For decades Africa served as a convenient battleground for nations who had no interests at stake on the continent. Fast forward to the present day where the international environment has undergone a complete transformation due to globalisation and Africa’s status in the international geo-political order has risen drastically. In the 21st century, there is a “New Scramble” for Africa as the so-called emerging economies are competing for influence on the continent. Countries from the Asian continent, namely India, China and The Russian Federation have been ear marked as emerging economies and have in recent times aimed to expand the scope of their engagement with Africa. While considerable attention has been given to the role of India and China in Africa, little attention has been paid to the re-emergence of Russia as a significant power in Africa.

The aim of this paper is to fill this void by assessing Russia’s African Policy, particularly its economic interests on the continent in the 21st century. This will be done by providing a brief history of Russian-African relations in order to contextualise the topic, followed by a reasoning as to why one speaks of the re-emergence of the Kremlin on the continent. It will then proceed to take a closer look at the nature and rationale behind Moscow’s renewed interest in Africa. Lastly, this paper will analyse the implications of Moscow’s re-engagement with the overall aim of investigating whether there is room for cautious optimism for the continent.

Russia-Africa relations during the Cold War

Russia’s engagements in Africa can be traced back to the Cold War between the United States (US) and the then USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republic the Soviet Union), which led to the two superpowers competing for influence on the continent.⁽²⁾ Starting in the 1950’s, Africa was viewed as a prime battlefield between Soviet Command and Control Planning and Western Capitalism.⁽³⁾ The Cold War Soviet African Strategy involved maintaining friendly relations with many African countries, including Angola, Egypt, Namibia, Sudan , Somalia, Ethiopia and Egypt by offering various funding to ideologically sympathetic allies. However, following the collapse of the USSR, Russia-Africa relations entered a significant phase of decline, both politically and economically as Africa lost its significance as an ideological chess board.⁽⁴⁾

In the 1990’s, more proximate and domestic challenges occupied the Kremlin and consequently relations with Africa took a dive. According to Fidan and Aras, Russia inherited a lot of responsibilities from the old Soviet Union, including technical economic assistance for 37 African countries and trade agreements with 42 countries.⁽⁵⁾ However, the collapse of the USSR marked the end of the technical cooperation, Russia’s foreign policy of aid was halted and African countries were requested to repay their debts. The decline in relations is illustrated by trading figures where, on the eve of the Soviet dissolution, the Soviet-Union trade volume with Africa of US$ 1.3 billion declined to US$ 740 million by 1994.⁽⁶⁾ Aside from the economic losses, cultural and scientific relations with the continent were weakened as well.⁽⁷⁾

With these developments, the African continent disappeared from the Russian radar screen tarnishing the Kremlin’s reputation on the continent and provoking the African press to refer to Russia as the “Land that turned its back on the continent”.⁽⁸⁾ Fast forward to the present day and the question one asks is why does Russia have a renewed interest in Africa? What has led to the shift in policy?

“Russia coming back to Africa”

The point of departure in understanding Russia’s renewed interest in the continent can be found in the country’s foreign policy. A reinvigoration of economic strength, strong economic growth, increase demand for Russian exports (oil and natural resources) and higher foreign exchange reserves fuelled Moscow’s desires and confidence to expand its influence beyond those countries it traditionally considered as being of strategic importance.⁽⁹⁾ At the beginning of the 21st century, Russia began to change its perception of the continent in accordance with its framework of new values and national priorities.

A document published by the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that the “policy of developing traditionally friendly relations with Africa and cooperation on mutual interests provided the opportunity to use the African factor in such a way as to make progress on our international interests and economic goals.” ⁽¹⁰⁾ In sum, the document advocated active participation in resolving conflicts on the continent, easing debts of African countries, contributing to development of human capital and providing humanitarian assistance to the continent.⁽¹¹⁾ Hence, to improve its political and economic ties with Africa and to facilitate market access for its firms, the Russian Government undertook high official visits to African countries of strategic importance.

The above abstract reveals that Moscow’s political ambitions, as well as its economic and commercial motivations, are driven by the larger objective of re-establishing its geopolitical stature. In this context, Africa is a ‘gold mine’ as its vast natural reserves make the continent an increasingly attractive investment destination for Russia’s energy and other natural resource industries.⁽¹²⁾ As a producer of natural resources, namely oil, gas and minerals, Russia views its way of strengthening its role in the world by buying into Africa’s mineral resources.⁽¹³⁾ This serves as the pillar of its renewed engagement in Africa.

It must further be mentioned that while at this stage that Russia - as a major producer and exporter of oil and natural gas - does not require new supplies of energy from Africa. However, Russia’s renewed interest in the continent is motivated by a risk of a depletion of resources in the future. Should the current rate of natural exploitation continue, Russia runs the risk of exhausting its oil reserves. According to a study conducted by the African Development Bank, “Africa’s rich untapped oil and natural gas reserves provide an opportunity for Russia’s outbound exploration drive and strategic goal of remaining the world’s largest exporter of oil (second to Saudi Arabia) and natural gas, and maintaining Europe’s dependence on its exports of natural gas.” ⁽¹⁴⁾ Aside from providing an alternative source of supply, the lower cost of production and exploration in Africa strengthens the continent as an attractive investment destination.⁽¹⁵⁾

Overall, the Kremlin’s strategy involves increasing its control over energy sources throughout the world and in doing so, to strengthen its own economic and political power. Russia is particularly interested in gaining control over the supply of oil and natural gas from Africa to European countries. This view is supported by many analysts who believe that Russia’s goal to be a geostrategic power is based on the control of access that other countries have to Africa’s resources by forming cartels with African oil and gas producers.⁽¹⁶⁾

Today Russian multinationals invest in oil, gas, diamond, aluminium, iron ore and other metal products in countries such as Angola, Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Gabon, Nigeria, Namibia and South Africa. As the main rationale for Russia’s renewed engagement in Africa has been covered, it is pivotal to scratch below the surface to analyse the implications of the Kremlin’s involvement in the continent.

Implications

In order to assess the implications of the Kremlin’s influence, one is required to look at the depth and width of Russia’s engagements on the continent. Firstly, it must be recognised that whilst Russian-African relations has increased in the past decade, compared to other developed countries and emerging markets, Russia’s importance as a trading partner to African countries is quite minimal.⁽¹⁷⁾ Secondly, Russia lags behind other emerging economies in promoting its interests in Africa due its shift away from the continent in the 1990’s and due to the lack of a coherent national strategy.⁽¹⁸⁾ These factors must be considered when analysing the degree of Russia’s influence on the continent. One may easily assume that in light of the above factors, the Kremlin’s influence on the continent is limited. However, Russia economic engagements, whilst minimal when compared to other states, has had both positive and negative spin-offs.

The direct positive spin-off would be a growth in economic opportunities for the resource-rich African countries as the continent stands to benefit from increased competition among the world’s emerging economies to develop its vast resources. While the income generated from developing these resources has the potential to generate jobs and boost the income in Africa, it must be recognised that this positive spin-off is not guaranteed. Revenues do not always translate into long-term sustainable growth, nor is there a guarantee that the revenues generated from natural resource production always contribute to human capital and social infrastructure development.⁽¹⁹⁾ This is due to the fact that resource-rich countries tend to be vulnerable to corruption and instability. This scenario, coupled with limited domestic policies and regulation, has the potential to create a negative social and environmental outcome. Moreover, in the quest to gain a foothold in the continent, foreign countries do not shy away from working with oppressive regimes.⁽²⁰⁾ This clearly does not bode well for the general well-being of the continent’s people. Thus, one could say that the Kremlin’s influence has indirect political and social consequences.

The above analysis paints a grim picture of Russia's re-engagement with the African continent. However, whilst the negative consequences are largely influenced and exacerbated by the internal dynamics on the continent, the Kremlin’s has created some positive opportunities that cannot be overlooked. According to a recent study, “Russia’s well established expertise in extracting energy resources and advanced nuclear know-how presents a value-added opportunity for Africa.”⁽²¹⁾ In this regard, Russia is participating in tenders for the construction of the first nuclear power plants in Egypt and Nigeria.⁽²²⁾ Furthermore, Russia has been instrumental in writing off African debt, and like other G8 members, has pledged to double its ODA assistance to African countries.⁽²³⁾

Therefore, one could say that there is room for cautious optimism for Africa in light of the above analyses. Countries endowed in natural resources stand to benefit not only from a revenue generation point of view, but also due to the “catalytic role the increased investments will have on socio-economic growth and development."⁽²⁴⁾ Considering that steady economic and social development is determined by stability, the major obstacle to the realisation of these benefits is the internal dynamics confronting many African countries, which could see profits squandered in the hands of the elite and corrupt without benefiting the people and the continent. As such, analysts suggest that foreign investment companies should be called upon to create incentives or adopt measures to generate sustainable and shared benefits for resource producing countries in Africa.⁽²⁵⁾ Until such time, the benefits of Russia’s commercial and economic interests on the continent will be limited.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to examine Russia’s re-engagement with the African continent and has found that the main rationale for the renewed attention is fuelled by its desire to renew its geopolitical stature by ensuring, in and amongst others, a continued supply of resources to cement Europe’s energy dependence. In this regard, Africa serves as a ‘gold mine’ with its vast untapped resource base. Whilst Russia-African trade remains relatively low compared to those with other emerging economies, the Kremlin’s influence cannot be ignored as there are both positive and negative implications. The positive outcomes are however offset by the negative internal dynamics. Africa may only fully benefit from the renewed interest once these internal dynamics are resolved.

Now, more than ever, with an interest from every corner of the globe, Africa has the potential to realise its development goals through new and renewed engagements if the revenues received from investments are channelled to uplift the continent and its people. Thus, if this process is applied, the Kremlin’s return offers cautious optimism for Africa.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Pratiksha Chhiba through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Africa Watch Unit ( africa.watch@consultancyafrica.com This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it ).
(2) Kester Kenn Klomegah, ’Chasing China in Africa’, Inter-Press News Agency, 18 June 2008, http://ipsnews.net.
(3) Daniel Volman, ‘China, India, Russia and United States, The Scramble for African Oil and the militarisation of the continent’, Nordic Africa Institute, 2009, www.diva-portal.org.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Hakan Fidan & Bűlent Aras, ’The return of Russia-Africa relations’, Bilig, Ahmet Yesevi University, 2010, http://yayinlar.yesevi.edu.tr.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Kester Kenn Klomegah, ’Africa: Russia outpaced by China on the continent’, Inter-Press News Agency, 26 February 2010, http://ipsnews.net.
(10) Hakan Fidan & Bűlent Aras, ’The return of Russia-Africa relations’, Bilig, Ahmet Yesevi University, 2010, http://yayinlar.yesevi.edu.tr.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Mark. N Katz, ‘Russian policy towards Africa and the near east,’ Russian Analytical Digest No 83, 24 September 2010, http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch.
(13) Kester Kenn Klomegah, ’Chasing China in Africa’, Inter-Press News Agency, 18 June 2008, http://ipsnews.net.
(14) Habiba Ben Barka, ‘Russia’s Economic Engagement with Africa’, The African Development Bank Group, 11 May 2011, http://www.afdb.org.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Kester Kenn Klomegah, ’Africa: Russia outpaced by China on the continent’, Inter-Press News Agency, 26 February 2010, http://ipsnews.net.
(17) Habiba Ben Barka, ‘Russia’s Economic Engagement with Africa’, The African Development Bank Group, 11 May 2011, http://www.afdb.org.
(18) Kester Kenn Klomegah, ’Africa: Russia outpaced by China on the continent’, Inter-Press News Agency, 26 February 2010, http://ipsnews.net.
(19) Habiba Ben Barka, ‘Russia’s Economic Engagement with Africa’, The African Development Bank Group, 11 May 2011, http://www.afdb.org.
(20) Ariel Cohen, ‘Russia’s New Scramble for Africa’, The Wall Street Journal, 2 July 2009, http://online.wsj.com.
(21) Habiba Ben Barka, ‘Russia’s Economic Engagement with Africa’, The African Development Bank Group, 11 May 2011, http://www.afdb.org.
(22) Ibid.
(23) Ibid.
(24) Ibid.
(25) Ibid.

Written by Pratiksha Chhiba ⁽¹⁾