South Africa’s almost ‘back to back’ re-election to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a non-permanent member for another two-year tenure in October 2010 affirmed the nation’s role as the continent’s leader. South Africa, with the five permanent members, and Bosnia Herzegovina, Brazil, Colombia, Gabon, Germany, India, Lebanon, Nigeria and Portugal will burden great responsibility in a time where the north versus south agenda is taking prominence in international relations. The stress South Africa places on the importance of operating in a multilateral context helped win a second term with 182 votes cast in favour out of a possible 190.⁽²⁾

South Africa’s long history as a ‘bridge builder’ committed to strong cordial relationships has enhanced over the past sixteen years. How has South Africa managed to obtain this powerful constructive role not just in Africa, but in the world? To what extent can this be contributed to President Jacob Zuma? South Africa’s participation in the 2007-2008 United Nations Security Council came under intense scrutiny and criticism and her current tenure has been no different. This discussion paper will aim to explore what Zuma’s foreign policy is and what impact it will have on South Africa in an international context.

Mbeki to Zuma

In order to understand Zuma’s current foreign policy, former President Thabo Mbeki’s foreign policy must be explored, as he is considered the ‘father of South Africa’s foreign policy’. Mbeki’s drive for international prestige centred on a much more complex and programmatic approach than his predecessor, Nelson Mandela. As deputy president in 1995, he stated ‘South Africa should place itself within the context of the Southern African region and define its place on the continent of Africa and the world’ and in his inauguration speech in 1999, Mbeki was more emphatic about South Africa’s identity when he vowed ‘it is no longer possible to falsely define South Africa as a European outpost in Africa’.⁽³⁾ South Africa wanted to be seen as the saviour of Africa, a leader of the south and a reformer of the global multilateral architecture and the answer to this goal lay in Africa.

The Mbeki regime began to move away from Mandela’s western-orientated approach and focused on an ‘African agenda’ commonly referred to as the ‘African Renaissance’; a legacy expected to last long into the future. Whereas the white apartheid Government had seen South Africa as an extension of Europe, Mbeki’s South Africa set out to assert the country’s position in Africa.⁽⁴⁾ With Mbeki’s initiative, South Africa took a more south-orientated foreign policy.⁽⁵⁾ Moving beyond a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ between North and South, Mbeki promoted a view of development as a universal and strategic challenge. In this view, there needed to be change in the international balance of power.⁽⁶⁾

The presidential transition from Mbeki to Zuma was also a change from one who was considered to have been a foreign policy president to one whose agenda is in gestation. Zuma’s 2009 election has seen the foreign policy of ‘African agenda’ slow down and the reintroduction of a Western-leaning approach. During Zuma’s state visit to Britain in March 2010, which included tea with Queen Elizabeth, the World Bank approved the first-ever loan to South Africa to the tune of US$ 3 billion. Zuma quickly wrapped up air miles in visits to Brazil, India, China and Russia. In March 2011, French President Nicolas Sarkozy met in Paris with his ‘good friend President Jacob Zuma’ and the two leaders described their countries as ‘strategic partners’ that would cooperate closely on a range of diplomatic and economic development projects. In its April 2011 issue, Africa Report magazine referred to the Paris-Pretoria relationship as ‘a north-south business and development axis’.⁽⁷⁾

Zuma’s more Western or ‘north’ stance is seen in the 2010-2011 Ivory Coast fiasco and South Africa’s position on the crisis revealed indecisiveness. South Africa first toyed with supporting the Angolan position in favour of former President Laurent Gbagbo, after which it tried to align itself with the position of the African Union (AU), which argued in favour of Alassane Ouattara, while also pushing for a negotiated settlement between the two Ivorian sides. It took a visit to Paris by President Zuma for a position to emerge and South Africa eventually came out in defence of Ouattara.

In 2011, South Africa voted in favour of UN resolution 1973 imposing a ‘no fly zone’ over Libya, while South Africa’s other BRIC partners China and Russia chose to abstain. South Africa later ‘u-turned’ on their position that the vote was never intended to give NATO a blank cheque for a regime change, though South Africa did approve of a 6-month mandate to bomb. South Africa’s Libya issue made Russian President Dmitri Medvedev appeal to his South African counterpart for closer “coordination” on international crises like Libya.⁽⁸⁾

South Africa in the UNSC 2011-2012

Within the context of Pretoria’s delicate balancing between the West on the one hand and China and Russia on the other, the country’s Security Council stance has to be understood in terms of South Africa’s need to leverage its influence on certain African issues, like that of Sudan and Zimbabwe. In the last stint in the UNSC, the West thought that South Africa would automatically rubber-stamp the Permanent Five (UN Security Council veto-holding members) decisions such as on Iran without it having been consulted in its role as president of the Council. Former Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad said succinctly, “we would not be worthy of membership of any multilateral grouping if it has to be that we must simply accept any document that is put before us”.⁽⁹⁾ South Africa’s stance therefore distinguishes it as a leader in a quest to transform global governance.⁽¹⁰⁾

Speculation has risen in New York and the world over that South Africa’s quick return to the Council, where it joined Nigeria, was a precursor to formalising a permanent status for Africa’s two seats, and that Egypt would likely be shut out if Africa had its way. South Africa has thus come a long way in the past two years.

Conclusion

One of the dilemma’s facing South Africa in the multilateral context of the Security Council will be managing the Africa agenda. For instance, Brazil does not need to seek the support of Latin America in order for it to pursue issues on the agenda, or to assert her presence in the global arena. For South Africa, as a member of regional organisations like SADC and the AU, there are constraints shaping its position. From what this paper has explored, Zuma’s administration inherited a pro-Africa agenda that cannot easily be shaken off. South Africa’s inclusion into BRIC has upgraded its ‘northern’ stance, as shown by Zuma’s more cordial relations with the West. South Africa is now serving in the council at a time of great challenge, particularly the fragile situation in South Sudan, chaos in Somalia and simmering tensions in the Ivory Coast. The debate concerning Iran’s quest for nuclear power and the Palestinian situation will gain more attention in the latter part of 2011 and South Africa, and especially Zuma, will need to show strength and resilience, as the South is increasingly relying on South Africa to push their agenda forward.

South Africa’s hosting of the COP17 in November 2011, the biggest and most influential summit of 2011 will also determine the shape of Zuma’s foreign policy as the major decisions (or lack thereof) of Cancun (COP16) were deliberately pushed aside by Mexico to rest on the plate of South Africa. Overall, Zuma’s foreign policy is resulting in a stronger, more affluent South Africa in world affairs and the ultimate goal of obtaining a permanent UNSC seat is a likely possibility if Zuma can continue portraying a positive image of South Africa abroad.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Anton M. Pillay through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Africa Watch Unit. ( africa.watch@consultancyafrica.com This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it )
(2) Lesley Masters, ‘South Africa in the UN Security Council 2011-2012’, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2011, http://www.igd.org.za.
(3) Chris Landsberg, ‘The Emerging Africa Strategy of the New Jacob Zuma Administration.’ In Zondi, S. and Masters, L (eds), 2010.
(4) Chris Landsberg, ‘ Transformation, Continuity and Diffusion: South Africa’s foreign policy under Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma', Inroads – The Canadian Journal of Opinion, Issue No. 29, Summer/Fall 2011, http://www.inroadsjournal.ca.
(5) Flemes, Daniel and Wojczewski, T, 'Contested Leadership in International Relations: Power Politics in South America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa', German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Working Paper No. 121, February 2010, http://www.giga-hamburg.de.
(6) Chris Landsberg, ‘ Transformation, Continuity and Diffusion: South Africa’s foreign policy under Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma', Inroads – The Canadian Journal of Opinion, Issue No. 29, Summer/Fall 2011, http://www.inroadsjournal.ca.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Lesley Masters, ‘South Africa in the UN Security Council 2011-2012’, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2011, http://www.igd.org.za.
(10) Francis Kornegay and Tom Wheeler, ‘Is South Africa Living Up to its Responsibilities as Africa’s Leader?’, Online debate, Council on Foreign Relations, 13 April 2007, http://www.cfr.org.

Written by Anton M. Pillay ⁽¹⁾