Before the Commission seeks to assign responsibility to any particular person or body for the events that led to the violence it is as well to reflect that the origins of the political disagreements that formed the background to those events can be traced back to the apartheid policies that led to the creation of the so-called homelands. Up to 5 December 1977 all those people living in Bophuthatswana were South Africans, albeit that most of them were Tswana-speaking, and always had been. By a legislative enactment viz. the Status of Bophuthatswana Act No 89 of 1977, they were overnight made something else. They were then no longer South Africans but citizens of Bophuthatswana, a country that was fragmented into seven areas of land all separate from one another, some being hundreds of kilometre from the capital Mmabatho and one, Thaba'Nchu, the smallest of the areas, lying over 500 kilometres away from any of the others.

This state of affairs had two consequences. For the majority of the people it led to dissatisfaction, frustration and a feeling of rejection from their roots; for others it represented an opportunity to create and govern a state of their own, free from the racist apartheid policies of their former rulers and independent of the latter. That independence was, however, to a great extent illusory. Bophuthatswana was not recognised internationally or anywhere else as an independent state except by the South African Government. Its citizens still had to carry South African travel documents if they wished to venture outside South Africa. Landlocked as all the separate areas were, it had no access to any port or harbour except through South Africa. The greatest element in its illusory independence was the fact that it was dependent on South Africa for over 70% of its annual budget. It was in this ill conceived and, to any right-thinking person, totally unworkable and unmanageable creation of the apartheid era of the National Party Government in South Africa that the citizens of Bophuthatswana were compelled to live from 1977.

Although collective Cabinet accountability existed in Bophuthatswana it is clear to the Commission from the evidence before it that the strong man in the Cabinet was President Mangope. It is furthermore clear that he had in the last few months of 1993 and the first two months of 1994 lost touch both with the realities of the political scene in South Africa and with the opinions and desires of his people. With his Government a participant in the constitutional negotiation process it must have been overwhelmingly obvious to him that the apartheid era was over and that the homelands which were part of the apartheid structure would, - nay more, could - no longer exist. For Bophuthatswana, which was dependent for 71% of its national budget on South Africa, its continued independence had, as a practical reality, come to an end. As a legal entity it would also cease when the interim constitution, in accordance with which the Status of Bophuthatswana Act of 1977 was repealed, would on 27 April 1994 be implemented.

The evidence is overwhelming that free political activity in Bophuthatswana did not exist and was suppressed by an arrogant employment of the Police Force who frequently used force to do so. The unpopularity of the police with the public is ample testimony of this, giving rise in turn to marked antagonism to the Government. The strikes of the civil servants resulting in the complete collapse of the administration, of the teachers, of the hospital staffs, and in the broadcasting services and the dissatisfactions in the police and armed forces must have been known to him. That they were, is evidenced by his calling to his aid the Afrikaner Volksfront of General Viljoen. That decision, although ostensibly one of the National Security Council, was undoubtedly motivated by President Mangope. He had intimated beforehand that he would call in the help of others and it is clear that the idea of calling on the Afrikaner Volksfront to assist did not come from any of the other members of the Council.

That decision again illustrates either how out of touch President Mangope was with his people or his disregard for their feelings. He chose to call in a "Boere People's Army" of right-wingers, whose support of his regime would have angered those in opposition to it, and he failed to inform his people timeously or adequately that he was doing so and his reasons for it. It was argued that he could have assumed that his chiefs of the police and army would have informed their men of the decision. President Mangope, however, never instructed them to do so nor made a single enquiry as to whether they had done so. It was further argued that there was inadequate time for it to happen as the final decision to call in the Afrikaner Volksfront 11 March 1994 was only taken on the afternoon of 10 March 1994. The decision to call on the Afrikaner Volksfront for assistance was, however, taken on 8 March 1994 but was implemented on 10 March 1994. The structure to have the information promptly conveyed to the police, the army and the population generally could have been put in place by 10 March 1994 and it could have been disseminated immediately on 10 March 1994. The Afrikaner Volksfront, whose members were spread far and wide, were called up within hours. Surely the information that they were coming could have in similar time been conveyed to a public concentrated in two small urban areas like Mmabatho and Mafikeng.

President Mangope's acceptance that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging would not join the Afrikaner Volksfront in coming to Bophuthatswana also reveals a naive failure to recognise reality. He knew that they were part of the Afrikaner Volksfront, he had witnessed their lack of discipline and militancy at the invasion of Kempton Park and had he thought for a moment he would have realised that the possibility of their joining the Afrikaner Volksfront was a very real one, particularly after Mr Eugene Terre'Blanche's telephone call to him on 10 March 1994. It is the opinion of the Commission that calling in the Afrikaner Volksfront "Boere People's Army" represented a serious political blunder on the part of President Mangope which prepared the ground for the seeds of violence subsequently sown by the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging.

The Commission also voices its criticism of President Mangope on two further aspects. In his evidence he was at pains to say that if the South African Government and the Transitional Executive Council had not deposed him on 12 March 1994, the Bophuthatswana Parliament would have met on 15 March 1994 and taken the vital decisions in regard to re-incorporation and participation in the election of 27 April 1994. He blamed the South African Government and the Transitional Executive Council for not having allowed that to happen. The facts are, however, that already in 1993 he knew that the election date had been fixed for 27 April 1994 and that the last date for parties to register for the election was 5 March 1994. There was therefore more than ample time for Parliament to have been convened and to decide on the issues. In fact, had the Bophuthatswana Parliament decided to take part in the election it would have been necessary for the political parties in Bophuthatswana, who wished to participate, to register by 5 March 1994. Parliament, therefore, should have met before that date. Additionally, as the situation in the country became more tense Parliament could have been urgently summoned together at the end of February or in the first days of March 1994. That he did not do so again illustrates President Mangope's failure to recognise and deal with the realities of what was happening. His stubborn refusal to allow the Independent Electoral Commission to put their voting structures in place to allow South Africans living in Bophuthatswana and those with South African identity documents to vote in the election, as expressed to Mr Justice Kriegler, also shows a failure to accept the reality of what was happening.

He testified that he was distrustful of the Transitional Executive Council and the South African Government, fearing that if he asked for their assistance, they would stage a coup to oust him and his Government. Once again this shows his stubborn unwillingness to appreciate the reality of what was occurring. His own citizens, repressed and denied free political activity and expression and concerned about their future, had risen in revolt against his regime and his country was seriously destabilised. There was widespread civic disorder, looting, bloodshed and loss of life. This must clearly have been known to him. It had been reported to him by General Seleke, General Turner and Mr Rowan Cronje; he had seen it on television. The need to restore stability was manifest and urgent. Yet instead of calling on the one party who could have done so viz. the South African Defence Force (it did so within hours when called upon) he chose to call on a "Boere People's Army" who on his own evidence were merely to be used to guard key installations, not to restore stability. General Turner wanted him to call in the South African Defence Force early on 11 March 1994 but he allowed Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg to persuade him otherwise. This was another disastrous error on his part. He even expressed his anger at General Turner's action in, on his own initiative, calling in the South African Defence Force when it was obvious that the situation had got completely out of hand and that there was a real possibility of further bloodshed occurring. It is in the Commission's opinion clear that if on 10 March 1994 and even early on 11 March 1994 President Mangope had called on the Transitional Executive Council and the South African Government, much of the subsequent bloodshed and loss of life would have been avoided and he must bear responsibility for this.

A large measure of responsibility for the events leading to the violence also rests on the former South African Government and the Transitional Executive Council. As appears from the evidence, in the days of the week preceding 10 March 1994 the strike of the civil servants had caused the administration to collapse and the strikes in the other sections of Bophuthatswana had led to almost the entire country ceasing to Auction. It was indeed a bomb waiting to explode. These facts, according to intelligence documents in the Commission's possession reveal that they were known to the former South African Government and to the Transitional Executive Council. Apart from its intelligence services having informed it of the situation, the delegation from the Crisis Committee referred to in the evidence of Funani and Van Wyk had met the Transitional Executive Council on 9 March 1994 to report on the situation and Mr Rowan Cronje had met President F W de Klerk on the morning of 10 March 1994. Additionally, the National Director of the Lawyers for Human Rights, Mr Brian Currin, on 22 February 1994, wrote to the Transitional Executive Council informing it of the crisis in Bophuthatswana and said that it required serious and immediate intervention. "Lives are being lost", he said. He also called on the Transitional Executive Council "to strip Bophuthatswana of its sovereignty and to place the region under the care of a curator".

The Commission is of the view that if timeous steps had been taken even before March 1994 by the South African Government and the Transitional Executive Council much of the subsequent disastrous situation could have been averted. In fact, even if a decision had been taken to move in the South African Defence Force only on 10 March 1994 or even early on 11 March 1994 many lives may have been saved. Troops were standing by on the borders and if the declaration by the then Minister of Law and Order, Mr H Kriel, of the areas verging on Bophuthatswana as unrest areas had been widened to declare them as "no go" areas so as to prevent the Afrikaner Volksfront and Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging from entering Bophuthatswana, the bloodshed could have been avoided. The evidence of several of the witnesses was that as Bophuthatswana was still then an independent state, South Africa could not have prevented its citizens from entering it and that had it chosen to do so forcibly a war situation between the right-wingers and the South African Defence Force may have developed. As to the recognition of Bophuthatswana as an independent state, the former South African Government and the Transitional Executive Council appears to have accorded it that recognition when it suited them and not to have done so when it did not. The pressure brought to bear by the Transitional Executive Council on the Development Bank of Southern Africa not to grant Bophuthatswana the loan it had applied for and its withholding of payment of the customs levies is testimony of this as is the fact that on 12 March 1994 the Transitional Executive Council and the South African Government had no qualms about sending Foreign Minister Mr Pik Botha and Mr Mac Maharaj, the secretary of the Transitional Executive Council, to depose President Mangope and to bring his regime to an end. That step could have been taken on 10 March 1994 or even earlier. As to not stopping the right-wingers from entering Bophuthatswana it seems to the Commission to have been highly irresponsible on the part of the South African Government and the Transitional Executive Council, which was aware that large contingents of armed South Africans were gathering on its border with the obvious intention of invading a neighbouring state, not to have taken measures to prevent that happening. Had the obviously well-equipped troops that were present there following their training exercises in the area been moved into positions to stop the entry into Bophuthatswana it seems to the Commission unlikely that the Afrikaner Volksfront, trained and disciplined as the witnesses said they were, under the command of the moderate General Constand Viljoen and Colonel Jan Breytenbach, would have sought a confrontation with the South African Defence Force. It is equally probable that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging would not have wished to have engaged in an armed confrontation with the South African Defence Force merely in order to get into Bophuthatswana.

His attendance at the meeting of the National Security Council on 8 March 1994 must have convinced General Viljoen that a situation existed that, if it had not already done so, was getting completely out of hand. Indeed, he admitted as much in his evidence. The widespread strikes and massive civil unrest must have been clear indications to him that the general populace were hostile to the Mangope regime. Again, he conceded this in his evidence. Although the Bophuthatswana Government was its ally in the Freedom Front, it is hard to conceive what purpose the Afrikaner Volksfront hoped to achieve by bringing in a force of right-wingers to try to keep Bophuthatswana an independent state. It was suggested in cross-examination of General Viljoen by one of the counsel that the Afrikaner Volksfront saw in Bophuthatswana a possible "Volkstaat" and that this was the agenda that lay behind its support for President Mangope.

The embracing of the right-wing by President Mangope and the desire of the right-wing to support the Mangope regime is therefore most incongruous. General Viljoen was sufficiently realistic to appreciate that the era of apartheid was over and that the demise of the homelands was imminent. His encouragement and that of other right-wing leaders such as Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg of President Mangope to attempt to keep Bophuthatswana independent was therefore, in the view of the Commission, not only a major political error but their actions were most provocative. The Commission has already expressed the opinion that calling in the assistance of the Afrikaner Volksfront by President Mangope was a grave political blunder on his part, opening the door as it did to the presence, as part of the Afrikaner Volksfront, of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and its members, whose shooting of innocent black civilians was the cause of many of the deaths on 10 and 11 March 1994.

The agreement by General Viljoen and the Afrikaner Volksfront to assist was, in the Commission's view, a contributing element in that blunder. Although he was invited to either make a written submission or to testify before the Commission, Doctor Hartzenberg choose not to do so. Evidence as to his participation in the events of the week 7 to 13 March 1994, therefore was uncontradicted. Dr Hartzenberg's discouraging of President Mangope from calling in the South African Defence Force when General Turner had pleaded with him to do so, also was a grave error. Had that happened when General Turner requested it, many lives would probably have been saved. The Commission is also of the view that General Viljoen and Dr Hartzenberg both knew of the propensity of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging towards unruly and undisciplined behaviour and when once they realised that Mr Terre'Blanche had disregarded their request and instruction not to join the Afrikaner Volksfront in going to assist President Mangope and was mobilising his members to do so, they should have done more to ensure that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging did not enter Bophuthatswana. In his evidence General Viljoen said he had done all he could to stop them. He had, he said, sent messages to tell Mr Terre'Blanche not to enter as had Dr Hartzenberg and he had warned Colonel Breytenbach and Commandant Steyn to tell them not to do so. It seems to the Commission, however, that once they knew that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging was mobilising its members, General Viljoen and Dr Hartzenberg should have gone personally to Mr Terre'Blanche and instructed him to withdraw his men. Had they done so, a different situation would probably have occurred vis-à-vis the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and its presence in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area.

President Mangope in particular and certain other witnesses including General Viljoen and Mr Rowan Cronje chose to lay the blame for the unrest situation in Bophuthatswana in the week of 7 to 13 March 1994 and the weeks leading up to it, on the African National Congress. Emphasis was laid on the so-called three phase strategy to destabilise the county, as evidenced, so it was submitted, by the decisions set out in the minutes of the Anti-Bophuthatswana Campaign Conference of 19 May 1993. In particular it was contended that the reported anticipated invasion by African National Congress cadres over the weekend of 12 and 13 March 1994 was the reason for calling in the assistance of the Afrikaner Volksfront which in turn led to the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging's presence and the subsequent shootings.

As pointed out earlier, it is clear from the evidence that although the African National Congress had decided to embark on a campaign of mass action it was not that but the spontaneous dissatisfaction with the Mangope regime and the intransigent attitude of President Mangope in refusing to agree to re-incorporation that caused the strikes of the civil servants and others and the civil unrest in the week of 7 to 13 March 1994. As set out earlier in this Report those strikes were undoubtedly encouraged and supported by the African National Congress. As to the third phase, there is no evidence, firstly, that the African National Congress had decided to revert to the armed struggle from which it had undertaken to desist in terms of the Pretoria Minute of 19 August 1992 and, secondly, as set out above, of any massing of armed cadres preparatory to any invasion of Bophuthatswana over the weekend of 12 to 13 March 1994. That the African National Congress played a role in encouraging and spurring on the opposition to the Mangope regime is undoubted but in the view of the Commission its importance in respect of what happened in Bophuthatswana in the week of 7 to 13 March 1994 must not be overemphasised.

It is clear that the Bophuthatswana Police Force generally found itself in an invidious position in the week of 7 to 13 March 1994. Unpopular with the public, its members were under attack by the latter. Many of its members found that this presented them with an intolerable situation, particularly those whose political sympathies lay against the Mangope regime and in favour of re-incorporation into South Africa. Although up to 10 March 1994 policing continued to be carried out by them, difficult though it may have been, it is not strange that by 10 March 1994 elements had decided to carry out those duties no longer, causing effective policing to come to an end. Coupled with that was the unwillingness on the part of General Seleke and members of his upper command structure to realise the seriousness of the situation both in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area generally and in the Bophuthatswana Police Force in particular and to give any effective orders or directions to those below them. Criticism must be directed at General Seleke for choosing to direct his attention to seeking to exact retribution from Lieutenant Lethleogile and those who expressed their opposition to him, rather than concentrate his attention on trying to cope with the situation of unrest in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area that was rapidly getting out of hand. The Commission does not have the same criticism of Colonel Mokobyane who, in the other parts of Bophuthatswana north of Pretoria, was trying his best to control the looting and rioting that broke out on the afternoon of 10 March 1994 and continued until the situation was stabilised on 11 March 1994 by the Internal Stability Unit of the South African Police. As set out in the detailed discussion of the individual deaths, those policemen responsible for shooting the deceased in those cases in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area were not acting under any instructions but did so in "frolics of their own" while those in the other areas of Bophuthatswana did so, save in one instance viz Case B27: Madumesha Petrus Mpete, in attempting to protect the property of those who were the targets of the mobs of looters.

As conceded by Regimental Sergeant-Major Phuduhudu there are always individuals, even in well-trained and disciplined forces, who act irresponsibly. That certain individuals of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force acted irresponsibly and on their own initiative and not on any instructions from their commanders appears clear from the evidence in the shootings of Francois Alwyn Venter (Case No 57) and Francois Willem Janse van Rensburg (Case No 9). Apart from this, and despite their anger and resentment at the presence of the right-wingers in the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area on 10 and 1 1 March 1994, the Bophuthatswana Defence Force members acted generally as a disciplined force. The skirmish involving the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging convoys and the resultant deaths of the three members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging viz. Nicolaas Johannes Fourie, Jacob Stephanus Uys and Alwyn Wolfaardt, was a consequence of that anger and resentment. It was contended that the presence of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and their operations was as a result of the encouragement and activities of certain of the white commanders of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, notably Colonel Phillipus Marx. As set out above the Commission is unable to find any proof of this. The Commission finds that certain of the criticisms levelled at General Turner are warranted. He was aware on 8 March 1994 that the National Security Council had decided that members of the Afrikaner Volksfront were possibly going to be invited into Bophuthatswana to assist his forces in guarding key installations. He could have informed his officers of this decision. When the final decision to invite the Afrikaner Volksfront was taken on the afternoon of 10 March 1994 he should have told his command structure of this and particularly the black officers who would have been those who would have been most sensitive to the presence of the right-wingers in their country. He should, at the very least, have informed Colonel Focke who, as the commander at the Joint Operations Centre, would have been responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force troops with those of the Afrikaner Volksfront and Regimental Sergeant-Major Phuduhudu who would have been able to inform the men that the Afrikaner Volksfront members would be coming into the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area. His failure to do so was, in the Commission's view, a major blunder. Had he done so, the Commission feels that Colonel Focke could well have deployed some of his troops to deal with the situation when the shooting of members of the public by members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging occurred. Although with hindsight it may be said that he was also incorrect in allowing the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging to remain in Bophuthatswana, that action must not be regarded from the position of an armchair critic but must be viewed in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time, particularly as he was to a large extent following the instructions of Mr Rowan Cronje who was the Minister of Defence. In his favour it must also not be forgotten that it was General Turner who at all times wished to call in the assistance of the South African Defence Force but was thwarted by President Mangope. It was he who finally did so in defiance of President Mangope's instructions.

It is undoubted that the major responsibility for the deaths in the Mmabatho/ Mafikeng area must fall on the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. The evidence is overwhelming that they entered the area uninvited and that they were not welcome there. Mr Eugene Terre'Blanche said he and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging came there at the invitation of President Mangope; President Mangope said they did not. There is an abundance of evidence to support President Mangope's version. As set out earlier that was the evidence of General Viljoen and of Mr Rowan Cronje. Mr Terre'Blanche admitted during an interview in the producing of a documentary titled "Death of Apartheid" that he was requested by Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg not to send the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging into Bophuthatswana as General Viljoen and his "Boere People's Army" were to assist the Bophuthatswana Government. He, however, denied that he agreed to abide by this request. It was the evidence of Mr Cronje, General Turner, Colonel Botes, Colonel Swart, and Commandant Douw Steyn that Mr Terre'Blanche and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging were asked to leave. The probabilities also are that President Mangope, having regard to his previous experiences with him, would have been unlikely to have invited Mr Terre'Blanche to assist him. This is particularly so as General Viljoen and the Afrikaner Volksfront had been asked to render that assistance. The evidence is also overwhelming that members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging entered the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area with the avowed intention of shooting its black citizenry and that they carried out that intention. The chilling and horrendous prayer of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging "Dominee", never countermanded by anyone, that "dit sal van ons verwag word vandag om kaffers dood te skiet" is testimony to this. It is also borne out by what Mr Terre'Blanche said in an interview on "Agenda" a programme presented by Max du Preez on the former SABC television when he referred to what he called: "'n skitterende oorwinning" of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging in its invasion of Bophuthatswana in that "en die uitslag van die aanval is presies dit - 11 ongevalle aan die kant van die AWB waarvan 5 dood is en aan die anderkant 50 dood en 285 gewond". That "anderkant" was the many innocent, unarmed citizens who were gunned down by members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. It must also be remembered that the four members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging viz. Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging Generals Cruywagen and Jordaan, and Messrs Kriel and Terre'Blanche, who appeared before the Commission chose to make unsworn statements rather than to give evidence under oath and subject themselves to cross-examination as to their purpose in going to Bophuthatswana, other than to say that they were going to assist President Mangope. How they were to do so, to whom they were going to report and what their command structure, especially in relation to the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, was to be, was never disclosed nor was the evidence of the intention certainly of those encamped at Riviera Park, to shoot blacks dead, ever refuted nor the intention ever denied. It could also hardly have been, in the light of the detailed evidence in so many of the cases, that the deceased certainly in at least five of those cases and probably more were shot by members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. Large numbers of citizens were also wounded by the latter. In the view of the Commission the top structure of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging viz. Messrs Terre'Blanche, Cruywagen, Jordaan and those Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging Generals referred to by Arthur Kemp in "Vuur en Verraad" viz. Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging Generals W Etsebeth, Nico Prinsloo and Andries Terre'Blanche must be held responsible for those deaths, which were inflicted on unarmed, innocent civilians by members of their organisation. That responsibility in the light of the legal principles set out in Part One of this Report, is in the Commission's opinion criminal in nature on the basis either of common purpose, conspiracy or incitement.

Although the South African Police were monitoring the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and its intended invasion of Bophuthatswana and had set up road-blocks on the South African side of the border ea. at Rooigrond, it would seem that little was done to prevent the entry of heavily armed men into Bophuthatswana. General Johan Van Der Merwe, then Commissioner of Police, said that the Police could do little to prevent their leaving South Africa and entering Bophuthatswana because of the latter's legal independent status and could only ensure that none of them were contravening the laws relating to arms and ammunition by searching them and their vehicles for unlicensed firearms. From the evidence of those at the road blocks, however, such as Lieutenant-Colonel Gideon van Zyl, it would appear that this did not take place. He said that all that could be done was to monitor the situation as large numbers of khaki - and camouflage clad - men crossed the border. It is the view of the Commission that more effective steps should have been taken to prevent this mass of armed persons leaving South Africa and entering Bophuthatswana. It would also appear that in the areas other than the Mmabatho/Mafikeng area the Internal Stability Unit's stabilisation of the situation may have been accomplished with an excessive use of force.

There can be no doubt that the events that took place in the former Bophuthatswana on 10 and 11 March 1994, represented a watershed in the political history of South Africa. The resistance of the black armed forces to the Afrikaner Volksfront and to the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, resulting in the deaths of some of the members of those organisations, brought with it a realisation on the part of the right-wing organisations that an ill-equipped, in terms of military equipment, largely untrained minority of civilians without proper arms and armoured vehicles, cannot hope to succeed in any armed confrontation with a well equipped, well-trained and disciplined army of professional soldiers. It also brought with it the realisation that assaults upon and the killing of blacks will result in retaliation with, in many instances, fatal results. Those realisations led to the cessation of the militant activities and the demise of the militant right-wing elements in the South African political milieu. The loss of lives in Bophuthatswana, dear though that price undoubtedly was, was the price that was paid for the saving of many other lives in South Africa and the events, even if they should have been avoided, should be viewed in that light.

Part Seven : Findings And Recommendations

1. INTRODUCTION

2. PRESIDENT MANGOPE AND HIS GOVERNMENT

3. THE FORMER SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

4. THE AFRIKANER VOLKSFRONT AND GENERAL CONSTAND VILJOEN

5. THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

6. THE BOPHUTHATSWANA POLICE FORCE

7. BOPHUTHATSWANA DEFENCE FORCE

8. THE AFRIKANER WEERSTANDSBEWEGING

9. THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

10. THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE

11. CONCLUSION