During the Darfur crisis, China used its seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to prevent numerous attempts to impose an embargo on Sudan. While Chinese involvement in Africa has always been under international criticism, there are still African nations interested by what China has to offer - weapons and cash inflow in exchange for natural resources. The Darfur crisis was an opportunity for China to learn how to balance international business and the reputation of good practice that should come with international diplomacy. It is true that using its UNSC seat was clever and not a surprise, but China demonstrated amateurism in using it and at the same time, manipulating international opinion. Looking closely on which other country can attract Chinese interest leads to Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) - a country whose vast reserve of natural resources is located in a region plagued with political and military instability. This paper examines how China has made use of its position in the UN to leverage its commercial interests.

China, founding member of the UN and the veto power

In 1947, the then Republic of China (ROC), as one of the founding members of the UN, was appointed its UNSC seat.⁽²⁾ It did not come as a surprise since all the appointed countries were the victors of World War II, with the United Kingdom (UK) and France from Europe, the United States (US), the then USSR and the ROC for Asia.⁽³⁾ The UNSC creation was an attempt to keep world power in balance and maintain peace. In fact, the Charter of the United Nations clearly discusses in Chapter 7 what action should be taken by the Security Council, or the Permanent 5 (P5), “with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.”⁽⁴⁾ Since the early years of the Security Council, its most controversial feature has remained the veto power as described by Chapter 5 of the Charter of the UN.⁽⁵⁾ With the UNSC being composed of the P5 and 10 non-permanent members, the veto power or the ‘great power unanimity’, refers to the fact that decisions on substantive matters require nine votes, including the concurring vote of the P5.⁽⁶⁾ Put simply, all P5 countries have to agree on a decision for it to be executed.

In comparison with the other members, China has almost never used its veto power since its first time in 1946 by the then ROC;⁽⁷⁾ even though by 1949 a political crisis resulted in the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its replacement of the former in the 1960s at the UNSC. Whether it was during the time of the ROC or during the time of the PRC, this trend has not changed at all. In fact, in its 65 years as a UNSC member, it has only used its veto power 6 times as opposed to France (18), UK (32), US (82) and Russia (124).⁽⁸⁾ Contrary to other UNSC members, China has not used its veto power as an expression of its opinion about global politics and events. China has solely used its veto power to protect its political interest for the first four times (1946-55, 1966-75, 1997, 1999) and to protect its investment for the last two times (2007, 2008).⁽⁹⁾

Chinese investment in Sudan

In 2007, the Sudanese Government was the centre of international criticism over the Darfur genocide. While the US moved quickly and imposed unilateral sanctions,⁽¹⁰⁾ its belief that an international embargo would be imposed on Sudan was proven to be wrong. China urged the UN to demonstrate some patience instead and while making this request, China did not provide the required vote to make the UNSC decision on an arms embargo effective.⁽¹¹⁾ Chinese investment in the Sudanese oil industry might have been the reason why an embargo was not supported by China. Chinese investment in Sudan began as early as the late 1960s when China was an arms dealer for the then-Sudanese Government and its supply of arms continuously rose until the 1990s.⁽¹²⁾

In 1996, the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), a state-owned Chinese company bought 40% of the shares made available in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) consortium, which is a Sudanese oil project.⁽¹³⁾ A 2007 UNCTAD report showed that Sudan received US$ 351.5 million in Chinese foreign direct investment by 2005 that was not solely directed to oil.⁽¹⁴⁾ In fact, Sudanese benefits arising from Chinese investment also included weapons that were used in Darfur during years 1999-2006 and China was responsible for supplying 90% of weapons found in Sudan.⁽¹⁵⁾ If it was not the oil investment that China was trying to protect by threatening to use its veto power, it could have been its other business interests, like the export of arms, that needed protection from the UNSC embargo.

Arms dealing and veto power

While international criticism was not precisely on the arms export itself, the fact remains that no multilateral agreements has have been ever signed by China to prevent the exportation of arms to countries that might use them to violate human rights.⁽¹⁶⁾ Such violations were the main reason why Sudan was under the embargo threat. Chinese arguments, which encouraged patience from both UN side and Sudanese side, soon came under fire;⁽¹⁷⁾ as it was opined that the best way to bring peace to Sudan from the Chinese side would have been by stopping the arms supply. In 2008, the term “The Genocide Olympics”⁽¹⁸⁾ was used to describe the involvement of China in the Darfur genocide through its arms supply.

China’s influence in trying to bring peace to Sudan was proven insufficient or only providing further confidence to the Sudanese Government that China, thanks to its business-oriented politics, was not afraid to use its veto power to protect its Sudanese interests.⁽¹⁹⁾ Attacks on UN peacekeepers in Darfur, as well as foreigners and diplomats were viewed as deliberate actions undertaken with the assurance of no retaliation from the UN, due to Chinese backing.⁽²⁰⁾

In June 2008, 2 months before the opening Olympic Games of Beijing, Chinese president Hu Jintao made a statement officially urging the Sudanese Government to cooperate with the UN peacekeeping force,⁽²¹⁾ and thus finally complying with the international community. Right after the Olympic Games, US$ 3 million was granted by China to Sudan to be used to improve and strengthen North-South relationships.⁽²²⁾ This was done in an effort to work on its diplomatic image while keeping its business relationship in Sudan safe. Later, in February 2009, both countries celebrated 50 years of mutual profitable relationships ⁽²³⁾ and months later China joined the international community to congratulate Sudan on the election that led to the creation of a new African nation, South-Sudan.⁽²⁴⁾

Chinese investment in the Congolese mining industry

A loan agreement of US$ 8.5 billion,⁽²⁵⁾ followed by a subsequent US$ 5 billion solely dedicated to the infrastructure improvement of the mining industry,⁽²⁶⁾ was completed between China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2008. Attracting criticism from Bretton Wood institutions who argued that the loan was putting the country in more debt, the Congolese Government responded that it was not a loan, but instead trade, where in exchange of money inflow and infrastructure investment, Chinese contractors were allowed to have access to their minerals resources and mining industry.⁽²⁷⁾

Out of the numerous mineral reserves in the DRC, the one that attracts international attention is coltan or more precisely its main element, tantalum. It is a key component to everything in high-technology equipment, from cell phones to computers to missiles and weapon systems. The DRC currently holds around 64% of the world’s reserves, all located in the Kivu region in eastern DRC, a region locally controlled by rebel movements.⁽²⁸⁾ Mining sites are controlled by rebel armies originating from DRC, Rwanda and Uganda who through attacks, violence against women and destruction of local communities have maintained control over the area and secured cheap child labour.⁽²⁹⁾

There are three main processors operating in DRC, which are consuming 80% of the total ore production of the DRC, and the biggest one is the Ningxia Non‐ferrous Metals Smeltery (NNMS) a Chinese state-owned company.⁽³⁰⁾ Due to various reports from NGOs and the UN linking the coltan from the DRC to be the direct reason for the existence of rebels, other processors have quickly moved to the production of what they call “clean coltan”,⁽³¹⁾ meaning coltan from origins other than the DRC. In 2002, a UN rapport confirms that NNMS did not follow the trend, as 50% of its ores was coming from DRC, therefore making China the primary exporter of coltan from the DRC.⁽³²⁾

The connection between coltan mining and the continuing conflict in Kivu became more apparent when in 2003, an arms embargo was imposed on armed groups from DRC⁽³³⁾ instead of an economic embargo, with China voting along with its fellow P5 members for its application. An economic embargo could have been more effective by having an impact on the main reason why rebels are in Kivu: the profitable mining business. The arms embargo that was modified, renewed and extended until 2011⁽³⁴⁾ will have no effect on the Kivu human rights issue because weapons can be easily bought in the neighbouring countries or even brought back to DRC by rebel groups from Rwanda or Uganda. In 2006, UN arms control in the eastern DRC found small arms and bullets from China and nothing has been done by the three respective countries to ensure a tighter border regulation in the Kivu area.⁽³⁵⁾ Therefore, little or no reaction should be expected from China as long as the embargo on DRC does not affect its business there, which is not likely to happen as long as only the arms embargo is imposed by the UNSC.

Conclusion

While all UN embargoes on DRC have been passed by the UNSC without any opposition from China, it is unlikely that there will be any Chinese opposition as long as the embargo is limited to arms. DRC is not a big arms customer and there is always the possibility of obtaining Chinese weapons from neighbouring countries. Little or no reports have formally accused China of directly participating in fuelling the DRC eastern conflicts through its business ties. If such accusations are made and there is a possibility that it has some impact on the revenue of its investment in DRC, China will likely make good use of its UNSC seat powers, as it did for Sudan.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Astrid B. Akoyoko through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Asia Dimension Unit ( asia.dimension@consultancyafrica.com This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it ).
(2) Website of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations office in Geneva, http://www.china-un.ch. (3) Nikos Retsos, ’UN Security Council. A relic of WWII, and a lair of global predators’, 17 January 2010, http://my.telegraph.co.uk.
(4) Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, UN website, http://www.un.org.
(5) Ibid, Chapter V.
(6) Ibid.
(7) ‘Changing patterns in the use of the veto in the security council’, Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Lindsay Beck, ’China urges patience on Sudan, opposes sanctions’, Reuters, 31 May 2007, http://www.reuters.com. (11) ‘Bush announces new economic sanctions on Sudan to halt Darfur crisis’, Fox news, 29 May 2007, http://www.foxnews.com.(12) ‘China’s involvement in Sudan: arms and oil’, Human Rights Watch, 2003, http://www.hrw.org. (13) Ibid.(14) Laura Macinnis, ’Sudan top target for Chinese investment in Africa’, Reuters, 27 May 2007, http://uk.reuters.com.(15) ‘Investing in tragedy’, Human Rights First, March 2008, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org.(16) Thalif Deen, ‘Why China blocks sanctions on Iran, Sudan, Burma’, Inter Press Service, 13 June 2006, http://www.asiantribune.com.
(17) ‘90% of the weapons for Darfur come from China’, Asian news, 14 March 2003, http://www.asianews.it.
(18) Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘China’s genocide Olympics’, New York Times, 24 January 2008, http://www.nytimes.com.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Edward Cody, ’China steps up pressure on Sudan over Darfur’, Washington Post, 13 June 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com.
(22) ‘China grants Sudan $3m for north-south unity’, Sudan Tribune, 30 November 2008, http://www.sudantribune.com.
(23) Ibid.
(24) ‘China says to continue efforts for Sudan's peace processes’, Xinhuanet, 27 April 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com.
(25) ‘Les contrats Chinois en République Démocratique du Congo: Un nouvel ordre économique pour l’Afrique?’ http://www.alterinfo.net.
(26) Tristan Coloma ‘Le « contrat du siècle »’, Monde Diplomatique, February 2011, http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr
(27) ‘Olivier Kamitatu: l'accord-prêt Chinois contribue à la reconstruction, Congo planète, 20 septembre 2009, http://www.congoplanete.com
(28) Get Loud website, http://www.getloud.ca
(29) Ibid.
(30) Tiffany Ma,’ China and Congo’s coltan connection, Project 2049 Institute, September 2003, http://project2049.net.
(31) Ibid.
(32) Ibid.
(33) ‘Arms embargo on the Democratic Republic of Congo’, UK Business Link website, http://www.businesslink.gov.uk.
(34) ‘DR Congo arms embargo 'failing'’, BBC News, 16 October 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(35) Ibid.

Written by Astrid B. Akoyoko (1)