across the aisle, so remains risky.

None of these options is easy for Pretoria, especially as local election politics incentivise the optics of confrontation with the US, with its associated economic risks.

The key test will follow immediately after the elections, when both governments confront the dilemma of whether their commercial and strategic interests still outweigh the political incentives driving them apart.

Written by Ronak Gopaldas, ISS Consultant and Signal Risk Director & Priyal Singh, ISS Senior Research Consultant and Signal Risk Geopolitical Analyst