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Date : 04/02/2006
Source: Department of Foreign Affairs
Title: Minty: Special meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency


Statement by Mr Abdul Samad Minty, Governor of the Republic of South Africa, at the special meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and related board resolutions, Vienna, Austria

Chairperson,
At the outset, I would like to express through my brother, Ambassador Ramzy, heartfelt condolences and sympathy to the families and friends of those passengers and crew that tragically died or were injured in the Egyptian ferry disaster that took place yesterday.

Chairperson,
South Africa fully associates itself with the statement made on 2 February 2006 by the Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement. We also appreciate the informative and comprehensive factual report given at the beginning of our special session by the Deputy Director-General on recent developments regarding the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Chairperson,
The resolution that is before the Board would represent a watershed in the Agency’s efforts to deal with the outstanding issues related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme. This resolution seeks to initiates a process whereby the Security Council will become more substantially involved in the Agency’s verification activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a diminishing and possibly subservient and even marginal role for the Board.

We have made it clear in the run-up to this special meeting that South Africa has, as always, work for the adoption of consensus decision by the Board on the Islamic Republic of Iran. South Africa, together with many others made every effort to achieve this and consensus was well within our grasp.

This was a lack of agreement on the formulation of operative paragraph 2 and consensus could have been possible if this action could have been deferred to March, consistent with the improvement in operative paragraph 8.

Chairperson,
South Africa believes that in the absence of a definitive assessment by the Agency on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, the Board cannot now consider referring a report or reports to the Security Council and General Assembly.

The best approach is for the Board to adopt decisions by consensus that would reinforce the work of the Agency and create a climate conducive to resolve the outstanding issues pertaining to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme.

Chairperson,
South Africa’s concerns related to the basic thrust and content of our work between now and March are mainly based on the following;

Firstly, the impact on the role, authority, impartiality and integrity of the Agency. Secondly, the impact and consequences of our actions and decisions on the need for the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue to implement voluntary, non-legally binding confidence building measures to facilitate the process to find a long-term sustainable solution to its peaceful nuclear programme.

Thirdly, the impact on the NPT in the context of the role of the Agency, including the Board, in the process to verify the non-diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Chairperson,
South Africa is seriously concerned about the impact and consequences of the decision by the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran to resume research and development activities in January 2006. Tensions have heightened and we have entered into a virtual confrontation mode. We need to keep focus on the big picture and when emotions run high, facts and common sense often become blurred, preventing us from finding a sustainable and peaceful solution to this matter. We must guard against jeopardising the role and responsibility of the Agency.

South Africa places a great importance on the role, authority, impartiality and integrity of the Agency and we would not wish to do anything that would reduce or undermine its solemn responsibilities. We believe it is imperative that the Director-General and the Agency should be permitted to complete its verification work without undue pressure and hindrance and that should be our primary concern.

I wish to recall for the attention of the Governors a very important decision that was taken by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which is directly relevant to this matter and I quote “The Conference reaffirms that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.”

This decision reaffirms the special responsibility that rests on us to ensure that our decisions and actions should not jeopardise the role and responsibility of the Agency.

Chairperson,
The reports by the Director-General on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the recent update given by the Deputy Director-General, has shown a positive and continuing trend of co-operation by the Islamic Republic of Iran with the Agency. It is recognised that as a result of the corrective actions taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Agency was able to clarify many, but regrettably not yet all, of the outstanding issues.

South Africa expects that the co-operation given by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency in clarifying these outstanding issues will continue. Such proactive co-operation and support to the Director-General and his staff would allow the Agency to bring this matter to a close and to restore confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.

We call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue to implement its voluntarily, non-legally binding confidence building measures, including the suspension of its enrichment related activities.

South Africa welcomes the Islamic Republic of Iran’s continued implementation of the Additional Protocol as if it had been ratified and urges the Islamic Republic of Iran to complete the ratification process as soon as possible.

Ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol and the continued full implementation of all the voluntarily, non-legally binding confidence building measures, as called for by the Board in its previous consensual decisions, are considered essential measures to facilitate the process to clarify the issues related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme.

Chairperson,
The total elimination of all nuclear weapons is our common objective and therefore, the issues of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are inextricably linked to each other. This should not be considered as some outdated position, since the reality is that those who have nuclear weapons should not ever threaten non-nuclear-weapon States with the use of nuclear weapons, but eliminate them.

Our concerted efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be matched by a concurrent effort to eliminate, in a verifiable and irreversible manner, of all nuclear weapons and of the universal adherence to the NPT.

In terms of the application of the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, NPT States Parties have undertaken to pursue a nuclear programme for peaceful purposes in conformity with their obligations under Articles I and II of the NPT. In verifying the non-diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, non-nuclear-weapon States have to conclude INFCIRC/153 type safeguard agreements with the Agency. It is the responsibility of the Agency, as the competent authority, to verify in accordance with these type of agreements, the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the NPT by these States Parties.

Governors should note in particular that the Agency’s verification of or inability to confirm the non-diversion of nuclear material by a non-nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the INFCIRC/153 type safeguards agreement, will determine the further measures the Board may adopt, including those measures outlined in Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. In this regard, the Board at its discretion may decide to notify the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The Agency’s investigation being undertaken in the Islamic Republic of Iran is therefore undertaken in the context of verifying the non-diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency.

The focus of the Agency’s investigation is not to provide arguments or reasons for punitive actions to be undertaken against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The focus is rather to facilitate a process whereby the Islamic Republic of Iran could undertake corrective action within a reasonable time, to enable the Agency to verify non-diversion. A process currently ongoing and which the Board will assess at its first regular meeting in March this year.

Chairperson,
We need to recognise that the issue of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme is a unique and special case and therefore decisions adopted by the Board in this regard should not be regarded as setting a precedent for future cases to be dealt with by the Board.

The implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of certain non-legally binding confidence building measures is essential to addressing the outstanding issues regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme.

However, South Africa has also consistently urged Members not to equate voluntary measures undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran with the legally binding obligations stemming from Members’ safeguards agreements with the Agency.

In this regard South Africa has welcomed initiatives aimed at restoring confidence in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, including the initiative by the Russian Federation for a co-operation agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran on the enrichment of uranium.

South Africa strongly believes that this initiative is aimed at restoring confidence in the peaceful nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme and has no applicability beyond this framework. All States Parties of the NPT in conformity with their obligations under the Treaty have the right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In conclusion Chairperson,

Regardless of the content of the decision adopted today through a vote, South Africa continues to believe that we must resolve differences through dialogue and negotiations, thereby avoiding a confrontation that could escalate into a spiralling conflict with uncontrollable consequences.

I thank you.

Issued by: Department of Foreign Affairs
4 February 2006

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