On 29 January 2013, a Boko Haram commander claimed a ceasefire with the government in Nigeria. Sheik Abu Mohammed Ibn Abdulazeez, a man local security sources say is a Boko Haram member, sent a statement to journalists in the city of Maiduguri, saying that a truce had been called and that he was declaring a unilateral ceasefire with the government.⁽²⁾ The peace that the nation has been waiting for has finally been made, but it is unlikely that anyone will take the truce seriously. Terrorist attacks continue unabated from both sides, and President Goodluck Jonathan maintains that he cannot negotiate with a faceless organisation.

Just 10 days before the ceasefire was agreed, Jonathan sent troops to help expel Islamists from northern Mali and commented that it was part of Nigeria’s own fight against Boko Haram, northern Nigeria’s Islamists. Nigeria’s foreign minister Olubenga Ashiru said in an interview on 24 January 2013 that “some of these characters [Boko Haram] were trained in Northern Mali... so if we can destroy their capability in northern Mali it will help us at home.”⁽³⁾ With the government determined to crush both the rebels in Mali and those in Nigeria, it seems unlikely that a truce will be sustained or greeted with much optimism.

This paper explores the notion that, given the circumstances, this truce is no more than a farce. Moreover, unless Goodluck Jonathan changes his methods, the situation in Nigeria stands to deteriorate. The president persistently denies claims by rights groups that government corruption and poverty are among the root causes of the terrorist problem in Nigeria and argues that we “shouldn’t play politics with Boko Haram.”⁽⁴⁾ Instead Jonathan seems intent on tackling the problem with force and terror, a tactic that clearly is not working. Nigeria’s leader is using the prevalent anti- terrorist sentiment, exacerbated by the conflict in Mali, as an excuse to ignore the numerous flaws in his government and the underlying causes of the terrorism. The people of Nigeria are increasingly being asked to choose between the radical Islamist group and the government’s own brand of terrorism. Unfortunately for Jonathan, it seems unlikely that they will continue to support a government which does so little to tackle their grievances.

So far so bad

The primary problem with the government’s military approach to the Islamist group is that as the organisation is faceless, it is very difficult to identify who Boko Haram agents are and thus to track down the ‘right’ people. As such, the military are at a loss as to where to direct their advances. While Boko Haram squads target soldiers and security agents with explosives from fortified positions, the soldiers go in to neighbouring houses and are said to indiscriminately beat up male occupants.⁽⁵⁾ Thus, even when the radical sect’s attacks are less frequent, the violence committed by the security forces ensures that a “palpable sense of fear” lingers in the northern states.⁽⁶⁾

Jimeh Saleh, who grew up in Maiduguri, describes how gun-toting soldiers have set up countless check points and taken up positions outside churches and police stations throughout the north.⁽⁷⁾ While the soldiers are supposedly there to protect the civilians, people seem “united in their condemnation of the curfew and the militarisation of the streets.”⁽⁸⁾ Citizens of Maiduguri accuse the soldiers of torture and other human rights abuses. The people are living in fear of the terror tactics of the very government that is supposed to protect them.

Abuja denies that it is violating human rights. Jonathan has played down the military’s robust approach, and has argued that his methods are “paying off.”⁽⁹⁾ Furthermore, Colonel Sani Usman has contended that “there is no Nigerian soldier that goes out on the streets just to kill innocent Nigerians.”⁽¹⁰⁾ The Colonel assures reporters that the soldiers ensure that whatever they do is within the “ambit of the law” and claims that government abuses are simply Boko Haram propaganda, used to “manipulate the minds of the people.”⁽¹¹⁾

Nevertheless, the numerous complaints from citizens in the north are hard to ignore and point to a long-term campaign of government violence. A student in Kano told reporters that “even if you are not Boko Haram, you are punished so harshly that you will call yourself Boko Haram. Then the army will kill you.”⁽¹²⁾ According to this student, there is a “place called Guantanamo in Damaturu where the military keep people to punish them.”⁽¹³⁾ The government, clearly lacking a better, more sustainable solution, is treating terrorism with a new terror of their own. This is hardly the message of stability and effective governance that Jonathan should be sending his people.

Short-sighted solutions

These attempts to curb Boko Haram’s attacks are problematic in their own right; killing innocent civilians cannot help but assist the recruitment for the very group they hope to exterminate. As Amnesty International’s Lucy Freeman pointed out the government’s tactics are “alienating communities” who are being forced to live at the mercy of two terrorist organisations.⁽¹⁴⁾ But the problem runs deeper than this.

The Nigerian forces’ aggressive, inappropriate tactics stem from their inability to deal with the underlying cause of instability in the region. Instead they are addressing the superficial aspects of the crisis, hoping to be perceived as ‘doing something’ about the problem. As such, Jonathan is determined to focus on and propagate the idea that there is a “solid link” between the Nigerian-based terrorist group and other radical organisations in the Sahel region. He thereby proposes that Boko Haram poses a much larger existential threat to North Africa.⁽¹⁵⁾ This notion is supported by the United States and is somewhat problematic. The suggestion that the terrorist organisation has links to Al-Qaeda and al-Shabab may well be grounded in the truth, but, as David Anderson has said, at present, the argument seems to be based purely on speculation by Nigerian security forces and by politicians in the White House.⁽¹⁶⁾

It is plausible that even if these explanations are true and Boko Haram is trying to join with other jihadist groups, they are also politically useful justifications for politicians in Nigeria and Washington.⁽¹⁷⁾ Such accounts of terrorist activity enable Goodluck Jonathan, with the normative support of the United States, to escape the possibility that this terrorist movement really stems from domestic problems. If the movement is seen as a broader inexorable international issue, then it is much easier for the politicians to justify crushing Boko Haram with force rather than negotiating with them and addressing the deeper, structural causes of the ongoing crisis.

It is key that the grievance-based analysis of this conflict is not overlooked. While Boko Haram is a radical religious sect and they do promote a version of Islam which forbids Muslims to take part in any political or social activity associated with Western society,⁽¹⁸⁾ it is plausible that the ongoing violence they are encapsulated in has very little to do with sectarian issues. The rebellion they lead attacks the insecure structures on which Nigeria has been built, in particular the divide between Muslims and Christians. However, conceivably this emotive, historical division is merely an easy politic for the group to utilise in garnering support. Their task is made infinitely easier by the government’s failure to offer any better alternatives.

Arguably religious extremism is no more than a facade for the real issues that Boko Haram are fighting for. We must question why it is that although millions of Muslims live in the south, there is no “Boko Haram problem” there.⁽¹⁹⁾ The answer undeniably lies in inequality. It is no coincidence that the group has risen out of the northeast of Nigeria where 72% of the population live below an official poverty line, as opposed to merely 27% who do so in the south.⁽²⁰⁾ This part of Nigeria has been repeatedly neglected by Nigerian Governments and there is a tendency for the politicians of the federal governments in these states to simply put “band-aids” on the problems they face rather than tackling the issues head on.⁽²¹⁾

Even when funds are sent to federal governments in the northern states, corruption is so severe that the money rarely, if ever, reaches the people for whom it was intended.⁽²²⁾ As a result, the bonds between the people and the government are extremely weak, and civilians increasingly turn to Boko Haram because of their disenchantment with President Jonathan. This disillusionment is only exacerbated by the government’s response to Boko Haram, which is characterised by indiscriminate violence.

Concluding remarks

Perhaps dialogue with Boko Haram is not possible. As analysts and Jonathan have been quick to point out, talking to a faceless organisation is extremely difficult. This job is made harder by the hard-line attitudes of the group’s leader who has proclaimed that he “enjoys killing anyone who God commands [him] to kill.”⁽²³⁾ But just because peace talks are not feasible does not mean to say that a military approach is more appropriate. It is absolutely essential that the government recognises that their strategy so far has been a complete disaster that has resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths. Abuja must change tack immediately before it is too late to do so.

President Jonathan has pledged his commitment to education and has vowed that his new educational institutions will give “hope to the people.”⁽²⁴⁾ But while he remains convinced that Boko Haram is “definitely not” the result of “misrule,” it is hard to believe that these promises, much like the truce, are not just empty words.⁽²⁵⁾ As such, Boko Haram’s attacks will continue to threaten his nation, only aided by his own military’s terror tactics.⁽²⁶⁾ Until the president shows a real interest in addressing the grievances of the Islamic organisation and moving away from a military solution, the citizens of Nigeria will remain caught in the crossfire of two terrorist groups and he will struggle to control an increasingly divided nation.⁽²⁷⁾

The Nigerian Government’s failure to deal with the growing threat of Boko Haram has made the group into much more than a terrorist organisation. The Islamists now represent a large majority of the population who are unhappy with the way that Nigeria is run and the vast inequality that pervades everyday life. While it is unlikely that many will join Boko Haram for their faith in Islamic Sharia law, if Jonathan does not change his ways, thousands will join the radical organisation because of their lack of faith in the government.

Written by Jess Moody ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact Jessica Moody through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict and Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). This CAI discussion paper was developed with the assistance of Denine Walters and was edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) ‘Boko Haram “commander” declares ceasefire’, Aljazeera, 29 January 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(3) Davison, W. and Mazen, M., ‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram members trained in Mali, minister says’, Bloomberg, 25 January 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Saleh, J., ‘How Boko Haram attacks have changed the Maiduguri where I grew up’, BBC, May 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Charbonneau, L. and Nichols, M., ‘Nigeria says its push on Boko Haram Islamists paying off’, Reuters, 26 September 2012, http://www.reuters.com.
(10) Ross, W., ‘Nigerians fear of Northern atrocities’, BBC, 1 November 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Ibid.
(15) Nigeria’s president wants Mali rebels crushed’, Aljazeera, 24 January 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(16) Hanna, M., ‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram: A growing threat’, Aljazeera, 27 December 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Ibid.
(22) Sika, H., ‘Where is the rule of law in Nigeria?’, Aljazeera, 3 November 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(23) ‘Profile of Nigeria’s Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau’, BBC, 22 June 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(24) Charbonneau, L. and Nichols, M., ‘Nigeria says its push on Boko Haram Islamists paying off’, Reuters, 26 September 2012, http://www.reuters.com.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Davison, W. and Mazen, M., ‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram members trained in Mali, minister says’, Bloomberg, 25 January 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com.
(27) ‘Nigeria’s president wants Mali rebels crushed’, Aljazeera, 24 January 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com.