From a political point of view the country is obviously preoccupied with the local government elections which take place on a nation-wide basis on 18 May. At this stage, while some interesting trends are emerging, it is premature to make any serious observations. The one issue which is central is the delivery of essential services. This is, as was pointed out in the previous Insight, a major problem throughout the country; and the political implications are heightened by the generally accepted perception that service delivery is best in the Western Cape, which happens to be the only province controlled by the Democratic Alliance.

In the Insight which appeared on 19 April, and which focused on the death of service delivery protester Andries Tatane at the hands of the police, we raised the whole question of accountability. We pointed out that when Peter Bruce, editor of Business Day, demanded that the National Commissioner of Police General Bheki Cele be dismissed by the end of that week, he was relying on the existence of accountability – as was Andries Tatane in his protestations against poor or non-existent delivery of services.

Accountability is essentially what defines constitutional democracy – and here the country from a political point of view is failing dismally. How to remedy this? Part of the answer lies in leadership. But it is also a matter of the ruling party's public ethics. In some ways the situation could be elevated by changing the electoral system – and as we are in election period something about that.

A simple test of accountability is the following: Can consent, once given, be withdrawn? Can the electors change their mind? Have voters the opportunity not only to install or hire government, but also to fire them? And – most importantly - can today's electoral majority become tomorrow's electoral minority?

As things stand, that clearly is not the case in South Africa – although the local government elections could point to some interesting developments. But our political system as it is now, is described in constitutional texts as being of the "dominant-party system" or "one-party dominated system variety". This refers to situations where the future defeat of a party, which has successfully won an election and therefore power, cannot be envisaged or is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.

One result in such a dominant party system is the tendency of the party to conflate party and state and appoint party officials to senior positions irrespective of the requirements of political neutrality or of their having the required qualifications. A second is that it forestalls the development of a permanent and professional civil service. Another is that it encourages careerism in place of a vocation of politics: political office is the high road to wealth.

But much more seriously in a multi-racial, multi-cultured, multi-lingual country like South Africa, the dominance of one party, especially when primarily representative of one section of the population, is obviously not conducive to a democratic culture, national unity, or individual identification with the country. In fact, it generates a sense of exclusion of those who - whether for ideological, cultural, social or identity reasons - are not of the dominant party. In fact, it is a system which leads to alienation and exclusion.

The present electoral system, as is well-known, has a 400-member National Assembly elected on a national proportional representation basis. And thank heaven that it is proportional even to this extent – because otherwise the ANC would be the only party in Parliament and we would be a one-party state.

What is the alternative? An alternative was suggested by a Commission under the late Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert which reported in 2003. His task force recommended a variation on the electoral system, whereby 69 constituencies would be drawn along existing provincial, municipal and metropolitan boundaries. Political parties would then draw up lists of constituency candidates similar to the provincial and national lists used in the current system. The constituency representatives would account for 300 members of the National Assembly, the remaining 100 being drawn proportionately from a closed national list. Slabbert's recommendation was no doubt influenced by the German electoral system in which half of the legislature is elected on a proportional election basis and the other half on a constituency basis.

Aside from contributing to a wider representation of political parties in Parliament, and therefore encouraging greater choice and political expression within the political system, if adopted this recommendation would strengthen the accountability of elected members of Parliament – a very essential feature of any democratic order but, judging from attendance records, shamelessly disregarded by our members of Parliament.

One last comment. A constitution, however formally democratic, does not guarantee by itself a democratic dispensation. What is critical to any democratic polity is not simply that it is supported by governments and the public that elect them. But that it is suffused with a democratic culture. In the final analysis, the durability of any constitution depends on the attitudes and values and habits of minds of its citizens. After all, Africa has seen literally dozens of high-sounding constitutions – starting with Ghana in 1957 – fall into disrepute. Regular re-affirmations and re-commitments to the goals set out in a constitution are a very healthy exercise.