A white paper released by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in 2002 defines electoral conflict and violence as “any random or organised act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral process.”⁽²⁾ Electoral violence also occurs after the outcomes of an electoral process become public, especially when groups are dissatisfied with these outcomes and resort to violence. In Nigeria’s case, a number of factors lead to electoral violence such as the lack of credibility in elections, the clamour for political power, economic control by actors and groups, and the subsequent results of elections that favour one political party, ethnic group or religious interest over another.

It has become the norm that elections in Nigeria are associated with tensions between groups and the eventual escalation to violence. Ongoing peace-building efforts and progress made in reconciling relationships can be paralysed based on the outcome of elections. Nigeria’s ⁽³⁾ case provides a very real experience of electoral violence and the impact on ongoing peace processes. Nigeria will be conducting elections in April 2011 and this paper examines the impact this has had and will continue to have on ongoing peace processes within the country. Recommendations on how to address electoral violence are also provided.

Election-related violence in Nigeria

Nigeria has remained rather stable at the core in spite of the pockets of violence in various parts of the country. The root of Nigeria’s instability and ongoing violence is embedded in a history that has been characterised by conflict amongst groups in their bid to control state resources. Further, the politicisation of ethnicity and religion has been the source of many of Nigeria’s conflicts and will remain the case leading up to the elections next month. For instance, Nigeria is largely embedded along ethnic and religious lines which further highlight the politicised nature of renewed violence in the state of Plateau. The fact that ethnicity or religion has come to define one’s loyalty to a certain political party or individual does not bode well for peace and security in the country.⁽⁴⁾

The idea that whoever holds the highest political office in the country is able to determine the allocation of wealth creates an environment for intense corruption and rigging of the electoral process to ensure parties and their chosen candidates win. A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG), released on 24 February 2011, states that “politicians still seem determined to use violence, bribery or rigging to win the spoils of office.”⁽⁵⁾ It is worrisome because systematic violence and rigging during elections have become engrained in Nigeria’s political sphere, thereby the realisation that this has implications for the security of the population. Deaths linked to electoral violence have been recorded. More recently, there has been the assassination of at least one candidate, intra-party attacks, and other election related deaths.⁽⁶⁾

The level of insecurity, characterised by the rapid eruption and frequency of violence, especially during elections, is further heightened by the lack of swift and early response by the state and its security actors. In many parts of Nigeria, including the northern states, the “response of public authorities is habitually too late and heavy handed.”⁽⁷⁾ For instance, the police are more prone to stay away from communal riots, due to their limited ability to mitigate these riots and the potential hostilities they will face.⁽⁸⁾ Their ability to respond in a swift and early manner becomes more significant with the introduction of bombs and explosives to spread terror and destroy human lives. Cases such as the explosions in Jos and Abuja in late 2010 attest to this.

Implications of electoral violence in ongoing peace processes

Nigeria’s elections will take place against the backdrop of instability and violent spurts in areas including Plateau state and the Niger Delta region. This creates a major security threat in these areas and the country as a whole. These volatile situations will be impacted, more negatively than positively, during the elections unless measures are in place to mitigate and prevent their further escalation.

Implication #1: The Plateau State

The crisis in Plateau State has claimed the lives of thousands and led to the destruction of livelihoods and infrastructure. In January 2010, over 500 lives were lost and, between March and December 2010, an additional 100 lives were lost.⁽⁹⁾ An estimated 70 lives were lost from the bombings on Christmas Eve 2010 and reprisal attacks claimed over 30 lives.⁽¹⁰⁾ This “fragile near-peace”⁽¹¹⁾ and the looming possibility of large scale fighting and destruction still lingers. The basis of the violence in the state has been based on control over resources and access to political office however clouded by ethnicity and religion.⁽¹²⁾ The frequency of these conflicts and the rapid manner in which they erupt and escalate becomes critical taking into account the upcoming elections and the contests for power within the state.

Efforts in restoring peace and security have been on the increase. On that basis, the Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies of the University of Jos has been involved in peacebuilding efforts in Jos with critical stakeholders. Through this initiative, in collaboration with the Netherlands Embassy in the country’s capital Abuja, youth groups have undergone capacity building on conflict and peacebuilding.⁽¹³⁾ These workshops are planned for traditional rulers, leaders, and women groups amongst other stakeholders.⁽¹⁴⁾ A football camp organised by the Young Ambassadors for Community Peace and Inter-faith Foundation was heralded as a positive step as friendships were built across these divisions.⁽¹⁵⁾ Furthermore, the Bukuru Peace Cup Football match between Jos North and Jos South seemed to bridge gaps.⁽¹⁶⁾ The fact that violence erupted even after this initiatives shows that more concerted efforts need to be in place and the underlying issues need to be addressed in the short and long term. This, therefore, calls for a preventative and not curative approach, which will involve analysing the structural issues and an in-depth historical analysis of the conflict.

Implication #2: The Niger Delta

As the oil rich region of the country, the Niger Delta continues to be a playground for a wide range of actors and interests. In that contested space, conflict has erupted due to the manifestation of these competing interests. The instability in states such as Bayelsa in the region has been fuelled by elections and their outcomes at the state and federal Government levels. The region has been characterised by heightened insecurity, attacks on innocent civilians, and the displacement of persons. Numerous cease-fire agreements have been interrupted by militants’ declarations to return to conflict. The idea that militant groups and their interests and agendas are not necessarily part of the civilian population makes it difficult to resolve the crisis.

Efforts to resolve the crisis through dialogue, development, and other means by past Governments and regimes have been dismal on the whole. The Niger Delta crisis received some attention during the current term of President Jonathan Goodluck to find agreeable solutions. This has seen more engagement with leaders of armed groups and movements within the region. Furthermore, the creation of the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta Affairs shows a clear commitment from the Presidency to return stability to the region. Notable efforts, which include non-violence training and orientation for youths in the region as well as skills acquisition programmes, have been used to target youths.⁽¹⁷⁾ As of 2 February 2011, “12,917 former members of various Niger Delta armed militant groups underwent the demobilisation and integration process through participation of several non-violent conflict resolution programmes.”⁽¹⁸⁾ These individuals have been posted to various institutions for training and some will be used to impact on the lives of other youth within the region.⁽¹⁹⁾ Ex-combatants who have undergone training “attested that they were made to understand that arms violence is not the best way to actualise any struggle, and they would rather take up their agitation intellectually with Government”.⁽²⁰⁾ How sustainable these will be and the impact of the elections on these efforts remains to be seen.

The outcome of the elections favouring President Jonathan Goodluck will ensure that efforts to restore peace to the region will continue and might improve the situation there considerably. On the other hand, it remains to be seen should President Goodluck not be successful in the elections, what impact this will have on relations in the region and the potential for more violence and attacks to emerge. The need to intensify peacebuilding efforts in these hotspots becomes more relevant in the lead up to the elections. It must be noted that in northern Nigeria,

communal or religiously-motivated violence in the far north has abated to some degree in the last [ten] years and the peacebuilding strategies of state governors and civil society groups have played a role in this process.⁽²¹⁾

The way forward

It is important that the upcoming elections do not trigger conflict on a wider scale, as has been the case in the past.

Ongoing peace-building efforts must continue to focus on dialogue, nation-building, and tolerance which will contribute to reconciliation amongst various groups leading up to elections. At the national level, there needs to be more focus on building national cohesion. The focus on resolving the conflicts in Jos and the Niger Delta crisis also requires a broad mitigation strategy for electoral violence that can flare up at any time. Sensitisation campaigns for communities through civil society including women, youths, and faith-based groups will help to create an understanding of election related violence and their role in preventing it.

The police and military are important in preventing the escalation of violence but they must be accountable and transparent in their approaches and interactions with the population. Most importantly, these actors must be legitimate in their use of force to ensure that innocent civilians are protected even during the elections. Security forces in Nigeria have “done very little to prevent rigging or violence and have often been bought by politicians.”⁽²²⁾ Reports coming from the crisis in Plateau State suggest that the civilian population have dressed up as the police and military and, through that, continue to incite violence. There thus needs to be a process of accountability and a proper vetting process should be in place to track and identify rogue officials. These security actors must also have sufficient knowledge, skills, and resources to be able to intervene rapidly.

Security providers cannot work alone. The links between civil society organisations, security providers, and community leaders are necessary to establish mechanisms for early warning and early response to conflict. This linkage can be strengthened through strong lines of communication and information sharing on possible tension areas, conflict triggers in communities, and opportunities for conflict resolution. These will also contribute to reducing the prevalence of conflict that tends to occur during election periods and will be of benefit even after they are concluded.

The role of the Commonwealth, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the African Union (AU) becomes critical to begin to engage actors at the top levels of power. The role of key decision makers in influencing their parties, constituents, and political candidates to desist from using violent and corrupt means will help to contribute to peaceful elections. The engagement from these regional and continental powerhouses must promote the political support for non-violent means.

Noteworthy developments include the creation of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and other related offences collaboration committees in early 2011 to focus on a collaborative approach to “win the battle against corruption in the nation’s electoral system.”⁽²³⁾ The value and impact of this collective approach will be of immense importance in the coming months. The fact that “no one has been convicted of an electoral offence since independence”⁽²⁴⁾ shows why the need for this collaboration is significant.

Conclusion

In the long term, Nigeria must address the historical and structural causes of this conflict to sufficiently address electoral related disputes. Unless this assessment is done, elections in the country will always be associated with insecurity, violence, and a loss to human lives and property. More concerted and conscious efforts need to be made on nation-building or the peace will remain fragmented.

Beyond its borders, the impact of protracted electoral violence will have dire consequences for its neighbours and the whole West African region. For example, the humanitarian impact itself could be detrimental if the violence exacerbates, leading to large numbers of refugees to small neighbouring countries unable to handle such an influx. The economic bedrock of society will be affected greatly, especially its booming oil economy.

With the crisis in Ivory Coast, it is important that Nigeria remains stable for the good of the continent. Nigeria can lead the way by ensuring that elections are peaceful and that the handing over of power from one individual and the Government to another is organised peacefully.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Dorcas Ettang through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict & Terrorism Unit (conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Fischer, J., 2002, ‘Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention’, IFES White Paper 2002-01.
(3) Nigeria’s presidential elections are scheduled for 9 April 2011 and elections for state governors and legislators on 16 April 2011.
(4) The basis for a selection of a candidate should go beyond his ethnicity or religious affiliation to include the platform on which his/her campaign is based and the societal gaps he/she will address.
(5) International Crisis Group. 2011. Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration? Policy Brief/Africa Briefing, No. 79, pp. 1-23.
(6) Ibid.
(7) International Crisis Group. 2010. Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict. Africa Report, No 168, pp. 1-43.
(8) Ibid.
(9) ‘Redressing Violence in the “Home of Peace and Tourism”’, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding in Collaboration with Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, February 2011, http://www.wanep.org.
(10) Ibid.
(11) McCain, C., 2011, ‘Peace on Earth and Bombs in Jos’, Young Ambassadors for Community Peace and Interfaith Foundation, 1 January 2011, http://yacpif.wordpress.com.
(12) According to the West African Network for Peacebuilding, the cause of the conflicts remains contentious in nature and this is due to the ethnic and religious dimensions of the Jos conflict. They highlight that the indigene/settler feud over who controls politics and resources and the religious dimensions that are in most cases drawn along ethnic lines come to the fore.
(13) Audu, O., 2011, ‘Centre Begins Peace Process in Jos’, Daily Independent, 27 February 2011, http://www.independentngonline.com.
(14) Ibid.
(15) McCain, C., 2011, ‘Peace on Earth and Bombs in Jos’, Young Ambassadors for Community Peace and Interfaith Foundation, 1 January 2011, http://yacpif.wordpress.com.
(16) Ibid.
(17) ‘Return of Violence in Niger-Delta, What does John Togo, Other rebelling Ex-militants want?’, Vanguard, 21 November, 2010, http://www.vanguardngr.com.
(18) ‘How to Sustain Peace in the Niger Delta by Alaibe’, Nigeria Sun, 03 February 2011, http://story.nigeriasun.com.
(19) Ibid.
(20) ‘Return of Violence in Niger-Delta, What does John Togo, Other rebelling Ex-militants want?’, Vanguard, 21 November 2010, http://www.vanguardngr.com.
(21) Northern Nigeria comprises the states of Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara.
(22) International Crisis Group. 2011. Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration? Policy Brief/Africa Briefing, No. 79, pp. 1-23.
(23) ‘C’Wealth tasks Nigeria on electoral violence’, The Guardian Nigeria, 10 February 2011, http://www.ngrguardiannews.com.
(24) International Crisis Group. 2011. Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration? Policy Brief/Africa Briefing, No. 79, pp. 1-23.

Written by Dorcas Ettang ⁽¹⁾