Subsequent to the disputed elections of 27 December 2007, Kenya was engulfed by post-election violence (PEV) which lasted for about a month. More than 1,220 people were killed, 3,500 injured 350,000 more were displaced, and hundreds of rapes and the destruction of over 100,000 properties were perpetrated.⁽²⁾ The disputed elections exploded into ethnic violence – awakening the deep-rooted rivalry that had existed for an extended period of time – as well as economic frustrations among the citizens, particularly the youth. In light of the above, and following both local and international outcry, the attention and consequently the intervention of the International Criminal Court (ICC) took hold with the intention of bringing to justice those who were involved in committing such heinous crimes.

This CAI paper reviews the ICC involvement in Kenya’s disputed elections of 2007. It presents a brief overview of the period following the disputed elections and also a profile and initial prosecution trials of six suspects who have been summoned by the ICC for allegedly orchestrating the violence that led to the loss of lives and caused a gross violation of human rights, massive displacement of people and the destruction of properties. This paper cannot stress enough how important it is for the ICC to bring to justice all those who carry the highest responsibility or were involved in committing these crimes.  Yet, in light of the recent ethnic clashes occurring in various parts of the country which are reminiscent of the 2007 PEV, it is easy to anticipate violence in the imminent presidential elections scheduled to take place on 4 March 2013.

Kenya’s disputed elections: An overview

Although Kenya had experienced some serious election violence prior to 2007 and this was also ethnically-based but politically instigated like the 1992 clashes, the 2007 PEV was the most devastating. The enormity of the trauma characterised by this violence took not only the Kenyans but also the international community by surprise.⁽³⁾ This is perhaps because the violence quickly turned into what would be considered ethnic cleansing – a reminder of the 1994 Rwandan genocide – awakening a deep-rooted ethnic rivalry that had been dormant and overlooked for a long time. An outburst of economic grievances among the citizens is often reoccurring following any disputed elections. As is always the case, the local people believe their economic problems would be addressed if a new president is voted into power, and this occurrence in Kenya was no exception.

The PEV, which lasted a little over a month was characterised by horrific crimes, which included murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, the deportation or forcible transfer of the populace and other atrocious acts.⁽⁴⁾ The violence was a reaction to the rumours that incumbent presidential candidate Mwai Kibaki had rigged the presidential elections of December 2007 against a backdrop that Raila Odinga was indeed the front runner in the polls. And on New Year’s Day 2008, people began receiving text messages urging violence, which quickly became transmittable across the country as economic frustrations, tribal and politically-motivated attacks were perpetrated throughout Kenya.⁽⁵⁾

The violence occurred in two phases. The initial phase started when President Mwai Kibaki – from the Kikuyu tribe – was declared the winner of the elections ahead of his major opponent Raila Odinga, from the Luo tribe. Kibaki’s swearing in ceremony was immediately followed by ethnic violence, with Odinga’s supporters, most of whom were Luo, targeting the Kikuyus to show their disgruntlement. However, the tables turned during the second phase of the violence, with Kikuyus carrying out revenge attacks on other ethnic tribes perceived as Odinga supporters. These attacks took place from 25 to 30 January 2008.⁽⁶⁾

Causes of PEV: Disputed elections as a catalyst for more violence

In its reports on the post-election violence of 2007-8, the non-governmental organisation Human Rights Watch concluded that, "this violence [was] the outcome of decades of political manipulation of ethnic tensions, and of impunity intertwined with longstanding grievances over land, corruption, inequality and other issues."⁽⁷⁾ Most of the Kenyan people who participated in the PEV had been hovering over silent grievances only waiting to be expressed. Catalysed by the disputed presidential elections, which put Kibaki into power for the second term, violence – not at all related to the recent disputed elections – was bound to occur. The violence was characterised by youths who had very little opportunity for employment despite Kibaki’s 2002 election promise to create more jobs, and as such, the youths violently reacted to show their frustrations and disbelief following the announcement that Kibaki had won. It is always perceived that the youth’s participation in any given violent situation is often dynamic.⁽⁸⁾ This is most especially true in countries with a ‘youth bulge’ (a country with a large number of youths 15-24 years). However, it is not to say that the violence escalated because of the huge number of young people. On the contrary, it most certainly escalated because of the fact that they were unemployed.⁽⁹⁾

Similarly, the PEV was a catalyst for the Kalenjin tribesmen to clash with their Kikuyu neighbours, with whom they have had disputes for an extended period of time.⁽¹⁰⁾ It is believed that many of those who carried out the attacks throughout Kenya were well known by their victims. People who had lived as neighbours for several years suddenly became enemies simply because of their ethnic differences. Overall, the PEV led to the death of more than 1,200 people and displaced over 350,000 more. Even though many of those who had been displaced have either returned home or been resettled, the issue of land ownership still remains and can be a basis for future political turmoil and ethnic violence.⁽¹¹⁾ The period following Kenya’s 2007 disputed elections was outwardly the worst humanitarian crisis recorded in Kenyan history since its independence in the 1960s.

The power-sharing deal that changed the Kenyan Government

Kenya suffered one of its worst humanitarian crises in history following the disputed elections of 2007. Nonetheless, the violence, which was caused by the outright rigging of the elections, came to a halt when the international community, through the former United Nations Secretary General Koffi Annan, came to Kenya’s rescue. Annan had the backing and full support of the international community. At the time, both the rival opponents and their supporters could not see eye to eye. Annan arrived in the East African nation nearly a month after the elections. As the chief mediator in the peace talks, Annan not only managed to get the two opponents to negotiate, but also got them to sign a power-sharing arrangement that changed the structure of the Kenyan Government thereafter. On 28 February 2008, Kibaki and Odinga signed a power-sharing agreement known as the National Accord and Reconciliation Act. This agreement created a coalition Government with Kibaki as president and initiated the Prime Minister’s Office to be headed by his major opponent Odinga. This new coalition Cabinet was sworn in on 17 April 2008 ⁽¹²⁾ and its 42 member composition became the largest in Kenyan history. It included new ministries for cooperative development, Northern Kenya development, and Nairobi metropolitan development. In addition, some ministries were also subdivided, leading to the establishment of new cabinet positions.⁽¹³⁾ The National Accord went beyond power-sharing and was aimed at bringing about fundamental changes not only in the structure of the Government but also to address the deep-rooted and historical grievances that had not been addressed by former Governments or those that contributed to the PEV. Therefore, the current constitution and other constitutional, land and judicial reforms being undertaken in Kenya were also part of the National Accord that was signed.

The Waki inquiry: Kenya’s preliminary attempt at justice

It has been nearly five years and only a handful of the victims have acquired justice for the crimes committed against them during Kenya’s PEV of 2007. The Office of the Attorney General, through the Department of Public Prosecutions, has since compiled a list of cases purportedly linked to the election violence. These cases amounting to thousands range from arson and petty theft to rape and murder. However, despite this initial step to meticulously acquire this information, there have been only some prosecutions and an even smaller number of convictions – this induced by a complete lack of investigations of both the organisers as well as the financers of the violence.⁽¹⁴⁾

Established amidst the ghastly violence, the Commission to Investigate Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) – also known as the Waki Commission named after its chairman, Justice Philip Waki – conducted its initial investigations and recommended that a special tribunal should be established whose mandate would be to try the people allegedly responsible for inciting the violence. In fact, in December 2008, President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga cordially signed an agreement that sanctioned the establishment of this tribunal, which would also implement all the Waki recommendations in their entirety. However, the Kenyan Government and its Parliament have since enormously overlooked this commitment. A few Parliamentarians showed total rejection of the commission and the establishment of a tribunal because they preferred to see all the crimes against humanity tried at the ICC in The Hague. Surprisingly, some of those same Parliamentarians later disingenuously called on Kenya to withdraw from the Rome Statute establishing the ICC.⁽¹⁵⁾

The ICC: Kenya’s last resort to justice

Although the ICC is often referred to as “a court of last resort,”⁽¹⁶⁾ this is not necessarily the case. As long as the crimes that have been committed are covered under its jurisdiction, the ICC immediately takes interest regardless of the willingness or capability of a country’s capacity to undertake such a case. Its jurisdiction mostly covers crimes against humanity, genocides and war crimes.⁽¹⁷⁾ The ICC’s ultimate goal, therefore, is to investigate, gather reputable evidence and prosecute only those it believes – on the basis of the evidence collected – have the highest responsibility, either directly or indirectly, for the crimes committed during any given violent/conflict situation, as in the case with Kenya. The ICC became involved in Kenya’s prosecution process of the PEV crimes because some of those crimes fell under its jurisdiction. In addition, the ICC is based on the principle of ‘complementarity’, which ensures that all national prosecutions categorised as international crimes have its highest priority. This basis is found in the preamble of the Rome Statue, as well as Articles 1 and 17.⁽¹⁸⁾

In March 2010, the ICC began its investigations into Kenya’s PEV and, in December 2010, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo requested summons for six suspects. The Kenyan Government had previously agreed to assist the ICC with its investigations. However, it later revoked this decision, and instead devised means on how to prevent the prosecutions entirely. Initially, the Kenyan Parliament appealed for the Government to withdraw from the Rome Statute, but the Government did not award them this satisfaction. The Kenyan Government then formally requested the United Nations Security Council to suspend the investigations for one year, on the basis that ICC prosecutions were potentially disruptive and could disrupt national reforms needed to pave the way for the local prosecutions. Following Kenya’s request, the Security Council held unofficial consultations, but concluded that the cases were a threat to international peace and security.⁽¹⁹⁾ In other words, their request was rejected.

Still, a frantic Kenya filed an admissibility challenge before the ICC claiming that following the adoption of its new-fangled constitution and other reforms, the country now had the ability to investigate the six suspects. The ICC’s principle of complementarity indicates that “any challenge to the admissibility of cases before the Court are governed by Article 19 of the Statute, with grounds for inadmissibility found in Article 17.”⁽²⁰⁾ As if bad luck had befallen this East African nation with all its requests denied, the ICC also rejected the challenge in May 2011. This was on the grounds that there was “no concrete evidence of ongoing proceedings before national judges and holding that such a challenge could only succeed if the accused were facing similar charges in a national court at the time of the challenge.”⁽²¹⁾

At this point in time, Kenya was now desperate to block the ICC’s investigations of the six suspects believed to have orchestrated the PEV. The Kenyan Government petitioned the ICC’s decision, and submitted new evidence claiming that fresh investigations into the six suspects were underway. Indeed, its July 2011 submission indicated that the Kenyan police had interviewed 35 witnesses in the Rift Valley concerning the role of the six suspects in orchestrating violence. But, the police claimed that it had not found satisfactory evidence to bring the suspects before the Kenyan courts. Still, in August 2011, the ICC rejected this appeal.⁽²²⁾ The ICC’s rejection was also supported by the European Union’s Managing Director for Africa, Nicholas Westcott, who asserted that only if Kenya had a local justice system credible enough to prosecute the six suspects, the ICC would not have any business intervening.⁽²³⁾ Armed with irrefutable evidence that Kenya could not prosecute the six suspects, the ICC’s investigations carried on, and this time, in their fullest capacity. This was absolute proof that no one – not even persons with high Government positions – can “bribe, kill, or intimidate” in order to influence the ICC’s decision.⁽²⁴⁾

With the ICC’s investigations underway, it was only at this point that “the Kenyan Government affirmed its belief that peace, reconciliation and justice cannot be achieved without a local mechanism.”⁽²⁵⁾ To the many victims, the National Reconciliation act did not provide the justice they deserved and believed that the ICC is their only “hope for justice.”⁽²⁶⁾ Other victims wanted the people who actually carried out the crimes to be the ones to face trials. However, there has been limited success of cases in the ordinary courts as there is a clear indication that the Kenyan authorities have been reluctant or incapable of effectively prosecuting the PEV crimes. For instance, in the Uasin Gishu district, despite the fact that there were an estimated 962 police shootings, 405 of which were fatal, and dozens of reported rapes allegedly perpetrated by police officers, no single police officer has been convicted for the shootings or rapes directly linked to the PEV. This displays “the extent of impunity for certain groups of people that appear to be protected.”⁽²⁷⁾

The ICC’s six suspects

After thorough investigations into those responsible for orchestrating Kenya’s PEV of 2007, the ICC finally narrowed down its list to only six suspects. Even then, the ICC Prosecutor vowed to use a “three-pronged approach” to accountability, which would include “the ICC, national criminal proceedings and the truth and reconciliation commission.”⁽²⁸⁾ The six suspects, all of whom are high-profile political and opinion leaders, include: 1) Francis Muthaura, the head of the country's civil service; 2) Henry Kosgey, the Chairman of Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM); 3) Hussein Ali, a former police chief; 4) Joshua Arap Sang, a broadcaster accused of planning attacks, along with Kosgey and Ruto, as well as thumping up ethnic hatred on the airwaves; (5) Uhuru Kenyatta, the deputy prime minister and finance minister; and (6) William Ruto, one of the top opposition leaders and a former Education minister.⁽²⁹⁾

Both Kenyatta, crowned Kenya's richest man by Forbes magazine, and Ruto, plan to stand in the next presidential elections due to take place on 4 March 2013. Both men vowed to stand regardless of the ICC outcome.⁽³⁰⁾ Incredibly, the ICC trials are not scheduled to start until after the 2013 elections. This will allow Kenyatta and Ruto to campaign and actively participate in the elections without the issue of conviction hovering over their heads. It also typifies the utmost impunity political leaders enjoy, and sadly, including those accused of crimes against humanity.⁽³¹⁾ Nonetheless, if the suspects had to face trials prior, this situation would not block them from running for office as their eligibility to stand is not in any way governed by the ICC. It is however governed by the Kenyan Constitution and laws. It would therefore be up to the East African nation’s authorities to “interpret and apply national laws on that issue.”⁽³²⁾

On the contrary, if either suspect is elected president in the forth-coming elections of 2013, they would not be prosecuted by any court, regardless of whether the crimes were committed prior to becoming president or the court case has already begun. This is in reference to the previously overlooked Article 143 (1) of the 2010 constitution which states that “criminal proceedings shall not be instituted or continued in any court against the President or a person performing the functions of that office, during the tenure of office.”⁽³³⁾ Notwithstanding, the clause does not affect the ICC as the court is not subordinate to the Kenyan constitution,⁽³⁴⁾ thus the suspect would not escape the ICC prosecutions, even with a presidential status. However, an undeniable possibility is that the Kenyan Government could protect the elected president from arrest and prosecution. This would result into inconceivable dismay for the PEV victims who strongly believe that the ICC is their only hope for acquiring justice for the crimes committed during the PEV of 2007-8. 

The Pre-Chamber trials: An overview

The initial Pre-Chamber II trials were divided into two: one comprised of the three leaders of the ODM party and the other included the remaining three individuals accused of committing atrocious acts against the ODM party supporters.

(1) Prosecutor vs. Hussein Ali, Francis Muthaura and Uhuru Kenyatta

Following the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II summonses to appear against the six men on 8 March 2011, all the suspects obliged and made their initial appearances as stipulated. Ali, Kenyatta and Muthaura made their first appearance at the ICC on 8 April 2011. There was tangible evidence to show that two of the three suspects were guilty of the crimes they were being accused of. The prosecution alleged that Ali, Kenyatta and Muthaura “committed or contributed” to the killing of the ODM supporters, the banishment or “forceful transfer” of ODM supporters, the “rape and other forms of sexual violence against ODM supporters,” the maltreatment of civilians “based on their political affiliation” as well as other callous acts.⁽³⁵⁾

The evidence presented in Court showed that meetings were held prior to the attacks in the cities of Nakuru and Naivasha in January 2008. The Pre-Chamber concluded that Muthaura and Keyatta were indeed illegitimately responsible as they acted as indirect co-perpetrators – committed crimes through another person(s). This was in accordance “with article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute for the crimes against humanity of forcible transfer, murder, persecution, rape, and other atrocious acts.”⁽³⁶⁾ However, there was reasonable doubt to indicate that Ali was also an indirect co-perpetrator, as his contribution to the commission of the crimes was not indispensable. Nonetheless, he did contribute to the commission of the crimes in accordance with article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute. For instance, he had the power to stop the numerous police shootings, several of which were fatal, which were ongoing at the time.⁽³⁷⁾ This demonstrated failure by the police to protect the citizens amidst such chaos.

(2) Prosecutor vs. Henry Kosgey, Joshua Arap Sang and William Ruto

The second appearance involved the leaders of the ODM party: Henry Kosgey, Joshua Arap Sang and William Ruto. The three individuals made their preliminary appearance at the ICC on 7 April 2011.⁽³⁸⁾ According to the prosecution, the three men met and planned the PEV in the Rift Valley, in a town called Turbo located in the greater part of the Eldoret area, Kapsabet town as well as Nandi Hills town. As presented by the prosecution, the crimes were committed by large and organised gangs of Kalenjin youth against members of the civilian population, as part of a widespread and systematic attack to wipe out those who had any affiliation to the PNU party. In addition, the prosecutor claimed that the accused set up a network of ODM representatives, members of the media, former Kenyan police and army forces and local leaders to assist in the execution of their plans.

The Pre-Chamber concluded that Kosgey and Ruto were illegitimately responsible as they acted as indirect co-perpetrators – committed crimes through another person(s). This was in accordance “with article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute for the crimes against humanity of forcible transfer, murder and persecution.”⁽³⁹⁾ “The majority view was that there were ‘reasonable grounds to believe that the network was under responsible command and had an established hierarchy, with Ruto as leader, Kosgey as deputy leader and treasurer and Sang as responsible for communicative purposes.’”⁽⁴⁰⁾ However, as was the case with Ali, the Chamber could not find concrete evidence to show that Sang was also an indirect co-perpetrator, despite the fact that he also contributed to the commission of the crimes in accordance with article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute.⁽⁴¹⁾

The above two segments are a vivid example of how prosecutions at the ICC operate and what kind of evidence is needed to present or make a lucid case at The Hague. This is what drove the ICC’s intentions into Kenya. However, this does not mean the failure and total collapse of the judicial system in Kenya. Kenya simply lacked the evidence to show that her judicial system was able and willing to prosecute the six suspects, hence the ICC involvement.

Recent developments

In recent months, there have been rising incidences of ethnic violence in Kenya. The timing could not have been any better since these incidences are occurring towards the time when the nation is scheduled to have its first presidential and Parliamentary elections under the new constitution drafted in 2010. The March 2013 Kenyan elections will usher in a new Government structure in which Kenya will be divided into 47 counties and for each county, a regional political power will be elected. This structure of governance will necessitate the merging of several districts and ethnic boundaries. Most of the local populace feel that this modification will relinquish all the power they have over their territories and as a result, there has been a rise in ethnic tensions and violence throughout the East African nation.⁽⁴²⁾ It should not be forgotten that most of the crimes committed during the 2007 PEV, for which investigations are currently underway at The Hague were carried out because of the element of ethnic difference. Although the majority of the clashes were among the Kikuyu, Luo and the Kalenjin, violence amongst the rest of Kenya’s ethnic tribes in the years to come should not be disregarded.

Pre-election violence in Kenya has occurred since the restitution of multiparty politics in 1992, when the Government of former President Daniel Arap Moi vigorously encouraged the Kalenjin and Masaai to fight against the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley. Most of the violence centres on issues of ownership as well as access to and use of the land. Hitherto, the main focus of the violence has been on the Rift Valley, but other communities in the Coastal Province and around Mt. Elgon also engage in constant wrangles over the land.⁽⁴³⁾ These ever-rising ethnic clashes could indicate that pre-election violence will be worse than in the past. “The scope of clashes taking place this year outline[s] a more disturbing trend than in other years.”⁽⁴⁴⁾ For instance, ethnic violence has been rampant in the Isiolo region of Northern Kenya, which is traditionally diverse and home to several different ethnic groups such as the Borana, Meru, Samburu, Somali and Turkana communities.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Particular concern has been channelled towards the Turkana people, where over 70 of them have lost their lives and 1,000 more have been displaced since the ethnic violence escalated in 2011. Hitherto, these communities have generally co-existed peacefully, with the periodic tribal violence attributed to cattle-rustling. But, disputes over territory and power due to the upcoming elections have caused some severe consequences on the traditional occupants. Some of these disputes have been considered early warning signs for ethnic violence in the Isiolo region alone. These include:

• “A history of ethnic discrimination against the Turkana;
• Deliberate destruction of Turkana land and agricultural resources;
• Indiscriminant killing of Turkana women and children;
• Systematic attacks on Turkana homes and villages, including fatal attacks, burning and looting;
• The denial of Kenyan identity cards to Turkana people – part of a vetting process that lawfully should not apply to Kenyan Turkana – by a biased committee of Borana and Government officials; and
• Violent attacks on Turkana planned by Borana politicians.”⁽⁴⁶⁾

Concluding remarks

Overall, the Kenyan Government has several times acknowledged and admitted failure with regards to addressing the PEV of 2007. Even though it had the will to acquire justice for the crimes committed, this decision seems as though it was hauled out of them, particularly when the ICC decided to take over the investigations. Even so, the ICC cannot single-handily deliver justice for all the victims of Kenya’s 2007 PEV. Indeed, a mere conviction of the six suspects who allegedly incited the violence could not possibly achieve this enormous desire. Therefore, the Kenyan Government still has to step up to see to it that a substantial amount of justice is acquired by going ahead with the local prosecutions – even though this cannot happen considering the fact that the next presidential elections are just around the corner. Nevertheless, the Kenyans ought to have learnt that influences from their leaders can either build or destroy a nation. The latter was witnessed in Kenya when some people were allowed to be persuaded by their leaders and politicians to kill in the name of land.⁽⁴⁷⁾ This incident left horrific memories which would haunt the nation and its people for a long time to come.

Similarly, the move by the ICC to prosecute just a handful of suspects should be viewed as a lesson learnt for all officials – not only in Kenya, but Africa as a whole and perhaps the rest of the world – who anticipate using their high Government positions to incite violence or PEV and expect to get away with it. Even though the ICC almost entirely prosecutes only a handful of those responsible for the crimes within its jurisdiction, additional investigations and prosecutions ought to be conducted in Kenya to broaden the accountability for the PEV.⁽⁴⁸⁾ The best way to halt such callous mannerisms and intentions from leaders is to have a very strong justice system. This system should be strong enough to also prosecute and convict even the seemingly powerful Government officials, and citizens should be aware of it to believe and trust in it.

In addition, Kenya’s leaders and citizens should take into account the likelihood of another ICC intervention if they orchestrated election violence in the future. The notion is that the ICC’s involvement in Kenya’s 2007 PEV is indeed influencing the way Kenyan politicians, citizens and institutions like the police and security agencies conduct themselves, especially in this period towards the 2013 elections, and in the years to follow. For instance, subsequent to the ICC involvement, the attitude of people in Kenya towards inciting violence seems to be changing. People are now aware that the ICC will most certainly intervene if they committed crimes against humanity such as gross human rights violations. Recently following the clashes in Tana River County, security agencies were deployed to restore order. However, they were extremely cautious and careful in the application of force. And when asked why they were not being effective, they responded that unless Cabinet gives them such permission, they will go slow. This is because they fear the intervention of the ICC and being taken to The Hague. This here is an example of the impact the ICC’s involvement in Kenya’s 2007 PEV has had on the behaviour and attitude of security forces and institutions in the country. Before the ICC intervention, these agencies were oblivious and instead got involved in gross human rights violations and got away with this kind of impunity every time.

On the other hand, the deep-rooted ethnic rivalry that engulfed several parts of Kenya following the disputed elections urgently needs to be addressed. For instance, “for the ethnic Kalenjins of Kenya's Rift Valley, the red, iron-rich soil is something worth fighting for, and many still resent the 'invasion' of other ethnic groups who bought coffee and tea plantations left after British colonial rule.”⁽⁴⁹⁾ If such tensions are left hanging, they could most certainly erupt without warning as was the case following the disputed elections. In the meantime, it is safe to say this ethnic rivalry is a time bomb waiting to explode.

Perhaps Kenyans have learnt some lessons and are not likely to resort to violence of a gross magnitude again, particularly in light of the involvement and role of the ICC in the domestic affairs of their country. However, whether they let such a crisis occur again or not solely rests in their hands.  It would be absurd if history repeated itself and they have learnt nothing or forgotten everything from the 2007 PEV experience.

Written by Catherine Akurut (1)

NOTES:

(1) Contact Catherine Akurut through Consultancy African Intelligence’s Conflict and Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) ‘Situation in Kenya’, The Hague Justice Portal, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net.
(3) Roberts, M.J., ‘Conflict analysis of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya’, September 2009, http://www.ndpmetrics.com.
(4) ‘Situation in Kenya’, The Hague Justice Portal, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net.
(5) Goldstein, J. and Rotich, J., Digitally networked technology in Kenya’s 2007-2008 post-election violence, Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2008-09, Harvard University, 2008, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu.
(6) ‘The impact of the Kenyan post-election violence the Kenyan flower export industry’, Improving Institutions for pro-poor Growth, August 2009, http://www.iig.ox.ac.uk.
(7) Somerville, K., ‘Kenya: land and communal clashes increase as country gears up for elections’, African Arguments, 20 September 2012, http://africanarguments.org.
(8) Michailof, S., Kostner, M. and Devictor, X., ‘Post-conflict recovery in Africa: an agenda for the African region’, African Region Working Paper Series. No. 30, April 2002, http://www.worldbank.org.
(9) ‘Conflict resolution, peace and reconstruction in Africa’, African Development Bank, 2008, http://www.afdb.org.
(10) Roberts, M.J., 2009, ‘Conflict analysis of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya’, http://www.ndpmetrics.com.
(11) Somerville, K., ‘Kenya: land and communal clashes increase as country gears up for elections’, African Arguments, 20 September 2012, http://africanarguments.org.
(12) ‘Situation in Kenya’, The Hague Justice Portal, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net.
(13) ‘Background note: Kenya’, US Department of State, 7 May 2012, http://www.state.gov.
(14) ‘Turning pebbles: Evading accountability for post-election violence in Kenya’, Human Rights Watch, 2011, http://www.hrw.org.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) ‘Kenya to establish a local judicial mechanism to probe violence’, The Hague Justice Portal, 14 December 2010, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net.
(19) ‘Turning pebbles: Evading accountability for post-election violence in Kenya’, Human Rights Watch, 2011, http://www.hrw.org.
(20) ‘Kenya to establish a local judicial mechanism to probe violence’, The Hague Justice Portal, 14 December 2010, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net.
(21) ‘Turning pebbles: Evading accountability for post-election violence in Kenya’, Human Rights Watch, 2011, http://www.hrw.org.
(22) Ibid.
(23) ‘Pre-Trial Chamber II: Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the cases of Prosecutor v. William Samoeiruto, Henrykiprono Kosgey, Joshua Arap Sang And Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimimuthaura, Uhuru Muigaikenyatta And Mohammed Hussein Ali’, International Criminal Court, March 31 2011,  No.: ICC-01/09-01/11 and ICC-01/09-02/11, http://www.icc-cpi.int.
(24) ‘Turning pebbles: Evading accountability for post-election violence in Kenya’, Human Rights Watch, 2011, http://www.hrw.org.
(25) ‘Kenya to establish a local judicial mechanism to probe violence’, The Hague Justice Portal, 14 December 2010, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net.
(26) ‘Turning pebbles: Evading accountability for post-election violence in Kenya’, Human Rights Watch, 2011, http://www.hrw.org.
(27) Ibid.
(28) ‘Kenya to establish a local judicial mechanism to probe violence’, The Hague Justice Portal, 14 December 2010, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net.
(29) ‘Can the ICC deliver justice to Kenyans?’, Aljazeera, 25 January 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(30) Webb, S. and Macharia, J., ‘Kenyan presidential hopefuls to face war crimes court’, Reuters, 23 January 2012, http://www.reuters.com.
(31) Somerville, K., ‘Kenya: land and communal clashes increase as country gears up for elections’, African Arguments, 20 September 2012, http://africanarguments.org.
(32) ‘Q+A: ICC to decide whether Kenyan suspects face trial’, Reuters, 17 January 2012, http://www.reuters.com.
(33) ‘President Uhuru can’t face ICC trials’, The Star, 8 October 2012, http://www.the-star.co.ke.
(34) Ibid.
(35) ‘Situation in Kenya’, The Hague Justice Portal, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net.
(36) Ibid.
(37) ‘Turning pebbles: Evading accountability for post-election violence in Kenya’, Human Rights Watch, 2011, http://www.hrw.org.
(38) ‘Situation in Kenya’, The Hague Justice Portal, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net.
(39) Ibid.
(40) Ibid.
(41) Ibid.
(42) ‘Genocide alert watch: Kenya’, The International Alliance to End Genocide, 2 May 2012, http://www.genocidewatch.org.
(43) Somerville, K., ‘Kenya: land and communal clashes increase as country gears up for elections’, African Arguments, 20 September 2012, http://africanarguments.org .
(44) Joselow, G., ‘Kenya Red Cross: clashes signal violent election year’, Voice of America, 24 August 2012, http://www.genocidewatch.org.
(45) ‘Genocide alert watch: Kenya’, The International Alliance to End Genocide, 2 May 2012, http://www.genocidewatch.org.
(46) Ibid.
(47) Baldauf, S., ‘In Kenya, the deep pull of land drove grievances – and ethnic violence’, The Christian Science Monitor, 10 December 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com.
(48) ‘Turning pebbles: Evading accountability for post-election violence in Kenya’, Human Rights Watch, 2011, http://www.hrw.org.
(49) Baldauf, S., ‘In Kenya, the deep pull of land drove grievances – and ethnic violence’, The Christian Science Monitor, 10 December 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com.