The next Ordinary Summit of the African Union (AU) planned for January 2012 in Addis Ababa promises to be unique in many ways. Besides the inauguration of the Chinese-funded new building, aimed at hosting the AU’s Headquarters, most of the attention will be focused on the election of new AU commissioners. The renewal of the AU Commission generally takes place amid impressive political bargaining where member states try to shape the AU’s developments by positioning some of their best cadres in an influential position in Addis Ababa. The specificity of this year’s elections comes from South Africa’s decision to send Ms Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, its former foreign minister and current home affairs minister, as candidate for the top job of head of the AU Commission. By doing so, South Africa (SA) is challenging the sitting chairperson Jean Ping​. This rather “unfriendly” gesture of bidding to replace a chairperson of the Commission, who has only served for one term, has been diversely appreciated in capital cities around the continent. There are many excellent reasons to explain SA’s appetite for the chairmanship of the AU Commission and even to justify the choice of Ms Dlamini-Zuma. However, notwithstanding the strength of these arguments, South Africa runs the risk of being perceived as relying on its own strength as a regional power in Africa to get this position.

There are several reasons why an AU chairperson Dlamini-Zuma would make sense. In typically African consensual manner, the chairmanship of the AU is traditionally expected to follow a rotation principle whereby every sub-region should have its turn. Because it is the last region to achieve its independence,, Southern Africa has never been able to place a Secretary General of the former Organisation of African Unity or an AU chairperson of the Commission. It is therefore justified to argue that a national from a Southern African country be elected as head of the AU Commission because the region has a lot to offer to the continent. Also, the choice of Ms Dlamini-Zuma appears to be a smart move from SA as she comes with an impressive pedigree for this position. Having served under former president Thabo Mbeki​ when SA’s foreign policy substantially contributed to shape Africa’s and the South-South agenda, Ms Dlamini-Zuma is today a rather successful home affairs minister, credited for turning around the fortunes of a ministry previously known for its lethargy. That the election of a woman in that position would bring a much-needed breath of fresh air in a male dominated African intergovernmental institution is another argument in favour of Dlamini-Zuma.

Another important reason why the candidacy of Ms Dlamini-Zuma makes sense from a South African perspective is the current discrepancy between the country’s proclaimed prioritization of Africa in its foreign policy and the glaring lack of commitment to support African regional organisations like the AU. If South Africa remains one of the AU’s Big Five (a group of 5 countries accounting for about 75% of the member states’ contributions to the AU budget) the country has been widely criticised for committing little more than money. For example, the number of good skilled and experienced South African nationals working for the AU commission is surprisingly low and does in any case not reflect the ambitions of a regional leadership role that the country wants to play. (It is a fact, though, that Addis Ababa does not necessarily exert a strong power of attraction on SA officials who would earn much higher salaries by staying home. )

As a matter of comparison, it would be hard to consider a Commission of the European Union without a German or a French Commissioner. In that regard, Ms Dlamini-Zuma’s candidacy reflects a shift in SA’s foreign policy approach to regional organisations and a welcome move that would probably strengthen the Commission.

In any case, South Africa’s decision to send a top official for the AU Commission chair is a sign that the AU is growing in importance and is considered by the continent’s biggest economy as a critical position to influence the country’s international relations and Africa’s voice in the world.

Though is this a question of bad timing? Despite these positive signs and the apparent confidence of SA’s officials regarding their chances of success, it appears that SA might have misinterpreted the current mood in the continent or overestimated itself. There are good reasons to think that Ms Dlamini-Zuma’s election is no done deal.

First, it is fair to say that SA put the majority of its African partners in front of a fait accompli by announcing this candidacy. Although this is a sovereign decision for every state, South Africa’s failure to consult substantially before taking this decision led to the perception that Pretoria had a hidden agenda. Suspicions of a hidden agenda were centred around South Africa breaking the non-written rule that no ‘big country’ should apply for the AU’s top job. Also, it is alluded to in African capitals that Pretoria is trying to control the AU Commission to boost its bid for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Even worse, opponents to Dlamini-Zuma’s candidacy fear that she would be taking her orders from Pretoria if elected.

These perceptions have their roots and have been amplified by some recent controversial foreign and security policy decisions taken by Pretoria and which were considered by some observers as rather dividing instead of unifying Africa. SA’s management of the Côte d’Ivoire post-electoral crisis will certainly not go down in the diplomatic history of the country as its foreign policy’s best hour. By antagonizing Nigeria’s and ECOWAS’ conflict resolution approach in a West African country where Pretoria’s expertise is at best limited, SA not only violated its own foreign policy principles but also divided the AU. In addition, doubts were expressed about SA’s commitment to the promotion of democracy in Africa and respect for the stabilising role of regional organisations.

In the Libyan crisis, SA’s inconsistency and insistence on an unrealistic political solution to a conflict whose dynamic had long turned violent have raised questions about the country’s ability to lead both the AU or play a leadership role in the the UNSC. By championing the AU’s roadmap on Libya, which de facto excluded a military solution to end a repressive regime, Pretoria seemed to be more interested in procedural processes of inclusivity than by results-oriented outcomes, particularly when these changes are induced by non-African actors. The involvement of NATO in Libya and of France in the UN mission in Cote d’Ivoire gave rise to anti-Western sentiments expressed by various South African officials. The uniformed way in which this primary anti-Western posture was brought to the fore prevented a serious discussion about the grey zones of NATO’s rather generous interpretation of UN-Resolution 1973.

Finally, South Africa failed to convince its African partners that Ms Dlamini-Zuma’s candidacy was linked to a broader plan to reform the AU, an organization whose political weakness is proportional to the unanimous assertion that it is the only game in town. If Ms Dlamini-Zuma was to lose this election, relationships between the Commission and Pretoria will at best be sour for some time. SA’s diplomacy will have suffered another blow that could have been avoided.

Written by Paul-Simon Handy and Stine Kjeldgaard, Director Research and Intern