Located on the borders of Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad, Darak is valuable to local and national economies – and to violent extremists.

For over a year, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has been exerting pressure on communities and military positions in northern Cameroon’s Darak district. The group aims to extend its control beyond the Tumbuma Mantiqa region in northeast Nigeria, which serves as both a useful hideout and a fundraising hub.

Located in an isolated part of the Lake Chad Basin, Darak’s population is vulnerable. A 5 February ISWAP attack displaced over 2 000 people from Darak island. Residents are also caught in the crossfire between the insurgents and the defence and security forces.

ISWAP subjects locals to its ‘laws’, such as forcing them to pay ‘tax’ as a sign of allegiance and to provide the group with an income. And as part of their efforts to disrupt these income-generating activities and ISWAP’s movements, security forces physically abuse residents for ‘collaborating’ with the insurgents, and confiscate their property, such as canoes and phones.

ISWAP’s target area for expansion covers at least three districts: Darak, Hilé Alifa and Fotokol. With its many opportunities for cross-border trade, the whole area is strategically important to local and national economies. Its fish-rich waters and fertile land have become especially valuable as Lake Chad shrinks, as evidenced by a major border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria from 1994 to 2002.

ISWAP territory and target areas in the Lake Chad Basin

Darak island is accessible only by canoe, and is located close to ISWAP’s Tumbuma Mantiqa territory. The Darak district is a logistical and transport hub near the Nigeria-Cameroon border, and a busy centre for fishing and cross-border trade.

Along with the district’s fundraising prospects, ISWAP is attracted to the area’s weak state presence, which makes expansion a viable option. Few government officials live in Darak because the infrastructure is generally poor and frequently targeted by insurgents.

ISWAP openly spreads its propaganda at community gatherings such as weekly markets. In January, the insurgents announced that Darak was part of their dawla (state) and that no military personnel were welcome. They ordered people to address them as ‘Dan mallam’ (‘sons of the Prophet’). Their efforts to persuade residents to accept their presence include playing on the community’s shared beliefs and values, such as Islam.

During the area’s 2024 floods, ISWAP spread the message that the rising waters, which led to a proliferation of fish, were a reward from God for the jihad they were waging. The flood’s destruction of homes and infrastructure was said to be God’s punishment of apostates.

This rhetoric is generally spread at weekly markets, by word of mouth and via digital media, using imagery from ISWAP attacks to reinforce ideological adherence. Insurgents even shout slogans as they pass through villages, and talk to fishermen working the lake, who return to their communities bearing their messages.

Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research reveals that the group has appointed three Cameroonian lieutenants, Malam Abaicho, Malam Abdulrahman (from Makary) and Malam Djimé (from Tchika), whose mission is to bring the Darak area within ISWAP’s fold.

ISWAP backs up its rhetoric by presenting itself as the region’s new rulers. ISS research reveals several cases of whipping, fines, imprisonment and punitive abductions carried out since January.

In Doutché, herders were whipped and ordered to pay ₦300 000 (US$220) after an ISWAP judgment in a land dispute with a farmer. On the outskirts of Darak, herders were whipped for failing to pay their taxes on time. In Tchika, people were flogged for consuming alcohol, and farmers were beaten for entering an agricultural area without authorisation.

ISWAP hopes to gain the support of locals who have suffered security force abuses by promising to rid Darak of the military. ISS sources say the group has attacked 10 military outposts in the area since January, damaging state infrastructure and leading to the dismantling of Cameroonian military posts along the border.

These attacks aim to show the army’s inability to protect locals and weaken the social contract between the population and government. The upshot is a deterioration in civil-military relations and the closure of certain state services, including schools and health centres. ISWAP’s actions are confusing Darak residents and could indeed lead to increased support for the group.

A change in military strategy and tactics is needed. Operation Alpha, launched in 2014 by Cameroon’s army and the Multinational Joint Task Force, must be reinforced by more offensive operations aimed at clearing the area and dismantling temporary ISWAP strongholds.

This requires increasing troop numbers in Darak. Soldiers must be trained to operate in marshy, inaccessible terrain using specially-adapted military equipment. This includes: motorised canoes and tactical drones for close-range ground observation; medium altitude long-endurance drones that can fly for hours at high altitude to monitor vast territories; and armed combat drones capable of targeted strikes.

Joint military action between Cameroon and Nigeria would help secure the area on both sides of the border. Nigeria is currently conducting the Hadin Kai offensive against Boko Haram in neighbouring Borno State. This could complement a Cameroonian operation by enhancing intelligence sharing and tactical coordination.

Civil-military initiatives are also needed to foster trust and cooperation between soldiers and the population, and raise public support for state security measures. The objective should be to strengthen local communities’ resilience and reduce their vulnerability to ISWAP’s propaganda.

Allowing Darak to fall under ISWAP’s control would embolden the group, undermine the area’s hard-won sovereignty following the border dispute with Nigeria, and raise the terrorism threat in northern Cameroon.

Written by Célestin Delanga, Research Officer, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel & Abélégué Alliance Fidèle, Independent Researcher