On 2 December 2012, the Burkinabe people took to the polls to vote for their parliamentary and municipal representatives. Elections in Burkina Faso, as with many other African countries, are usually marred by violent civil protests and contestation from opposition parties. These elections were no different, as they took place after violent protests and army mutinies that almost disrupted the 24-year rule of President Blaise Compaoré's Congress for Democracy and Progress (Congrès pour la Dèmocratie et le Progrès) (CDP). An analysis of these elections is important as they provide insight into the manner in which democracy will be consolidated in Burkina Faso. Accordingly, the paper undertakes this analysis by raising two questions: a) What is the purpose of elections in a state that is dominated by a single party?; and b) What are the future implications for the status of democracy in the country? These questions will be answered through a discussion of Burkina Faso's electoral landscape, the conduct and results of the December 2012 elections, as well as the implications of these outcomes for the future of democracy in the country.

Electoral reforms reinforce the ruling party's advantage

Burkina Faso first initiated its transition to democracy in 1991. The CDP, lead by President Compaoré undertook various political reforms to facilitate the democratic transition. The democratisation process involved the adoption of a new constitution, the legalisation of opposition parties, and provisions to allow multi-party elections.⁽²⁾ As a part of its democratic reform, Burkina Faso adopted the Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system, based on multi-party constituencies. The number of seats within a constituency is important as it can affect how accurately the results of the elections reflect the political preference of the electorate. In terms of this electoral system, the bigger a constituency, the more proportional the election results are. There are two types of PR systems: the full PR system and the limited PR system. Burkina Faso adheres to the limited PR system, which is based on a closed list system. Under the limited PR system, each party presents a closed list of candidates that have been pre-selected by the parties. Voters are excluded in the pre-selection of candidates and can only vote for the candidates that appear on the list.⁽³⁾ This system has a dual function in terms of the distribution of seats and determining the individual candidates that will occupy the seats.

The electoral process involves a president being elected every five years by an absolute majority vote, using a two-round system. The prime minister is appointed by the president with the approval of the parliament. In the National Assembly (Assemblée Nationale), 127 members are elected through a closed list proportional representation system, and those members serve for five years. Since the democratic transition, Burkina Faso has held four presidential elections, four parliamentary elections and three municipal elections.

The CDP, a coalition formed in 1996 through a merger of 10 parties, has dominated elections in Burkina Faso since the 1987 military coup, which began President Blaise Compaoré's 24-year rule in the country. Despite the regularity of elections, the electoral process in Burkina Faso has lacked credibility, as it is seen to have favoured the ruling party. From 1991 to 2000, the use of the PR system resulted in the over-representation of the ruling party and a marginalisation of opposition parties within the National Assembly. Elections during this period were characterised by low voter registration and regular boycott by the opposition. As a consequence of the high pressure for reforms from the Burkinabe civil society and opposition parties, the CDP introduced a new electoral code in 2001. The new code introduced the following:⁽⁴⁾

• a mixed system: where deputies would be elected on regional lists in 13 districts and 21 other deputies on a national list encompassing the entire country. The so-called Hare quota remained as the method of translating votes into seats, and the remainder of seats were allocated using the method of largest remainder. The latter method required that there be redistricting of the country to ensure that there was proportional representation;
• the introduction of a single ballot system: which reduced the risk of fraud and enhanced the transparency and credibility of the electoral process; and
• increased independence and representativeness of the national independent electoral commission (CENI), by expanding its areas of competence and responsibility.

With the new electoral code in place, the 2002 parliamentary elections saw an increase in civil participation and representation of opposition parties in the National Assembly. These elections raised the hope that the Burkinabe political system was becoming more inclusive and produced a sense of democratic maturity in the country. However, such positivity and enthusiasm was short-lived as the parliamentary majority remained with the CDP. In 2004, the CDP used its parliamentary majority to push for amendments to the code that ultimately neutralised the reforms in practice and ensured its continued dominance. The amendments included a change in the number of voting districts, the inclusion of the Minister of Interior as part of the management of CENI and the revision of the constitution to allow Compaoré to run for another term. It was clear that the introduction of the new electoral code and the gradual opening of the political arena was a strategic step taken by the CDP to further legitimise its hold on power without undertaking any meaningful democratic reform. With the continual dominance of the CDP in subsequent elections, disillusionment with the electoral process returned, as the Burkinabe people felt that the outcomes of the elections were a foregone conclusion.

Whilst the CDP had managed to maintain its power, by 2006 there were numerous protests held by the Burkinabe people against the social and economic conditions in the country. The dissatisfaction amongst the people came to a head during 2010 and 2011. In 2010, the main opposition party, the Union for Progress and Change (UPC), boycotted the presidential elections; and in 2011, violence erupted throughout the country. The 2011 civil protest and mutinies by the army resulted in Compaoré dissolving the government and removing the country's security chiefs.⁽⁵⁾ The continual dissatisfaction during this period demonstrated that the Burkinabe people preferred to take their political discontent to the streets to expressing themselves at the ballot box.⁽⁶⁾ In such a context, the significance of elections become questionable, as reflected in the conduct and outcomes of the December 2012 polls.
The CDP predictably retains control of parliament

In a first for the West African country, the people of Burkina Faso voted in concurrent parliamentary and municipal elections on 2 December 2012. More than 3,000 candidates contended for 127 seats in the National Assembly and people were set to vote in 18,584 municipal officials. The newly elected municipal representatives would then appoint mayors for 302 rural and 49 urban communes.⁽⁷⁾ In facilitating the effective management and monitoring of the elections, CENI introduced a new biometric registration system, which enabled it to register people living in the remote areas of the country. The election management body also made use of SES Broadband Services to ensure constant connectivity, with the 45 remote electoral districts, video conferencing was enabled amongst CENI staff, surveillance could be maximised, and the fast and secure communication of ballots could be facilitated.⁽⁸⁾ The elections were conducted under the surveillance of  7,000 domestic and 200 international observers  who came from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), European donors, the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Polls opened at 6:00am (0600 GMT) throughout the country and people were seen voting calmly in neighbourhoods on the outskirts of the capital, Ouagadougou.⁽⁹⁾ While voting passed without any major irregularities, the elections were not without incident.  At the close of the polls there were reports of the destruction of polling stations in the southwest city of Banfora ⁽¹⁰⁾ and in Ouagadougou. The opposition party UPC, along with CDP members, complained about the compiling of missing and surplus votes.⁽¹¹⁾ In the end, the CDP once again emerged as the predominant ruling party and maintained its majority in the National Assembly. The results were as follows:⁽¹²⁾

The outcome of these elections came as no surprise. With a divided opposition, the CDP was favoured to win the elections, despite its own internal disputes. The opposition has always been divided and weak.  This has been due to the inability of the opposition to unite under a single presidential candidate, to formulate a viable alternative political platform, and the lack of resources for effective electoral campaigning. In the campaigns leading to the elections, the sentiments shared amongst the people and opposition parties were those of change ⁽¹³⁾ – particularly change that would end the dominance the CDP. The  latter's  overall win in both the parliamentary and municipal elections led opposition leaders, such as Norbet Tiendrebeogo (from the Social Forces Front), to state that "We flatter ourselves when we say that this is a democratic process, but it is a biased process...everyone knows Burkina Faso is a facade of a democracy even if it is well polished."⁽¹⁴⁾ He even went further to state that "efforts need to be made to go a little further in the fight against corruption in the country."⁽¹⁵⁾ This view was also echoed by Nathanael Ouadraogo (the national campaign director of the UPC, currently the main opposition party), who commented on the flagrancy of the lack of credibility of the elections in Ouagadougou.⁽¹⁶⁾ The oppositions' allegations are not unfounded.

It has been seen throughout the country's electoral history that the element of competitiveness has been lacking. The involvement of the opposition has always been a restricted affair. The opposition parties have often been harassed or co-opted to support the CDP due to its extensive patronage networks and control of state administration. The CDP's access to substantial resources allows for nationwide campaign machinery that the opposition cannot compete with. This inability to compete is further compounded by the fact that the opposition itself has been unable to offer an effective alternative to the electorate. The CDP's overwhelming dominance in all spheres of government has resulted in some form of indirect electoral fraud, if due regard is given to the fact that electoral fraud covers any form of in-built bias in the administration of elections and can occur at any phase of the electoral process. Burkina Faso's poor socio-economic standing along with the 'clientelistic' governmental style of the CDP, has ensured that the people's vote goes to those with power.

While these elections once again demonstrated the dominance of the CDP, they also exposed the internal disputes of the CDP. The CDP's internal disputes relate to issues of leadership within the coalition. President Compaoré has been in power since the military coup in 1987. Compaoré has since won four elections as president and the CDP is rumoured to push for further constitutional reforms that would enable Compaoré to run again in the 2015 presidential elections. In 2001, the Constitutional Council limited the presidency to two five-year terms. However, it was decided that the new law did not apply to Compaoré as he was already the acting president at the time. Many of the members within the CDP coalition want Compaoré to remain as president and run in the 2015 presidential elections. However, it would seem that Compaoré has passed the presidential baton to his brother, Francois Compaoré, who has been Compaoré's advisor throughout his 24-year rule. Having François Compaoré as the CDP president will not be the only change within the coalition. Recently, several elderly members of the CDP were removed from their positions to make room for new members.⁽¹⁷⁾ It would seem that the CDP is ushering in a new leadership that is more inclusive of the youth and women. However, this has caused deep internal tension within the party, which could affect its performance in the 2015 elections. Regardless of its internal disputes, the CDP has institutionalised its dominance in such a manner that there does not seem to be a foreseeable future where the CDP is not in control.

Burkina Faso: A case of elections without democracy?

In Burkina Faso, where there have been successive elections since 1991, one needs to set aside the regularity of the elections and assess the elections in terms of their transparency, fairness and competitiveness. Elections are considered to be a 'transformative tool for democratic governance'.⁽¹⁸⁾ Many theorists and political analysts alike have agreed that a country cannot undergo a process of democratisation without elections, but it is seen time and time again in newly independent democratic states or semi-authoritarian regimes on the African continent, that there can be elections without true democracy. This remains true in the case of Burkina Faso. President Compaoré in these recent elections was quoted as saying that "elections are important because they are used to gauge democracy and governance in the country."⁽¹⁹⁾ Where one is to gauge democracy in the country, it is clear that the process of democratisation is still a restricted affair and controlled by the ruling party. By holding periodic elections, the CDP has managed to gain electoral legitimacy, without running the risk of democratic change. It is clear that Burkina Faso is neither fully democratic nor authoritarian, and one has to question the future status of democracy in the country. One has to question what democracy means in this context.

Holding regular elections, the CDP has managed to consolidate its power and present Burkina Faso as a democratising nation. However, Burkina Faso exhibits certain signs of an electoral authoritarian regime. In electoral authoritarian regimes, elections are used as both a mechanism of control, as well as a means of false democratic governance. It is noted that in order for elections to qualify as democratic, and effectively contribute to the consolidation of democracy in a state, the elections "must offer an effective choice of political authorities among a community of free and equal citizens."⁽²⁰⁾ As highlighted above, Burkina Faso does not meet this basic condition. Not only is there uneven participation of women in the political process, the opposition parties are also ineffective due to limited resources and ineptitude. This is in addition to an electoral system that leaves voters with few choices and the dominance of one party in all spheres of government. Elections in this context do not serve their democratic purpose. Ironically, and despite the fact that the CDP systematically violates the most basic democratic principles, including ignoring constitutional limits on power, the international community has always regarded Burkinabe elections as 'free and fair'.⁽²¹⁾

Concluding remarks

The December 2012 elections in Burkina Faso present the perfect case study for highlighting the need to assess elections in terms of their purpose and effectiveness in states that are dominated by a single party.  The CDP has been the ruling party for the past 24 years and it seems it would remain in power for many years to come. While the country periodically conducts elections, the elections only serve as a facade for the electoral authoritarian regime of the ruling party.  The CDP's dominance in the county is one that has been strategically designed – from the adoption of the PR electoral system to the conduct of the elections, all in favour of the party. Elections in this country only serve to legitimise the dominance of the CDP and do not serve a democratic function. Whether this will change with the continual commitment to hold elections is yet to be seen.

Written by Kutloano Tshabalala ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact Kutloano Tshabalala through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Elections and Democracy Unit ( election.democracy@consultancyafrica.com). This CAI discussion paper was developed with the assistance of Fritz Nganje and was edited by Liezl Stretton.
(2) Loada, A. and Santiso, C., 'Landmark elections in Burkina Faso: Towards democratic maturity?', International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Burkina Faso Project, http://aceproject.org.
(3) Strauch, N. and Pogorelis, R., 'Electoral systems: The link between governance, elected members and voters', European Union Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD), 2011, http://www.europarl.europa.eu.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ouedraogo, B., 'Burkina Faso parliamentary vote on heels of unrest', Businessweek, 2 December 2012, http://www.businessweek.com.
(6) 'Burkina Faso country report 2012', Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI), http://www.bti-project.org.
(7) 'Burkina Faso: SES provide satellite services for connected elections', All Africa News, 28 November 2012, http://allafrica.com.
(8) Ibid.
(9) 'Voting starts in Burkina Faso's legislative polls', African Review, 2 December 2012, http://www.africareview.com.
(10) Ouedraogo, B., 'Burkina Faso parliamentary vote on heels of unrest', Business Week, 2 December 2012, http://www.businessweek.com.
(11) 'President's allies keep majority in Burkina vote', AFP, 7 December 2012, http://www.google.com.
(12) 'Country Profile: Burkina Faso National Assembly Electoral Results', International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) http://www.electionguide.org.
(13) Ouedraogo, B., 'Burkina Faso parliamentary vote on heels of unrest', Business Week, 2 December 2012, http://www.businessweek.com.
(14) Tinti, P., 'Burkina Faso holds Nationwide elections', VOA News, 2 December 2012, http://www.voanews.com.
(15) Ibid.
(16) 'President's allies keep majority in Burkina vote', AFP, 7 December 2012, http://www.google.com.
(17) Ouoba, A., 'Burkina Faso votes in test for Compaoré regime', AFP, 3 December 2012, http://www.repost.us.
(18) 'Burkina Faso to hold two simultaneous votes', United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 30 November 2012, http://www.undp.org.
(19) Ouedraogo, B., 'Burkina Faso parliamentary vote on heels of unrest', AP News, 2 December 2012, http://www.businessweek.com.
(20) Schedler, A., 2002. The menu of manipulation. Journal of Democracy, 13, pp. 36-50.
(21) As evidenced in the AU Mission Report on the elections, 'Mission d'Observation de l'Union Africaine aux Elections couplees Legislatives et Municipales du 2 Decembre 2012 au Burkina Faso', African Union, http://www.eisa.org.za.