Ending the military-heavy AUSSOM gives the AU space to develop a political mission focused on long-term stabilisation.

After nearly 20 years of operations, the African Union Stabilisation and Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) is no longer tenable. On 1 July, the United States (US) notified the AU that it would not provide funding for the mission beyond 31 December.

AUSSOM relies on US funds to cover its logistics costs. The US has also been providing bilateral support to troop-contributing countries and the Somali Security Forces.

The reasons for the US decision include the Somali federal government’s failure to take full ownership of its security functions and sustain the progress made against al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups. The US said it would not use its veto power to stop the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) renewal of AUSSOM’s mandate at the end of 2026, but would block any UN logistical or operational support.

The US decision is not surprising. In December 2024, it opposed using UNSC Resolution 2719 to fund AUSSOM, saying ‘the conditions have not been met for an immediate transition to the application of [Resolution] 2719 in Somalia.’ The resolution allows UN financing of UN-authorised and AU-led peace support operations.

The AU has deployed three such operations since March 2007. All have relied heavily on the UN, European Union (EU) and other partners’ financial and logistical support. This includes troop transport, aviation support, fuel, food, water, medical services and field sustainment for nearly 12 000 AU mission personnel and 20 900 Somali Security Forces.

In January 2025, the UNSC endorsed the AU’s four-phased AUSSOM strategy, which planned the handover of security responsibilities to the Somali Security Forces and a full exit on 31 December 2029.

The reality now is that whatever form AU support for Somalia takes, it cannot be a heavy military approach. Not only are the funds insufficient, but the mission has also reached the ceiling of what a military intervention alone can achieve.

Between 2007 and 2012, the operations of AUSSOM’s predecessor – the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) – were defined by heavy combat and initial stabilisation, culminating in the formal establishment of Somalia’s federal government. Authority was extended to five federal member states, achieving a significant political milestone.

From 2012 to 2018, AMISOM’s military pressure peaked, forcing al-Shabaab into a largely defensive position. However, this era was plagued by severe confusion over mandates and capacity constraints, as the mission operated without robust political support on the ground from the AU. It also lacked an exit strategy until the EU threatened to withdraw funding in 2018.

These funding threats, coupled with donor fatigue and al-Shabaab’s relative weakness at the time, prompted the AU decision to withdraw AMISOM by December 2021. But the overall security situation in the country and Somali authorities’ lack of political readiness stalled the handover of security responsibilities to the Somali Security Forces.

As a middle ground, the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) replaced AMISOM in 2022, with an almost identical mandate and a planned exit by December 2024. This period was regarded as stagnant, with no meaningful new security achievements. Some gains over al-Shabaab were even reversed.

The Somali authorities’ approach towards the AU missions also disincentivised continuation. Over the years, the federal government expelled senior UN and AU mission leaders, citing ‘misconduct’ and ‘interference in internal affairs.’ It played a more pronounced, but contested, role in planning, deployment and repatriation, interfering with the missions’ operational independence and hampering their ability to carry out tasks.

Arguably, Somalia’s federal and member state authorities have taken the AU mission’s security support for granted, leaving them with little incentive to resolve their political differences. Doing so would have achieved broader state-building and peacebuilding goals.

The AU now needs to shift from the current military-heavy configuration towards a politically oriented mission, especially in light of AUSSOM’s stagnating performance. Sustaining a 20-year military-heavy operation was always going to be problematic. The mission should have ended in 2021 after it helped Somalia establish governance structures and security institutions, and degrade al-Shabaab’s capabilities.

Mounting financial pressure adds to the argument against continuation. ATMIS accumulated massive debts, showing the AU’s structural incapacity to finance or logistically sustain large-scale operations.

But exiting the military sphere should not mean abandoning Somalia. The AU should transition to a time-bound, specialised political mission focused on long-term stabilisation. This requires a cautious, strategic exit for AUSSOM. Withdrawing the peace support operation will create a security vacuum, as the Somali Security Forces will likely struggle to assume sufficient security responsibilities.

The AU Commission is currently consulting with stakeholders and contributing countries to provide options to its Peace and Security Council (PSC), which will determine AUSSOM’s fate post-2026, and the AU’s future presence in Somalia. In reaching its decision, the council should consider two parallel paths.

First, support could take the form of a regional security cooperation mission. In 2021, UN and AU assessment teams suggested replacing AMISOM with the East African Standby Force (EASF). Current troop contributing countries – Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda – are EASF members. Most have security interests in Somalia and would want to retain hard-won gains. Such a mission would need the PSC’s political and technical support for planning, operations and resource mobilisation.

Second, politics is central to Somalia’s security problem. The PSC could establish a technical mission to support both the country’s political processes and the regional security cooperation mission.

The end of US funding should not mean abandoning the AU mission. Instead, it offers an opportunity to transition from a military to a political role, which is within the AU’s capabilities. By strengthening political engagements, the AU could better support the country.

Written by Meressa K Dessu, Senior Researcher and Training Coordinator, ISS Addis Ababa & Tamrat Zeyede Haile,
Consultant, ISS Addis Ababa