The Dalai Lama ‘scandal’ caused a certain amount of concern in early October 2011 as civil society, the media and Government debated the issue on a public platform. The Government’s apparent ‘refusal’ to grant the Dalai Lama a visa in order to attend the birthday party of Desmond Tutu in Cape Town elicited the fury of civil society and the media who seemingly represented only one side of the story. The anger emitted by the media and civil society can be summarised as ‘South Africa's foreign policy is dictated by outside interests.’

This discussion paper seeks to explore the Dalai Lama situation from a neutral standpoint. By exploring two ‘sides of the coin’, one can then determine whether the South African Government made the correct decision.

Who is the Dalai Lama?

Born Tenzin Gyatso in 1935, the 14th Dalai Lama is Tibet’s spiritual leader and former head of the Tibetan Government-in-exile until early 2011. With the help of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Dalai Lama fled Tibet in 1959 after an unsuccessful uprising. In the 1960's, his Government – the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) – was granted roughly US$ 2 million a year.⁽²⁾ In 1989 he was awarded a Nobel Peace prize and has garnered international recognition as a symbol of peace and non-violence. As a spiritual leader, he has cemented his role in international politics and has received numerous awards and prizes from heads of state world over. During the Mandela and Mbeki Presidencies, the Dalai Lama was welcomed into South Africa with all the pomp of a ‘state leader.’⁽³⁾

In recent years and coinciding with China's rise, the Dalai Lama has had to take a back seat as China's developmental drive has superseded the negative imagery it obtains that accompanies the Dalai Lama issue. In 2010, Russia denied him a visa, while in 2011 the Dalai Lama’s sister and member of his then cabinet, was denied a visa to visit Thailand. President Jacob Zuma’s Government denied him a visa in 2010 so as to not ‘interfere or distract’ from the World Cup preparations. The Dalai Lama’s invitation to attend Desmond Tutu’s birthday was in ways a ‘test’ to see what the South African Government would do.

Side A

According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), South Africa's refusal to grant the Dalai Lama a visa is about ‘pleasing China and is a denial of its struggle for democracy.’ HRW Africa Director Daniel Bekele stated “If South Africa refuses a visa to a Nobel Prize recipient and human rights campaigner, with no objective grounds for refusal, then there can only be less-than-noble motivations for its action.”⁽⁴⁾

On 4 October 2011, a furious Desmond Tutu said the current South African Government is worse than the apartheid Government. Tutu would also state that he has no intention of inviting the Dalai Lama to South Africa again. Tony Ehrenreich, a Congress for South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU) leader declared “Even though China is our biggest trading partner, we should not exchange our morality for dollars or Yuan.”⁽⁵⁾ Professor Loyiso Nongxa, vice-chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand, believed that the Dalai Lama fiasco undermined South Africa’s long struggle against injustice, saying that “The state’s deliberate indecision ridicules the values pertaining to freedom of speech, expression and movement enshrined in our Constitution and the freedoms for which so many South African have lived, and indeed died.”⁽⁶⁾ The African National Congress (ANC) stated that it questions the Government’s motives and the country’s largest opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), stated that they would seek answers in Parliament over this international incident.

Much of the blame was directed at the Presidency itself, with Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe implying that it was not his job to seek a visa for the Dalai Lama. This meant that the Department of International Affairs and Cooperation (DIRCO) was to be solely accountable, as it is responsible for the execution of South Africa’s foreign policy. DIRCO has been embroiled in controversy since 2007 when South Africa was first elected to serve as a non- permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Several academics such as Professor Adam Habib questioned South Africa’s stance on human rights issues and categorised her role in the council as a ‘betrayal.’ Though much of the criticism towards DIRCO is one-sided, several prominent academics have questioned the ‘capacity’ at the department. The lack of institutional memory on behalf of the DIRCO has also been called into question. South Africa's ‘confused’ stance in both the Ivory Coast and Libyan fiascos of 2011 have further portrayed DIRCO in a negative light. The Dalai Lama situation of 2011 can only shine more negative light upon the department, who have been singled out.

Side B

Nomfundo Walaza, CEO of the Desmond Tutu Peace Centre in Cape Town, believed that delays and silence on behalf of the Government demonstrate a lack of respect for both the archbishop and his guest. The Dalai Lama might be the ‘spiritual leader’ of the Tibetans, but he operates through the government-in exile in India, which has no jurisdiction. His Government’s sovereignty is not recognised by any state in the world. Recent ‘immolations’ by Buddhist Monks from Tibet have led to accusations from China that the Dali Lama is ‘inciting terrorism’ by not condemning this political act.

South Africa’s largest trading partner is China. South Africa accounts for 20% of China's trade in Africa and the countries signed a strategic partnership agreement in 2010. In September 2011, the South African and Chinese Governments signed memorandums of understanding on geology and mineral resources and financial cooperation during a state visit by Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe to China. Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in South Africa is about US$ 6 billion (ZAR 60 billion) and South Africa's FDI in China is about US$ 2 billion (ZAR 20 billion).⁽⁷⁾ In a study entitled Paying a Visit: The 'Dalai Lama Effect' on International Trade, the authors noted that “meetings of a head of state or head of Government with the Dalai Lama lead to a reduction of exports to China by 8.1% or 16.9% on average, depending on the estimation technique used.”⁽⁸⁾ The study also theorised that President Barack Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in February 2010 soured relations with China and therefore “undermined the US's recovery from the current economic crisis.”⁽⁹⁾

In 2009, Russia and India were not in favour of South Africa joining BRIC. China was the most vocal out of her BRIC counterparts in pushing for a place for South Africa. A central element of the Zuma administration’s foreign policy is to assert the link between domestic socio-economic priorities and South Africa’s international relations. This means that if jobs, education and poverty eradication are key priorities at home, South Africa’s approach to its foreign relations should reflect this. Strengthening South-South relations, especially against the background of the developed world’s economic difficulties, is viewed as an important vehicle in this regard.⁽¹⁰⁾ Of the five states which make up BRICS, the China-South Africa partnership is the strongest.

Even with the DIRCO denying it, the visa 'delay' is obviously caving in to pressure from China. This is understandably acceptable being that China is the world’s superpower. Chinese FDI in South Africa represents US$ 6 billion and this figure does not include the billions that South Africa earns by acting as the gateway into Africa for Chinese companies. The economies of Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho and Mozambique heavily rely on South Africa and bilateral consequences with China will negatively affect the whole Southern African region. Even though South Africa-China trade is not typically ‘south-south’ and represents an unbalanced ‘north-south’ pattern, South Africa must still respect the ‘partnership’, as ultimately, China’s investments are helping to promote South Africa’s industrial policy and development strategy.

Conclusion

Having examined two sides of the coin, it is true that the visa ‘delay’ is a moral catastrophe on part of the South African Government. Nevertheless, national interests will always come first. The billions that China invests in South Africa create employment, give South Africans access to inexpensive goods and promote development.

In August 2010, Zuma signed a comprehensive strategic partnership with China that would result in more than ZAR 100 billion invested in South Africa over five years to support projects in culture, education, media, health, tourism and financial services. In September 2011, Motlanthe raised more than ZAR 20 billion in investment on a trip to China. Therefore, South African foreign policy is right to support the interests of its domestic policies. In actuality, if South Africa was to change or risk its foreign policy interests, then, in fact, it would be ‘caving it to interests.’

NOTES:

(1) Contact Anton M. Pillay through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Africa Watch Unit (africa.watch@consultancyafrica.com)
(2) World News Briefs, ‘Dalai Lama Group Says It Got Money from CIA’, New York Times, 2 October 1998, www.nytimes.com.
(3) Guy LIeberman, ‘Dalai Lama's visit - SA's real integrity test’ Daily Maverick, 20 October 2011
www.dailymaverick.co.za.
(4) ‘Dalai Lama ban about pleasing China - Human Rights Watch’, News24, 30 September 2011, www.news24.com.
(5) Lydia Polgreen, 'Dalai Lama’s Visa Request Is Denied by South Africa', New York Times, 4 October 2011, http://www.nytimes.com.
(6) Shirona Patel, ‘Wits dismayed at silencing of Dalai Lama’, Politics Web, 4 October 2011,
www.politicsweb.co.za.
(7) ‘Tibetans blame China for Dalai Lama Visa denial’, Mail and Guardian Online, 23 March 2009, http://mg.co.za.
(8) Charles Molelee, ‘Chinas big economic stick: No Dalai Lama Allowed’, Mail and Guardian Online, 7 October 2011, www.mg.co.za.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Ana Alves and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, ‘South Africa- China Relations: Getting Beyond the Cross-roads?’, South African Institute of International Affairs, 29 August 2010, http://www.saiia.org.za.

Written by Written by Anton M. Pillay ⁽¹⁾