The African continent has long been wracked by conflicts spurred on by the easy availability of weapons through both the licensed and illicit arms trade. The proposed United Nations (UN) Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) seeks to create a legally-binding regulatory mechanism to block illicit activities in the global arms trade and block the flow of weapons to conflict-afflicted regions or nations under UN embargoes. This CAI paper discusses how the arms trade affects Africa, the campaign for an ATT, and how the Treaty could help conflict-affected African nations.

The small arms trade and Africa

Arguably, the ramifications of the arms trade are felt more heavily in Africa than on any other continent. Out of the estimated 500 million small arms and light weapons (SALW) worldwide, 100 million are to be found in Africa.⁽²⁾ Easy to use and easy to conceal, they are the weapons of choice for non-state actors such as insurgents and criminal groups. The unregulated flow of arms throughout the continent has, according to the African Union (AU), led to “the development of a culture of violence that has destroyed the social fabric of many countries in Africa” and “undermined efforts at economic development, governance and democratisation.”⁽³⁾ Arms trafficking is not simply a human security issue; it has socio-economic and development implications as well. Indeed, conflicts fuelled by imported weapons are estimated to cost Africa at least US$ 18 billion a year, almost completely cancelling out the amount granted in development aid.⁽⁴⁾ In addition, many of the countries manufacturing these arms are also sending development aid to countries affected by conflicts.⁽⁵⁾ Moreover, armed conflict is believed to contract an African nation’s economy by up to 15%.⁽⁶⁾

It is not just the actual weapons that are easy to come by. Estimates state that the global trade in ammunition alone for light weaponry is US$ 4.3 billion - greater than the trade in the arms themselves - with overall parts and components sales at US$ 9.7 billion for the period 2008-2011.⁽⁷⁾ Components are sourced from around the world and sometimes emerge from regions and nations with few controls. Domestic regulation has failed to take these considerations into account.

The ease of access to light weaponry is the main problem for many afflicted regions. The case of cattle rustling in Kenya is a prime example. There pastoralists, herders, and cattle rustlers clash over land and livestock. Most of those involved would prefer not to carry a gun but they must in order to protect what little they have. Those herding cattle, often young teenagers, say they have to fire their weapons in skirmishes at least once a week.⁽⁸⁾ It is a scenario which decimates entire communities and is made all the worse by the easy access to weaponry. To prevent these situations from occurring, an ATT would seek to cut off the supply of arms at its source.

Although illicit SALW remain the most commonly used weapons in African conflicts, trade in other conventional weapons to conflict zones has been recognised as a contributory factor in the escalation of local and regional conflicts and human rights violations.⁽⁹⁾ Black market trafficking usually takes place on a regional or local level. It is the licensed trade from arms-manufacturing countries which accounts for the large transfers. Indeed, the value of the illicit trade is a small fraction of the licensed trade.⁽¹⁰⁾ In the case of Africa, some Governments also contribute to the illicit trade by arming proxy insurgent groups, that is, through state-sponsored terrorism. Such activity contributes to human rights abuses, breaches of international humanitarian law, prolonging conflicts, and threatens national and regional stability.

The Arms Trade Treaty: Scope and objectives

Currently no global regulatory framework exists for the purchase and transfer of conventional arms. This lack of supervision has allowed US$ 2.2 billion worth of arms to be imported by countries under arms embargo during the period 2007-2010, with regional or partial UN embargoes having little or no impact.⁽¹¹⁾ Proponents of the ATT seek to change that. Indeed, should the ATT be realised it would be the first legally binding treaty for regulation of the global weapons trade, which is valued at more than US$ 60 billion a year.⁽¹²⁾ It would establish universal standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional weapons and so would prevent weapons transfers to conflict-affected regions.

The Treaty was a long-talked about fantasy among campaigners until it first became reality in 2006 when Britain, supported by Australia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Finland, Kenya and Japan, brought an initial Resolution 61/89 “Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms” to the UN, calling for preparations for a Treaty. ⁽¹³⁾ The resolution also noted that that there was “growing support across all regions for concluding a legally binding instrument negotiated on a non-discriminatory, transparent and multilateral basis, to establish common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.”⁽¹⁴⁾ The General Assembly adopted the Resolution which established a group of governmental experts (GGE) in 2008 to examine the instrument’s feasibility and request that member states submit their views to the UN Secretary-General. In 2009, the General Assembly adopted resolution 64/48 which declared that a United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty would “sit for four consecutive weeks in 2012 to elaborate a legally-binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms.”⁽¹⁵⁾ The United States (US) was the sole vote against the Resolution. However, in October 2009 the Obama administration changed the official stance of the US on the Treaty.⁽¹⁶⁾

There were high hopes and a high level of support for a Treaty to be finalised at the July 2012 negotiations, yet the ATT fell at the last hurdle when the US (the world's largest producer, importer and exporter of arms) blocked it.⁽¹⁷⁾ However, hope remains among campaigners and nations in favour of the ATT that it will be finalised in 2013. Indeed, a joint communiqué by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the Minister for Trade of Sweden, in September 2012 reaffirmed their commitment to a “legally binding but nationally enforced” ATT and over 90 countries have supported a declaration urging a swift continuation of the process.⁽¹⁸⁾ Should the ATT fail at the UN there are still opportunities for it to be ratified by the international community in another sphere. For example, the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions were resolved outside the UN, through the political initiatives of Canada and Norway respectively.⁽¹⁹⁾ Indeed, the Ottawa Convention is hailed a success, as it has not been signed by major arms producers and yet use and production of mines have effectively ceased.⁽²⁰⁾ Some campaigners argue this is because of the stigma created by the treaty.⁽²¹⁾

Depending on one’s perspective, the draft ATT may be perceived as either a pragmatic or a weak effort at regulating the global arms trade. The states involved, of course, retain the right to acquire the means of self-defence. They also maintain legislative rights governing ownership and transfer of weapons within their borders.⁽²²⁾ Furthermore, while it does cover SALW such as machine guns, the range of major conventional arms covered is not as extensive. For example, fighter aircraft are covered yet predator drones are not.⁽²³⁾ In addition, one of the key elements of the draft Treaty states that nations must not authorise the sale of weapons to any regime where there is “a substantial risk that those arms would be used to commit…serious violations of international humanitarian law.”⁽²⁴⁾ However, there is a risk that this crucial element will be watered down in any final Treaty. Russia, China and the US have all expressed their concerns on this issue, suggesting instead, less specifically, that nations should "take into account" human rights before proceeding with arms sales.⁽²⁵⁾

Despite these setbacks, there are still a large number of advantages to implementing the Treaty in its current draft form. The most important provision would prevent Governments from authorising a trade if there is a “substantial risk” of the arms being used for one or more of the following five purposes: to provoke or aggravate regional or sub-regional instability, to commit serious violations of humanitarian or human-rights law, to hamper efforts to reduce poverty, to commit transnational organised crime, or to support or perpetrate terrorist acts.⁽²⁶⁾ Treaty signatories will be expected to pass domestic legislation to ensure that their own arms firms comply. Each year they will have to report on their weapons-trading to an ‘implementation support unit’. This body's main sanction will be to name and shame transgressors.⁽²⁷⁾ In addition, some believe that respectable arms firms in Europe and America would welcome the ATT to a certain extent. That is to say, it could reduce their regulatory burden by replacing a host of different national rules with one international code and offer some protection against doing business with dodgy entities that may damage their reputations.⁽²⁸⁾

The advocacy and campaign group Control Arms believes there are several ways in which the latest draft of the Treaty could be improved. These include the need to close the loophole that exempts contracts under defence cooperation agreements, the inclusion of ammunition in the scope of items to be regulated under the treaty, ensuring strong assessment criteria for transfers, and requiring public reporting of arms transfers and treaty implementation.⁽²⁹⁾ Ammunition is a particularly critical issue because if its supply is left unchecked, then already illegally armed actors’ weapons will remain operable. According to the current draft, ammunition can be controlled or not controlled depending on “the whim of the country.”⁽³⁰⁾ Analysts find it difficult to accurately assess levels of resistance towards inclusion of small arms ammunition in a treaty, as those states which have expressed reservations have failed to explain the reasoning behind their actions.⁽³¹⁾

Implications of the ATT for Africa

Most African nations have recognised the potential benefits of an ATT and have expressed considerable support for the proposal. Indeed, many of the existing African agreements regarding small arms either include elements of the proposed treaty, or express the need for such an agreement. For example, the Bamako Declaration on an ‘African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons’ calls on arms-supplier states to eliminate the practice of dumping excess weapons in African countries.⁽³²⁾ Furthermore, five African countries participated in the previously mentioned GGE: Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.⁽³³⁾ In addition, three conferences on arms controls have been held on the continent; one in Tanzania in 2005 and two in Nairobi in 2006 and 2008. At these conferences, despite some concerns, African nations have expressed strong support for an ATT and improved arms transfer controls.⁽³⁴⁾ However, at a continental level there has been relatively “little engagement” by the AU on the matter, particularly considering the significant potential impact of such an agreement on the African continent.⁽³⁵⁾ Indeed, a more unified approach with regard to the ATT would benefit African nations in negotiations at the UN and at previous meetings many African nations have expressed their support for a common position.

The implications of an ATT for the African continent are clear: it is a mechanism from which African nations could only benefit. It is for this reason that states and advocacy groups are pushing for strong criteria and a legally-binding and transparent Treaty. According to the advocacy and campaign group Control Arms, many state actors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) believe “a non-binding treaty would only legitimise the status quo where players act with impunity without a legally-binding global standard.”⁽³⁶⁾ One example of this is the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) ‘Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials’, which has not prevented non-ECOWAS arms producers exporting arms to West Africa.⁽³⁷⁾

A further reason to support the implementation of the ATT is that by making the information on transfers publicly available the treaty would help to prevent suppliers dumping arms in Africa. It is known that Russia is the largest arms supplier to Africa, and China to sub-Saharan Africa, yet the lack of data on Chinese manufacturers makes it difficult to trace weapons and related parts. ⁽³⁸⁾

According to the AU, further work needs to be done by African nations in the preparation of national action plans for responsible management of legally held weapons as well as in the preparation of arrangements among neighbourhood countries for effective systems of small arms control and harmonisation at regional level of legislation governing manufacture, trade, and possession of small arms.⁽³⁹⁾ Yet African states should also be commended for going some way towards regulating the trade; monitoring circulation and trafficking of arms; adopting legislation to criminalise illegal manufacture, possession, and trade of small arms; and in the destruction of surplus, obsolete, and seized light weaponry. A number of funding mechanisms are already in place to help countries become more compliant with the draft Treaty, including Official Development assistance (ODA) funds earmarked for Security Sector Reform (SSR). In 2010 alone, 101 countries received more than US$ 832.5 million worth of SSR-related assistance for implementation of the ATT.⁽⁴⁰⁾

Concluding remarks

Africa has long borne the brunt of the suffering caused by an unregulated arms trade and has the legacy of wars, loss of life and livelihoods, and other battle scars to prove it. If left unregulated at an international level, the arms trade will continue to flood conflict prone regions with light weaponry and such easy access to weaponry will encourage violence and unrest that may not otherwise erupt. The ATT has the potential to bring regulation to a grey area in international trade and commerce, and in the process save lives and increase the economic value and activities of conflict-afflicted regions, and boost human security and development. In order to achieve this, the treaty must be legally binding to ensure adherence and implantation and must include guarantees against political abuse. Indeed, the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions were successful because they established strong legal conditions for all state parties and helped establish “new customary international standards.”⁽⁴¹⁾

It is also essential that any legal requirements have strong criteria with no loopholes to ensure that weapons do not fall into the hands of human rights abusers - both state and non-state actors. The ATT must cover all conventional arms, munitions, parts and components, and all kinds of arms transfers in order to make a genuine impact.⁽⁴²⁾ Risk assessments by experts on transfers would also be a necessary step. Most African countries do not export arms and so should focus on strengthening their import controls and regulations, reducing corruption and promoting greater transparency in arms procurement.⁽⁴³⁾ Furthermore, instruments must be in place to help states in need of assistance to fully comply with the Treaty. Nations may also invite the arms industry and national defence forces to partake in the process so as to reduce opposition and permit these entities to formally voice their concerns. Arms-manufacturing nations and the defence industry have the responsibility to ensure that African nations do not continue to suffer for their lucrative trade. A legally-binding ATT would be a significant step towards realising a responsible and regulated global arms trade, which in turn would grant afflicted nations and communities the opportunity to prosper once again.

Written by Paul Quirke (1)

NOTES:

(1) Contact Paul Quirke through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Africa Watch Unit ( africawatch@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) ‘Small Arms and light weapons’, African Union, http://www.africa-union.org.
(3) Ibid.
(4) ‘Why we need a global arms trade treaty’, Oxfam International, http://www.oxfam.org.
(5) Hopkins, N., ‘Rift valley pastoralists pay for lack of arms treaty with their lives’, 2 July 2012, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(6) ‘Why we need a global arms trade treaty’, Oxfam International, http://www.oxfam.org.
(7) Ray, D.B., ‘The Final Countdown’, Oxfam International, 29 June 2012, http://www.oxfam.org.
(8) Hopkins, N., ‘Rift valley pastoralists pay for lack of arms treaty with their lives’, The Guardian, 2 July 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(9) Dye, D., ‘Africa and an arms trade treaty’, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper 191, August 2009, http://www.issafrica.org.
(10) ‘Illicit trafficking’, Small Arms Survey, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org.
(11) Ray, D.B., ‘The Final Countdown’, Oxfam International, 29 June 2012, http://www.oxfam.org.
(12) ‘Arms trade treaty negotiations begin, Syria casts shadow’, Reuters, 2 July 2012, http://www.reuters.com.
(13) Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations, 18 December 2006, http://www.ony.unu.edu.
(14) Ibid.
(15) ‘Arms trade Treaty’, Reaching Critical Will, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
(16) ‘A dirty business’, The Economist, 30 June 2012, http://www.economist.com.
(17) MacDonald, A., ‘A global arms trade treaty: a marathon not a sprint’, Oxfam, 13 August 2012, http://blogs.oxfam.org.
(18) ‘Joint Communiqué by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the Minister for Trade of Sweden’, French Foreign Ministry, 26 September, 2012, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr.
(19)‘One more push in the UN or shall we do it right?’, ADH Arms Trade treaty legal blog, 28 July 2012, http://armstradetreaty.blogspot.be.
(20) Author’s correspondence with Control Arms coalition, 12 October 2012.
(21) Ibid.
(22) ‘A dirty business’, The Economist, 30 June 2012, http://www.economist.com.
(23) ‘First reaction to the draft arms trade treaty’, Oxfam Australia, 26 July 2012, https://www.oxfam.org.au.
(24) Hopkins, N., ‘Rift valley pastoralists pay for lack of arms treaty with their lives’, The Guardian, 2 July 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(25) Ibid.
(26) ‘A dirty business’, The Economist, 30 June 2012, http://www.economist.com.
(27) Ibid.
(28) Ibid.
(29) Author’s correspondence with Control Arms coalition, 12 October 2012.
(30) ‘First reaction to the draft arms trade treaty’, Oxfam Australia, 26 July 2012, https://www.oxfam.org.au.
(31) Wallacher, H. and Harang, A., ‘Small but lethal- small arms ammunition and the arms trade treaty’, PRIO, 2011, http://controlarms.org.
(32) Dye, D., ‘Africa and an arms trade treaty’, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper 191, August 2009, http://www.issafrica.org.
(33) ‘Report of the Group of Governmental Experts (A/63/334)’, United Nations (UN), 2008, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org.
(34) Dye, D., ‘Africa and an arms trade treaty’, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper 191, August 2009, http://www.issafrica.org.
(35) Ibid.
(36) Author’s correspondence with Control Arms coalition, 12 October 2012.
(37) Ibid.
(38) ‘China's presence grows in murky world of arms trading’, France 24, 7 March 2012, http://www.france24.com.
(39) ‘Small Arms and light weapons’, African Union,  http://www.africa-union.org.
(40) Ray, D.B., ‘The Final Countdown’, Oxfam International, 29 June 2012, http://www.oxfam.org.
(41) Ibid.
(42) Ibid.
(43) Dye, D., ‘Africa and an arms trade treaty’, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper 191, August 2009, http://www.issafrica.org.