Two decades ago, West Africa had the largest number of dictatorships and military Governments, at least 40 of which were non-elected. Until recently, the process of democratisation that started across the region in the 1990s was slowly taking a successful course. In 2012, there will be around 20 African countries holding national elections, followed by the institutional changes that result from them.⁽²⁾ Amidst some tensions, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Senegal were (and are) all preparing for elections around March and April 2012.

Across the region, democracy, even amid setbacks, seemed to inch forward, albeit that after 50 years of independence, the path to democracy did not follow a straight line. For instance, this process was set back with Guinea’s recent coup in March this year (2012). With the Sahel region at the hands of several armed Tuaregs from Libya, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, the coup could not have come at a worse time. The events of the last few weeks in which Mali has had centre stage, raise very important issues of security and stability for the West African region.

This paper briefly looks into the recent unconstitutional change of regime in Mali, and analyses the implications of the coup for the country and the region.

Security challenges spark Mali drama

On 21 March 2012, two decades of democratic rule were rudely interrupted in Mali when reneged soldiers, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, attacked the presidential palace in Bamako and announced they had seized power in a coup, overthrowing the elected Government of President Amadou Toumani Touré. The coup occurred six weeks ahead of presidential elections in which Touré did not intend to run and, in fact, could not due to a constitutional term limit.⁽³⁾

The spark for the mutiny came during a visit to Bamako's main barracks by Mali's defence minister. For weeks, discontent had been building as ethnic Tuareg rebels with heavy weaponry from Libya, and better organised than at any time in the past, launched a series of attacks, sacking beleaguered garrisons and inflicting heavy casualties on the Malian army. It is claimed that when the minister failed to calm soldiers' concerns, troops swept into Bamako, stormed the state broadcaster's offices and laid siege to the presidential palace.⁽⁴⁾ The soldiers proclaimed the formation of a ‘national committee for the rebuilding of democracy and the restoration of the state’ (CNRDRE), under Captain Amadou Sanogo.

The uprising has paralysed the political functioning of the Malian state. The immediate human and material casualties are only the tip of the iceberg. The Sahel region has been unstable for many years, mainly due to the gradual installation of Islamist groups, a by-product of several years of terrorism in Algeria.⁽⁵⁾ The situation is further exacerbated by the return of heavily armed Tuareg fighters from Libya. The Malian Government had been struggling for some time with the Tuareg issue, with increased lack of control of its own territory, and rumours of widespread corruption; yet, did this grim scenario justify a coup? Such a radical shift in political leadership so far does not seem to have brought the answer to all the problems above. After all, no coup is a good coup.

A democratic reversal: Why Mali?

After two decades of relative success, democracy was abruptly interrupted in a military coup, weeks before a scheduled election. The recent events in Bamako lead us to reflect on what factors could have produced these outcomes. In comparison to its neighbour, Senegal, which three days later experienced a peaceful democratic transition, Mali has moved backwards.

Both Senegal and Mali have their particular history of democratic tradition. Senegal has long been seen as unique in West Africa for never having been subjected to military rule.⁽⁶⁾ On the other hand, Mali’s President Toumani Touré was himself a coup instigator, and he once noted that if civilians do their jobs poorly, they should expect trouble from soldiers. Despite that, Touré had made the effort to return the country to civilian rule, having himself been democratically re-elected. Is Senegal’s successful transition to be credited to the fact that having experienced the satisfactions of democracy, citizens there were more fervent in its defence? There was a serious crisis in Senegal prior to the elections, yet a coup d’état was not their first resort. Mali, on the other hand, has experienced coups as a ‘remedy’ to national crisis, which may explain why it has occurred again.

Many, including the coup leaders, argued that a weak leadership in Mali is the cause behind the country’s recent challenges. The apparent inability of president Touré to handle the Tuareg crisis and the military’s demands escalated into a coup. However, the coup sends strong signals to the Tuareg rebels that there is no leadership or control in Bamako. Ironically, the coup has backfired extraordinarily. The reason for the coup was the lack of management of the Tuareg rebellion, yet since then, the Tuaregs have utilised the confusion to further advance in their territorial quest.

Putting Mali back on the constitutional track

As stressed by many, Mali needs urgently to revert back to a constitutional democratic path.⁽⁷⁾ The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union (AU), European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) were all unified in calling on the coup leaders to immediately restore democracy. Jean Ping, Chairman of the AU Commission, spoke for all when he said in a statement that “We no longer accept coups d'états.”⁽⁸⁾ The United States, EU and France have also cut off aid to the country. These condemnations as well as Mali’s suspension by ECOWAS and the AU are welcome, but not enough. ECOWAS, the AU and the UN must act quickly and engage with the military junta in order to establish some sort of transitional authority and organise elections.

West Africa is still recovering from the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, threatened by serious insecurity in Northern Nigeria, and concerned about the political impasse in Guinea (Conakry), as well as by the electoral stalemate in Guinea-Bissau. For the sake of stability in the region, Mali could not be left to its own fate. Indeed, it was not – ECOWAS was quick to send a delegation of the Chiefs of Defence Staff to inform the military junta that the country had to return to democratic rule. After meetings with representatives of the military junta, ECOWAS gave a 72 hour ultimatum for a swift return to democratic and civilian rule.⁽⁹⁾ Giving in to the pressure, Captain Sanogo decided to reverse the country’s 1992 constitution. This move was welcomed, but it offered little insight into when the military would step down and when elections would be arranged. As a result, ECOWAS went ahead and imposed severe sanctions on the country. ECOWAS’ members say they will block Mali's access to cash from the West African central bank and will also close all their land borders with Mali.⁽¹⁰⁾ ECOWAS wants the military junta to understand that they cannot come to power through unconstitutional means; zero tolerance must be practiced.

Is Mali heading for a split?

The past two decades have largely been seen as a consolidation of democratic values in Mali; the fragility of which the current impasse appears to have proven. The country could now face a real possibility of territorial division. With the Sahel region at the hands of several armed Tuaregs from Libya, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, the coup could not have come at a worse time. Not only has this signalled weakness nationally, but it has also done so on a regional level. Mali’s future is uncertain. What is certain is that Touré and the junta need to settle their differences very quickly. Representatives of ECOWAS stated that “they should either relinquish power or look for somebody credible right now [to rule], and then they should give us a roadmap of how they are going to do it.”⁽¹¹⁾

The lack of leadership is leading to a lack of national security over extremely serious issues. Tuareg rebels have already taken advantage of the confusion and have secured control over key cities in the north.⁽¹²⁾ At a regional level, the mutiny has caused thousands of refugees to flee the north into neighbouring countries, including Mauritania and Niger, creating a humanitarian problem for the region.⁽¹³⁾ At a more global level, with a growing threat from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, whose members are concentrated in Mali's northern desert, the region needs strong leadership and control.

After the Tuaregs managed to secure key cities in the northern part of the country and claimed independence, many are worried that Mali could be split into two. However, this scenario is unlikely. Firstly, it is important to remember the fact that the borders inherited since independence, according to the African Union Charter, must be respected. Secondly, the situation in the north cannot be resolved until Bamako is stabilised and returns to civilian rule.

The Malian crisis is of the utmost concern for Malians, but also for the region and the continent. It is imperative that we avoid the danger of unconstitutional changes of power spreading on the continent. Furthermore, the Tuaregs’ claims of independence could also set a bad precedent for other smaller groups in the region. The Tuareg problem is not a Malian issue only, and should not be treated in isolation. The whole of the Sahel and the countries involved, i.e. Algeria, Mauritania and Niger are in a very fragile state of affairs.⁽¹⁴⁾ This is why the role of ECOWAS has been, and must remain, vital in the attempts to bring Mali back on the constitutional track. This first step is essential for the stabilisation of the region and, in the long term, of the continent.

Written by Nayanka Perdigao ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact Nayanka Paquete Perdigao through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Conflict and Terrorism Unit (conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Howes, P., ‘West Africa: Democratic change in West Africa- Senegal and Guinea Bissau go to the polls’, African Arguments, 17 March 2012, http://africanarguments.org.
(3) Ibid.
(4) ‘A coup in Mali, Mali-Drama’, 23 March 2012, http://www.economist.com.
(5) Melly, P., ‘Mali: Is there a route back to democratic stability’, 23 March 2012, Chatham House, http://www.chathamhouse.org.
(6) Howes, P., ‘West Africa: Democratic change in West Africa- Senegal and Guinea Bissau go to the polls’, African Arguments, 17 March 2012, http://africanarguments.org.
(7) ‘Putting Mali Back on the Constitutional Track’, International Crisis Group Media release, 26 March 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org.
(8) Melly, P., ‘Mali: Is there a route back to democratic stability’, 23 March 2012, Chatham House, http://www.chathamhouse.org.
(9) Vogl, M., ‘Is Mali’s coup doomed?’, BBC, 1 April 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(10) Ibid.
(11) Clottey, P., ‘ECOWAS Seeks Democracy Roadmap From Mali Junta’, 29 March 2012, Voice of America, http://www.voanews.com.
(12) Flintoff, C., ‘Mali's Coup: Echoes From A Turbulent Past’, 23 March 2012, NPR, http://www.npr.org.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Ibid.