The Horn’s proliferating diplomatic appointments have done little to bolster African influence amid new Middle Eastern alliances.

In September, Ansarullah (the Houthis) took control of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, shattering the assumption that the insurgency was confined to northern Yemen. The group is now at the epicentre of the Middle East conflict and is the channel through which crises flow between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.

Countries on either side of the Red Sea have responded asymmetrically to this shared shock. The Horn has dispatched more envoys while Middle Eastern countries, led by Saudi Arabia, are strengthening political institutions and hardwiring them with military deals. These include the newly signed Mecca Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA) and the politically oriented 14-member Multinational Maritime Defense Coalition (MMDC).

Although the Red Sea has a history of instability, current upheavals are distinct. Ansarullah is not only at war with the Saudi Arabia-backed Yemeni government, but is linked to the Israel-Hamas conflict, the Israel-United States war with Iran, and escalating conflicts in the Horn. These interwoven crises require equally interlinked responses from both shores of the Red Sea.

Red Sea and bordering countries

The assertion by Iran, commentators and Ansarullah itself that its conflict is solely with Saudi Arabia is untenable. Iran’s strategy of hedging its bets across the Middle East has enabled Ansarullah to evolve from an ally targeting Yemen’s government into a self-tasking surrogate whose operations also serve Iran’s interests. Having cultivated Ansarullah, Iran did not need to act on its earlier threat to close Bab al-Mandab.

Ansarullah’s deepening ties with al-Shabaab have helped transform the Yemeni group from a transnational criminal actor involved in smuggling and illicit financial activity into a force choking a Red Sea gateway carrying nearly 15% of global trade. The two Islamist groups now run a corridor of instability, migration and economic disruption from Tehran to Nairobi and Kampala.

The Horn of Africa’s four biggest conflict hotspots – Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia – have become intertwined with Middle Eastern crises. Although conflicts on both sides of the Red Sea stem from local grievances, Middle Eastern actors are the main drivers of conflict in the Horn. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) alone is entangled with Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan and has multi-purpose investments in every country in the Horn.

In the past, the Horn’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the League of Arab States coordinated over Somalia’s crisis and conflict resolution in Sudan. But countries on either side of the Red Sea are now using markedly different tools to address their shared challenges.

In March, the AU designated former Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete as its High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Kikwete, who opted to focus on South Sudan, joined a crowded field of IGAD envoys already deployed in the Horn – covering Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. Others include the Special Envoy for the Red Sea and Maritime Affairs, and the AU High Representative for Sudan.

A corresponding bench of envoys from outside Africa also covers the Horn – from the UN, EU, China, Germany, Japan, France, Norway, United Kingdom, Netherlands and Switzerland. While each is responsible for a piece of the interconnected conflict resolution puzzle, this ‘envoyflation’ adds little leverage to individual portfolios or to the Horn’s stability. Instead, Horn envoys and their external partners shuttle between capitals, with little progress to show.
 

By contrast, Middle Eastern countries are moving away from institutions such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, in favour of political-military frameworks. Although there are envoys in the region, they represent external powers, the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU), not Middle Eastern countries.

The MMDC, established to safeguard freedom of navigation, was launched in Saudi Arabia on 30 July with members including Red Sea and non-Red Sea countries in Africa, the Arab world and Asia.

While it includes Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan, the exclusion of IGAD highlights the Horn’s limited regional control over its coastline. This was already evident from Turkey’s wardenship of Somalia’s maritime defence, the UAE’s port expansion in the region and numerous countries’ military bases in Djibouti. Eritrea’s absence from the MMDC reflects its rejection of military solutions to Yemen’s conflict.

Days after launching the MMDC, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan unveiled the MJDA on 7 August. Conspicuously, it excludes Horn countries but includes non-Red Sea Pakistan and Turkey. On 5 October, Saudi Arabia conducted its first military operation against Ansarullah within the MJDA framework.

Both the MJDA and MMDC exclude landlocked Ethiopia and the UAE, which could weaken these frameworks. The exclusions reflect a political dispute over which countries qualify as Red Sea states – a debate that has undermined IGAD’s Red Sea efforts. Eritrea’s departure from IGAD in December 2025 further limits the organisation’s diplomatic leverage over the coastline.

Ethiopia, meanwhile, wants access to the Red Sea but faces opposition from Eritrea and Egypt, a founding MMDC member. This conflates Nile water disputes with disputes over the definition of the Red Sea.

The Horn has military institutions that could help secure the Red Sea. The East Africa Standby Force and Eastern Africa Fusion and Liaison Unit could have complemented IGAD’s efforts, but neither has a maritime focus. Consequently, African envoys are increasingly relegated to ‘managing’ inland conflicts, while their external counterparts are oriented towards the Red Sea.

Envoyflation reflects IGAD and the AU’s political inertia and financial weakness. Envoys are appointed in temporary posts and rely on external donor funding. In the Horn, this has led to fragmented responses and the exclusion of African actors from conflict resolution efforts. Middle Eastern states, by comparison, largely fund their own interventions.

AU and IGAD efforts to institutionalise their position on the Red Sea and engage with the League of Arab States were appropriate steps. However, the league has also been weakened by the altered context.

Going forward, the AU and IGAD should be ready to capitalise on emerging opportunities, reconceptualise their maritime mechanisms, streamline existing diplomatic efforts and work closely with their Middle Eastern partners

Written by Moses Chrispus Okello, Senior Researcher, Horn of Africa Security Analysis, ISS Addis Ababa