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On 5 March 2012, people all over the globe – particularly those adapted to the Internet’s social media websites – awakened to a video whose content took everyone – critics, enthusiasts, donors, sympathisers and the like – by storm. The video entitled ‘Kony 2012’ put Joseph Kony, a warlord who has eluded Governments for over two decades, on the forefront of media coverage. Consequently, the name Kony became a household name as was intended by the makers of the video. This video, which was released on YouTube by a United States (US)-based non-governmental organisation (NGO), Invisible Children, advocated for the arrest of Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group. The group had caused tremendous human rights violations and atrocities in the northern part of Uganda and continues to do so with a much smaller army in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, periodically. “We want to make him famous...not to glorify him, but so that his crimes would not go unnoticed,” narrated in the video.  

Indeed, warlord Joseph Kony was made infamous. Has the video Kony 2012 obtained the goal it was intended for? Has it made any admissible impact on the Kony problem since its release? This paper attempts to answer these questions. It also argues that making Kony famous was simply a drop of water in the ocean with regards to arresting the 25 year old warlord.

Part 1 of this paper offers a historical context about Kony and the LRA conflict which was only hinted upon in the Kony 2012 video, but not enough to present a vivid and an indisputable picture of the warlord. Part 2 of this paper provides an in-depth analysis of the video using relevant criteria to judge its adequacy.

Historical context: Kony and the LRA in northern Uganda

The LRA rebel group, led by Joseph Kony, had been active in northern Uganda for over two decades (since 1987). While in Uganda,⁽²⁾ the rebel group carried out some of history’s most horrific atrocities occurring in any conflict, some of which included murder, abductions, mostly of children – the boys to be used as child soldiers and the girls as sex slaves – as well as mutilations. Initially, there was Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirits Mobile Forces (HSMF), which opposed Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) and had overthrown Milton Obote II’s Government in 1986. Kony, who claimed to be Lakwena’s cousin, was a school dropout from Gulu at the time. He created his own Holy Spirit Movement and recruited his own soldiers from the Gulu area.⁽³⁾ As Kony was not as popular as Lakwena among the Acholi people, his impetuous nature followed suit when he resorted to the use of coercion, terror and abduction to build his brutal army.⁽⁴⁾ In addition, following Lakwena’s defeat by the NRA, many of the soldiers joined Kony’s movement. Kony also adopted the “discourses” Lakwena had created, “establishing a complex initiation and cleansing ritual.”⁽⁵⁾ However, although often implied that Kony's LRA was the continuation of Alice Lakwena's HSMF, this is not the case as Kony’s rebel group fully gained momentum around 1987.⁽⁶⁾

Kony started his insurgency using “small quasi-independent armed groups,” most of which operated in the northern Uganda districts (including Gulu, Lira and Pader) and southern Sudan (now South Sudan). However, in May 1988, the LRA obtained a boost when they were joined by former members of the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) rebel group that had refused to adhere to the 1988 peace agreement between the UPDA and Museveni's Government. The UPDA consisted of ex-army officers from the Acholi tribe who had fought with Museveni but later broke away in 1986, forming a rebellion which attempted to recoup their lost power.⁽⁷⁾ The LRA obtained yet another boost when the group started receiving support from the Sudanese Government. This appeared to be some sort of pay-back by the Sudanese Government for Uganda’s Government that supported the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) (then operating in southern Sudan). All through the 1990s, northern Uganda suffered numerous atrocities, massive displacements and the destruction of homes and properties.

Kony’s rebel group comprised mostly of children who had been abducted from their villages. In fact, the LRA is estimated to have created close to 20,000 child-soldiers, about 80% of whom were abducted children.⁽⁸⁾ By the time the conflict ended, it had led to the displacement of approximately 1.7 million people.⁽⁹⁾ The persistence of the LRA amidst its horrendous operations for over two decades is extremely inconceivable. This could be justified by the fact that the LRA rebel group comprised a large portion of abducted children, most of whom were held against their will and also by consideration of the fact that the rebel group operated in an environment (northern Uganda) which was conducive to firearms trade. However, it is believed that Kony's apocalyptic spiritual vision and the use of fear and violence to sustain his power and control within the LRA allowed the LRA-Ugandan Government conflict to persist for a protracted period.⁽¹⁰⁾

Elusions or illusions: The attempts to quell the LRA conflict and eventually capture Kony

Undoubtedly, arresting Kony has hardly been a priority of and has been (entirely) overlooked by the international community. Also, despite their efforts to capture him, the Ugandan and regional armies have been utterly without success. Several attempts had been carried out to end the LRA conflict in the north of Uganda, including a bottom-up approach towards persuading the lower-ranking Kony loyalist to surrender, a military solution called Operation Iron Fist and two major peace talks: the peace talks of 1994 with Betty Bigombe, the Minister of the Pacification of the North at the time as the chief mediator, and the Juba Peace Talks in July 2006. In due course, the use of the bottom-up approach was the only viable strategy that proved to be the most effective. This method targeted and communicated with the lower-ranking members of the LRA who were gradually persuaded to demobilise; an act that assured the northern Ugandan populace that the Government was indeed acting upon to bring the LRA conflict to an end.

The peace talks of 1994 were almost successful and the LRA was ready to surrender. However, President Museveni dismissed the deal and claimed that a military solution was the only way to rid the country of Kony and the LRA. Following the peace deal rejection, “there were unconfirmed intelligence reports that the LRA was forming dangerous alliances with not only Museveni’s opponents in the north, but also the refugee Hutu extremists in the Congo who had orchestrated the 1994 Rwandan genocide.”⁽¹¹⁾ Amidst this frightening situation, Museveni made an ultimate decision which would forever remain part of his legacy.⁽¹²⁾ He ordered tens of thousands of Acholi and other northern Ugandan civilians, most of whom were women and children, to be forcefully confined in Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps. This decision was purportedly to protect the northern Ugandan populace from the LRA rebels. These camps lacked even the most basic human necessities. Unfortunately, security was also not an absolute guarantee as the torment and terror by the LRA rebels subsequently increased.⁽¹³⁾ In the years that followed, the number of IDP camps kept increasing and, by 1998, there were about 23 camps in Gulu district, ranging in size from around 3,000 to 40,000 occupants, as in Awer and Pabbo, respectively.⁽¹⁴⁾

Unexpectedly in late 2005, the LRA withdrew its forces, trekked into the southern Sudan state of Eastern Equatorial, crossed the River Nile and then assembled in Garamba National Park located in the DRC.⁽¹⁵⁾ This state of affairs presented itself but only once and was therefore a perfect opportunity to give a peace agreement another try. Indeed the Juba peace talks between the Ugandan Government and the LRA insurgents were initiated in mid 2006. The mediation process was performed by Riek Machar, the former president of South Sudan, and a first Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed on 26 August 2006.⁽¹⁶⁾ As part of the peace process, the LRA rebels used this as an opportunity to dictate and reverse the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants. This was the ultimate condition for both parties to obtain a peace consensus. The LRA insurgents and the Ugandan Government signed an agreement in June 2007 that embarked on the general principles of how to handle accountability and reconciliation procedures in northern Uganda. The signed agreement indicated that the Government would carry out a judicial process convicting all those individuals that purportedly committed what was considerably “most serious crimes” during the conflict. It also provided for “alternative penalties for serious crimes committed by the LRA, without further specification.”⁽¹⁷⁾

At last, the Ugandan Government obtained the peace in northern Uganda that seemed like an illusion for over two decades. And as such, the security situation in the region has since improved significantly following the LRA rebel withdrawal, as well as the compelling finalisation of the 2006 Juba peace talks. To make peace a reality and amend the living situation of the people, several mechanisms for justice were used, including the reintegration of former LRA rebels, the use of the truth-seeking and reparations and formal justice mechanisms, as well as the media and access to information for sensitisation.⁽¹⁸⁾ This saw the initiation of a post-conflict reconstruction campaign on a massive scale by the Ugandan Government and numerous locals as well as NGOs. Due to these endeavours, there has been a significant improvement of the economy in the region and nearly all the people previously living in IDP camps, have returned to their villages.

However, despite this significant change in the formerly conflict infested area of northern Uganda, Kony had moved on to other areas other than Uganda’s northern region. He is still at large and he and his rebel group continue to cause havoc in Uganda’s neighbouring countries of the CAR, DRC and South Sudan. As such, in 2006, a United Nations Special Operation Forces was trained in “jungle combat” and its mission was to incarcerate Kony.⁽¹⁹⁾ However, this mission was unsuccessful. Another attempt was seen on 13 May 2010, when the United States Congress conceded to the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act that was meant to fund all the operations supposed to lead to Kony’s arrest. Indeed following this act, a hundred US advisors were deployed to assist the Ugandan army. These advisers were deployed into CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Uganda. In a letter he wrote to the Congressional leadership, President Barrack Obama stated that the forces would act as advisers to partner forces who have a seemingly similar goal of arresting Kony and other senior leaders of the LRA. Despite the fact that the US forces were deployed with full combat equipment, the letter Obama wrote stressed that they would only provide advice, assistance and information and not engage themselves in a fight with the LRA mutineers unless provoked and retaliating in defence.⁽²⁰⁾ Furthermore, the African Union (AU) also deployed 5,000 troops for the same mission.⁽²¹⁾ However, Kony continues to elude these seemingly refined forces (more than the Uganda army), whilst civilians continue to pay the price.

Although the Ugandan Government managed somehow to obtain one of its seemingly much desired goals – obtaining peace in the north – this was only a tip of the iceberg. Kony is still at large and operating in Uganda’s neighbouring countries of CAR, DRC and South Sudan. The mutineer group continues to carry out the same atrocious acts in Uganda’s neighbouring countries – such as murder and abduction of children to be used as child soldiers and sex slaves – as was done during the protracted conflict in northern Uganda.  It is because of this inhumanness that Kony is heavily sought for, not only by the Ugandan and regional Governments, but most importantly by the ICC. Nevertheless, it should not be erroneously perceived that Kony and his brutal LRA cannot return to northern Uganda.

Click here to read Part 2 of this discussion paper

Written by Catherine Akurut ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact Catherine Akurut through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Conflict and Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Currently, the rebel group does not spread terror in Uganda as they are more present in the CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan.
(3) Dunn, K.C., 2004. Uganda: the Lord’s Resistance Army. Review of African Political Economy, 31(99), pp. 139-142.
(4) Lawton. A. (Producer), 2006.  Uganda rising: The LRA conflict. Produced by Lawton, A., and released by Mindset Media: Canada.
(5) Dunn, K.C., 2004. Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army. Review of African Political Economy, 31(99), pp. 139-142.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Ibid.
(9) ‘Conflict and development: Building peace and post-conflict reconstruction’, International Development Committee, 17 October 2006, House of Commons, London.
(10) Dunn, K.C., 2004. War without end? The conflict in northern Uganda. Review of African Political Economy, 31(99), pp. 142-144.
(11) Lawton. A. (Producer), 2006.  Uganda rising: the LRA conflict.  Produced by Lawton, A., and released by Mindset Media: Canada.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Dolan, C., 2000. Views on the northern Uganda conflict from inside the war zone, ACCORD Working Paper (35).
(15) Pham, P., et al., 2007. When the war ends: peace, justice and social reconstruction in northern Uganda. Human Rights Centre: Berkeley.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Brown, B.B., et al., ‘React and respond: the phenomenon of Kony 2012’, African Studies Association, 30 March 2012,http://www.international.ucla.edu.
(20) Lobe, J., ‘Obama sends military adviser to Uganda’, Aljazeera, 16 October 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(21) ‘African Union to launch force for Kony hunt’, Aljazeera, 25 March 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com.