Somalia's traditional, clan-based way of life has led some to caution that the idea of a nation-state is not very useful for Somalis.⁽²⁾ Yet, since the end of the dictatorship of President Siad Barre in 1991, international actors have contorted themselves over how to piece together the complex Somali socio-political puzzle. Their priorities have been to unify, stabilise and democratise the Somali polity. However, most interventions, diplomatic engagements and humanitarian missions have led to confusion, fear and paralysis, and failed to bring about sustainable peace. The Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) mandate, which was set to expire on 20 August 2012, has left few under any illusion of the scale of the task ahead. Just one year ago, there was a clear warning from the International Crisis Group that the international community should avoid feeding complacency and contributing to a stalemate by continually propping up the TFG at all costs.⁽³⁾ Today, the role of the TFG has been reviewed, but the approach of the international community has shown depressing continuity.

While few observers doubted that the TFG's mandate would come to an end on 20 August 2012, and that a new president would be appointed, the need to win support from certain clans has given rise to concern over the ability of the incoming president to govern the entire territory and provide Somalia with a democratic legacy. As a result, it is likely that a smooth transition will rely more on the political skill, financial advantage and international backing of incumbent president, Sharif Ahmed, than on a consensual formula capable of uniting all Somalis.⁽⁴⁾ This CAI paper explores the process of electing new institutions in Somalia, and the implications for the establishment of a stable political system in the country. It begins with a brief overview of Somalia's turbulent political past and an analysis of the efficacy of the recent international peace efforts that laid the groundwork for the handover. It then turns to investigate the issues and local actors involved in the elections, before assessing the prospects for peace and democracy at the end of the TFG's mandate.

How Somalia became a failed state

Having won independence from Italy and Britain in 1960, Somalia was viewed by Western leaders as a model democracy to be emulated across the continent. This era was short-lived, however. After Siad Barre came to power in a coup in 1969, a single-party political system swiftly followed. The country struggled for more than 20 years under President Barre's military regime, but it was the period subsequent to his overthrow, on 26 January 1991, that resulted in wider inter-clan fighting and provided the catalyst for Somalia's trajectory towards fragmentation and state failure.⁽⁵⁾

Although central and southern areas of Somalia have seen pockets of political stability since 1991, notably under the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), there has been little to no attempt at devising and implementing a countrywide, unifying mandate. In contrast to the Islamic Union that overthrew Barre, the expansion of the ICU across central and southern Somalia from the year 2000 onwards was met with far less domestic resistance. Although the ICU's application of Shariah Law early on was unquestionably harsh, many Somalis welcomed the sense of security that had been absent for more than a decade.⁽⁶⁾

By 2006, Government strongholds were under siege and many state troops were defecting to the ICU. In order to stem the loss of control, Ethiopia, supported by the United States (US), wrested control of Mogadishu, reversing nearly all of the ICU's strategic gains.⁽⁷⁾ Yet then, as now, there was little in the way of a comprehensive plan to make the new Government sustainable, with the former head of the ICU's executive council (and present transitional president), Sheikh Ahmed, calling for the onset of an insurgency.⁽⁸⁾ Out of this insurgency emerged the Islamist group, al-Shabaab. The group boycotted international conferences aimed at bringing peace to Somalia and condemned other alliances for failing to adopt a global jihadist ideology. As Ethiopian troops left the country in 2009, al-Shabaab was quick to fill the void, implementing Shariah in areas under its purview. Today, al-Shabaab is not the force it was three years ago. However, the group still controls key areas of Somalia and for this reason, their presence cannot be overlooked when analysing the process of constituting new political institutions in Somalia.

Today, Barre's legacy continues to have a direct impact on the ambitions of the Government as it attempts transition. Created out of a reconciliation process in 2000, a TFG was given the mandate to re-establish centralised state apparatus and return Somalia to democracy. Despite successive incarnations, the TFG has never been able to exert influence across all of Somalia,⁽⁹⁾ to the extent that many elections for posts within the TFG have had to be held in neighbouring states. See Figure 1 for a list of groups exercising control over the various areas of Somalia.

Figure 1: Groups in control of Somalia ⁽¹⁰⁾

International support and the inefficacy of the TFG

International support for the TFG has not always produced results compatible with a smooth transition. The prioritisation of security over political development has seen military incursions and a series of drone strikes that have only served to mobilise further support for insurgent groups. Indeed, al-Shabaab emerged as a small youth militia of a relatively moderate Islamic organisation, and it was not until Ethiopia's invasion in 2006 ⁽¹¹⁾ that the group radicalized and was brought to prominence as a popular guerrilla movement. Thus, when a new era of politicians in Somalia are seen as synonymous with those who instigated attacks that resulted in the deaths of scores of Somalis, there is good reason to be concerned that any subsequent stability will be short-lived.

The systemic weakness and relentless infighting of Somalia's Transitional Federal Institutions is such that communication at the closing stages of the transition was reduced to only a handful of actors. These individuals, including the former president and the former speaker of Parliament,⁽¹²⁾ have remained the partners of choice concerning engagement over the transition. Given the lack of headway over broader transitional objectives, it is unfortunate but understandable that international actors are keen to rush through the transitional phase.⁽¹³⁾ The imperative for a speedy transition may, however, lead to weak, illegitimate and unsustainable democratic institutions.

After successive extensions, there was broad consensus that the mandate of the TFG should not be renewed beyond 20 August 2012. With this in mind, a 'Roadmap' was introduced to keep the end of transition on course. Decision-making around the Roadmap has been constricted to a small number of sponsors and domestic signatories, whilst any dissenters have been labelled as "spoilers"⁽¹⁴⁾ and marginalised. By forbidding the presence of groups which, while controversial, are essential to securing peace, the TFG has been accused of "never missing an opportunity to miss an opportunity"⁽¹⁵⁾ when it comes to taking the necessary steps to ensure political stability in Somalia. This tendency adds weight to the notion that the Roadmap is another top-down solution imposed by outsiders, which risks provoking the re-emergence of grievances after the TFG's mandate ends.

Towards a roadmap to a peaceful and democratic Somalia

Amidst a devastating famine in some parts of the country, Somali leaders gathered in Mogadishu in September 2011, to produce a document aimed at ending transition in Somalia and establishing legitimate and democratic institutions. This national reconciliation conference was the first political event of its kind in four years and aimed to recompose the splintered East African state, while placing Somalia on the road to peace and prosperity.

In a bid to safeguard the gains made at this conference, a further meeting was convened in London on 23 February 2012, bringing together international actors and Somali politicians with the aim of stepping up the pressure on Somalia to complete the transition. Indeed, the months bridging 2011-12 represented the most sustained period of diplomacy between the United Kingdom (UK) and Somalia since the fall of the Barre regime.⁽¹⁶⁾ However, the TFG's intransigence on many of the Roadmap's originally agreed objectives meant that only an abridged version of the document could be agreed upon (see Table 1), which served to prompt frustrated international actors to push more firmly for an end to the fragile and fractious Transitional Federal Institutions.⁽¹⁷⁾ Ultimately, there is no clear idea of what Somalia's political landscape will look like following the expiry of the TFG's mandate, and this looming political uncertainty remains a concern for politicians - both internationally and within Somalia.⁽¹⁸⁾

As far as the Roadmap's international sponsors – the African Union, the United Nations, the US and the UK - are concerned, any great variation of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is neither likely nor desirable. Following the end of the TFG, AMISOM is likely to attempt consolidation of its presence and expand where possible - yet this risks confusing a security issue with a political crisis, resulting in the belief that the force of arms alone is capable of tackling many of the daily demands faced by Somalis.⁽¹⁹⁾ Consequently, if the international community is serious about ensuring long-term stability in Somalia, it should aim for political and economic solutions beyond the Roadmap, such as looking to strengthen areas of infrastructure, rather than relying solely on missions like AMISOM.

Table 1: Transitional Roadmap for Somalia ⁽²⁰⁾

Even if the elections pass without a hitch, there is little to indicate that democracy itself will be bolstered. Whilst many hope that these elections will represent an end to the days of carpetbagger-politics, the elections for Somalia's new political representatives remain fraught with inequality and vested interests. Despite having more than twice as many candidates as the previous round of transitional elections - in 2000, 2004 and 2009 - the multifaceted election process is inextricably skewed in favour of incumbent politicians.⁽²¹⁾ Among the presidential hopefuls are six signatories to the Roadmap who played a direct role in selecting the 135 clan elders, whose task it is to appoint the 225 MPs, who, in turn, elect the president. These signatories already have a clear support base among the elders who are likely to select MPs supportive of their campaigns.⁽²²⁾ Plurality will suffer at the hands of this unfair system designed to maintain the political status quo. This is not only bad for future democratic transition, but also presents a risk to Somalia's development, for whoever becomes president will require more than just name recognition amongst a small political clique; he will require sincere popular support in order to gain traction to move the political agenda forward, or at least prevent it from lapsing.

Although there have been only minor procedural complications to date, deeper political undercurrents threaten the credibility of the transitional process. In particular, the incumbent, Sheikh Sharif, who can boast at least four of the six requirements to win,⁽²³⁾ is widely agreed to have successfully used his position to edge out his competitors. Further, international actors have played a key role in the outcome of previous TFG elections, from Djibouti aiding the election of Abdiqasim Salad Hassan in 2000, to Ethiopia supporting Abdullahi Yusuf in 2004.⁽²⁴⁾ There is anxiety this time because, as in 2009, Sheikh Sharif is the international community's candidate of choice. Whilst many may have grudgingly accepted that the process will not be bottom-up, it will be far harder to digest if the transition is not seen as being Somalia-centric. Indeed, members of the Assembly had only 10 days (see Table 1) to approve and rubber-stamp the provisional Constitution, whilst scrutiny prior to this was limited to the signatories of the Roadmap and their international sponsors. This again undermines the TFG's credibility and stated ambitions of holding public consultations.⁽²⁵⁾

Even if the presidential aspect of the transition goes well, generating agreement over the Constitution is likely to remain challenging, owing to uncertainty around issues such as the conditions related to devolution of power. Clan-based federalism has become an insurmountable barrier to the emergence of an effective national Government in Somalia and, if maintained in order to prevent short-term confrontation with regions such as Puntland and Somaliland, as some have suggested,⁽²⁶⁾ these issues will almost certainly risk hindering any gains made following the end of transition.

Prospects for peace in the wake of the elections

One of the foremost sources of socio-political concern in the wake of the elections will be the means by which the new Government engages with al-Shabaab and its followers. The tripartite assaults on al-Shabaab - by AMISOM, Ethiopia and Kenya - have prematurely given rise to a feeling of post-election security. On the one hand, there is a propensity to overstate the group's internal divisions,⁽²⁷⁾ which hints at complacency. On the other hand, those implementing the Roadmap fail to offer much in the way of a political alternative to al-Shabaab's moderate followers, or others keen to have their voices heard. Despite speculation regarding talks intended to take place between groups from both sides, the TFG has not been viewed as a credible or legitimate interlocutor.⁽²⁸⁾ If the Somali imbroglio is to be resolved in a sustainable way, then it will be incumbent on the new Government to furnish the militants with a viable alternative. In short, it is essential to provide political and policing structures commensurate with the power of the military, to respond to the challenges ahead.

There will, of course, be some who feel that federal power is the problem, not the solution. Somali nationalists will undoubtedly view any federal system as the first step on the road to the disintegration of the Somali state, whilst those cut off from areas where national income is typically generated, for example, areas with natural resources or ports, will also feel isolated and vulnerable. Further, there is a risk that a federal model may be misinterpreted as a code for clan-based provinces. These sub-regions may then become less about administration, and instead invite questions about access to rights and land. As last year's expulsion of Somalis from Puntland made clear,⁽²⁹⁾ this is all too possible and, if unaddressed, risks inciting violence rather than halting it. Perhaps the most unpalatable aspect of federalism is that some regions, such as South and Central Somalia, may end up in the hands of groups like al-Shabaab. It is hard to envisage a way in which this would be agreeable to the existing TFG and its external partners, who have invested much time and finance in attempting to bring about a democratic transition.

A 200 page report, released in July 2012 by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, revealed the systemic misappropriation, embezzlement and outright theft of millions of aid dollars between 2009 and 2010.⁽³⁰⁾ Although the Prime Minister's Office denies the claims, a separate report released in May 2012 by the World Bank also found that 68% of Government revenues from 2009 to 2010 went missing.⁽³¹⁾ Since Somalis presently have only a limited means to hold their leaders to account, the officials at whom the finger is being pointed look likely to retain senior positions in the post-transitional Government. Despite some attempts at reform, the political will required to enact necessary legislation is said to be lacking at the highest levels. Faith in the new system and support for the centralisation of power will likely wane if further evidence supporting these allegations is revealed. Meanwhile, elections in which all Somalis can vote, and therefore hold the country's politicians to account, are unlikely to take place for some years.

Concluding remarks

The litmus test for legitimacy in any election to high office must be that it is representative, participatory and bottom-up. Yet, there is little to indicate that the Somali grass-roots have been either invigorated or engaged by this electoral process. Consequently, whatever the outcome of the process to elect new officials, the next five years will be crucial for ensuring organisation around fledgling political parties, if there is to be any long-term attempt to shift attitudes that have previously centred on gun-barrel politics. This will be particularly important as thousands of Somalis who fled Mogadishu amid fighting and insecurity have slowly been trickling back since 2011, following the departure of al-Shabaab from, and increased Government control of, the capital.⁽³²⁾ Whilst clan organisation is likely to remain the definitive building block of Somali socio-political spheres for some time to come, it will be important for civil society to galvanise support for political groups where it can in the coming years, in order to facilitate wider participation in the next election and assist in the pursuit of country-wide stability.

Written by William Townsend ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact William Townsend through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Elections and Democracy Unit (elections.democracy@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Harper, M., 2012. Getting Somalia wrong: Faith, war and hope in a shattered state. Zed Press, London.
(3) 'Somalia: The transitional government on life support', International Crisis Group Africa Report No. 170, 21 February 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org.
(4) Anon., 2012. Somalia: End of transition looms. Africa Confidential, 53(13), p. 6-7.
(5) Cockburn, A., 'Somalia', National Geographic, July 2002, http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com.
(6) 'Life under Somalia's Islamists', BBC News Africa, 11 June 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(7) Gartenstein-Ross, D., 2009. The strategic challenge of Somalia's al-Shabaab. Middle East Quarterly, 16(4), pp. 25-36.
(8) McGregor, A., 'Weapons and tactics of the Somali insurgency', The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis, 5(4), 5 March 2007, http://www.jamestown.org.
(9) 'You don't know who to blame', Human Rights Watch, 15 August 2011, http://www.hrw.org.
(10) 'Somali anger at corruption claims in leaked UN report', BBC News Africa, 17 July 2012, www.bbc.co.uk.
(11) Wise, R., 'Al-Shabaab', Centre for Strategic and International Studies, July 2011, http://csis.org.
(12) Mosely, J., 'End of the roadmap: Somalia after the London and Istanbul conferences', Chatham House, June 2012, http://www.chathamhouse.org.
(13) Samatar, A., 'UN corrupts Somali political transition', al-Jazeera, 30 July 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(14) 'UN and partners issue warnings against Somali peace process spoilers', UN News Centre, 1 May 2012, http://www.un.org.
(15) Menkhaus, K., cited in 'Analysis: Mogadishu after al-Shabaab', IRIN News, 7 September 2011, http://www.irinnews.org.
(16) Healy, S., 'Somalia: After the London conference', Special report for Alshahid Centre for Research and Media Studies, 3 March 2012, http://cdn-english.alshahid.net.
(17) Mosely, J., 'End of the roadmap: Somalia after the London and Istanbul conferences', Chatham House, June 2012, http://www.chathamhouse.org.
(18) Amyimadu, A., 'A political solution for Somalia', Chatham House, 6 February 2012, http://www.chathamhouse.org.
(19) Mosely, J., 'End of the roadmap: Somalia after the London and Istanbul conferences', Chatham House, June 2012, http://www.chathamhouse.org.
(20) Compiled by author using data available at: 'Consultative meeting on ending the transition in Somalia: Statement on adoption of the Roadmap', Radio Aljir, 6 September 2011, http://www.radiodaljir.com.
(21) Hussein, A., 'Somalia prepares for first presidential elections in Mogadishu', Sabahi, 12 July 2012, http://sabahionline.com.
(22) Aynte, A., 'Somali presidential elections: Six ways to win power', African Arguments, 3 July 2012, http://africanarguments.org.
(23) Ibid.
(24) Bradbury, M. and Heal, S., 'Endless war: A brief history of the Somali conflict', Conciliation Resources, Accord, http://www.c-r.org..
(25) 'The final communiqué of the international contact group meeting in Djibouti is issued', United Nations Political Office for Somalia, 6 February 2012, http://unpos.unmissions.org.
(26) Uluso, M., 'UN crafted constitution has many Somali watchers bemused', International Policy Digest, 2 July 2012, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org.
(27) Hanson, S., 'al-Shabaab', Council on Foreign Relations, 10 August 2011, http://www.cfr.org.
(28) Mosely, J., 'End of the roadmap: Somalia after the London and Istanbul conferences', Chatham House, June 2012, http://www.chathamhouse.org.
(29) 'Somaliland to expel foreigners within 30 Days', Garowe Online, 5 September 2011, http://www.englishgaroweonline.com.
(30) 'Corruption rules in Somalia, UN says', Boston Globe, 17 July 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com.
(31) 'Somali anger at corruption claims in leaked UN report', BBC News Africa, 17 July 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(32) 'Population movement tracking monthly report: Total movement within Somalia', United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, April 2012, http://www.unhcr.org.