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Date
: 19/09/2006
Source: Department of Minerals and Energy
Title: Sonjica: Special session of the International Atomic Energy
Agency
Statement by the Minister of Minerals and Energy, MS Buyelwa
Sonjica, at the special session of the International Atomic Energy
Agency on “New framework for the utilisation of nuclear
energy in the 21st century: assurances of supply and
non-proliferation”, Vienna
Chairman
Allow me to express my appreciation to the Director-General and to
the Secretariat for arranging this important special event.
With the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), almost 50 years ago and in recognition for the increasing
importance of nuclear power generation and the substantial benefits
of the atom in other areas of human development, the founding
members had envisaged a central role for this newly established
organisation in facilitating international co-operation in the
peaceful uses of the atom. At the same time, these founding members
also recognised the dual application of nuclear energy for both
peaceful and non-peaceful uses and consequently provided a
framework for safeguarding this important resource and for
verifying the non-diversion thereof to non-peaceful purposes.
Whilst international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy increased and the safeguards system expanded over the years
through the development of the non-proliferation regime, including
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), some of the original ideas set
forth by the founding members in the Statute of the Agency, never
came to fruition. Included amongst these was the notion of the
agency acting as a fuel bank to provide and assure the reliable
supply of fuel for civilian use in a fair and equitable
manner.
During the years a number of attempts were made to create
additional measures beyond the safeguards system aimed at
preventing sensitive technologies from being misused for
non-peaceful purposes. These attempts included proposals during the
1970s to establish multilateral fuel cycle centres and an
international nuclear fuel authority, which was intended to
guarantee the supply of nuclear power plant fuel to NPT
non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS), with the proviso that such States
renounce national reprocessing or enrichment plants.
If we examine the subject of today's special event, we have to
admit that history indeed has a way of repeating itself. It is
therefore imperative that during our discussions at this event, we
interrogate the central question as to why these efforts failed and
on how we can extract lessons from these experiences in finding a
solution to our common concerns about the abuse of these sensitive
technologies given the new realities of the 21st Century.
As Governments, one of our most important pre-occupations today is
energy security. There is wide recognition for the need to
diversify energy supply by developing advanced, non-polluting, more
efficient, affordable and cost-effective energy technologies,
including renewable energy technologies to meet the rising global
demand for energy, particularly in developing countries. At the
recently concluded Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in
Havana, Cuba, the Heads of State and Government of these 116 States
again underlined the need to ensure that energy policies support
developing countries' efforts to eradicate poverty. They also
emphasised the need to accelerate the development, dissemination
and deployment of affordable and cleaner energy efficiency and
energy conservation technologies, as well as the transfer of such
technologies, particularly to developing countries.
These Heads of State or Government agreed to enhance co-operation
with a view to improving access to energy including alternative
sources of energy by developing countries. At the same time they
underscored the sovereign right of States over the management of
their energy resources.
When looking at alternative energy sources, an increasing number of
countries are today recognising the role that nuclear energy can
play.
This realisation about the increased relevance of nuclear energy in
contributing to global energy needs prompted a re-evaluation of
supply arrangements. In this regard, studies were recently
undertaken to examine the issue of assurances of the supply of
nuclear fuel, including the initiative by the Director-General of
the IAEA to mandate an expert group on look at possible
multilateral approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. As you are
aware, this expert group issued its report during 2005, which
included a number of conclusions and recommendations. Whilst the
report contains several interesting ideas and options that require
further consideration, the experts themselves stated that the
desirability or feasibility of multilateral nuclear approaches and
the options identified in the report do not necessarily reflect
agreement by all the experts – a clear illustration of the
complexity of the issue.
When the expert panel's report was discussed in the Board of
Governors last year, South Africa emphasised that any decision
taken in this regard may not place any unwarranted restrictions on
the inalienable right of States to the peaceful application of
nuclear energy. We also stated that there is a need to guard
against actions, which would merely serve to exacerbate existing
inequalities, including through the creation of another kind of
cartel that would exclude full participation, particularly by
States in full compliance with their safeguards obligations.
Why did the previous proposals especially those of the 1970s not
result in the adoption of such a multilateral mechanism? Most of us
would agree that the one factor that undoubtedly influenced the
outcome of these proposals was the geo-political circumstances of
that particular era. Another factor that may have prevented
consensus was the existence of a vibrant market for the supply of
nuclear fuel – a market that sufficiently supplied in the
demand. In addition, the unwillingness of States to relinquish
control over their national capabilities would also have influenced
the outcome of these proposals.
It is important to recall that the negotiation of this instrument
resulted in a carefully crafted treaty that, although
discriminatory in nature due to the creation of two distinct
categories of States, provided a delicate balance between the
rights and obligations of the nuclear-weapon States - the haves and
the non-nuclear-weapon States - the have-nots. As part of the deal,
the treaty not only created obligations for everyone on nuclear
non-proliferation, it also included obligations on nuclear
disarmament and rights on the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.
In the latter regard, Article IV of NPT states that, nothing in the
treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of
all Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with Articles I and II. As such, the NPT provides a
framework of confidence and co-operation within which the
development of the peaceful uses of the atom can take place.
In terms of the non-proliferation provisions of the treaty, it
should be noted that the NPT did not seek to limit access to any
advanced or sensitive technologies by States Parties that are in
conformity with their obligations.
This principle is made clear in Article IV. The non-proliferation
provisions therefore specifically seek to prevent the diversion of
material to any nuclear weapons programmes or other nuclear
explosive devices.
When we examine the proposals of the 1970s, these also included
conditions for access to the reliable supply of nuclear fuel -
conditions that were clearly in direct conflict with the
inalienable right of States “to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”, as provided
for in the NPT. Unfortunately, we have noted that some of the most
recent proposals on supply mechanisms contain similar conditions.
Although the prevailing proliferation concerns may prompt us to
consider alternative arrangements on supply mechanisms, these may
under no circumstances impose unwarranted restrictions and controls
over the legitimate peaceful use of nuclear energy.
One of the approaches suggested in the most recent proposals on
supply arrangements is the possible establishment of regional
multinational centres.
Whatever the outcome of the discussions on the most appropriate
approach, it is imperative that we ensure that no arrangement would
prevent any country or region from full participation.
In view of the statutory mandate of the IAEA, I believe that the
establishment of any credible mechanisms to assure the reliable
supply of nuclear fuel should be considered in the context of the
agency. Not only does the agency have a legitimate role to
encourage and assist the practical application of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes, in accordance with its statute, it also has
a special responsibility to take into consideration the needs of
the developing areas of the world.
Our discussions on the need for such a mechanism, as well as a
possible framework to ensure reliable access to nuclear fuel,
should therefore not involve any preconditions that would even hint
at the possibility that non-nuclear-weapon States, in conformity
with their legal obligations under the NPT, should forego their
inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If we
agree to such conditions, we may well be contributing to
undermining the very bargains on which the NPT was founded and
further disturb the delicate balance of rights and obligations
under this instrument.
The decision by States not to pursue domestic fuel cycle activities
is a sovereign one. The availability of nuclear fuel in the market
or the existence of mechanisms that facilitate reliable supply may
well contribute to such a decision. Although it is argued that
those already pursuing uranium enrichment activities would in any
event not be utilising this mechanism, it should be remembered that
some might choose to pursue sensitive fuel cycle activities in a
limited way or only for research purposes.
However, those States that may decide to pursue domestic sensitive
fuel cycle activities for peaceful purposes and in conformity with
their international legal obligations should not be discriminated
against by excluding them from the possible benefits that may
derive from such mechanisms. In addition, we should guard against
the notion that sensitive technologies are safe in the hands of
some, but pose a risk when others have access to them. The
pursuance of energy security is not only a right of all states, but
also a global responsibility. In recognising the potential role
that nuclear energy can play in this context, it is our duty to
ensure that no unwarranted restrictions are imposed. Further
modalities for preventing the diversion of these sensitive
technologies may be required in order to ensure that we can pursue
such activities without fear and with the necessary assurances.
What is required in this regard is a non-discriminatory approach
that would assure the supply of nuclear fuel, whilst fully
respecting the choices of States and protecting their inalienable
right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, consistent with their
non-proliferation obligations.
I would like to conclude by appreciating the dynamism of this
debate, and that it is still work in progress, but listening to my
colleagues' proposals I could not help asking myself the following
questions, maybe from the realisation of the vulnerability of
developing countries. If it were not for the multilateral
instruments that are in place:
* To what extent will the establishment of the Gross National
Product (GNP) or international centres undermine the multilateral
tools like the IAEA?
* What would the implications be for the developing and more
vulnerable countries?
* Would these new bodies not give more control to the developed
nuclear power states – making the developing countries even
more vulnerable?
* Would these new bodies not also widen further the inequality gap
between the developed and developing countries?
I hope that these questions can and will be responded to honestly,
as this is a matter where all nations are directly or indirectly
involved or affected.
I thank you.
Issued by: Department of Minerals and Energy
19 September 2006