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My dear friends and fellow South Africans,

I have lived long enough to observe that South African history is
essentially cyclical. One-party hegemony is no novel phenomenon and
neither is the wholesale denial thereof. As elites change, new
historical perspectives emerge. The South African elites I have
witnessed first-hand - and please note that I was born in 1928 - have
all exuded a strong sense of purpose and a positive belief in their
own longevity and self-importance. They have also behaved accordingly.
American President Lyndon Johnson once said of his fellow-Texan,
Governor John Connally: "That sonofabitch has forgotten he was ever
poor?. Mr President could have been paying tribute to members of South
Africa's various political elites - and their spin doctors.

Yet, in retrospect, my assessment of South Africa's decade and a half
of democracy is one of cautious celebration. Under Mr Mandela and Mr
Mbeki, and now Mr Zuma, our post-apartheid governments have made giant
strides in the delivery of much-needed public goods, values and
services to their hitherto marginalised constituents. By so doing, the
post-apartheid state has largely legitimised itself in the eyes of the
people. In a fundamental sense, the South African state has
progressively sought to become constitutional and anchored on the rule
of law. And our civil society organisations and the political
opposition have, much to the annoyance of those in power, been trying
hard to put this state on the road to becoming a genuine civic society
where the rights and freedom of individuals reign supreme.

It is with this insight in mind that the IFP and I, whilst not
directly involved in the latest bout of opposition 'toenadering', have
watched the process unfold with great interest because we believe a
truly unified opposition would make for a strong SA. Multipartyism is
the best ? the only - guarantor of democracy. And as I said two weeks
ago, we wish the key actors well and good fortune. But I would like to
clarify what I believe are the defining characteristics of a unified
opposition.

First, I largely subscribe to the dictum that opposition parties don't
win elections, governments loose them. The reason is self-evident.
Governments get to set the agenda; announce targets; unveil programmes
and are largely free to manage the news coverage of government
business. Being in opposition, by contrast, usually means been forced
onto the back foot; to respond to events rather than being weather
makers.

The word 'opposition' itself is infused with gladiatorial
connotations. Confrontation is inferred. This means, unfortunately,
that the role of the opposition has too often been stigmatised in
Africa's democratic discourse characterised as it is by consensus and
a respect for (state) authority. Although, in some post-independent
states like, for example, Tanzania, the oppositionopted to play a
'constructive role' and worked with government to bolster development.

On the whole, In common with other African democracies, SA lack a
tradition of developing issue-based campaigns that define many Western
democracies and bring a new life into their stale political
environments.

It is therefore no good for the opposition here to feebly lay all the
blame on a dominant ruling party for preventing the emergence of a
responsive opposition.

This leads me directly to my biggest concern pertaining to the
deliberations about unifying the opposition. We have largely focused
on getting the ANC's share of the vote down below 50 percent (which
would be good), but precious little on how we do things differently
from government - if at all.

To say we would be more transparent and accountable, whilst virtuous,
is in fact, nothing more than what the Constitution enjoins us to do.
The electorate expects nothing less of us. Unity should therefore not
be the prerequisite to fulfill this function. If the purpose of human
fellowship is for action, this too, I posit, should be the purpose of
a united opposition.
Yesterday's notions of 'left', 'right' and 'centre' have become
increasingly problematic. Spotting whether a policy is left wing, or a
move to the right, depends on many things, including subtle shifts in
political context, and a dialectic between politicians and parties. As
a result, challenging incumbent governments on ideological grounds has
proved futile in many democracies. I suspect it will continue to be
futile here. This places the opposition a difficult position.

And too often the opposition's participation in policy debates is
impeded the unrelenting ruling-party's spin-doctors parody that the
opposition is, at best, an annoying interference or at worst,
unpatriotic, as the government rolls out its meritorious programmes.
Try and do your job as an opposition politician in South Africa
nowadays and ask an inconvenient parliamentary question or point out
an obvious absurdity in government policy. The generosity of spirit
and the readiness to reconcile, which so ostensibly define our new
order, often disappear in an instant and the ANC, in a knee-jerk
reaction, will label you a racist, a saboteur, a subversive, a
dissenter or all of the above.

Being in opposition thus requires a stern frame of mind and requires
stamina. To be relevant, a party must find the hairline crack in the
argument of the day, pick up the hammer and deal a strong and decisive
blow.

For this is the age of the permanent campaign. The term comes from
current American political theory. Its application to the South
African context is well supported by facts. Local research
persistently shows that voter perceptions in South Africa are built
over long periods of time on the basis of cumulative impressions.
Similarly, voter loyalty favours long-established political parties.
It is also hard earned, but lasting. Any winning strategy must, as a
result, formulate itself within the context of a permanent campaign.

Seizing the initiative often means waiting for the government to
stumble or exposing some scandal or irregularity. The former
Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), for
example, which uncovered vital evidence pertaining to the corrupt arms
deal, was a former IFP MP. Opposition MP's usually make names for
themselves as exposés, like the DA's new doughty member David Maynier
(again over the arms procurement process) rather than as opinion
makers. It would be a pity if Mr Maynier will be just remembered for
his role in uncovering irregularities, and not for his elegant
exposition of what the SADF should be for in his maiden speech, too.

It is actually hard to think of an example of when any opposition
party has really captured the public imagination with a unique idea or
selling point, to use marketing language, since 1994. The much touted
Basic Income Grant (BIG) was adopted, not formulated, as a policy by
opposition parties. Do opposition parties believe in 'ring-fenced'
taxation; a moderate or an increased interventionist role for the
state? Do we support progressive tax credits or increased social
grants, or a combination of both? Do we advocate a hawkish or dovish
foreign policy? To quote the late Clara Peller, 'where's the beef?'

Opposition parties have largely failed to find a common voice on at
least one or two issues. Our efforts have, in the past, been
fragmented and lacking in strategic finesse. The rare exceptions have
been a few joint opposition rallies against floor-crossing and a once
off joint press conference in 2006 on the time allocated to opposition
speakers in the debate on the tenth anniversary of the adoption the
Constitution. More recently, four opposition parties sent a joint
letter to President Zuma complaining that he did not fulfill his
constitutional obligation to consult opposition leaders when he
nominated a candidate for the position of Chief Justice (he
apologised). But, again, this is reactive, institutional orientated,
in the moment stuff, not proactive policy interventions. These
disparate interventions do not constitute a raison d'être.

I would also like to strike a cautionary note about how tough uniting
the opposition is by taking you, for a just a moment, to Westminster,
where in the run up to the 1997 general election the Labour leader
Tony Blair and his Liberal Democrat counterpart Sir Paddy Ashdown met
clandestinely to work closely on a project intended to totally realign
the Left in British politics. For the twentieth century had clearly
been, in Britain at least, the Conservative century. It seemed that,
to Blair and Ashdown, far more united the Labour and Liberal Democrat
opposition parties than what divided them: a moderate role for the
state; retaining Margaret Thatcher's key market reforms; increased
spending in public services; devolution, and so on.

The project ultimately failed because of Blair's belief that he could
not overcome the opposition within his own Cabinet. During their many
meetings - some in the middle of the night - Ashdown and Blair built
up the closest relationship of any two British political leaders in
modern times. Yet, in due course, the bonhomie between the two left of
centre parties evaporated, as the political exigencies of (Labour)
being in office took hold.

After its devastating defeat in 1997, it took a long time (until David
Cameron's election in 2005) for the Official Opposition Conservatives
to find their feet again. And it, paradoxically, often fell to the
Liberal Democrats to supply decent opposition. They opposed, amongst
other things, what they believed to be Labour's growing
authoritarianism in home affairs, the pretext for war in Iraq ? the
'dodgy dossier' (which the official opposition supported), and their
finance spokesperson proved to be way ahead of the times in warning
that the credit bubble was about to explode.

Now, in terms of game theory and scenario reconstruction, what would
have happened if the two protagonists' (government and the second
largest opposition party) had formed an electoral pact or even merged
as Blair and Ashdown had envisaged?

The comparison is, of course, not entirely analogous to the South
African situation because it is unlikely that our official opposition
party will close the poll gap in the next parliament to defeat the
ruling party. In other words, the path to power is likely to be longer
and windier. But the opposition may make serious inroads in the 2011
election and win key metro and town councils. That is why it is good
to talk now.

Yours sincerely,

Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi, MP