Part I of the article (available here) illuminated the important role reserved for Captains of Industry, business corporations, and entrepreneurs to financially support initiatives aimed at enhancing the African security environment, which is fundamental for any business development. It also described and underlined the importance of having a safe and secure littoral and riverine ‘operating environment’ in the West and Central African regions to allow socio-economic development programmes to take root. Furthermore, it touched on the potential negative influences caused by increased migration patterns towards the urban littoral.

This section of the paper will (i) briefly describe the prevailing conditions and some initiatives that surround the Central African water infrastructure, and (ii) outline and explore three possible cost-effective and cross-cutting models that could be exploited to accelerate the implementation of a sustainable solution to existing and future security challenges in these maritime and riverine domains. The first model is ‘riverine focused’ and centred on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); the other two models are ‘littoral focused,’ but are equally applicable to the riverine and Great Lakes environments.

Modernisation of the DRC’s Fore Navale (FN) – Towards a stable balance

Within the DRC, only a small percentage of the road infrastructure, despite on-going work, is properly surfaced to deal with daily transportation and haulage requirements. This lack of road infrastructure, combined with a very limited and irregular working railway network, and the costs associated with air transportation, impacts considerably on the mobility of the DRC’s communities. This, in turn, has a negative socio-economic impact. However, the DRC is privileged to be connected to an extensive river network, which, if developed in a sustainable way, would provide the country (and its neighbours) a key transport mechanism and logistical infrastructure able to serve numerous communities. This network of many rivers and lakes is already an essential artery for trade and travel in the country and is an economic lifeline for citizens looking to trade goods and access necessities. However, for many years, neglect has caused much of this network to be rendered unusable; barges regularly become stuck on sand banks since rivers have not been dredged in decades. Exacerbating this challenge, many of the inland ports are in various stages of decay and lack the facilities required for safe, efficient and effective vessel dis/embarkation, cargo discharge or loading. Additionally, there is a lack of integrated transport planning with key trans-modal facilities unavailable at most times.

For the DRC and wider region, two key questions come to the fore: (i) whether a true renaissance of the former riverine transportation activities can be achieved and, (ii) if so, the extent to which that will embrace the need for an increased and integrated maritime, riverine and lakes domain awareness regime. More significantly, the second point outlines a necessity to identify an actor that could take the lead to develop that regime. In Part I, it was suggested that the DRC’s Force Navale (FN), along with other nations’ riverine capability mechanisms, could assume a fundamental role as the critical enabler and guardian whilst facilitating a sustainable renaissance at the same time! Clearly, such recognition would also require the generation of a commensurate annual budget⁽²⁾ in order to ensure both a credible presence in the most important areas, and that investment in ‘networked’ civil-military surveillance and response centres are fit for purpose.

In the Maritime Domain, there is a notable increase in initiatives and programmes that seek to implement MDA. A good example of this is the IMO/MOWCA-driven concept of the Integrated Coastguard Function Network for West and Central Africa, which was first considered in 2003 and is currently in a positive stage of development. In contrast, in the riverine and lake domain, there are few, if any, concrete initiatives and training programmes for the ‘maritime and riverine communities’ that address current deficiencies in general awareness, security and safety standards.⁽³⁾ Let alone persistent and coordinated surveillance, emergency response and interagency coordination that could be followed up by focused, cooperative, coordinated local or regional action.⁽⁴⁾ Action, for example, could be directed to illegal drug, mineral, environmental resource (wood logging) and product flows (weapons),⁽⁵⁾ and illegal fishing. Less overt action or ‘intervention’ could include Anti-poaching Operations on the Great Lakes, or quasi border control to counter the entry and exit routes for criminals engaged in illegal killing and illicit trade in wild animals.

Model One – Green Paper⁽⁶⁾ on the DRC’s Force Navale

Working within the outputs of the strategy discussed in Part I, the DRC’s Force Navale would be required to transform and be prepared to take on the role as a principle critical enabler in maintaining security in the maritime, riverine, and Great Lakes environment. This would require a planning phase to ascertain a profile of operational readiness and associated costs due to years of neglect. To address this situation, the European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the DRC (EUSEC RD Congo),⁽⁷⁾ and as part of its Action Plan for the current mandate, has initiated a Green Paper⁽⁸⁾ to assist in deciding the best way forward to transform the Force Navale. The document is meant to guide the DRC Naval Staff in a realistic assessment of their best suited roles, set against current and future challenges and threats, whether these are in the littoral or in the riverine environment. Once that is clear, the next step is to address ‘the hardware,’ the required training and leadership development programmes, desired regional cooperation or even affiliation, essential infrastructures, resource sharing and so on. More specifically, further assessment is needed to identify the extent to which the Force Navale will be capable of conducting counter drug operations, combating illegal fishing, carrying out environmental protection tasks and deploying a rapid disaster response at sea and/or within the inland waterways system. Or perhaps some of these roles should be assumed by other regional maritime capabilities, with non-African navies and associated capabilities in a cooperative role. The second issue would be to assess the viability of such a concept that would require an evaluation to ascertain if there is sufficient regional trust. Other major considerations would be associated with costing and continuation. For example, what would be the annual budget and what would be the estimation of the annual incremental increase and how would that be met? A ‘large budget’ that seeks for a complete, integrated system that connects with (regional) civilian agencies or in contrast a smaller budget that will only permit cost-effective, off-the-shelf technology and ‘hardware’ must be evaluated within a viability framework that embraces a complex multi-dimensional situational picture. Due to the geographical scope of the DRC, these will be the core questions. Donor opportunities must also be included within the strategic planning phase to ensure donor ‘gifts’ can be optimised and sustained with the appropriate logistical support and continuity procedures.

There are other ‘risks’ or dilemmas involved when a common view is brokered between diverse stakeholders that enjoy status, have a strong view, or have an economic interest. A main risk is that it is easy to cross the line between cooperation based on shared views and principles; and overbearing/asymmetrical pressure based on power and influence, at the expense of the weaker partner. It is of paramount importance that the FN, despite its significant challenges, is sufficiently capable of driving forward its own transformation, with a minimum of intrusive guidance by third parties. To paraphrase Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence at the time of the Arab Revolt (1916-1918):

“It’s better to let them do it themselves imperfectly than do it yourself perfectly. It is their country, their way and our time is short.”⁽⁹⁾

But will the pace of transformation keep pace with other developments? The Green Paper further advocates the point that the transformation of the FN must be implicitly linked to the many on-going initiatives in the area of Security Sector Reform. If accepted, it should provide a powerful international ‘political’ backing for the much needed transformation process and the ability of the DRC to address current and future illegal, or threatening activities.

Without wishing to suggest that the FN is not capable of regenerating and transforming by its ‘own means,’ it makes sense to identify and encourage European Union (EU) nations (not excluding the United States of America (USA) or South Africa for that matter) to assume an ‘assistance’ role to guide and help the FN on its path towards the future. Such nations would require sound knowledge of all aspects of maritime and riverine operations. The aforementioned Green Paper suggests the creation of a dedicated (EU) Task Force, possibly subordinate to the In-country EU Representative. This Task Force could be seen as a clearing house and a focal point, to ensure that all planned activities (in particular activities supporting the FN transformation process) are coordinated and synchronised to achieve optimum results. Moreover, it is an example of what could be coined ‘Post-Operation Support,’⁽¹⁰⁾ where nations commit themselves to maintain a strong affiliation with the Host Nation through a reduced, yet persistent, long-term, physical presence, even when past conflict has finished. This leads us to the next model.

Model Two – A hybrid model: Public-Private Partnership and ‘Business Push’

In general terms, this model is based on the formal approach through either ‘Call for Tenders, or Requests for Proposals or Quotations’, by national government to actors, like the EU, foreign military or, for instance, a private Maritime Security Consortium capable and certified to offer ‘hands-on consultancy services.’ As mentioned in Part I (available here), the prevailing global financial situation inhibits an appetite to establish the ‘Rolls-Royce’ type regional affiliations between European and African nations, and maintaining an unobtrusive, yet long-term foreign civil-military presence on the African continent. A presence that is foremost based on the strategic objective to embark on joint training and assistance programmes that aim to structurally and coherently assist the Host Nation in a broad range of security requirements. Its ‘by-products’ would – inter alia – involve aspects such as Physical Security & Stockpile Management (PSSM) of weapons and munitions (to counter the illegal flow of weapons), strengthening governance, but also create the conditions for economic and socio-cultural development.

So, if no ‘Rolls-Royce’ what then becomes the affordable option? Put in very simple terms, try to find Captains of Industry, businesses and other institutions (the ‘Stakeholders’) that are prepared to pay for, or offset some of the operating costs, and by doing so also benefit themselves (a clear ‘win-win’ situation). A topical example of this approach is the current employment of so-called Vessel Protection Detachments (VPD) consisting of armed military that protect vulnerable ships against piracy, and where shipping companies pay for parts of the overall costs of employing such VPD. Benefits can be measured in a significantly reduced risk of pirate attack, shorter routes (no longer avoiding piracy-infested waters) and lower insurance premiums.

However, in more specific terms, Model Twoassumes that there are no legal objections to employing a mixed team of expertise provided by a core of former military personnel (including law enforcement and customs officials) organised into Assistant – Trainer, Coaching and Mentoring Teams, that are capable and certified to deliver a broad range of security related products when regular foreign military capabilities are not available, or in insufficient supply to meet the demand. These teams can be augmented by civilians on ‘temporary loan’, especially from the Stakeholders, and would bring with them many skill sets, such as administrative experience, maritime engineering and construction.

The teams – acting as the proverbial tip of the spear – would operationalise set objectives and the associated specialised programmes of the African Maritime Safety and Security Agency (AMSSA).⁽¹¹⁾ These specialist teams (and their products) – not unlike the aforementioned VPD – are funded and/or supported from multiple sources. Firstly, by the Host Nation(s) that directly benefit from services rendered. Secondly, with business enterprises that are keen to expand their foothold further into the African continent and will directly benefit from an enhanced security climate to increase their business potential and reach (‘return on investment’). Examples of industry sectors are shipbuilding, dredging and port and road construction companies, but also those specialised in offering bespoke (un)manned surveillance or disaster response solutions. The latter could include a network of static and mobile medical facilities that would serve both the civilian and military communities. Other ‘industry sectors’ that could benefit are cruise line, offshore wind farms and eco-tourism operators. Needless to say, all this will mitigate against local unemployment, most notably of the educated, younger generation. Other options for financial support could possibly come from EU institutions, the AU, the UN and other financing mechanisms such as the World Bank, or the African Development Bank.

A welcome spin-off of such cooperation, according to ‘Transparency International,’⁽¹²⁾ is that collaboration across the (defence) industry is a key factor in tackling corruption.

Model Three – ‘Joint’ Forward Operating Bases – A Novel Approach or Legal Nightmare?

Model Three expands on Model Two: the host nation grants the aforementioned Maritime Security Consortium permission to establish ‘Forward Operating Bases (FOBs)’ from where maritime and riverine ‘presence operations’ are conducted by indigenous forces assisted by contracted foreign specialists. FOBs can be established in key areas along the littoral and riverine environment and either use existing infrastructures, or provide for new build. These FOBs are ‘triple-hatted’: a base for training and education, a base for the conduct of interagency operations in the littoral and riverine domain, and act as (sub-)regional ‘Information Sharing Centres.’ The latter implies an information architecture that – ultimately – links into both military and civilian control nodes, at the national and regional level. Over time, these Information Sharing Centres could transform into structures that respond to a Maritime (or Riverine) Enforcement Agency with commensurate command authority to effectively police the littoral and riverine domains. Like Model Two, overall funding is provided by a combination of host nation, stakeholder, and donor assistance.

In addition to funding support and the modernisation of existing infrastructures, stakeholder assistance could also comprise providing modern specialised ships such as Offshore Patrol Vessels, Offshore Energy Support Vessels, Emergency Response and Rescue Vessels and specialised smaller crafts on a lease basis to the Host Nation (with an option to buy afterwards; or ‘donated’ in recognition for their decisive engagement), as well as technical expertise, crews and other human resources. Joint operations must continue until such a time that the Host Nation’s capabilities no longer require external assistance, and the host nation becomes the sole owner of the established infrastructures and other associated material that were provided by the stakeholder(s).

To attract foreign investment, the Host Nation could grant favourable conditions for companies to establish or expand their industrial footprint in the country, and other stakeholders could assist with market-oriented ‘financing packages’. ‘Could’ because investment licences are issued, based on proven capability of the Stakeholders and, for instance, also their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), and Safety, Health, Environmental and Quality Management (SHE-Q) programmes. Model Three would therefore provide an innovative approach, combining public-private partnership, bespoke ‘capacity building at the sharp end’ and business push.

Conclusion

The global role of the military, Africa included, is not to rule but to secure democratic institutions and to safeguard the territorial integrity of their nations. Some African States have advanced significantly transforming their armed forces to that model; other states are still embryonic. Foreign civil-military capabilities, with appropriate funding and a realistic mandate, working in a coordinated, transparent manner with other humanitarian organisations must now pull and pool resources. Innovative thinking and a ‘fresh vision’ on the delivery of development aid and military assistance that works hand in hand towards a unifying purpose is called for. This could encompass the realisation of the objectives of very complex post-emergency Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) strategies, which must include a capable security architecture, or when a ‘straightforward delivery’ of urgent humanitarian relief is required. This design should not exclude multi-dimensional engagement with less traditional partners, or countries like China or India, especially on the African Continent.

In the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring, and the violence in Nigeria, political and security cooperation in West and Central Africa between member states and stakeholders demands immediate attention. Despite treaties and high-level conferences, the African Union, and the Economic Community of West African and Central African States (ECOWAS-ECCAS) continue to encounter difficulties in the development of sustainable regional security architecture within a robust policy framework. In a similar vein, the Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership and its Joint Africa – EU Strategy does not seem to be making significant headway in these areas. This paper concludes that these concerns need to be addressed as a matter of utmost importance, and, in so doing, the concept of the Black Swan can be utilised for the benefit of the region and its communities, whilst simultaneously helping to avoid an ‘undesirable migration pattern.’

NOTES:

(1) Contact Marco Hekkens through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict and Terrorism Unit (conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) does include infrastructure as part of its grants. Cape Verde has used its MCC money to substantially upgrade its port facilities. The DRC as a MCC-eligible country should look to MCC as a way to address some of this strategic work.
(3) Thomason, R., September/October 2011, ‘Security Training Requirements for the Maritime Community’, The Maritime Executive, p. 60-62, www.maritime-executive.com.
(4) The ferry disaster on Lake Kivu on 25 April 2011, claiming at least 38 lives with over 50 people missing, and a week later another accident with estimated 20 deaths are examples in a series of serious disasters in 2011, claiming over hundreds of lives.
(5) ‘Organised Crime and Instability in Central Africa, A Threat Assessment’, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Report, October 2011.
(6) To be read as a discussion document intended to stimulate debate and launch a process of consultation on a particular topic. This particular Green Paper is also meant to invite interested individuals or organisations to contribute views and information. See: http://en.wikipedia.org.
(7) See the European Union External Action Service website, http://consilium.europa.eu.
(8) Hekkens, M.J.M.S., December 2011, ‘Study into options to modernise the DRC’s ‘Force Navale’ as a tangible contribution to a Comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR) effort; and to stimulate social and economic development’, EUSEC RD Congo.
(9) According to Lawrence’s biographer, Jeremy Wilson, the line is probably a corruption of Article 15 of his “27 Articles”, published in the Arab Bulletin of August 20 1917 and meant as a guide for British officers fighting alongside Arab tribesmen. The original reads: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.” See: http://www.ft.com.
(10) Houben, M.F.J., November 2011. ‘Tegenwicht – “Post-Operation Support”’, Militaire Spectator, No. 11.
(11) Sumser-Lupson, K., AMSSA, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu.
(12) See Transperency International’s website at http://www.transparency.org and ‘Gaining ground on the anti-corruption front’ by Pyman, M., 16 November 2011, Director of Transparency International’s Defence and Security Programme, published in Jane’s Defence Weekly.

Written by Marco Hekkens ⁽¹⁾