The Northern Sea Route could bypass African ports, but shifting trade patterns present opportunities to strengthen maritime and logistics networks.

Global warming and rising sea surface temperatures are making the Northern Sea Route (NSR) connecting Asia with Europe via the Arctic increasingly commercially viable. The route was previously largely blocked by thick, hard-to-navigate ice.

On 15 August, the Dubai Tower container ship left China’s Ningbo port, arriving at Britain’s Teesport on 9 September. Part of a new seasonal container service between China and northern Europe, this shorter route – dubbed the Ice Silk Road – has advantages over the Suez Canal and Cape Route, with implications for Africa.

Although its long-term sustainability remains unclear, and the route may not be fully viable for year-round commercial shipping soon, the NSR’s opportunities are obvious.

Before the recent Red Sea disruptions, around 15% of global maritime trade and 30% of global container trade passed through the Suez Canal. Much of this traffic now moves around South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, extending the usual travel time by up to 14 days. The whole journey can take over 40 days. The NSR is approximately 40% shorter than traditional routes.

The NSR also avoids chokepoints such as South-East Asia’s Strait of Malacca and Bab al-Mandab between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, which are vulnerable to maritime insecurity and navigation disruptions. The World Shipping Council reported 120 attacks globally between November 2023 and January 2026, with the Bab al-Mandab Strait the hotspot. The Strait of Hormuz blockages due to the United States (US)-Israel war on Iran have exacerbated the risks.

The Strait of Malacca and Gulf of Aden bordering northern Somalia have long been associated with piracy and armed robbery at sea, heightening insecurity along the traditional Asia-Europe shipping route. A related impact is growing insurance costs as major insurers reprice their risk, in many cases tenfold.

Finally, the NSR is much cooler, benefitting cold chain logistics, particularly for agricultural and electronics goods. This will become increasingly significant in a rapidly warming world.

Climate change impact is a double-edged sword for the Arctic. The same warming that reduces sea ice cover and makes routes such as the NSR more accessible is also reshaping navigation risks. Retreating ice leaves larger areas of open water over which waves can build, contributing to rougher seas, while thinner ice is more easily broken up and displaced by Arctic cyclones.

There are also other considerations. Greater accessibility will increase the Arctic’s geopolitical importance. The NSR runs largely along Russia’s Arctic coast and depends heavily on that country’s infrastructure and icebreaker capacity, potentially replacing Middle East geopolitical risks with greater dependence on Russia.

At the same time, growing competition over the Arctic is evident with United States President Donald Trump’s renewed push for control of Greenland.

The impact on Africa is less clear. The NSR could mean African ports are bypassed in the movement of cargo between China – and eventually other Asian nations – and Europe. Currently, the Suez Canal and Egypt could stand to lose the most.

As for the rest of Africa, the NSR may have a lesser economic impact. The current uptick in shipping diverted around the Cape of Good Hope has led to increased investments and demand for bunkering and services in a few countries, specifically Namibia and Mauritius.

However, the evidence suggests that more traffic has not delivered economic opportunities for African economies more broadly. Rounding the Cape does not, by itself, generate transit revenue, and vessels tend to obtain supplies, fuel and maintenance elsewhere without stopping at African ports.

This lack of revenue makes it difficult to cover the increased costs of surveillance, search-and-rescue, and pollution monitoring due to higher traffic around the Cape. So, if traffic shifts north, the immediate economic impact may be limited.

Either way, African states may not be entirely sidelined by the NSR. Major trade players could invest in alternative maritime routes to reduce their dependence on any single corridor – and, in the NSR’s case, on Russia and Arctic navigation conditions.

Take China’s approach. President Xi Jinping signed agreements with Egypt in September to expand Chinese investment in the Suez Canal Economic Zone. This points to a longer-term view of a post-Iran war scenario and the restoration of a safer Red Sea route. Along with Chinese investments in the NSR, Beijing is positioning itself across several maritime corridors. Other countries could well do the same.

The Suez’s strategic importance will likely endure, while the Cape will probably be relegated to the third-best route between Asia and Europe. Still, the Cape Route has the benefit of remaining open year-round and does not face seasonal or geopolitical constraints.

Africa’s challenge is to avoid remaining on the sidelines as the global shipping system adjusts to the NSR.

Keeping the Cape of Good Hope available does not necessarily require substantial new investment in African ports, as vessels can continue passing without calling. Instead, African states should become part of the logistics networks that develop around these routes. Doing so requires a proactive and systemic approach to maritime governance.

Singapore, a key player in global shipping, offers a useful comparison. It has been preparing for changes to established maritime routes by developing Arctic shipping expertise, including vessels capable of ice navigation and icebreakers, while exploring opportunities in Arctic port development. At the same time, it ensures the competitiveness and capacity of its own maritime hub.

African states cannot compete with Singapore on the same terms, but they can determine whether they benefit from the changes the NSR brings.

The development of the NSR shows that investment in sea-based logistics is increasing. The carrying capacity of vessels, combined with the decarbonisation of shipping, will boost this mode of transport in a globalised economy.

Africa’s port development, together with inland logistics infrastructure, would not only attract extra-African trade but also enable intra-African trade under the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement. Both would help achieve the continent’s Agenda 2063 ambitions.

Written by Dhesigen Naidoo, Research Associate, Climate Risk and Human Security Project, ISS Pretoria & Denys Reva, Researcher, Transnational Threats and Organised Crime, ISS Pretoria