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Date: 08/03/2004
Source: Ministry of Finance
Title: T Manuel: Oxford University Inaugural Global Economic
Governance Lecture
OXFORD UNIVERSITY INAUGURAL GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE LECTURE BY
TREVOR A MANUEL, MINISTER OF FINANCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA, AT OXFORD UNIVERSITY, LONDON, 8 March 2004
GLOBALISATION AND THE AFRICAN STATE
Introduction
Allow me first to thank you for inviting me to address you today.
Since I was appointed Minister of Finance in 1996 the question of
economic governance in both its international and domestic guises
has been one of my preoccupations. That preoccupation has arisen as
a direct result of the reintegration of the South African economy
with the global economy, which has created for us unprecedented
challenges in addressing the various pressures, risks and
opportunities that derive from integration, and more broadly
globalisation, and also because economic governance is central to
my work on building the foundations for more rapid economic growth
in the Southern Africa region.
Nancy Birdsall describes the debate on globalisation as being
fundamentally about who's running the global economy and in whose
interest. She argues that while most economists, finance officials
and central bankers agree that the benefits of global, market-based
integration can more than offset the costs for the poorest
countries and the poor within countries, most social activists in
contrast point out that so far, this potential has not been
realised. That is the challenge we face today: to translate the
potential benefits of globalisation into real, tangible gains for
the poorest in the world. (Nancy Birdsall, "Why it matters who runs
the IMF and the World Bank", Center for Global Development, January
2003)
Globalisation presents a critical challenge to sound economic
governance in all states, and in particular African states. I want
to speak today about how globalisation interacts with three
systemic fragilities in Africa - the role of the state in growth,
regional African institutions and the relationship between Africa
and the 'North'. Finally, I will turn to the current African
approaches to these problems and how they link with global economic
governance.
The challenges that face the African continent are immense. The
gross domestic product of Spain is roughly equivalent to that of
Africa as a whole. Approximately one in two people on the African
continent survives on less than $1 per day. A more disturbing
statistic is the one provided by William Easterly in a paper that I
will return to later: the GDP per capita on the African continent
in 1998 was the same as the GDP per capita in 1960.
Historical context
For centuries under colonialism, the economic system imposed on
Africa was one where raw materials were extracted, taken to Europe,
processed and resold to the colonies. Labour too was drawn from the
continent in significant quantities. The fact that a fair price was
not paid for these 'exports' would be putting it mildly. In the
post-colonial era, the prevailing economic relationships changed
very little. Africa exported raw materials at prices it had very
little influence over to the North and imported finished products.
To pay for these imports, African states were given large amounts
of credit. Aid flows, in many but not all cases, have reinforced
this dependency paradigm. Even today, Africa exports its raw
materials and brainpower.
For over five hundred years, the economic system on the African
continent did not foster the development of an industrial base and
did not allow intellectual capital to be nurtured. While many would
argue that in the post-colonial era poor governance and bad policy
choices on the continent played a major role in crafting the
present economic scene, there are just as many who would argue that
it is the structure of power relations between coloniser and colony
that fostered the creation of elites that plunder, of states that
are powerless and of political systems built on patronage.
The African state
In part, globalisation presents risks to Africa because the
apparatus of the state in most African countries is weak, but also
because few African states have managed to find the right mix of
policy to sustain rapid economic growth and poverty
reduction.
In that context of inconsistent growth and widespread poverty, the
globalisation challenge can tip states in the wrong direction -
away from good governance, effective regulation, and pro-growth
policies and toward rent-seeking, the stifling of the private
sector, and the further weakening of already inadequate social
policies and institutions.
At the same time, Africa has been slow to develop the sort of
international institutions capable of assisting in the policy and
sectoral adjustments needed to benefit from globalisation. Regional
institutions and arrangements have also lacked the institutional
capacity to offer external support to adjustment or to create the
large-scale infrastructure projects to support market creation. And
that weakness is often mirrored by the cautious approach of many
African states to perceived losses of sovereignty incurred by
regional integration.
In both of these areas, however, Africa is making great strides, as
I shall discuss. The open question, and one which will influence
global economic issues for decades to come, is whether further
progress will be made on the creation of an international
environment that is capable of supporting our efforts.
Globalisation and fragile economic growth
One of the larger challenges posed by globalisation is the extent
to which governments need to adjust macroeconomic and/or
microeconomic policies to achieve more rapid economic growth in an
environment of open markets.
For African countries, that challenge assumes giant proportions.
Most African economies retain fairly high trade barriers, largely
due to weaknesses in revenue collection from other forms of
taxation, whose reduction would require significant economic
adjustment in the domestic economy. Public and private regulatory
institutions and market structures are often not sufficiently
developed and deep to weather the effects of poor policies and
exogenous shocks. A good example is the impact of a cessation or
sudden resumption of foreign aid - the size of these flows are
globally miniscule - but locally massive - with predictable local
economic effects.
Such imbalances are more destabilizing for African economies -
because even small imbalances can disrupt thin markets, and because
the adjustment process is often impeded, rather than facilitated,
by the policy response.
In particular, adjustment processes usually place the burden of
such adjustment on politically under-represented social groups,
leading to an increase and perpetuation of poverty. Some
marginalized groups become permanently locked out of economic
opportunity, distorting the distribution of income, reducing the
potential growth of the economy, and giving rise to political
instability.
These considerations lead to a few tentative ideas. First, African
economies will remain highly sensitive to the role of Multilateral
institutions and donors - financial flows need to be handled
delicately to avoid severe economic repercussions.
Secondly, that multilateral adjustment programmes need to be more
holistically conceived than they are at present. Dani Rodrik has
pointed out the importance for growth of microeconomic policies
that facilitate the shifting of people from old and non-competitive
industries to new industries and new forms of economic activity.
Such policies entail assertive re-skilling, high quality education,
and access to social and other forms of capital in open
environments in which individuals can take advantage of new
economic opportunities. (Dani Rodrik, "Development Strategies for
the next century" February 2000)
Whilst William Easterly, in a paper entitled National Policies and
Economic Growth argues that while economic growth is negatively
affected by bad policies (an increase in deficits or inflation and
the imposition of high trade barriers), the reverse effect is not
necessarily true. He finds that there is no strong correlation
between the pursuance of macroeconomic reform and growth. Countries
reduce their deficits, lowered inflation rates and liberalized
trade regimes did not necessarily perform better after the reforms.
(William Easterly, "National Policies and Economic Growth: A
reappraisal" Center for Global Development, May 2003)
Moreover, Shanta Devarajan (et al) finds that there is no positive
correlation between public or private investment and growth in
Africa. Similarly, aid flows have not had a discernable effect on
growth either. They find that only eight out of 34 African
countries had a positive relationship between aid and investment,
with 12 displaying a clear negative relationship. Intuitively, this
seems a strange finding. (Shantayanan Devarajan, William Easterly
and Howard Pack, " Low Investment is not the Constraint on African
Development" Center for Global Development, October 2002)
The evidence of policy failure in Africa is considerable. GDP per
capita growth since 1980 has been lower than in the preceding 20
years. Yet, it was during this period where Africa privatised,
liberalised and brought down deficits and inflation. John Nellis
describes the case of Zambia. In what the World Bank in 1998 hailed
as the most successful privatisation programmes in Africa, Zambia
sold 90 percent of its' state owned enterprises. Since then, in
just over a decade Zambia has had one of the largest reductions in
industrial capacity ever observed. Factories have closed down,
unemployment has risen and poverty is pervasive. (John Nellis,
"Privatization in Africa" Center for Global Development, February
2003)
The Zambian case is not atypical. The general conclusion from his
study of privatisation in Africa has been that where the regulatory
capacity is weak, institutions immature and markets thin and where
Governments lack the capacity to manage complex contracts,
privatisation can worsen the economic environment, not strengthen
it. The sequencing of policy reforms has not been given sufficient
attention. Nevertheless, the multilateral financial institutions
still focus on privatisation instead of building regulatory and
institutional capacity and more appropriate sequencing.
Put differently, economic growth is not just a function of prudent
macroeconomic policies (lowish deficits and inflation and
manageable debt levels). Microeconomic policies that facilitate
adjustment through the provision of social capital and opening up
of economic opportunity - especially to the poor, are critical too.
The difficulty is that such reforms are unlikely to be achieved by
weak states, which can themselves be further weakened by
large-scale financial assistance with tight conditionality. Not
only are weak states incapable of defining and operationalising
broader notions of public welfare, but they often have no interest
in moving in that direction.
The challenge posed by globalisation is that as policy makers we
must constantly grapple with the new pressures and changes in our
environment - new areas of policy, new regulations and institutions
all confront us every day. Occasionally, the pressures become very
great and we do nothing, taking refuge in the sovereignty of our
states and the threat of its loss as a means of defending our
inaction.
Indeed many African communities hold too dear the idea of national
sovereignty, perhaps because it is a relatively recent facet of our
existence, but also - because like in all other communities - it is
seen to be politically useful. Unfortunately, this has tended to
slow the development of African institutions - even though the
economic and political bases for their development are manifest in
the weak level of trade between our economies, the lack of
infrastructure, and our small size.
Building regional institutions
To overcome our aversion to regional and global institutions, it
seems critical that we recognize that collective state action need
not reduce sovereignty. Indeed, it seems to me that the European
experience of integration suggests that national sovereignty may be
enhanced through integration, despite the piecemeal loss of
sovereignty in some areas. When applied to the pressures of
globalisation, this thesis seems to me to hold even more strongly -
globalisation can be addressed in regional and global institutions
in such a way as to increase the power of states and better reflect
the social and economic preferences of their citizens.
This idea seems especially pertinent in a regional context. Limited
infrastructure, non-existent regulation or limited enforcement
capacity, thin and undiversified markets for finance, goods and
services all limit the extent to which African economies develop.
The experience and practice across the continent is, of course,
diverse. While some regions remain in low-level equilibria, others
have made great strides in bedding-down policy, regulation, and
macroeconomic stability, and are reaping the rewards of higher
investment.
Despite international economic turmoil, economic growth in Africa
is expected to average 3.1% this year and 4.2% next year. This is
more than twice the average growth we achieved from 1984 to 1993,
and marginally higher than the average for all developing
countries.
Macroeconomic stability is being consolidated, with average
consumer price inflation rising by about 9.7% in 2002, down from
13.2% in 2001, and 54.6% in 1994. Underpinning these improving
inflation figures are our fiscal balances, which have declined from
deficits of -5.2% of GDP in 1994 on average to deficits of -2.1% in
2001.
But we are unlikely to reap the rewards of more rapid economic
growth with only macroeconomic stability. Growing our economies
requires us to create and support effective regional institutions
that are credible interlocutors for national governments. This
means that they are backed by appropriate economic and political
governance mechanisms, both internal to the regional institution
and at the national level. They should be able to ensure public
sector led provision of market infrastructure and foster the
private sector. As the cornerstones of the African Union, Regional
Economic Communities (RECs) must be strengthened to provide the
framework for developing cross-border market infrastructure,
addressing externalities, and forming common policies and
regulations.
As in the context of domestic governance noted earlier, in this
area weak states can be critical obstacles to progress.
I do not subscribe to the idea that either the institution of the
state or the institution of the market can or should do everything
in economic development. There are simply too many examples of
failures of systems of paternalistic states and uncontrolled
markets for me to accept either as a one-size-fits-all model for
development.
Rather, our model is one of an active, accountable state, dependent
on appropriate and non-distortionary revenue generation to provide
the means for individuals to engage in economic activity in markets
- and where people are unable or incapable of doing so, to provide
a basic standard of living. That model depends in turn on
well-regulated markets in which the private sector invests,
produces, employs, and competes. To my mind, that is a very special
partnership, and one which informs New Partnership for Africa's
Development (NEPAD), and in particular the move toward peer review
and use of standards and codes in Africa. Such a state can work in
partnership with the private sector to unlock rents, expand
economic activity and reduce poverty.
Africa and global economic governance
Our experience, albeit short, with NEPAD and the African Union (AU)
has been an enriching one. We have come together, as a continent;
defined the broad tenets of good governance and of sound economic
management and are building the institutions to support those who
adhere to these principles.
The development of regional economic communities and of effective
and accountable institutions, such as the Pan Africa Parliament and
the African Peer Review Mechanism, will contribute to Africa's
ability to address the pressures of globalisation.
In summary, NEPAD enables us as Africans to better manage what we
get out of the international financial and developmental
architectures, whilst pursuing domestic reforms aimed at maximising
the benefits.
In combination with the finely structured NEPAD efforts, the
international environment must become more supportive of our
efforts in Africa and the developing world more generally. The
failure so far to make significant progress in lowering
agricultural subsidies and increase market access is a dismal
reflection of global insecurities, and sours the commitments made
in Monterrey and Johannesburg to do much more than trade
reform.
Nonetheless, I want to conclude my talk with some comments on what
increasingly seems to me to be a prerequisite for a supportive
international economic environment. That is, to complete the reform
of the international financial architecture that was given so much
energy by the Asian crisis.
One of the key realisations in the aftermath of the Asian crisis
(and reinforced by that of Argentina) was that domestic regulatory
institutions and governance matter, not just for prevention of
crises but also for their resolution and the recovery of the
stricken economies. To get a handle on domestic weaknesses that
make economies prone to crisis, it was important to engage more
fully with governments and the national economic and regulatory
systems they are responsible for. For that reason, and others, a
range of emerging market economies were invited to the discussions
on prevention and resolution and helped in the formulation of new
codes and standards.
All of this has been immensely beneficial for the international
financial system, the strengthening of regulatory and oversight
functions in national systems, and the spreading of knowledge.
Global economic governance, and hence reform of the international
financial architecture, however, remains incomplete. We need a
multilateral basis for overcoming future bouts of financial
contagion - to maintain the connection between developing economies
and international capital and goods markets and enable them to grow
and reduce poverty.
The logical extension of the new role of emerging market economies
and other developing countries would have been to reform the
governance of multilateral institutions to enable them to take part
in the decision making of those bodies. Not only would this
strengthen reform efforts, and thereby reduce the contingent costs
of future crises, but it would also strengthen the legitimacy of
those institutions in other parts of the developing world.
Instead we are left with multilateral institutions, which, despite
the impressive efforts of their staff, are experiencing a
degradation of their legitimacy because of their governance
structures.
The very tools and instruments that the world has to address
poverty and inequality and poor governance are themselves the
subject of scrutiny in the field of representivity. If the World
Bank, IMF, World Trade Organisation, Financial Stability Forum and
the Bank for International Settlements do not represent the voices
of the poor and marginalized, are they unlikely to correctly
analyse the policy choices that can be used to address the concerns
of the poor and marginalized.
Stephany Griffith-Jones outlines three compelling reasons for the
voice of the poor to be given a platform in our multilateral
institutions through a greater say by developing countries. First,
she correctly points out that decisions taken do not reflect the
perspectives of the majority affected by poverty. Second, calls for
developing countries to improve their governance arrangements,
expand democratic accountability and protect the marginalized are
likely to fall on deaf ears if the proponents themselves lack
representivity. Lastly, the voting arrangements in many of these
institutions do not reflect the current global economic
environment. Rather, they reflect a picture of development that is
60 years old. (Stephany Griffith-Jones, Improving the Voice of
Developing Countries in Governance of International Financial
Institutions, Unpublished?)
Firm proposals have been put on the table. The issue of voice was
discussed at the annual IMF and World Bank Spring meetings in 2002
and in Monterrey, Mexico. The dilemma is to balance the need to
maintain the support of the rich nations with the ability to remain
credible, legitimate and relevant.
In a world of volatile capital flows, powerful financial markets,
and destabilizing macroeconomic policy decisions, it seems only a
matter of time before the major financial contributors to the IMF
and World Bank recognise the prudential character of reform, as
financial costs grow ever higher.