In January 2013, France began operations in northern Mali at the request of the Malian Government to counter a rising insurgency following a coup in March 2012. The French military along with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) subsequently led a successful campaign that denied operational movement to Tuareg rebels ⁽²⁾ and their Islamic militant supporters in northern Mali. The insurgency rapidly dissipated under international pressure, which resulted in an exodus of insurgent groups that crossed the porous borders of Mali for Niger, Mauritania, Algeria and Chad. Many consequently feared a spill over of insurgency across neighbouring countries, especially Niger as it shares many of Mali’s socio-economic and political challenges. Yet Niger is not Mali, as it has been very successful at combating insurgency in the past. This CAI paper discusses the similarities that predisposed Mali and Niger to insurgency before defining the unique Nigerien approach to counterinsurgency.

Islamic militant breeding grounds

Niger has long been considered a breeding ground for insurgency and Islamic militants. However, the advent of Operation Serval by the French, which caused radical Islamic fighters to flee Mali for Niger, bolstered the strength of already established Nigerien groups even more. This sudden increase in capacity of Islamic militant groups, such as the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Dine and the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, therefore caused much concern given Niger’s history of insurgency.

In this regard, a larger indigenous Tuareg population already resides in Niger and has a history of rebelling against the government from the 1990s until most recently in 2007.⁽³⁾ With the influx of Islamic fighters from Mali, it was believed that if these militants could succeed in creating a power-sharing agreement then a rolling insurgency might forcibly sweep across the Sahel and northern Africa.

Niger has all of the right elements to foster an insurgency. The country ranks at the bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI),⁽⁴⁾ while its economy is supported by uranium exports that fluctuate dramatically on the global market causing financial instability.⁽⁵⁾ Moreover, the vast majority of the population (85%) survives on less than US$ 2 a day.⁽⁶⁾ Finally, droughts and a continuously encroaching desert further complicate Niger’s agricultural prospects by causing 2.9 million Nigeriens to face daily food shortages.⁽⁷⁾ Local grievances are therefore not difficult to find in this West African country.

In addition to these obstacles, the Nigerien army appears to have a chronic disdain for civilian rule. Since relinquishing military power to President Mahamadou Issoufou in April 2011, for example, there have been two coup attempts.⁽⁸⁾ Moreover, the military remains a dominant and active force in Niger as its total budget more than doubled in 2012.⁽⁹⁾

Adding more cause for concern is the fact that the Nigerien government is seen to be corrupt, self-serving and ineffective.⁽¹⁰⁾ The nomadic Tuareg people in the north of Niger, which make up around 10% of the population, have long rebelled against this type of rule.⁽¹¹⁾ Due to their remoteness from the capital of Niamey, they feel marginalised and alienated by the lack of support and representation within the government.⁽¹²⁾

By reviewing the above political and socio-economic features of Niger, the country appears very similar to Mali as it has all the makings of an ideal insurgent stronghold with its weak governance, inability to project power in the border regions, high levels of poverty, chronic underdevelopment, lack of jobs, unstable regional politics and porous borders. Yet, Niger has succeeded in eliminating rebellions and diffusing insurgents through both military and political means.

The Nigerien counterinsurgency experience

The Nigerien military is unique in that for being a relatively small force it is highly capable and adapted to fighting insurgencies. The army is an active fighting force that receives a lot of French equipment and international training. The 12,000-person military is combat proficient with many of the officers and soldiers having direct counterinsurgency experience in Niger, Cote d'Ivoire and Iraq.⁽¹³⁾ As such, when conflict broke out in Mali, Niger was quick to react and to understand what the conflict meant for its own stability. It was among the first in the region and internationally to call for an armed intervention in Mali.⁽¹⁴⁾ The Nigerien Government was also quick to allow United States (US) Predators and Reapers to utilise its airfields and requested that they be armed, although the US decided ultimately not to arm the drones.⁽¹⁵⁾

In early August 2013, as Mali neared collapse an additional 5,000 Nigerien soldiers were sent to the Malian border to prevent insurgents from crossing into its territory.⁽¹⁶⁾ The Nigerien military also sent 900 soldiers to Mali as part of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to help fight the insurgency.⁽¹⁷⁾ The Nigerien Government increased the wages of military units operating in the conflict and reallocated US$ 80 million from health and education programmes to the military.⁽¹⁸⁾ The government also created an Economic and Development Plan (PDES) totalling US$ 4.8 billion in long term development projects along with a US$ 2.5 billion Strategy for Development and Security (SDS).⁽¹⁹⁾

This manoeuvre was reminiscent of Niger’s experience in 2011 when Nigerien troops were mobilised on the border of Libya after the collapse of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s regime during the Arab Spring. The troops were used to stem an influx of 200,000 refugees and to disarm any Nigeriens who fought for Gaddafi’s regime and were attempting to return to Niger with their weapons.⁽²⁰⁾ In addition to physically removing weapons, the Nigerien Government reactivated the 1994 High Authority for Peacebuilding (HACP), a body initially created to oversee peace negotiations with the Tuareg rebels.⁽²¹⁾ The HACP sought to develop schemes to reintegrate returnees and to offer community incentives for voluntary disarmament.⁽²²⁾ As such, the entire community and not just the individual benefited from being disarmed.

The Nigerien Government has also worked to dissolve insurgency by incorporating and aiding groups that feel marginalised. In 2009, for example, the government signed a peace agreement with the Tuareg.⁽²³⁾ This agreement has since been bolstered by further inclusion of the Tuareg within local and central governments and an increase in development and aid to their regions.⁽²⁴⁾ This peace agreement has not been broken since it was signed by both parties, and has effectively subverted a chronic rebellion.

Finally, Niger has continued to developing regional and international defence and security relationships. It most recently, on 20 August 2013, signed a military cooperation agreement with Mauritania,⁽²⁵⁾ for example. This pact is aimed at helping the two countries combat terrorism, illustrating Niger’s commitment to the region and to recognising that terrorism is not a country phenomenon but rather a regional and global movement. While Niger continues to develop strong regional defence relationships, it still maintains its historical ties with France and with the US. This allows Niger to acquire the regional intelligence required to conduct counterinsurgency operations while still benefitting from the capacity of international partners.

Concluding remarks

While Niger’s socio-economic and political snapshot may make it appear to be a “breeding ground for Islamic militants,”⁽²⁶⁾ this is not the reality on the ground. Niger has the capability and experience to handle terrorism by utilising its military in the short term and by simultaneously pushing for development and inclusion in the long term. This unique carrot and stick approach to dismantling and reintegrating Islamic militants and rebels is further enhanced by its willingness to collaborate with its regional neighbours and international supporters. Niger benefits financially by courting the international community as a reliable and stable partner in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel region. Ultimately, Niger is effective at fighting insurgencies because of its proactive, experienced military and forward-thinking development-minded government.

Written by Ryan M. Barnett ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Ryan Barnett is a Research Associate with CAI. Contact Ryan through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Conflict & Terrorism unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) ‘Q&A’, BBC, 7 September 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk; The nomadic Tuareg people of Mali and Niger are pastoralists who rely on the traditional lands for survival. They have long claimed to be marginalised by both governments and remain alienated from the political system. These factors have led to numerous rebellions in the past.
(3) Feeney, M., ‘After Mali, Islamic militants look to Niger’, Reason 24/7, 8 July 2013, http://reason.com.
(4)‘Analysis: After Mali, Niger battles to secure its borders’, IRIN, 12 September 2013, http://www.irinnews.org; The Human Development Index (HDI) is a way of quantifying the level of development within a country by measuring factors such as life expectancy, education level and personal income.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid
(8) Elischer, S., ‘After Mali comes Niger: West Africa’s problems migrate east’, Foreign Affairs, 12 February 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com.
(9) ‘Analysis: After Mali, Niger battles to secure its borders’, IRIN, 12 September 2013, http://www.irinnews.org.
(10) Koepf, T., ‘Terrorist attacks in Niger: Not another Mali’, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 3 June 2013, http://www.iss.europa.eu.
(11) Bozonnet, C., ‘Niger remains wary of Mali crisis on its doorstep’, The Guardian, 6 March 2013, http://www.theguardian.com.
(12) Elischer, S., ‘After Mali comes Niger: West Africa’s problems migrate east’, Foreign Affairs, 12 February 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com.
(13) Bryden, A., N'Diaye, B. and Olonisakin, F. (eds.), 2008. Challenges of security sector governance in West Africa. Lit Verlag: Munster.
(14) Tinti, P., ‘Niger: The stable Sahelian state, for now’, Think Africa Press, 27 September 2013, http://thinkafricapress.com.
(15) Schmitt, E., ‘Drones in Niger reflect new U.S. tack on terrorism’, The New York Times, 10 July 2013, http://www.nytimes.com.
(16) Bozonnet, C., ‘Niger remains wary of Mali crisis on its doorstep’, The Guardian, 6 March 2013, http://www.theguardian.com.
(17) Analysis: After Mali, Niger battles to secure its borders’, IRIN, 12 September 2013, http://www.irinnews.org.
(18) Tinti, P., ‘Niger: The stable Sahelian state, for now’, Think Africa Press, 27 September 2013, http://thinkafricapress.com.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Ibid.
(22) Ibid.
(23) Koepf, T., ‘Terrorist attacks in Niger: Not another Mali’, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 3 June 2013, http://www.iss.europa.eu.
(24) Ibid.
(25) Gueye, B., ‘Mauritania, Niger sign defence pact’, Magharebia, 21 August 2013, http://magharebia.com.
(26) ‘Analysis: After Mali, Niger battles to secure its borders’, IRIN, 12 September 2013, http://www.irinnews.org.