Date: 05/10/2011
Source: The National Treasury
Title: SA: Nene: Address by the Deputy Minister of Finance, at the annual audit committee conference, Johannesburg

Ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to be invited to deliver this keynote speech
at your Annual Audit Committee Conference. Your topic remains very relevant for
our times, as the impact of the Great Financial Crisis, now acronymed GFC,
continues to lurk in the corridors of our global financial system and threatens our
global economic recovery.
While we are still trying to get to grips with the GFC and to put regulatory measures
in place to prevent the same crisis happening again, a new but related threat is
rearing its head at us – sovereign debt risk.
Causes of the GFC
As we now all know, the GFC was triggered by poor market conduct from financial
institutions in the form of loose credit extension and non-disclosure to non-
creditworthy individuals.
This unfortunate trend was underpinned by superficially low interest rates in the
USA, resulting in a flood of liquidity in the global economy and the frantic chase for
high yielding financial instruments.
The long held wisdom that house prices would continue to increase provided an
illusory comfort to both the lender and the borrower that their investments in property
will always be “in-the-money”.
As interest rates started to reset to higher rates, something which was not disclosed
to all borrowers, many of the household debtors started to default. To make matters
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worse, a lot of these mortgages were packaged, moved from balance sheets and
sold to other investors, thereby transferring the risk out of the retail banking system
to other financial systems. These packaged assets came to be known as the
Subprime Mortgage Backed Securities.
As individuals started to default on their loans, the performance of Subprime
Mortgage Backed Securities started to be negatively affected, thereby adversely
affecting the various institutional investors, and also the investment and retail banks.
Because banks could no longer trust each other, as they did not know which bank
was sitting on good or bad assets, they started shying away from lending to each
other. To further preserve their already strained balance sheets, banks started
deleveraging and avoiding further lending to corporates and individuals. So we
entered the great global economic recession.
Then we had institutions which veered away from their traditional business and
started to do quasi-banking business. AIG is a classic example of an insurance
company which got caught in the GFC web because of excessively providing Credit
Default Swaps – that is insurance against credit defaults. Needless to mention, when
the defaults started, even one of the largest global insurance companies could not
deal with the crisis.
At the root of all these is short-termism and greed. The excessive desire to make
excessive money encouraged the creation of complex financial instruments with the
sole purpose of making more money. As the rush for such complex instruments
surged, people traded and others invested in instruments they did not even
understand, let alone the regulator.
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) did not help the situation by assigning high ratings to
complex structured subprime debt based on inadequate historical data and in some
cases flawed models. Financial institutions too relied heavily and blindly on the
CRAs and put less reliance on their own internal risk management mechanisms.
Governance lapses: global and corporate
The big question, which I suppose is very relevant for all of us here today, is: to what
extent did the failures or weaknesses in corporate governance contribute to the
GFC? Could good corporate governance, proper risk management and effective
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board oversight have prevented all these? The answer, to a certain extent, should be
a yes.
The weaknesses in the global financial architecture surely did not do much to help.
Failures in co-ordination between different country regulators responsible for
supervising multinational financial institutions weakened their ability to respond
swiftly and adequately to prevent and ameliorate the spread of risk and the crisis.
Major financial and even non-financial companies had in place reward systems that
encouraged and rewarded high levels of risk-taking, focusing on short term benefits,
without taking into account the long term performance and the interests of their
companies. Institutional investors need to take some responsibility here as they are
everyday drivers of share prices, and most of them tend to suffer from short term
“herding” behaviour.
A lot of the people who played a role in the GFC didn‟t care much if things went
under because they would have made their quick bucks and moved on to something
else. And we should dare say that probably the banks themselves, consciously or
subconsciously, believed that they were too big to be ignored, let alone fail.
What has been evident, post the crisis, is that there have been significant failures of
internal risk management systems in some major multinational financial institutions,
made even worse by incentive systems that encouraged and rewarded high levels of
risk taking. The former CEO of Citibank has been widely quoted as having said:
“While the music is playing, you have to dance”. This highlighted the „short-termism‟
mind-set prevailing at the time, which promoted short term gains and performances
at the expense of long term growth, including also society gains, as many people lost
their jobs in the wake of the GFC.
We must all ask ourselves, to what extent were company boards clear about the
strategies and risk appetite of their companies. Were the independent board
members exercising proper oversight on their executive? Were they asking “stupid”
or “obvious” questions – because it is such “stupid” and “obvious” questions which
can reveal issues taken for granted by the executive.
As we all are gathered here today, I am certain that we want to equip ourselves
adequately in order to discharge our duties in our respective institutions where we
operate. And we must not stop with our institutions, we must think of the impact, both
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positive and negative, our institutions have on our societies. You, as audit
committees and auditors, must all recognise the important role you play in helping
companies and other entities to identify weaknesses and put in place measures to
strengthen their governance mechanisms. You must be the whistle-blowers for
society.
I would even include the often overlooked Remuneration Committees in this
governance role, which have to come up with remuneration and reward policies
commensurate to “fit and proper” managers, and reasonable risk taking.
The role of boards
As a country, we did relatively well amid the GFC. However, we should never be
complacent. We now have the benefit of the recent financial crisis from which we can
draw lessons on the failures of governance and how best to avoid the destructive
path that led the entire world to this current situation. How did it all come to this? To
what extent did boards understand their mandates and scope? Did they exercise the
oversight powers as they were required and expected to?
The question is a challenging one. Do we need more stringent governance rules, or
actually, have the rules always been there and we just took them for granted?
Various standard setting bodies and regulators internationally, such as the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, International Organisation of Securities
Commission (IOSCO), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) have in place codes and principles on governance of financial institutions,
for both banking and non-banking institutions. For instance, the Basel II capital
accord contains mechanisms in Pillar II enabling regulators to impose additional
capital charges for incentive structures that encourage risky behaviour. Interestingly,
and to the credit of our banks and regulator, our banks have always held a higher
than required Capital Adequacy Ratio.
A report published by the OECD in 2009 revealed a number of worrying trends on
the failures of governance at board and management level of most multinational
financial institutions. In particular, the OECD noted that some boards had not put in
place mechanisms to monitor the implementation of strategic decisions such as
balance sheet growth.
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The financial turmoil has revealed severe shortcomings in practices both in internal
risk management and in the role of the boards in overseeing risk management
systems at a number of banks and financial institutions. So again, the best practice
in terms of rules and codes seem to be there, but either we do not understand them
well or we simply take them for granted.
A number of existing codes also stress that executive directors should have a
meaningful shareholding in their companies in order to align incentives with those of
the shareholders. The Senior Supervisors Group noted that “an issue for a number
of firms is whether compensation and other incentives have been sufficiently well
designed to achieve an appropriate balance between risk appetite and risk controls,
between short run and longer run performance, and between individual or local
business unit goals and firm-wide objectives”. This concern was also shared by the
Financial Stability Forum (2008). Another report published by the Securities
Exchange Commission about Bear Sterns also noted proximity of risk managers to
traders, suggesting lack of independence.
The Role of Auditors
Where do you come in as audit committees or auditors? To answer these questions,
we must all understand what governance means. I like the definition by Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu: governance is the term used to describe the role of persons
entrusted with the supervision, control and direction of an entity.
This role can be exercised by three entities, or a combination thereof: the Board of
Directors, the Audit Committee, and other supervisory committees.
For the Board of Directors to make decisions, and proper decisions, they require
relevant and reliable information. The auditor‟s primary role is to verify the accuracy
of this information, among other things. Ultimately, they contribute to ensuring that
financial information given to investors is reliable. This is important since it enables
discipline by the market.
Audit Committees can also play a more holistic role than ensuring that the financial
statements are accurate and reliable. For example, would you not assist us greatly
as a society if you also checked that the company had an Environment, Social and
Governance (ESG) policy framework, that this ESG framework was sound, and most
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importantly, that the company, through its board, was complying with this policy?
Should we not focus on group audits rather than individual audits?
Policy responses at international level
The G20 has come up with a number of key policy principles to provide further
guidance to national regulatory frameworks, and strengthen institutions and cross-
border regulatory arrangements through creating more formal mechanisms to co-
ordinate the work of regulators across borders. Through the Financial Stability Board
(FSB) and other standard setting bodies, a lot of what emerged from the G20 has
already found resonance with various countries, and South Africa has not been an
exception.
At international level, the crisis has also revealed the weaknesses of narrow focus of
financial regulation by only dealing with supervision of individual entities at a micro-
prudential level.
The new approach, which was mooted by the G20, is to move towards a macro-
prudential approach to financial regulation, which focuses on identifying global and
domestic macroeconomic and financial stability risks together. Put differently, it
focuses on systems and financial institutions‟ links, domestically and abroad.
South Africa’s response
The global financial crisis has presented South Africa, like other countries, with the
opportunity to see how best to enhance its financial architecture and regulatory
framework.
During his annual Budget Speech in Parliament in February 2011, the Minister of
Finance announced the release of a document titled: “A Safer Financial Sector to
Serve South Africa Better”, which outlines a number of policy priorities which
National Treasury will be focusing on in the next few years.
One of the most important announcements covered in the document is the shift to a
“twin peaks” model. The twin peaks model is an objective-driven approach to
regulation and seeks to establish two dedicated regulatory bodies, one responsible
for prudential regulation and the other for market conduct. As I indicated earlier in my
speech, the failure in market conduct, and its supervision, played an important role in
the GFC.
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No system of regulation can be successful unless it is transparent, independent and
accountable, not only as far as Government is concerned but also the regulated
industries and the public at large. Appointment of competent and highly skilled senior
executives, board members and applying „fit and proper‟ tests to ensure highest
levels of integrity, are important for all entities, both public and private.
We are fortunate in South Africa to have dedicated professionals like Mr Mervin
King, who has since provided us with a blueprint for governance.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude with a cynical note and in agreement with the statement from
Deloitte Touche Tehmatsu: “No governance system, no matter how well designed,
will fully prevent greedy, dishonest people from putting their personal interest ahead
of the interests of the companies they manage”.
So, my answer to the question you posed is as follows: there are already codes and
principles of good corporate governance which are tried and tested. These
international and local best practices should be incorporated in internal risk
management. Where we fail, as Boards of Directors, is when we ignore these
principles or take them for granted. We also fail when we, as independent directors,
are scared to ask the “obvious” and “stupid” questions. We should ask the executive;
are you running the company properly and treating your customers fairly?
However, there are areas which certainly require enhancement; for example the
focus on group supervision, co-ordination and auditing of multinational financial
entities. We also need to strike a good balance between rewarding hard work and
excessive risk taking. As a member of the G20, we will continue to participate in the
global forums and adopt best practices where applicable.
Good corporate governance alone will not solve all problems. The most important
ingredient is the change of attitude and behaviour, and adherence to high levels of
integrity and moral fortitude. To the extent that this is not the case, there will always
be a need to regulate behaviour by putting rules and codes in place. It is incumbent
on all of us to strive for good corporate citizenship.
Thank you.