With the ongoing calls for more democratic regimes throughout North Africa, it was only a matter of time before Moroccans would heed the call. In an effort to prevent the same scale of escalating violence as was seen in neighbouring Libya, King Mohammed VI called for a referendum to be held on 1 July 2011. The referendum would put to vote several proposed changes to the Moroccan Constitution. These changes would limit the King’s powers, ultimately giving more weight to the voice of the Moroccan people. This paper examines the Constitutional referendum and its subsequent impact on the country.

Morocco’s political background

The Kingdom of Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with an elected Parliament. Morocco has a population of 32.3 million⁽²⁾ and is part of the Maghreb states. The independent Berber Kingdom of Mauretania dates as far back as 110BC, making it one of Africa’s longest surviving kingdoms. The current royal family, the Alaouite dynasty, has been the rulers of Morocco since 1666. The geographical location of Morocco has made it an important territory for the French, Spanish and Italian nations during the early 20th century, resulting in numerous wars with these European states.

Morocco has been through a number of political crises during the past century. The First Moroccan Crisis took place in 1906 with Germany backing Moroccan independence while the France tried to establish a French Protectorate. This crisis was brought to an end by the Algeciras Conference in the same year. The result was that Morocco was divided into a French Protectorate and a Spanish Protectorate. The Second Moroccan Crisis was ended in 1912 by the Treaty of Fez and resulted in the establishment of a full French Protectorate. In 1956 Morocco gained independence from France after fierce resistance to European rule by the Berbers. Sultan Mohammed V returned from exile in Madagascar to rule the new independent state and established a constitutional monarchical rule. In 1957 he assumed the title of King.

In 1961, Hassan II took over the role of the King of Morocco. Hassan II assumed a tighter grip on the Government than his predecessor by installing himself Prime Minister and naming a new Cabinet. His reign is known as the ‘years of lead’ due to state violence against democratic activists. In 1975, Morocco annexed the territory of Western Sahara which remains under Moroccan control to this day. Hassan II’s son Mohammed VI ascended to the throne in 1999. He has been described as a moderniser as his reign saw a change in family code, in particular allowing women more power. He promised to take on corruption, create more job opportunities and end Morocco’s poor human rights record.

Electoral procedures prior to the reforms

The Constitution provides for a monarchy as well as a Parliament and an independent judiciary. The King of Morocco was granted extensive powers by the Constitution as it stood. The King was the Chief of the Military. He also had the power to dissolve Parliament, suspend the Constitution and to rule by decree. He is therefore both the secular political leader and the ‘Commander of the Faithful’ as the religious leader of the country. Elections are held every five years and multiple parties participate. Executive power is exercised by the Government whilst legislative power is vested in both the Government and Parliament. The previous Prime Minister, Abderrahmane Youssoufi, was appointed in 1998 and his Government consisted mainly of oppositional party members – a first in the modern Arab world. The current Prime Minister is Abbas El Fassi, a member of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party. He was elected in 2007 and previously served as Minister of Employment.

Pro-democracy protests (20 February movement)

Following the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in January 2011, Moroccans took to the streets to voice their grievances. On 20 February nearly 40,000 protesters demonstrated in the major cities.⁽³⁾ Protestors called for improved economic opportunities, educational reform, and the release of political prisoners, a lift on the restrictions on the media, a better health system and a strategy to deal with rising living costs.⁽⁴⁾ The protests started peacefully, but later turned violent in poorer neighbourhoods with at least five casualties on the first day.⁽⁵⁾ Protests continued until 20 March when a large protest march ended in clashes between the protesters and the police.⁽⁶⁾ During this protest march, which was even bigger than the 20 February demonstrations, protestors called for the dismissal of several advisors to the King. These include the current Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi, party leader Fouad Ali El Himma and the King’s private secretary and royal business manager, Mounir Majidi.⁽⁷⁾

On 9 March, King Mohammed VI made a televised announcement that a Constitutional referendum was to be held to deal with the demands made by the protesting crowds. He promised that the changes would provide "expanded individual and collective liberties and the reinforcement of human rights."⁽⁸⁾ The King also set up a commission to advice on the possible constitutional changes. The 20 February Movement criticised the King for appointing members of the commission arguing that they would be biased and refused to submit proposed changes.⁽⁹⁾ In April, the King announced the release of 190 political prisoners. The Movement was also not placated by this, arguing that many of the prisoners were nearing the end of their sentences.⁽¹⁰⁾

Proposed constitutional amendments

On 9 June 2011, the commission announced the proposed changes to the Constitution. The key changes centred on the transfer of certain political powers from the King to the Prime Minister. The changes provide that the King will appoint the Prime Minister from within the party with the most seats in Parliament. The Prime Minister will also be the Head of the Government with the power to dissolve Parliament and head the Government Council which is responsible for the preparation of policies for discussion by the Cabinet. The reference to the King as ‘sacred’ will be removed and women were to have guaranteed ‘social and civic’ equality in addition to political equality. Parliament will also have more say over civil rights, electoral and national issues. Berber, a language spoken by close to 9 million Moroccans ⁽¹¹⁾ would also become a national language along with Arabic. Combined, the changes turn Morocco into a Constitutional monarchy. The 20 February Movement welcomed the proposed changes but said it “does not respond to our demands for a true separation of powers.”⁽¹²⁾

Referendum results and response to the reforms

The referendum for the proposed amendments was held on 1 July. A total of 15 million voters ⁽¹³⁾ were registered to vote and despite calls from the 20 February Movement to boycott the referendum, voter turnout was high at approximately 73 %.⁽¹⁴⁾ 98.5 % of the votes were cast in favour of the proposed changes, meaning that the amendments were passed.⁽¹⁵⁾

The overwhelming support for the proposed changes ensured that the Constitution of Morocco will be changed and the proposed amendments will stand. The King will no longer be head of Government, but still retains control over the security forces, foreign policy and religious matters. Oppositional parties have welcomed the changes saying that Morocco will become more democratic. The peaceful acceptance of the referendum and the outcome suggests that Moroccans, for now at least, are satisfied with the progress made since the February uprisings. Many however consider these changes to be merely superficial, claiming that they will not benefit ordinary Moroccans enough. The February 20 Movement has called for on-going protests against the reforms, but thus far there haven’t been any major protests against the amendments. Islamist groups have also joined the February 20 Movement in rejecting the new Constitution on the basis that it threatens Morocco’s religious identity. The international community has responded positively to the amendments, particularly the European Union and the Arab League which consider the moves to be an important sign of Morocco’s commitment to democratic principles.

Concluding remarks

Whether these changes will remain enough for Moroccans remains to be seen. If unemployment rises and people’s demands are not met, protests are likely to be seen again. Depending on the success of protests in neighbouring Libya and the progress made in Tunisia and Egypt, bigger changes might also be on the way for Morocco.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Madie Schutte through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Election Reflection Unit ( election.reflection@consultancyafrica.com This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it ).
(2) ‘Morocco country profile’, BBC News, 21 July 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(3) Giles Tremlett, ‘Morocco riots leave five dead’, The Guardian, 21 February 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(4) NPR Staff, ‘Morocco’s protest takes peaceful turns’, 20 February 2011, http://www.npr.org.
(5) Giles Tremlett, ‘Morocco riots leave five dead’, The Guardian, 21 February 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(6) ‘Morocco’s referendum on reform’, BBC News, 29 June 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news.
(7) Kirsten McTighe, ‘Moroccan youth demands action, not words’, NY Times, 11 May 2011, http://www.nytimes.com.
(8) ‘Morocco’s referendum on reform’, BBC News, 29 June 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news.
(9) Kirsten McTighe, ‘Moroccan youth demands action, not words’, NY Times, 11 May 2011, http://www.nytimes.com.
(10) Ibid.(11) Mouna Kadiri, Bladinet, 20 July 2006, http://www.bladi.net.
(11) Michale Martin ‘Moroccan constitutional reform: Berbers say the battle’s just begun’
International Business Times, 6 July 2011, http://www.ibtimes.com.
(12) ‘Morocco’s Referendum on Reform’, BBC News, 29 June 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news.
(13) Election Guide, ‘Morocco’, 6 March 2011, http://www.electionguide.org.
(14) Ibid.
(15) Moroccan Boards, ‘Morocco referendum results’, 3 July 2011, http://www.moroccoboard.com.
(16) AFP, ‘Moroccan Islamists Could Reject Constitution’, 13 June 2011, http://www.google.com.

Written by Madie Schutte ⁽¹⁾