On 15 February 2011, protests began in Libya. The Libyan uprising mirrored similar popular movements in Egypt and Tunisia where anger and discontent spread throughout the country against leaders seen as undemocratic and unaccountable. Anti-Government opposition members throughout Libya demonstrated against the rule of Muammar Gadaffi. Unlike in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt where the opposition remained largely peaceful, in Libya they turned violent and reports came in that anti-Government demonstrators were coming under attack. Defecting soldiers and pilots ⁽²⁾ seemed to verify the claims that Gadaffi was ordering attacks on protesters in order to stem the uprising.

Gadaffi made appearances on state television, delivering long addresses and diatribes accusing foreign influences—including the West and al-Qaeda—of fomenting unrest within Libya. Simultaneously, interviews with civilians and anti-Government protesters accused Gadaffi of hiring and using foreign mercenaries to carry out attacks on demonstrators. These include claims of foreign fighters from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Mali, Niger, Sudan, and possibly as far away as Asia and Eastern Europe.⁽³⁾ Other reports have been of ‘captured’ foreign soldiers described by anti-Government demonstrators as “black and French speaking.”⁽⁴⁾

This CAI discussion paper briefly examines the concept of conflict as an industry throughout Africa, using the present example of Libya and exploring the reports of/use of mercenaries. It begins by examining Gadaffi’s historical ties and involvement with mercenaries. It then looks at how Gadaffi is able to fund and arm mercenaries. Finally, it seeks to explain why regional societal and economic conditions make it easy for Gadaffi to attract foreign fighters to Libya.

Libya’s historical links to foreign fighters

Gadaffi has a history of recruiting mercenaries. During the 1970s and 1980s, Gadaffi worked to develop an ‘Islamic Legion’ as part of his efforts to promote and prepare for the creation of a pan-Arabic state. Recruits into this legion were composed of poorer immigrants from countries in the surrounding Sahel, including Chad, Mali, Niger, and Sudan.

The thousands of immigrants who comprised Gadaffi’s legionnaires were frequently dispatched throughout Africa and the Middle East, and as far afield as Benin, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Syria during the 1980s. The majority of Gadaffi’s fighters, however, were involved in Chad and Darfur in Sudan. Some of those who were in Darfur are even reported to have stayed on in the country, forming part of the leadership and fighting core of the Janjaweed militia used by the Government in Khartoum.⁽⁵⁾

When this ‘Islamic Legion’ was disbanded in the early 1990s, its erstwhile fighters were given the choice of returning to their original homes or staying in Libya. According to some estimates, as many as 10,000 of these fighters stayed behind in Libya. Those who stayed in Libya were given the opportunity to acquire Libyan citizenship if they worked to train or join Libya’s regular army.⁽⁶⁾ Even in the case of those fighters who returned to their homes, their ties to Gadaffi were not completely severed. Many returning legionnaires were Tuareg nomads from Algeria, Mali, and Niger, who (continued to) fought on and off with central governments, often with financial and military support and offers of sanctuary from Gadaffi.⁽⁷⁾

Given his broad connections and links to networks of fighters and rebels throughout sub-Saharan Africa and in neighbouring countries, it is clear that Gadaffi has numerous sources that he can draw from when recruiting and hiring mercenaries.

Funding and arming mercenaries

There are two main ingredients a government needs in order to hire and construct a mercenary army: money and weapons. Gadaffi and his regime have plenty of both.

Libya is an exporter of oil and natural gas. These two commodities alone provide an estimated 95% of the nation’s export revenue and at least half of its national gross domestic product (GDP).⁽⁸⁾ Europe is the main export market for both goods. European oil imports and other investments helped push the value of assets in the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), Gadaffi’s sovereign fund to over US$ 70 billion.⁽⁹⁾

Gadaffi’s billions allow him to not only hire mercenaries, but also arm them. He is aided in this by a plethora of arms’ deals: In 2008 and 2009, the United States Government approved multi-million dollar contracts between American security and defense firms and Gadaffi in Tripoli for explosives, incendiary agents, and aircraft parts.⁽¹⁰⁾ Recent reports indicate that European nations sold over US$ 470 million in armaments to Gadaffi in 2009.⁽¹¹⁾ Yet the totals from arms sales by the United States and European nations pale in comparison to trade figures from Russia. Prior to a recent order signed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Russia and Libya engaged in almost US$ 4 billion in arms deals, including US$ 1.8 billion worth of military aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles.⁽¹²⁾

Other countries and companies throughout Europe have also been identified as providing financial and military support to Gadaffi. According to publications on statistics for 2009, Malta, Belgium and Bulgaria provided at least US$ 130 million in small arms shipments and licenses, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy sold over US$ 84 million in permits for electronic jamming equipment, and Italy, France, and Portugal provided over US$ 180 million in licensing for military aircraft, assault craft, and drones to Tripoli.⁽¹³⁾ In 2009, it was recently discovered that Italian company Fabbrica d’Armi Pietro Beretta shipped nearly US$ 8.5 million worth of small arms to Tripoli via Malta, including 7,500 pistols, 1,900 semi-automatic rifles, and 1,800 shotguns.⁽¹⁴⁾ Now, in the wake of the unrest, the United States, Russia and members of the European Union (EU) have cancelled such ongoing arms deals with Libya.

Despite the recently imposed embargo, reports indicate that there are nations still selling weapons to Gadaffi. The international community has been monitoring flights between Tripoli and Minsk, Belarus over the possibility that they are carrying weapons. Flights have been tracked between Sebha airport, which lies outside of radar tracking systems in Libya’s extreme south—and Baranovichi, a large former Soviet weapons storage area now controlled by Belarus.⁽¹⁵⁾ Despite efforts to restrict Gadaffi’s access to weapons, it appears there are still nations willing to work around the international community and sell Libya arms.

Recruiting mercenaries

Political and economic conditions throughout sub-Saharan Africa and in the countries neighbouring Libya also contribute to make recruiting foreign fighters an easier process.

In addition to the former foreign legionnaires already established within Libya, new recruits have been attracted by promises and opportunities for financial gain. As ‘soldiers of fortune,’ the economic incentive for an individual to fight for a foreign government or ruler can be strong. Gadaffi has reportedly used his network and connections in northern Mali and Niger, offering Tuareg rebels thousands of dollars per day to fight for him in Libya.⁽¹⁶⁾ Gadaffi is also reportedly using mass-media and advertising to attract potential mercenaries. In Guinea and Nigeria, announcements have appeared offering would-be fighters up to US$ 2,000 daily to come support Gadaffi.⁽¹⁷⁾

For individuals throughout sub-Saharan Africa and in the countries immediately surrounding Libya, the opportunity to work for significant sums of money is a difficult offer to turn down. In Nigeria, yearly gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is US$ 2,250, only US$ 250 more than the reported salary offered for new recruits.⁽¹⁸⁾ In Guinea, GDP per capita is even lower at US$ 990, and in Mali, GDP per capita is at US$ 1,200 with unemployment rated at 10%.⁽¹⁹⁾ These economic indicators are even worse in the north of the country where Tuareg rebels have engaged in constant war against the central Government in Bamako.

In some instances, young individuals searching for employment opportunities in Libya are lured and tricked into becoming mercenaries. Interviews with captured mercenaries in Libya have identified many young men from neighbouring Chad who were promised employment and higher wages in Libya. In one instance, a Chadian shepherd was promised work and put on a plane he thought was bound for Tripoli. The plane eventually landed in Al-Bayda east of Benghazi where he was given a gun, told to fight for Gadaffi, and would be paid if he killed protesters, and killed if he refused.⁽²⁰⁾

Aside from the economic incentives, the political unrest that has plagued much of sub-Saharan Africa provides numerous potential recruits for Gadaffi’s mercenary army. As conflicts subside in other regions of sub-Saharan Africa, a potential continuing supply of mercenaries could emerge when armies are demobilised.⁽²¹⁾ Former soldiers in regular armies may find it hard to reintegrate into society or develop employable skills beyond fighting and using a weapon. This risk is highlighted with two contracting firms with strong ties to South Africa. Both ArmorGroup and Erinys have thousands of contractors and security guards on the ground in Iraq.⁽²²⁾ There are growing fears that when the United States pulls out from Iraq, these contractors may return to South Africa or potentially find work as fighters elsewhere, including in Libya for Gadaffi.

Even for non-professional military personnel or contractors, the thrill of fighting or setting out abroad can be a strong enough pull to attract young men to sign up as mercenaries. While some may find it extremely difficult to settle down in their countries or find employment, others may simply yearn for a life of excitement and camaraderie that fighting can fulfill.⁽²³⁾ For others, fighting is a means of securing and improving one’s future, especially considering economic uncertainty and poor job prospects in other countries.

Concluding remarks

It appears that historical, political, social, and economic factors at the regional and international level contribute to Gadaffi’s ability to recruit and maintain foreign fighters and mercenaries. From a historical perspective, Gadaffi’s use of mercenaries is not a new phenomenon. During the 1970s and 1980s, Gadaffi formed an ‘Islamic Legion’ that he used in neighbouring Chad and Sudan. Gadaffi has maintained his contacts and connections with these fighters, many of whom have direct ties to Tuareg rebels throughout the Sahel.

At the regional level, poor economic conditions and strong military or rebel presences in neighbouring countries can contribute to individuals willingly working as mercenaries for a foreign government. These include high unemployment rates, poor economic prospects in the mercenaries’ home countries, and high numbers of militia, rebel, and armies that provide potential mercenary recruits. Individuals within these groups often have few marketable skills for employment, other than fighting or using a weapon.

At the international level, oil and investment deals with the Gadaffi Government appear to have provided the funds necessary to hire and maintain a mercenary army. With billions of dollars to spend, Gadaffi has been able to attract youths from the region and continent to fight for him, while also purchasing large quantities of the weapons needed to fight.

Notes:

(1) Contact David Rosenblum through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Africa Industry and Business Unit (industry.business@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Peregin, C., 'Two Libyan fighter pilots defect to Malta', TimesOfMalta, 22 February 2011, http://www.timesofmalta.com.
(3) Smith, D., 'Has Gaddafi unleashed a mercenary force on Libya?', The Guardian, 22 February 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(4) Keating, J., 'How to hire a mercenary', National Public Radio, 24 February 2011, http://www.npr.org.
(5) de Waal, A., 'War in Sudan: An Analysis of Conflict', London, Peace in Sudan Group, 1990.
(6) Quist-Arcton, O., 'Libya’s Gadhafi accused of using foreign mercenaries', National Public Radio, 23 February 2001, http://www.npr.org.
(7) Vogl, M. 'Tauregs join Gaddafi’s mercenaries', BBC News, 4 March 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(8) The Heritage Foundation, '2011 index of economic freedom', http://www.heritage.org.
(9) MSNBC, 'London office of Libya investment fund deserted', 9 March 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com.
(10) Daily Mail, 'Obama administration approved $40 billion in private arms sales to countries including Libya and Egypt', 12 March 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Al Jazeera, 'Russia bans arms sales to Libya', 10 March 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net.
(13) Rettman, A., 'Libya replete with EU arms as Gaddafi massacres protesters', EUobserver, 22 February 2011, http://euobserver.com.
(14) Rettman, A., 'Italy-Libya arms deal shows weakness of EU code', EUobserver, 3 March 2011, http://euobserver.com.
(15) Rao, P., 'Think tank warns of arms deliveries from Belarus to Libya', ASDNews, 28 February 2011, http://www.asdnews.com.
(16) Vogl, M. 'Tauregs join Gaddafi’s mercenaries', BBC News, 4 March 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(17) Keating, J., 'How to hire a mercenary', National Public Radio, 24 February 2011, http://www.npr.org.
(18) The Heritage Foundation, '2011 index of economic freedom', http://www.heritage.org.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Meo, N., 'African mercenaries in Libya nervously await their fate', The Telegraph, 27 February 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk.
(21) Suter, K., 'Mercenaries in Warfare', Global Directions, http://global-directions.com.
(22) Baker, D., & Gumedze, S., 'Private military/security companies and human security in Africa', Institute for Security Studies, African Security Review, 16.4, http://www.iss.co.za.
(23) Suter, K., 'Mercenaries in Warfare', Global Directions, http://global-directions.com.

Written by David Rosenblum ⁽¹⁾