When Muammar Qadhaffi began referring to his citizens as “rats and cockroaches,”⁽²⁾ many may say that he asked for it. Such statements, together with growing fatalities caused by Qadhaffi’s forces (an estimated 1,400⁽³⁾ by March 2011), provoked a rather strong reaction from the international community, in comparison to cases such as Rwanda, where much greater incentive was needed for such a response. The United Nations (UN) was unusually swift in taking action against the Colonel and, together with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), saw it fit to begin a military intervention in the country. The rationale behind the intervention was the protection of Libyan civilians from Qadhaffi’s forces.⁽⁴⁾ Six months on, the question that begs to be asked is whether NATO’s intervention in Libya is indeed legitimate or, more broadly, under what circumstances is military intervention justified? This paper will indicate the inherent flaws present in military intervention with particular reference to the Libyan case.

Background

Libyans took to the streets in February 2011 to protest Qadhaffi’s 42-year rule.⁽⁵⁾ Early on, the Government showed its low tolerance for such action and warned of grave consequences if protestors did not relent. Violent Government action quickly ensued, prompting the UN to release Security Council Resolution 1970, which urged the Libyan Government to cease hostile actions against civilians.⁽⁶⁾ Continuing violence prompted the UN to then issue Resolution 1973, which authorised NATO powers to take “all necessary measures”⁽⁷⁾ to protect civilians and civilian areas.

The case for intervention

In an anarchic world without a body to govern or regulate the behaviour of states, such duty falls on the wider international community. Changes in international law and the development of civilisation itself have brought us to a point in time at which it is simply improper to stand witness to large-scale atrocities without taking appropriate action to stop it. We are reminded of NATO’s intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 1995. Here, mass graves in parts of the country (such as the Drina Valley of Bosnia), were being filled at a rate of 3,000 bodies a day.⁽⁸⁾ Given the firm stance of the Republika Srpska Government at the time and the barbaric assertion that the area needed to be “cleansed,”⁽⁹⁾ there existed a very real possibility that figures from the continuing atrocity may have been much higher had NATO not intervened when it did. In Rwanda in 1994, it will never be forgotten that approximately 800,000⁽¹⁰⁾ Rwandans were brutally massacred – a true humanitarian disaster – and, instead of intervening to halt the chaos, the international community preferred the position of spectator, arriving only three months later to assist in digging mass graves instead.

The challenges inherent in military intervention

Humanitarian intervention is a complex matter with no set criteria under international law, and save for a handful of cases, has not proven to be the ideal answer to already-volatile situations. This lack of criteria means three things: firstly, that it is difficult to ascertain when a situation actually qualifies as a “humanitarian disaster”⁽¹¹⁾ in need of intervention; secondly, that the practice itself is difficult to regulate under international law and; thirdly, that the practice easily lends itself to all forms of abuse and double standards when used for political motives rather than humanitarian aims.

Intervention is also problematic in that it violates one of the cardinal norms of international order: respect for state sovereignty. Indeed, it may sometimes be necessary to limit the scope of sovereignty in cases of potentially severe humanitarian disasters, such as genocide or ethnic cleansing,⁽¹²⁾ as put forward by the emerging legal concept of a “responsibility to protect.” This principle, though noble in theory, is vague in nature and the practical dynamics have not been sufficiently explored so as to address the drawbacks, which will inevitably arise if this concept evolves into settled practice.

What international law says

International law only permits the use of force under specific circumstances. To lawfully use force against a sovereign state one must be acting in self-defence⁽¹³⁾ or be authorised to use such force by the UN Security Council.⁽¹⁴⁾ The UN Charter, Chapter VII, deals with the use of force as a threat to international peace and security. With regard to the case at hand, it must be noted that however distasteful Qadhaffi’s actions may be, the matter is in fact purely internal and, as such, other states do not have a legal basis to interfere. This principle has been completely disregarded by the UN and certain NATO powers despite being firmly entrenched in international law.⁽¹⁵⁾ Furthermore, the onus of proving that Libya’s actions were a threat to global security and order (which may have provided the necessary basis) was not successfully discharged.

Rather worrying is the lack of effort by the UN to even attempt to show how this intervention was justified. Barrack Obama made a feeble attempt at such justification when emphasising Libya’s refugee situation and its potential impact on neighbouring North African states.⁽¹⁶⁾ While this holds some merit, one views the argument with a degree of circumspection as we have seen a complete disregard for the “refugee situation” in other current cases, such as Syria where it is estimated that 21,000 Syrian refugees have spilled over into Turkey alone.⁽¹⁷⁾ Of all the internal conflicts seen on the African continent in recent times, from Liberia to Sierra Leone to Uganda, not once have we seen a response of this nature by the international community. Such conduct points to selective concern as well as selective use of international law, which opens the door to questions regarding the motives behind such intervention.

Fuelling civil war

Another reason to be wary of military intervention is the possibility of fuelling catastrophic civil war. Here, one would do well to examine the case of Somalia during both the Siad Barre regime and later during the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) rule. In their respective time periods, both Barre and the TFG were generously endowed with arms by foreign states, which were later used against civilians when the country tumbled into civil war, not once but a number of times in a space of 20 years.⁽¹⁸⁾ While it may be true that the supply of arms does not necessarily lead to war, one cannot underestimate the way in which the presence of and easy access to arms facilitates war and the continuation thereof. This deals a severe blow to non-proliferation movements, especially in Africa where non-proliferation should be a greater priority. Furthermore, one has to take into account that civil war is not the plight of one nation alone, but rather works towards destabilising an entire region. In this regard, greater responsibility and foresight should be exercised by states such as Britain and Qatar,⁽¹⁹⁾ who (by arming the Libyan rebels) appear too eager to fuel the current strife without giving consideration to future implications.

In a short space of six months, Libya has become a heavily militarised area and, apart from the rebels, the civilian population has become heavily militarised too. When NATO began attacking ammunition sites, government forces manning such sites were forced to flee. Such sites were left abandoned and are now subject to heavy looting. Smugglers, along with regular civilians, have had uncontrolled access to a vast range of arms, from small arms to rockets and artillery shells.⁽²⁰⁾ With no functioning Government, there is no authority to control this worrying trend at present, and no viable plan to solve the problem in the future.⁽²¹⁾

The fine line between assistance and interference

Specifically when it comes to regime change, outside interference is unacceptable; however, it is almost always part and parcel of military intervention. In 2006, the United States (US) orchestrated an Ethiopian military intervention into Somalia to protect the “internationally legitimate” Government of Somalia (the TFG) from alleged radical Islamists (although no evidence was ever produced to indicate this “radical” nature at the time).⁽²²⁾ No regard was given to the fact that this Government had not gained legitimacy or consensus from the Somali people themselves and that the ‘radical Islamists’ (the Union of Islamic Courts) were, in fact, a legitimate force, which had gained immense public support after bringing peace and a sense of order to the city of Mogadishu for the first time in 15 years.⁽²³⁾

Numerous states have, with great speed, recognised the Libyan rebel force as Libya’s legitimate Government.⁽²⁴⁾ As early as July 2011, and before the Qadhaffi regime had been toppled, France and Italy agreed to unfreeze a collective amount of over ZAR 2,37 billion (US$ 350 million) of Qadhaffi’s assets to hand over to the rebels. Such action took place outside of NATO’s mandate on Libya and without evidence that the Libyan majority had accepted the authority of the rebels. This brings into question whether it is international recognition or popular consensus that confers true legitimacy on a body. Such interference runs contrary to a nation’s right to self-determination — the right to freely choose the political future of their nation, which is an entrenched principle in international law and of special significance in an African context given the colonial history of the continent.

Recent history has taught us that such action does not end with military intervention, thus leaving a very real prospect that an ideological intervention of sorts may be imposed upon the people of Libya. The problem here is that, aside from Libyans not being the ones to decide the matter for themselves, the Western ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach gives little or no regard to the unique characteristics of a nation and its particular needs. Libya is a country very tribal in nature, with a strong Socialist background, which also happens to possess vast amounts of natural wealth (and recently vast amounts of arms as well). After 42 years of set rule, with no democratic institutions in place, it would be foolish to assume that the country would be able to peacefully evolve into a new system, specifically a system of liberal democracy which seems to be the favoured choice of NATO powers. Furthermore, there is no evidence to indicate that the general masses would favour such a regime after coming from a Socialist system wherein a considerable portion of the nation’s wealth was harnessed to provide free universal healthcare, education, and even more basic necessities such as food.

Impact on Africa

NATO has indicated complete disregard for African states, institutions, and opinions. African voices faded into the background from the very outset, when the international community sought a solution to the Libya crisis. We are, again, reminded of Somalia in 2006, when calls from the African Union (AU) and the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) for Ethiopia to withdraw from Somalia were ignored by US-led Western powers.

Another point worth mentioning is that while the International Criminal Court may very well have been justified in its decision to indict Colonel Qadhaffi, it must be said that if the Qadhaffi’s and Bashir’s of this world face indictment and global condemnation, those guilty of the same (or in some cases worse) atrocities should be held to account too.⁽²⁵⁾ The days of imperialism may appear to be over; we may stress upon equality, cooperation, and respect. We may even entrench these ideals in our legal systems, insisting that all are equal before the law. But when leaders or states are not held by the same standard, it appears that we have not progressed at all. It is now time for the West to relinquish its self-appointed position of headmaster, sheriff, judge and jury in order to allow the African continent to develop its own political, economic, and social identity unhindered.

The threat of radicalisation

The Western world lauded the Arab Spring, holding that the various revolutions would bring with them new ideologies and renewed relations with the West. It was held that the growth of political freedoms meant the decrease of radicalization in the Muslim world. NATO’s intervention into Libya could very well translate into a step back in terms of such possibilities. Western presences in Afghanistan and Iraq; drone attacks in Pakistan and Yemen, as well as the US’s assistance to Israel have led to the severe distaste of Western authority throughout the Muslim world. Washington constantly voices concern over terrorism and the alleged terrorist threats emanating from these parts of the world, but has failed to note that, while a portion of Libyans are in favour of the intervention, a great number are not. One more war in a Muslim nation will only serve to fuel the problem of radicalisation, not only within Libya but also throughout the Muslim world.

Setting a dangerous precedent

If legitimacy is given to the Libyan intervention, it would no doubt open a Pandora’s Box, unleashing a very dangerous precedent, which could easily lend itself to abuse by powerful states. Already, the United States acts unilaterally with its refusal to end its respective occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq despite such wars having lost legitimacy a long time ago (although it is doubtful whether the respective invasions were legitimate to begin with). This enhances the prospect of further selective, illegitimate interventions and the question, which then arises, is who is to stop NATO or individual states from carrying out unilateral actions in future? Considering the ailing state of the American economy along with many of those in Europe, it is hugely surprising that such nations chose to engage in yet another costly war. More surprising is that this step was taken at a time during which there has been massive public outcry over such wars (along with their rising economic costs and human rights violations) in these countries themselves. The lack of disregard shown here uncovers many fallacies: one of those being that popular consent and democracy are respected ideals in liberal, Western states.

Muammar Qadhaffi is a token for the West; another one to add into that trophy case, which so proudly holds the likes of Saddam and Bin Laden. With his overthrow having taken place in such a short space of time, one wonders whether it ends here or whether this successful coup will serve to make the West even more bold in “dealing with” perceived threats to world peace. Important to note here is the way in which Qadhaffi quickly regained his pariah status in the international community. One of the most shocking incidents to have been uncovered during the conflict was perhaps the evidence indicating close ties between the Libyan Republic and American and British intelligence agencies. It turns out that the states, which are now condemning Qadhaffi for human rights abuses, are the very same states that assisted in the direct perpetration of many such abuses.⁽²⁶⁾

Acting outside the legal realm

The last and most pertinent point is that NATO has exceeded its mandate in Libya:

* An estimated 1,100 civilians (the very same the operation purports to protect) have been killed by NATO⁽²⁷⁾ and over 4,500 wounded.⁽²⁸⁾ There have been acknowledgments by NATO of “weapons systems failures” and accidental killings of rebels. NATO has held that it “deeply regrets”⁽²⁹⁾ such incidents; however, evidently not deeply enough to take more care in preventing them. What is more troubling is that, because these actions are taking place under UN sanction, there is scant possibility that those responsible for atrocities (on the side of NATO) will be brought to account later on, dealing yet another blow to an already-frail rule of law.

* NATO’s mandate permits only an air presence over Libya. Ground troops have, however, been seen in parts of the county.⁽³⁰⁾

* The UN failed to act responsibly at the outset of the operation when it failed to offer a definitive time frame for the intervention. Now, a point has been reached where Qadhaffi’s forces have been subdued to a great extent and the Libyan rebels have displayed a considerable degree of self-sufficiency. Despite this, NATO continues its aggressive campaign without offering a prospective plan or indication of what its role will be in the coming months, once the regime has been completely dismantled.

On 20 July 2011, France stated that Qadhaffi could remain in Libya in the event that he “quits politics.”⁽³¹⁾ Two crucial questions must be posed here: firstly, does one state really possess the authority to make such assurances? And secondly, does this not show flagrant disregard for the ICC and its decision to issue a warrant of arrest for Qadhaffi? Matters such as these are best left to be decided within the realms of international justice. It is certainly not up to individual states to make assertions on whether and what consequences perpetrators should face. Similarly, more recent calls for Qadhaffi’s capture, “dead or alive”, are also unacceptable. Continuing its irresponsibility, the international community has made no declaration against this, despite it being the very antithesis of the democratic ideals they claim to uphold. Condemning leaders to any fate, in the absence of a fair trial, would certainly take us back to the dark, primitive ages in which law had no place.

* NATO’s operation quickly morphed from the protection of civilians to direct, military assistance to an armed group (classified as combatants under international law) attempting a coup. The sketchy rationale given for this phenomenon was readily accepted, and there has been no inquiry into this (nor condemnation), highlighting the problem mentioned at the beginning of this paper: that with military intervention, “anything goes” because of the distinct lack of checks and balances in place to regulate the practice.

In conclusion

Whichever side of the fence one chooses to sit on in this ongoing debate, a fact that both sides must acknowledge is that this is by no means a humanitarian mission. Whether such altruistic missions actually do occur is doubtful. NATO powers (with the US at the forefront) have no problems with autocracy. One merely needs to examine the US’s ongoing relationship with the Governments of Saudi Arabia or Yemen to understand this. Neither do these powers have qualms about lives lost due to political repression. We know this because of the growing list of dire situations, which they choose to ignore. If we are to accept the premise of a humanitarian mission, then certainly Syrian civilians along with their Bahraini counterparts are equally deserving of such protection. And perhaps even more so than the Libyans, who have an organised force to counter Qadhaffi’s violence. NATO’s intervention has ultimately made a mockery out of international law. If support is offered for interventions such as these, law then becomes a tool to be used against political opponents, weaker states and economically vulnerable countries. This signifies that Western states rest comfortably, certain that they are immune to and above the law.

Furthermore, this intervention makes it difficult to place faith in the UN after it has sanctioned an intervention with no legal basis, going so far as to create law to suit the needs of particular nations. Then again, had the UN objected to the intervention, it would have probably been powerless to prevent it (see Kosovo in 1999). This impotence indicates how the organisation may be held hostage by the powers of certain states, leaving us with a feeling that we cannot rely on the UN for the preservation of international law or the prevention of war, which was in fact one of the organisation’s founding principles.

In all likelihood, the world has not yet seen the end of leaders like Qadhaffi – despots who will go to extreme lengths to cling to power. Neither have we seen the end of leaders such as Barrack Obama – self-appointed messiahs of the world – those promising to eradicate evil to make the world a safer place for all. The question we need to ask here is whether, given these circumstances, military engagement is the best way to conduct foreign policy in the future. Western states have, during the past 10 years, been all too eager to initiate violence in foreign lands, in the process bringing forth severe destabilisation, the remnants of which will be felt for decades to come by the populations of these countries. The superpower status of such nations means that greater responsibility and restraint is expected on the part of these states.

For all our talk of civilisation and progress, it is rather regrettable that only decades after the “never again” rhetoric so favoured at the end of World War II, it seems the language of war is the only one we speak. Ultimately, it is undoubtedly civilians who suffer most during protracted struggles. From lives lost, to the destruction of infrastructure, to issues surrounding the displacement of civilians, a mammoth task awaits Libyans at the end of this conflict. A task made in no way easier by NATO’s intervention into Libya.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Raeesah Cassim Cachalia through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Conflict and Terrorism Unit (conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) ‘Gaddafi calls protestors “rats”’, PressTV, 22 February 2011, http://www.presstv.ir.
(3) Ibid.
(4) United Nations, 17 March 2011, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org.
(5) ‘Libya forces “open fire” at funeral’, Al Jazeera, 19 February 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net.
(6) United Nations, 26 February 2011, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org.
(7) United Nations, 17 March 2011, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org.
(8) Fisk, R., 2001. Freedom: Pity the Nation (3rd ed.). Oxford, Oxford University Press.
(9) ‘Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, Radivoje Miletic, Milan Gvero, and Vinko Pandurevic’, United Nations, 26 September 2006, http://www.icty.org.
(10) Amy Bennet, ‘Mourning the Rwandan genocide 14 years on’, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org.
(11) Dugard, J., 2001. The Use of Force by States. International Law: A South African Perspective.
(12) Michael J. Arnold, 2008. Intervention, Contemporary Security and Strategy (2nd ed.). United Kingdom, Palgrave.
(13) Article 51 of the U.N Charter, http://www.un.org.
(14) Article 42 of the U.N Charter, http://www.un.org.
(15) Dugard, J, 2001. The Use of Force by States. International Law: A South African Perspective.
(16) ‘Obama's Libya Speech: The Doctrine Is Clear, but the Mission Isn't’, Time, 29 March 2011, http://www.time.com.
(17) Kim Sengupta and Justin Vela, ‘Turkey feels racial tensions as flood of Syrian refugees goes on’, The Independent, 15 June 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk.
(18) Hartley, A., The Zanzibar Chest. London: Harper Perennial; ‘Somalia’, Amnesty International, 2009, http://www.amnesty.org.
(19) Lutfi Abu-Aun, ‘Russia: Arming Libya rebels is “crude violation”’, Reuters, 30 June 2011, http://www.reuters.com.
(20) ‘Libya's abandoned stockpiles attract smugglers’, Reuters, 1 July 2011, http://www.reuters.com.
(21) While Libya’s Transitional National Council (TNC) has mentioned “buy-back” programmes in order to coax civilians to give up their arms, they have not given attention to smugglers or militant groups who have also been stocking up on such arms.
(22) Samatar, A.I., 2007. Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, American Warlordism and AU Shame. Review of African Political Economy, 34 (113), pp. 111-121.
(23) Ibid.
(24) ‘West prepares to hand rebels Gaddafi’s billions’, The Independent, 16 July 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk.
(25) NGO’s such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have called for George W. Bush to be investigated for crimes such as torture and extraordinary rendition amongst others. Calls of its kind have, however, not been mirrored by the greater international community giving way to a growing culture of impunity among Western states.
(26) ‘UK delivered anti-Gadaffi Libyans to him’, PressTv, 5 September 2011, www.presstv.ir.
(27) ‘Libya: Nato dismisses claims of civilian casualties’, The Independent, 15 July 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk.
(28) Ibid.
(29) ‘NATO admits civilian deaths in Libya raid’, Al Jazeera, 19 June 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net.
(30) Julian Borger and Martin Chulov, ‘Al-Jazeera footage captures “western troops on the ground” in Libya’, The Guardian, 30 May 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(31) Dina al-Shibeeb, ‘France says Qaddafi could stay in Libya if quits politics; Libyan official in Moscow’, Al Arabiya News, 20 July 2011, http://english.alarabiya.net.

Written by Written by Raeesah Cassim Cachalia ⁽¹⁾