Chad’s rapprochement clashes with its recent emphasis on national sovereignty and risks reviving insecurity among neighbours and disillusionment at home.

Chad and France appear to be reviving a longstanding military partnership that N’Djamena abruptly ended in November 2024. The rapprochement reflects enduring mutual interests, but also the limits of Chad’s efforts to diversify its security partnerships. How Chad manages France’s return without undermining its sovereignty claims or its Sahelian relations will be the critical test.

The two have enjoyed military cooperation since the mid-1960s, after Chad’s independence from France. Ties broke between September 1975 and March 1976, and again in November 2024. Since March 2026, all signs point to a resurgence in relations.

The countries’ military cooperation has been based on shared interests. Many Chadian officers were trained in French academies and on the ground in Chad. France provided weapons, personal protective equipment, armoured vehicles, communications equipment and logistical support. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assistance was delivered across Chad’s vast territory, along with participation on the battlefield. France also regularly backed Chad politically and diplomatically.

For France, Chad’s location offers numerous advantages as a forward operating base in Central Africa and the Sahel, enabling significant military projection and influence in both regions.

Despite this convergence of interests, the cooperation has been characterised by many ups and downs. At the heart of the 1975 breakdown were France’s unilateral actions to secure the release of a French citizen kidnapped by rebels, and the unauthorised overflight of Chadian territory.

The November 2024 split came when Chad indicated it would fully assert its sovereignty and seek alternative security partnerships, as its neighbours were doing. The Central African Republic had already rejected France in favour of Russia. Then Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – the Alliance of Sahel (AES) states that withdrew from West Africa’s regional bloc ECOWAS in 2025 – turned to Russia, expelling France and other Western partners.

The AES states, along with Chad and Mauritania, had been members of the G5 Sahel security and development framework created in 2014 under France’s auspices. Its joint military force targeted local jihadist groups, but was dissolved in 2023 when the AES countries severed ties with France.

Although the failure of Western security cooperation was a factor, the main reason for these rifts was the African countries’ sovereigntist and anti-imperialist rhetoric. This sentiment also informed Chad’s 2024 decision to end its military cooperation with France. Like the AES countries, Chad also withdrew from the International Criminal Court, citing similar arguments.

During the transition away from France, Chad diversified its military cooperation. An attempt with Russia didn’t prosper. Cooperation with Türkiye led to the acquisition of armoured vehicles, drones, training and technical assistance, and a presence in the country.

Since 2021, Chad and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have signed several agreements, including a cooperation pact in June 2023, resulting in donations of military vehicles, security equipment and training. In exchange, the UAE could use Chad’s bases to transfer equipment to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Hungary has also signed economic and military cooperation agreements with Chad.

Despite these new alliances, Chad’s split from France was short-lived, for two reasons. First, the alternative military partnerships are based on more transactional relationships focused on specific issues, rather than the near-permanent, multifaceted support that Paris previously offered.

Turkey’s approach involves arms sales, targeted training and air links, rather than direct intervention when required. The UAE provides financial and material support, but cannot operate on the ground. Plus, its engagement in Sudan in support of the RSF is becoming increasingly problematic for Chad diplomatically. Mounting security challenges faced by the AES countries that rely on Russia’s support make Moscow an unattractive prospective partner.

Second, despite the August 2022 Doha Agreement that Chad’s government signed with around 30 opposition and rebel groups, other security threats persist. These include the spillover of Sudan’s conflict and the emergence of the rebel Movement for Peace, Reconstruction and Progress in the southern Moyen-Chari province. These threats, along with Boko Haram’s continued presence in the Lake Chad area, highlight the need for better territorial surveillance and aerial intelligence.

For France, the rapprochement is a golden opportunity to re-establish ties in the region. However, this new cooperation is likely to differ from past agreements. France is adopting a more low-key approach with no official communication on developments, even though its forces have already been deployed in Chad.

France’s new Africa strategy features reduced personnel and equipment. In Chad, that would mean a liaison detachment with around 600 French troops (compared to 2 300 before), and less materiel and equipment. A lighter footprint would enable France to adopt a more strategically and intelligently conceived multi-alignment approach. This may again result in Chad becoming overly dependent on France’s military support.

Domestically, this could represent a step backwards for Chad. Public opinion is likely to interpret the move as abandoning the sovereigntist narrative and allowing a revival of France’s ‘Françafrique’ approach to controlling its former African colonies. This runs contrary to public sentiment in Chad, especially among the youth. In the region, Chad’s Sahel neighbours will likely again see the country as France’s stooge and as a threat.

France’s reduced footprint means it will undoubtedly have less influence, leaving Chad free to continue benefitting from support from other countries. However, the national agenda remains the most important consideration. How Chad capitalises on these partnerships without limiting them to ensuring the regime’s political survival remains a fundamental question.

To guarantee Chad’s stability and security, its government must further ease internal political tensions. This has already begun with the recent presidential pardon for imprisoned opposition leaders, outreach to rebel movements still operating in the bush under the Doha Agreement, and improvements in economic governance.

Finally, Chad should continue to reassure its neighbours of its support, as it has in the past. Proactive diplomacy, sustained cooperation and a return to a genuinely neutral position on Sudan are vital. This would affirm Chad’s constructive stance in seeking solutions to regional conflicts rather than fuelling them.

Written by Remadji Hoinathy, Senior Researcher, Central Africa and Lake Chad Basin, ISS