Growing ties between the Houthis and al-Shabaab could turn Red Sea instability into a more dangerous security threat for Africa.

The United States-Israel February attack on Iran led to the Iran-backed Houthi militia of Yemen seizing territory at the entrance to the Red Sea, with grave potential consequences for Africa and the world.

Intensifying Houthi attacks on ships over the last few years had already hurt regional economies and beyond. But a permanent Houthi grip on shipping through the Red Sea would be catastrophic. And it would be aggravated by the growing alliance between the Houthis and al-Shabaab in Somalia.

Last month, the Houthis’ capture of territory in the Red Sea gave it some veto over shipping through the strategic Bab al-Mandab strait. This strait carries about 30% of global container traffic, 15% of global oil and shipping transits, and 12% of global annual trade. The other key chokepoint in the Arabian Peninsula, the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, is already partly subject to Iranian and American control.

This week, Yemen’s government, backed by a Saudi-led military coalition, recaptured some control over Bab al-Mandab. The Houthis then stepped up missile attacks on Saudi airports.

Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait

Houthi control of Bab al-Mandab might seem implausible, given foreign powers’ many navies based in nearby Djibouti. But if it recurred, ‘Houthi interdiction of the Bab el-Mandab [could] involve anti-ship missiles, [unmanned aerial vehicles], and maritime drones [unmanned surface vehicles], which are hard to defend against,’ says Sahan research group Strategic Analyst and Founding Partner Matt Bryden.

And the Houthis ‘would only have to target a handful of ships to effectively close the passage to commercial shipping’ by alarming international carriers and increasing insurance prices.

‘Houthi engagement with Somalia’s al-Shabaab means … the group could also potentially threaten freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aden. International naval forces based in Djibouti are likely to be cautious about engaging in any kinetic action against the Houthis since this would invite reprisals against their facilities in Djibouti itself – something Iran has demonstrated can be achieved with considerable impact.’

For Saudi Arabia, a Houthi stranglehold on the Red Sea is especially unacceptable. It recently completed a pipeline from its eastern oil fields to its Red Sea port of Yanbu to circumvent Iran’s control of Hormuz.

Houthi attacks on ships harmed the economies of Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somaliland even before the Houthis seized Bab al-Mandab, through reduced vessel traffic and higher freight costs and insurance premiums. Egypt is probably the biggest loser. Even in 2024, with fewer Houthi attacks on commercial shipping, Cairo lost roughly US$3.76-billion in Suez Canal revenue.

Africa is also bearing indirect economic costs from restricted Red Sea access, as it imports 98% of its refined oil products. Rising Red Sea shipping prices make African imports and exports costlier and less competitive.

Houthi military aggression also has security implications. Resumed attacks have led to increased piracy in the Gulf of Aden, says the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. It notes growing Houthi-al-Shabaab ties since early 2025, largely involving arms shipments and Houthi training of militants. ‘Al-Shabaab, in turn, supports the Houthis with … funding and less traceable routes for arms trafficking.’

The centre says the Houthis could transfer more lethal military-grade drones and missiles to al-Shabaab, increasing its power to destabilise Somalia’s government. And they could install communications and surveillance equipment on Somali territory, extending Houthi missile and drone range.

A spokesperson for the United States military’s Africa Command described the link between the two groups as ‘highly concerning’ and a ‘threat to regional stability.’ For Alan Boswell, International Crisis Group Horn of Africa Project Director, Houthi military gains and their emerging alliance with al-Shabaab reveal a larger geopolitical transformation.

‘For much of the past century, policymakers have treated the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula as separate strategic regions divided by the Red Sea. That distinction is now evaporating. Wars on one side of the sea increasingly alter the military calculations on the other.’

Another sign of this change is Sudan’s civil war, which has pitted Gulf rivals Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) against each other. Riyadh backs the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Abu Dhabi supports the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

This war has also drawn in other states, threatening regional stability. Ethiopia backs the RSF while Somalia, Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front support the SAF. Beyond the Horn, Egypt supports the SAF – as do Türkiye, Iran and Russia, David Shinn, Professorial Lecturer at George Washington University and former US ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, told ISS Today.

Some members of these opposing alliances are now warring in northern Ethiopia. ‘Middle Eastern countries’ expanding involvement in the Horn increases the risk that internal conflicts in Ethiopia and Sudan will merge into a larger regional war zone,’ Boswell warns.

African maritime expert Tim Walker believes the Houthis are seeking not so much financial gains from targeting Red Sea shipping as domestic and international legitimacy and recognition to shape the region. He is unsure whether the Houthis are supplying al-Shabaab with sophisticated missiles, or whether al-Shabaab intends to adopt a maritime strategy beyond merely benefiting from smuggling.

‘Al-Shabaab, I think rather wants to deny the air domain to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and allies. [Al-Shabaab] wants what the Houthi have and use already, and Houthi technology and training in assembling and operating drones or modifying and weaponising commercially available drones.’

But if al-Shabaab does acquire even smaller missiles, he says, ‘those might be used to shoot down AUSSOM drones or helicopters, and that would … change the air dimension of the situation in Somalia.’

The immediate priority for African coastal states, and the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development, says Walker, is ‘to disrupt the weapons smuggling and maritime transport networks sailing between Yemen and Somalia. The UN renewed the legal basis for maritime interdiction until November 2026 for weapons destined for al-Shabaab – and it’s becoming increasingly urgent.’

What is clear is that if national interests in the wider region are increasingly blurring the Middle East-Africa border, the resulting growing instability cannot be addressed by Africa alone.

Written by Peter Fabricius, Consultant, ISS Pretoria