The contested Presidential elections in November 2010 provided the impetus for a violent and prolonged expression of ethnic, religious, and regional tension. This tension highlights social divisions that have become a definitive part of the Ivorian social landscape since independence. The standoff between incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and President-elect Alassane Ouattara led supporters of either side to resort to a level of brutality, which strongly echoed the civil war of 2002-2007. Over 3,000 people were killed and 1 million displaced in the fighting that continued even after Gbagbo’s arrest by forces loyal to Ouattara.⁽²⁾

In July 2011, Ouattara authorised a National Commission of Inquiry as well as a Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR) based on South Africa’s post-Apartheid transition.⁽³⁾ The mandate of the commission is to uncover the truth of crimes committed by both sides, and to hear the evidence of victims and perpetrators in an open environment.⁽⁴⁾ Progress has been slow, and the accomplishments of the judicial process have been curtailed by continued violence on both sides, as well as accusations of impunity for those connected to the current Government.⁽⁵⁾

Schisms within Ivorian society have historical roots that make reconciliation more difficult. The northern and southern regions of Côte d’Ivoire remain crudely divided by religion and ethnicity. Through successive governments under Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Laurent Gbagbo, the southern population, largely composed of Kwa and Kru tribes, has developed a suspicion of the predominantly Islamic north, where Gour and Mandé tribes are the majority. The notion of Ivoirité was developed by Houphouët-Boigny and continued under Gbagbo as a means of blaming social ills and unrest on the perceived foreign identity of the north. Ouattara himself was barred from the elections in 2000 due to his perceived Burkinabé origin. Developing a judicial process that does not exacerbate these divisions has proved a difficult task for the CDVR.

Gbagbo at the ICC

Reconciliation has been further complicated by the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into war crimes authorised by Gbagbo.⁽⁶⁾ The former president, whose refusal to cede power to Ouattara and thus encouraged prolonged violence,⁽⁷⁾ faces charges of inciting crimes against humanity, rape, and murder. Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng has warned that he faces a lengthy jail sentence if found guilty.⁽⁸⁾

If charges are upheld, Gbagbo would become the first former head of state to be tried by the ICC in its 10-year history. This would be of great historical significance for the court and ICC officials are eager to ensure Gbagbo’s continued presence in The Hague. Court prosecutors have turned down an appeal for leave on compassionate grounds, as he is considered likely to abscond.⁽⁹⁾ His lawyers deny claims that Gbagbo would seek to return to power in the country he ran for 10 years.⁽¹⁰⁾ United Nations (UN) experts have presented a report to the Security Council, which claims that supporters of the former president have been raising funds from across Europe to facilitate his release.⁽¹¹⁾

Attacks by Gbagbo’s supporters, who have been outraged by his detention, have been met with heavy handed reprisals from the Ivorian police and security forces. This gives credence to those who believe that no political solution to the current crisis can be found without the active participation of Laurent Gbagbo, and that this is impossible whilst he remains detained at the ICC.⁽¹²⁾ This does not seem plausible. Gbagbo was intransigent on the subject of politically brokered solutions during the post-election fighting, preferring to allow his supporters to take violent action against Ouattara’s followers. His re-emergence into the Ivorian political scene would only lend plausibility to his claims to power, which have been rejected by international observers of the election. It would also give a rallying cause for his supporters, whose struggle against the new Government would be further prolonged and become increasingly violent.

Partial justice encourages suspicion

At the domestic level, Charles Konan Banny, a prime minister under Gbagbo, is leading the commission. Opposition supporters see Banny as too closely linked to Ouattara, with whom he worked at the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). Gbagbo loyalists believe, with some reason, that an ally of the president will be unlikely to properly investigate accusations against Ouattara and those that fought for him after the election.⁽¹³⁾ This accusation gained traction following the March 2012 publication of a UN report that shows all 148 of those formally charged during the domestic judicial process fought for Gbagbo.⁽¹⁴⁾ This comes despite the clear implication of Ouattara’s forces in cases of murder and rape during the conflict. It also comes despite Ouattara’s vow to Prime Minister Jeannot Kouadio Ahoussou that all those responsible for “reprehensible acts during the post-election crisis will answer for their actions before justice.”⁽¹⁵⁾

Figures within the Government deny that the process has become one-sided and maintain that the CDVR is doing the best job possible to remain impartial with the resources available. Commission spokesman Franck Kouassi Sran has stated, “If we haven’t deployed all of our actions, it's because we're being held back by a lack of resources.”⁽¹⁶⁾ It is certainly true that a lack of resources will inhibit the full dispensation of justice. This is an enormous task, where a whole state has been implicated in a national crisis. Individually identifying victims and perpetrators in a crisis that displaced a million people is far beyond the capability of the commission.⁽¹⁷⁾ This is why high-profile cases are properly within the remit of the ICC without imposing on national sovereignty. It does not follow, however, that a lack of resources should lead to the politicised prioritisation of some cases over others.

Partial justice that lends a positive bias to the incumbent Government can only serve to deepen the divisions in Ivorian society. Communities of different religions, ethnicities and geographies will not learn to trust each other in a politically biased environment. The purpose of the commission is to uncover the truth and provide for the reconciliation of previously antagonistic groups. Well-founded accusations of favouritism during this process will be counter-productive. There are, however, some indications of judicial parity within emerging commission inquiries. The National Commission of Inquiry has recently published a report, sanctioned by Ouattara, which accuses his forces of responsibility for over 700 deaths during the crisis.⁽¹⁸⁾ This is a positive sign, but it remains to be seen whether these findings will lead to formal charges. According to Minister of Justice, Loma Matto Cissé, wide ranging legal reforms are expected by the end of 2012, which will allow for further prosecution on both sides.⁽¹⁹⁾

No reconciliation on a battlefield

Peace is a prerequisite of reconciliation. Unless fighting has ceased, it does not make sense to attempt to heal the wounds that fighting has caused. The initial stages of the judicial process may have prevented these wounds from healing. Pro-Gbagbo groups feel threatened and targeted by a legal process that has so far seen them as the sole perpetrators of crimes committed in the post-election violence. They see this as victor’s justice and some have sought to retaliate.

Pro-Gbagbo militia groups have recruited soldiers to fight the Ivorian Republican Forces (FRCI). These militia groups have launched attacks on civilian groups and public buildings.⁽²⁰⁾ On 5 and 6 August 2012, unidentified armed men attacked an army base and a police station in the Yopougon district of the country’s main city, Abidjan.⁽²¹⁾ The men killed 11 members of the FRCI and escaped with a cache of weapons, including machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.⁽²²⁾ There have been further attacks on police stations in Abidjan as well as Noe, near the Ghanaian border. Senior members of the Ouattara Government have raised fears that militia groups are gathering and training across the Ghanaian border, in order to launch a sustained offensive. These fears have led to repeated closures of the main southern border crossing at Elubo.⁽²³⁾

Attacks on state infrastructure and the fear that weapons procurement may lead to a sustained attack, have understandably worried the Ouattara administration and the armed forces. This has led to retributive action. Human rights groups such as the Ivorian League of Human Rights (LIDHO) have now warned that, in a climate such as this where peace has not yet been achieved, a judicial inquiry may risk serving as cover for the illegal treatment of those perceived to be involved. The worry is that attempts to mete out justice before peace has been achieved will inhibit the impartiality of that justice and its respect for legal due process. Justice through the reprisal of violence will only serve to deepen the wounds that the election re-opened.

Given the deeply entrenched divisions within Ivorian society, there is a high risk that blame will be apportioned not to individuals, but to groups. This attribution of blame has manifested in retaliatory behaviour by Ouattara’s security forces against those perceived to be part of pro-Gbagbo factions. There is evidence of large-scale detention without charge. More than 200 people, many of them members of Gbagbo’s political party, the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) have been detained,⁽²⁴⁾ and many have reported torture at the hands of the Ivorian police. According to Amnesty International, some detainees have been held for months without charge, whilst others have been released in exchange for cash payments.⁽²⁵⁾ National human rights groups such as LIDHO have expressed concern that the Ouattara Government is not sufficiently committed to following the rule of law in its pursuit of justice.⁽²⁶⁾ Even within the CDVR, there is some concern that these arrests are counter-productive to the judicial process. Ouattara Karim, a youth advisor to the Commission has warned that such arrests may complicate the reconciliation process, as they will be seen as retributive acts, which do not promote dialogue and reconciliation.⁽²⁷⁾

The most severe cases recorded by LIDHO include the arrest of a police officer, Serge Hervé Kribié, by the FRCI in the western town of San Pedro. Kribié was interrogated, stripped naked, tied to a pole, covered in water and then subjected to electric shocks. He died shortly after his torture.⁽²⁸⁾ Amnesty have reported attacks at a camp for internally displaced persons near the western town of Duékoué, which housed members of the Guere ethnic group, which is seen as pro-Gbagbo. Up to six people are thought to have died in the assault.⁽²⁹⁾ There have also been attacks on the headquarters of the FPI, as well as the offices of pro-Gbagbo newspaper, Le Temps.⁽³⁰⁾ Traditional hunting groups known as Dozos have been recruited to act as a state-backed militia, Amnesty reports.⁽³¹) There is likely to be truth in the accusations that FPI supporters have launched violent campaigns against state infrastructure, but this cannot serve as an excuse for military reprisal against the opposition. During a time of national inquiry into widespread criminality at the hands of the previous head of state, Ouattara must be seen to respect the rule of law.

It is understandable that Ouattara’s security forces want to quell any signs of rebellion before they take hold within the country. However, such action, as is described above, will severely discredit the peace process and will serve to further alienate sections of society that have suffered from Gbagbo’s removal from power. As Ivorian reggae star Alpha Blondy, who has enormous political sway within the country, has urged,⁽³²⁾ it may be wise for Ouattara to release detainees who are not facing murder charges. This will not only relieve some of the financial burden, but also display a willingness to forgive that is an essential element of the reconciliation process.

Conclusion

The rehabilitation of a nation that has endured some level of civil war for the last decade will be slow. Divisions will not heal overnight. Attacks by pro-Gbagbo groups have been rightly condemned and will slow the healing process by blurring the distinction between past and present crimes. The attacks serve to highlight the fact that Côte d’Ivoire may not be ready to begin the reconciliation process. The actions of the militia have been partly encouraged by the perception of a biased judicial system. A truth and reconciliation process cannot be successful when the emergent truth is one-sided. The violent reprisals consisting of illegal detention, torture, and attacks on opposition party members display frailties within the Ouattara administration and will deepen the mistrust that is inhibiting justice.

The first action Ouattara must take is to reform the armed forces, which have been divided over years of conflict.⁽³³⁾ In uniting the army and bringing it under the total control of the state, Ouattara can ensure greater levels of accountability for their actions, which will be necessary for a peaceful reconciliation process. Ouattara must publicly condemn violent acts committed in his name with the same fervour that he condemns those committed against him. Finally, the disarmament process, which was complicated by the influx of arms following the election, must be resumed with greater vigour if peace is to be achieved. If these aims are achieved, the goal of reconciliation, which has so far proved unattainable, will become more realistic.

Written by Fred Saugman ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact Fred Saugman through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Conflict and Terrorism unit (conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) ‘Gbagbo being held by Ouattara forces’, Al Jazeera, 12 April 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(3) ‘Ivory Coast truth commission not working’, BBC news, 3 August 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(4) ‘Cote d’Ivoire: Hard road to reconciliation’, IRIN, 20 July 2012, http://www.irinnews.org.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Schwebel, X., ‘National truth and reconciliation: A long road ahead for Cote d’Ivoire’, Caritas, 24 October 2011, http://www.caritas.org.
(7) ‘Ivory Coast leader: All fighters must disarm’, Associated Press, 4 December 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com.
(8) Escritt, T., ‘Ivory Coast ex-leader Gbagbo to stay in detention: ICC judges’, Reuters, 26 October 2012, http://www.reuters.com.
(9) Ibid.
(10) ‘Former Ivorian leader Gbagbo fights ICC for freedom’, Vanguard, 31 October 2012, http://www.vanguardngr.com.
(11) Ibid.
(12) ‘La reconciliation Ivorienne, impossible avec gbagbo à la CPI’, Slate Afrique, 6 November 2012, http://www.slateafrique.com.
(13) Bouverie, J., ‘The Ivory Coast: In search of impartial justice’, Think Africa Press, 15 August 2012, http://thinkafricapress.com.
(14) ‘Special report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire’, United Nations Security Council, 29 March 2012, http://reliefweb.int.
(15) ‘Pro-Ouattara forces killed 700 in I.Coast crisis: report’, ReliefWeb, 9 August 2012, http://reliefweb.int.
(16) ‘Ivory Coast truth commission not working’, BBC news, 3 August 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(17) Corey-Boulet, R., ‘Ivory Coast’s Truth Commission: No reconciliation on a battlefield’, Think Africa Press, 14 September 2012, http://thinkafricapress.com.
(18) Bouverie, J., ‘The Ivory Coast: In search of impartial justice’, Think Africa Press, 15 August 2012, http://thinkafricapress.com.
(19) ‘Cote d’Ivoire trials could begin by end of year, minister says’, UNDP, 25 October 2012, http://www.undp.org.
(20)  ‘Cote d’Ivoire: Hard road to reconciliation’, IRIN, 20 July 2012, http://www.irinnews.org.
(21) ‘Ivory Coast: The respect for fundamental freedoms, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary must be guaranteed’, FIDH, 10 September 2012, http://www.fidh.org.
(22) ‘Ivory Coast violence: Gbagbo allies attacked Abidjan’, BBC news, 7 August 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(23) ‘Cote d’Ivoire closes border again’, Modern Ghana, 26 September 2012, http://www.modernghana.com.
(24) ‘Cote d’Ivoire: Time to put an end to the cycle of reprisals and revenge’, Amnesty International, 26 October 2012, http://www.amnesty.org.
(25) Bavier, J., ‘Ivory Coast illegally arrested, tortured more than 200: Amnesty’, Reuters, 26 October 2012, http://www.reuters.com.
(26) ‘Réconciliation an Côte d’Ivoire: Bien mais peut mieuxfaire, note la Ligue Ivorienne des droits de l’homme’, RFI, 18 July 2012, http://www.rfi.fr.
(27) ‘Cote d’Ivoire: Hard road to reconciliation’, IRIN, 20 July 2012, http://www.irinnews.org.
(28) ‘Cote d’Ivoire: Time to put an end to the cycle of reprisals and revenge’, Amnesty International, 26 October 2012, http://www.amnesty.org.
(29) ‘More than 200 held and tortured in Cote d’Ivoire’, Mail and Guardian, 27 October 2012, http://mg.co.za.
(30)  ‘Ivory Coast: The respect for fundamental freedoms, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary must be guaranteed’, FIDH, 10 September 2012, http://www.fidh.org.
(31) ‘More than 200 held and tortured in Cote d’Ivoire’, Mail and Guardian, 27 October 2012, http://mg.co.za.
(32) ‘Cote d’Ivoire music star calls for release of pro-Gbagbo detainees’, Global Times, 5 November 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn.
(33) ‘Cote d’Ivoire: Facing insecurity with unreformed army’, IRIN, 17 October 2012, http://www.irinnews.org.