At the constitutional and governance level, the Presidency cannot simply treat Eskom as an autonomous private corporation. The national energy system, economic growth, fiscal risk, and electricity security are all issues of national public policy. The President and Cabinet therefore have a legitimate interest in Eskom's strategic direction. The crucial question is how that influence is exercised, through which institutions, and in whose interests.

The deeper question posed by the current governance crisis is whether formal governance structures remain in place while effective decision-making is dispersed and contested due to the frequent intervention of executives, boards, ministers, political actors, regulators, and private market participants.

It is evident that the Presidency is heavily involved in influencing Eskom's restructuring and is not immune to the company's governance crisis. The more intriguing question is whether this engagement increases public accountability or adds an additional level of economic and political competition around this precious electrical asset.

Ramaphosa has spearheaded the electricity reform agenda. The Presidency, National Treasury, the Department of Electricity and Energy, Eskom, and the NTCSA formed the Eskom Restructuring Task Team in 2026. Its particular objective is to oversee Eskom's restructuring and establish a completely independent transmission system operator. In July 2026, the Phase I report was also approved by the President.

Therefore, it would be difficult to establish logically that the Presidency does not control the management of Eskom. The institutional framework within which Eskom will operate is directly affected. Is this the governance we expect and envisage for South Africa?

This does not, however, automatically indicate unlawful interference. The president and Cabinet determine the public policy of a strategic state-owned corporation. Blurred lines present a risk.

Politics should not interfere with business, operational, and fiduciary choices; however, it should guide those decisions.

It was claimed that unbundling would reduce conflicts of interest, improve transparency, and prevent rent-seeking and corruption. In the past, the government claimed that keeping Generation, Transmission, and Distribution separate would improve accountability.

However, there is an inherent paradox in this approach: a policy designed to reduce rent-seeking could open doors for more rent-seekers. If the state carries the risk while private actors capture the most attractive revenue streams, then restructuring may reproduce a form of rentier capitalism even without formally privatising Eskom.

Vertically integrated Eskom controls generation, transmission, system operation, procurement, grid access, and energy sales.

Unbundling keeps these functions apart. That has the potential to improve governance. It may, however, also open a conduit of venal contact between public institutions and private capital.

The most rational question is not whether Eskom is divided into three entities. The vital question is: Who controls the transmission system, and who controls the rules governing access to it? Transmission is the natural bottleneck of the electricity economy. You may own a power station, but if you cannot connect to the grid, your electricity has minimal commercial value. Therefore, control over grid capacity allocation, connection approvals, transmission expansion, market operations, and dispatch rules creates enormous economic power. That therefore means control over transmission and grid access is economically and politically sensitive. This can create an avenue for private sector interests, which can come in different forms: regulatory capture, political mediation of commercial opportunities, and socialisation of costs with privatisation of profits.

Private energy interests may not need to "privatise Eskom" formally. They may instead seek to influence market rules, licensing, procurement design, transmission planning, and grid connection priorities. This is more subtle than conventional privatisation. Despite being owned by the public, commercial capital is granted access to the economic value created by public assets, which are nevertheless owned by the public. That is a classic form of regulatory capture.

If access to the power market is excessively dependent on political relations, investors may seek influence rather than compete primarily through efficiency and innovation. These relations make it easier to gain a regulatory edge, which opens up business opportunities and produces extraordinary profits. Rent-seeking is based on this fundamental logic. Private interests do not always benefit financially from increasing electricity production efficiency. Because it has obtained preferred access to the grid, a limited public resource, it may generate economic rents. This is all achieved through "political mediation of commercial opportunities."

South Africa has spent substantial public funds to stabilise electricity infrastructure and assist Eskom. If these restructurings result in the state retaining legacy debt, the public funding transmission infrastructure, consumers paying for network expansion, and Eskom carrying stranded or devalued assets while profitable generation opportunities increasingly accrue to private investors, we may have the socialisation of historic costs and risks along with the privatisation of future profitable opportunities.

Private participation is not inherently harmful when earnings and risk are equitably distributed. The question is who assumes risk and, conversely, who benefits? Unbridled-related governance crises are more risky than regular corporate governance crises. Because the business is being reconstructed, not just managed. Inadequate governance might lead to path dependency. It is difficult to readjust the market structure after it has been established. On the basis of that framework, private investors make investments, contracts are signed, financing agreements are finalised, and regulatory expectations solidify. As a result, decisions made today about governance may decide for decades who receives rents from the electrical business.

Eskom's Board Chairperson and President should be evaluated rationally and critically. Involvement of the president in Eskom cannot be questioned. Due to Eskom's strategic importance, some degree of presidential policy coordination cannot be avoided. Whether the Presidency's involvement fosters good public governance or creates an opaque political layer between official shareholders, the Eskom board, management, regulators, and new private interests is the real question. That is precisely the test for good governance.

The relevant minister has traditionally held the formal shareholder role, and the Presidency's electricity crisis task team facilitates policy implementation throughout government. However, presidential structures have also been directly tasked with spearheading and managing the reorganisation process. The question then arises of who will be held responsible if something goes wrong.

The likelihood of diffuse accountability increases with the number of political authority centers. Additionally, because it is difficult to hold each member accountable, diffuse accountability fosters rent-seeking. Perhaps this diffusion of accountability should be considered when evaluating Eskom Chairperson's assertion.

Was Nyati speaking as the Chairperson of Eskom voicing justifiable concerns about corporate governance about a decision that significantly impacts Eskom's assets, liabilities, and future viability, or was he speaking as a political player opposing government policy? Therefore, if the Board Chairperson expresses concerns over restructuring, it may be detrimental to corporate governance to conceal the Board's inquiry. Who is in charge of Eskom, the executive structure set up by the political executive or the Board created by corporate law? As a result, it makes sense to view Eskom unbundling as a political and economic restructuring of the electrical sector that purports to be an efficiency-driven change.

The primary question is whether unbundling will lead to an electrical system that is transparently regulated and genuinely competitive or if it will provide new institutional opportunities for politically connected business interests to acquire important parts of the power value chain.

Private participation alone does not provide the answer. Private investment may be financially advantageous. Equal and transparent grid access, independent regulation and system operation, competitive rather than politically mediated procurement, a clear division between policymakers and commercial beneficiaries, no transfer of public assets, risks, or liabilities on preferential terms, complete disclosure of beneficiaries and conflicts of interest, and clear parliamentary and public accountability for the restructuring process are the true empirical tests.

The irony is especially noticeable because the administration first proposed unbundling as a way to strengthen defences against corruption and rent-seeking. Consequently, a rent-seeking audit of the unbundling process itself is now required. "Will unbundling make Eskom more efficient?" shouldn't be the only question. It should additionally be, "Who gains new rights, access, contracts, assets, and market power as Eskom is unbundled—and were those gains obtained through transparent competition or through political and institutional influence?"

This is where a focus becomes especially potent: Eskom's unbundling and governance problems could be two aspects of the same political-economic issue—the conflict over who owns and profits from the economic rents ingrained in South Africa's electrical infrastructure.

Written by Bongani Mankewu, Director of the InfraFIN