The first decade of the 21st century, especially as it relates to the quest for continental integration, belonged to Muammar Gaddafi. Like Kwame Nkrumah before him, Gaddafi dominated the discourse on the need for unification by channelling resources, human and material, towards the achievement of the goal. Both Nkrumah and Gaddafi vociferously, albeit at different times and with different strategies, advocated the importance and urgency of establishing a ‘United States of Africa’.

Although the idea of African unity remained on the agenda for several decades, the overthrow of Nkrumah in a military coup in 1966 signalled the end of his goal of creating a single Government for Africa. Gaddafi resurrected the idea in the late 1990s, but the Libyan revolution that swept him from power in August 2011 will in all likelihood ensure that, similar to post-Nkrumah, the “United States of Africa” become a footnote in African realpolitik. This does not mean that all regional integration processes will come to an abrupt end; rather the substance of the debate will shift from a Gaddafi-inspired ‘Union Government of Africa’ to the importance of a gradual approach to African unity. The aim of this discussion paper is to flesh out the implications of the ousting of Gaddafi on African integration.

The Gaddafi era of African integration

A number of reasons have been cited for Gaddafi’s quest for the unification of Africa. Some observers argue that Gaddafi only became a proponent of African unity after he failed in his bid to create an Arab union.⁽²⁾ Others point to Gaddafi’s gratitude to Africa for the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) collective support throughout Libya’s dispute with the United States of America (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) over the Lockerbie affair.⁽³⁾ A multitude of factors are responsible for Gaddafi’s stance on African unity, but an underlining reason was his ambition of becoming the president of the envisaged single Government of Africa. While he at no point expressly made this claim, some of his actions pointed to this.

Noted for his eccentricity, Gaddafi splurged Libyan petro-dollars on seminars, meetings and Governments that affirmed his suitability for the ‘supreme’ position. One such meeting was the Libyan-financed meeting of Kings and Chiefs across Africa, held on the 28th and 29th of August 2009.⁽⁴⁾ At that meeting, the so-called ‘forum of kings, sultans, princes, sheikhs and chiefs of Africa’ not only endorsed Gaddafi’s vision of African unity, they also bestowed upon him the title of ‘King of African Kings’.⁽⁵⁾ In pre-revolution Libya, Gaddafi’s self-styled image as the leader of the continent was mainly expressed through life size portraits of the ‘brother-leader’, slogans proclaiming him as the ‘liberator’ of the African continent⁽⁶⁾ and liberal immigration policies that permitted sub-Saharan Africans to dwell in Libya.⁽⁷⁾

Gaddafi was not only one of the major financiers of the African Union (AU); he also played a significant role in the establishment of the organisation. In 1999, he convened a meeting in Sirte, Libya, to discuss ways of reforming the OAU.⁽⁸⁾ The meeting was the beginning of the process that led to the eventual formation of the AU. The fact that the institutional structure, power and functions of the AU fell short of Gaddafi’s vision of a central executive authority for Africa, ensured that he was constantly championing the reform of the organisation.

Pitted against African political leaders who favoured an incremental, step-by-step approach (the so-called minimalists) to achieving African unity, Gaddafi never relented on presenting far-reaching proposals on strengthening the AU. Suffice to say that at every point, the ‘minimalists’ always provided an effective counterbalance to Gaddafi’s federalist aspirations. It is, however, important to briefly outline, some of Gaddafi’s propositions:

* At the Sirte meeting in 1999, Gaddafi had already prepared a draft declaration even before the deliberations started. The declaration, amongst other provisions, advocated for the creation of an African Monetary fund, Supreme African Court, the African Congress and a General Secretariat;⁽⁹⁾
* At the inaugural session of the AU in Durban, South Africa in 2002, Gaddafi proposed that the objectives of the AU should be amended to include ‘uniformity in trade defence and foreign policy with the world, to ensure the defence of the continent and the strengthening of its political negotiating with the other parties in the world.⁽¹⁰⁾ At a ministerial meeting in Tripoli that preceded the Durban summit, Gaddafi also proposed the establishment of a single African army;⁽¹¹⁾
* Another proposal was the inclusion of the AU’s right to militarily intervene in member states. While the amendment relating to the inclusion of intervention in situations of ‘a serious threat to legitimate order’ was accepted, further proposals on intervention in situations of ‘external aggression’ and ‘unrest’ were rejected.⁽¹²⁾ Gaddafi also proposed the ‘prohibition of any state from entering into any treaty or alliance, as well as offering a base or accepting troops from any state outside the Union’;⁽¹³⁾
* Further to his federalist aspirations, Gaddafi proposed that the term of office of the Chairperson of Assembly of the AU should be at least two years, with possible extension to five years;⁽¹⁴⁾
* Largely motivated by Gaddafi, the AU summit held in Accra in 2007, was singularly devoted to the debate on the establishment of a ‘Union Government of Africa’; and
* The decision to transform the AU Commission to the AU Authority, taken at the 12th ordinary session of the AU in 2009, should also be seen within the context of Gaddafi’s vision of a continental union.

The Gaddafi era of African integration, similar to the Nkrumah era, was largely defined by the rhetoric of surrendering state sovereignty to a single administration, the AU. Gaddafi’s ambition was, however, diminished by two main factors - geopolitics and the lack of democracy. With regards to geopolitics, one could say that Gaddafi was punching above his weight, as Libya is not a regional hegemon. Although Libya is a rich nation, it did not have either the population or strategic influence, like South Africa or Nigeria, to set the agenda for regional integration.

Gaddafi was also too divisive, largely as a result of his support to rebel groups across Africa⁽¹⁵⁾ and his inflammatory statements about some African states,⁽¹⁶⁾ to command the respect and charisma needed for such a venture. Gaddafi’s non-democratic credentials also placed a huge question mark on his vision. Judging by his over forty years’ decimation of national institutions in Libya, the concerns about his intention of creating and leading, a ‘United States of Africa’ were not misplaced.
Ousting of the brother leader: What implications for African unity?

Since Gaddafi was an autocrat, his decision to spend Libya’s resources on pursuing the unification of Africa was devoid of the consent of his people. The Libyan people had no say on how their money was spent on Gaddafi’s pet project, neither was their opinion on the issue of African integration ever sought. It is against this background that one should consider how the Libyan Government, the National Transitional Council (NTC) and subsequent democratically elected Governments, will react to the issue of African integration. A number of factors point to the fact that a post-Gaddafi Government in Libya will only pay fleeting attention to African integration.

The first factor is the hostility of the AU to the NTC. Although a number of African countries are pursuing a different line of action, the AU has clearly noted its non-recognition of the NTC.⁽¹⁷⁾ In contrast to the position of the Arab League and the international community, the AU calls for an inclusive transitional Government.⁽¹⁸⁾ This has placed the two regional hegemons in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa (leading the AU position) and Nigeria (recognising the NTC), in two opposing camps. By failing to recognise the NTC, the AU has not only missed the opportunity to strategically position itself in dealing with post-Gaddafi Libya, but also paints itself as biased and protective of Gaddafi (and his supposed legacy). The latter point is not be lost on the NTC.

The second factor is the reality of the politics of the Maghreb/North Africa. With Gaddafi out of the picture, subsequent regimes in Libya will revert to the realpolitik of the Maghreb region, which places due emphasis on strong relations with countries in the Middle East and western nations. Strategic engagement with parties such as the Arab League, the European Union (EU) and the US, will take precedence over the AU. The third factor is the priority of nation-building. The quest for African unity will be the least of the problems of the new Government in Libya, as it will be more preoccupied with building critical national institutions and engaging in national reconciliation. This does not mean that Libya will cease to participate in the proceedings and activities of the AU; rather it will no longer be a dominant force in shaping the issues on African integration.

Gaddafi’s dominant influence on the narrative of continental integration in the past decade had both positive and negative sides. The positive aspect of it was that it sharpened the focus and importance of proactively engaging in activities that speak to the quest for unity. The irony of Gaddafi’s incoherent and eccentric approach to African integration was that it engendered further and wider debate on the idea. The drawback of Gaddafi’s control of the debate was that it provided a distraction from serious inter-Governmental engagement on shaping African integration. His outlandish and radical ideas on the creation of single Government ensured that that his colleagues were always on the defensive. Quality time was wasted on trying to reshape or reject his ideas or setting up of committees to debate the feasibility of some of his proposals. With Gaddafi no longer in the picture, AU leaders can now concentrate on the importance of building and firming the foundation of continental integration.

Conclusion

To insist on the immediate creation of a ‘United States of Africa’ without considering the gargantuan obstacles is akin to having a misplaced priority. Gaddafi’s insistence on the establishment of a single authority for Africa should be understood within the context of the dictatorial framework of his regime. His actions as the leader of Libya were primarily carried out through decrees and fiats. Thus, Gaddafi was accustomed to having his own way. While the idea of a single administration for Africa remains a desirable one, it is more imperative to engage in issues that seek to address the impediments to concrete integration in African countries and it is this reality that should shape a post-Gaddafi era of African integration.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Babatunde Fagbayibo through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Africa Watch Unit (africa.watch@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Gerhard Hugo, ‘Mission impossible? Colonel Gaddafi’s quest for unity’, Institute for Security Studies, 11 July 2007, http://www.iss.co.za.
(3) A Huliaras, ‘Qadhafi”s comeback: Libya and sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s’, African Affairs, 100, pp. 10-13, 2001.
(4) New African Magazine, October 2009, pp. 53-54.
(5) Ibid.
(6) T Maluwa, ‘Reimagining African unity: Some preliminary reflections on the Constitutive Act of the African Union’, African Yearbook of international Law, 9, p. 12 (footnote 16), 2001.
(7) Abigail Hauslohner, ‘The disinvited: The new Libya’s new racism’, Time Magazine, 31 August 2011, http://www.time.com.
(8) T Maluwa, ‘Reimagining African unity: Some preliminary reflections on the Constitutive Act of the African Union’, African Yearbook of international Law, 9, p. 12 (footnote 16), 2001.
(9) Ibid, p. 17.
(10) T Maluwa, ‘Fast-tracking African unity or making haste slowly: A note on the amendments of the Constitutive Act of the African union’, Netherlands International Law Review, 51, pp. 209-210, 2004.
(11) Ibid, p. 210.
(12) Ibid, p. 215.
(13) Ibid, p. 220.
(14) Ibid, p. 224.
(15) Abigail Hauslohner, ‘The disinvited: The new Libya’s new racism’, Time Magazine, 31 August 2011, http://www.time.com.
(16) ‘Gaddafi says Nigeria should split into several states’, BBC News, 29 March 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(17) Tesfa-Alem Tekle, ‘Libya: African Union snubs new revolutionary masters’, Sudan Tribune, 26 August 2011, http://www.sudantribune.com.
(18) Ibid.

Written by Babatunde Fagbayibo ⁽¹⁾