The formidable presence of ‘new’ global super powers such as China and India on the African continent has tended to dominate headlines and analysis; yet the role the countries of the Arabian Gulf are playing is inclined to be overlooked or reduced to stereotyped clichés centred on the exportation of jihadism, terrorism and ‘land grabs’. This paper is an attempt to provide a more nuanced understanding of the growing and diverse influence the Arabian Gulf exerts on the African continent.

In order to contextualise contemporary developments, this CAI paper first looks briefly at the historical background of Arab-African relations. It then examines the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC)(2) seemingly hypocritical response to the Arab Spring, arguing that supporting regime change in North Africa, and yet generally repressing internal demands for change, represents an attempt to expand its sphere of influence in the Maghreb and Egypt, whilst maintaining the status quo on the Arabian Peninsula. Current involvement (particularly by Qatar) in Mali is then analysed before the challenges and consequences of the Gulf’s food (in)security are addressed. This paper then looks at the increasing importance of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a counter-piracy ‘hub’, both in terms of advocating a regional approach to combating maritime insecurity and in providing vital training. It concludes by suggesting that the Gulf’s influence on the continent is spreading beyond the traditional arena of North Africa, embracing diverse forms of involvement that may have profound effects on the evolution and resolution of conflicts.

The historical background

The relationship between Africa and Arabia, though often complex, controversial and contradictory, is, in essence, primeval and inevitable: It stretches back millennia to a time when the two land masses were one; to a time, 60-70,000 years ago when man first crossed from the Horn of Africa into Arabia via the Bab El Mandab,(3) and to a time when, even in the pre-Islamic and Christian eras, there were significant linguistic, racial and cultural similarities.(4) These, coupled with strong economic and social ties (whether voluntary or, as was the case with slavery, enforced) created what was, in effect, an ‘Afro-Arab melting pot’. Crucially, this was a relationship based on symbiosis rather than the almost asymmetrical parasitism of Western literature, which reduces Africa to the role of Arab recipient. For example, there were extensive trading interactions between Ethiopia and Southern Arabia, whilst the Axumites from present-day Eritrea ruled Yemen during the second and third centuries B.C.(5)

These connections were further strengthened with the advent of Islam in the 7th century. Galvanised by the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed, Muslims fanned out, spreading and imposing the powerful message of Islam. Whilst Arab influence was particularly pronounced in North Africa, initially, as in the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia, Islam and Christianity coexisted relatively peacefully. Interestingly, it has been argued that Islam merely served to emphasise already existing political, economic and cultural interactions.(6) Yet the historical residue of earlier relations continues to inform and shape current Afro-Arab discourses at the popular, elite and academic levels. This is especially evident in the division of the continent into ‘Arab/Islamic’ Africa and ‘Black’ Africa. Indeed, ‘Arab’ interaction with Sub-Saharan Africa is generally seen as following three main spheres of influence: firstly as enslavers, secondly as allies in the decolonialisation movements of the 1950s/60s and thirdly as espousers of Pan-Africanism and integration.(7) These latter developments, in addition to Sub-Saharan Africa’s support for the Arab cause during the Arab-Israeli conflict, illustrate the co-operative nature of Afro-Arab relations yet in so doing tend to sideline the role the GCC continues to play on the continent. This paper now analyses some of the pertinent aspects of the Gulf’s involvement in Africa.

Interventions and involvement

The so-called ‘Arab Spring’ – a catchy if arguably ill-advised misnomer given the on-going fragility that dominates the majority of North Africa and the intractable carnage of Syria – continues to challenge GCC countries. From the movement’s outset in 2011, the GCC followed a policy that was seemingly Janus-faced. On the one hand, it played (and continues to play) an important role in supporting regime change in countries such as Libya, Yemen and Syria, yet on the other hand, public protests within the GCC were resolutely crushed, with Bahrain in particular, brutally cracking down on protestors.

To a great extent, the GCC’s continuing involvement in the Arab Spring and its messy aftermath stems from ideological and economic opportunism and ambition rather than genuine altruism and a desire for democratic reform. The GCC’s reaction was particularly strident and determined over Libya, demanding no-fly zones, backing military strikes,(8) and providing anti-Gaddafi rebels with much-needed arms, financial aid and training.(9) By supporting the Arab Spring and aligning themselves with the international (Western) community, the GCC has arguably emerged as an important international mediator between the West and the wider Arab world, cementing its place as a vital strategic partner in a turbulent region, whilst also being viewed as championing ‘freedom’. It has also led to the ousting of dictators whose eccentric and destabilising dabbling threatened not only the wider Arab (Sunni) world, but also GCC rulers. Gaddafi, for example, had a record of plotting against Gulf potentates.(10) Indeed, it is currently following a similar path in Syria with Saudi Arabia and Qatar arming rebel fighters.(11) Pragmatically, GCC intervention in Syria may be an attempt to curtail Iranian influence (‘the Shia fear’) by removing Assad, but in terms of public relations it is proving highly valuable. It not only endorses GCC support for popular regime change; it also, in stark contrast to the United Nation’s (UN) veritable emasculation, provides an opportunity for the GCC to be seen as responding to civilian suffering and able and willing to ‘take action’.

The GCC’s direct backing of Islamists, especially Salafi groups, has seen their influence extend in North Africa. The support of Saudi Arabia, the Arabian Peninsula’s aging behemoth and Qatar, the “pygmy with the punch of a giant”(12) has been noteworthy, and is especially tangible with regards to sponsorship of Islamic organisations such as the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the non-governmental organisation (NGO) ‘Islamic World League’, in addition to newer bodies like the International Union of Muslim Scholars.(13) Indeed, the recent spate of elections across North Africa, which has seen Islamists making remarkable political inroads, has provided the GCC with an extensive network of alliances, seemingly justifying its sympathetic relationship with such groups, and the religious–pragmatism that defines much of the Gulf’s foreign policy. Furthermore, ideology and security is also interlinked with strategic economic investments, leading perhaps to the development of socially responsible Islamic capitalism.(14) Thus, the Arab Spring and its complex aftermath have demonstrated the GCC’s realistic dynamism focused on guaranteeing its own security, through pursuing contradictory policies; on the one hand, supporting Islamist groups, whilst, on the other, speaking the language of international (secular) liberalism. The two need not necessarily be incompatible especially if grounded on innovative, responsible economic policies and pragmatic politics, yet the long-term repercussions of this delicate balancing act remain to be seen.

Meddling in Mali?

Qatar has emerged from the Arab Spring with a reputation as a small yet increasingly powerful regional and global player. Yet its policies have not been without controversy – its continuing support of Islamist militias in Libya, for example, has been criticised.(15) Recent developments, meanwhile, suggest that its influence may be stretching further than North Africa. Reports have been surfacing that Qatar is funding the main armed ‘terrorist’ groups in Mali – Sunni Islamic groups responsible for ‘hijacking’ the rebellion and desecrating Timbuktu, such as Ansar Dine, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA).(16) So far, there has been no official confirmation, but in the confused environment of northern Mali where rumour and counter-rumour abound, information is a powerful weapon when ‘truth’ is a rare commodity.

Whether or not Qatar is providing support to Islamist rebels under the guise of The Qatar Red Crescent (QRC) is not easily verifiable – certainly it has pledged to help Malian refugees in the north of the country and in neighbouring Burkina Faso to the tune of US$ 500,000.(17) It is perhaps more likely that any ‘support’ Doha is affording armed groups is occurring on an ad hoc basis (perhaps as private donations) rather than as a concerted aspect of foreign policy. Regardless, the flood of arms and weaponry from the messy (and on-going) confusion of Libya (financed in part by the GCC and the West) has certainly contributed to regional volatility. Described somewhat hyperbolically as a “new breeding ground for terrorism,”(18) Mali is in danger of becoming a much-maligned ‘green peril’ poster-child. The fear of instability spilling over into other areas of the Sahel is a very real one given the acute food shortages, mass movements of people, porous borders and the presence of armed groups. Moreover, it is here that the terrorist/rebel definition becomes expeditiously blurred by the murky motivations of their backers.

The food security paradox

At first sight, the concept of ‘food security’ appears anathema in the GCC. The air-conditioned malls that dominate the Gulf’s cities are crammed with numerous food outlets, and the GCC’s well-upholstered citizens rank amongst some of the world’s fattest – four GCC countries for example are in the ‘top 10’.(19) However, rising food prices, a reliance on food imports and a chronic scarcity of water means that the Gulf is gripped by a perception of threatened food security. Affordable food forms a fundamental part of any country’s social contract. This was particularly evident during the Arab Spring and many of the GCC countries turned to food subsidies to avert unrest. The Emir of Kuwait, for example, announced 14 months of free staple foods for nationals.(20) The Gulf’s search for sustainable production has led to highly publicised and controversial agro-investments in African countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia, countries that, paradoxically, receive food aid.(21)

These so-called ‘land grabs’ have generated considerable notoriety and division – on the one hand, proponents of agro-businesses (predominantly the GCC, India and China) point to the need for large-scale foreign investment and commercialisation in Africa in order to secure food for an ever-growing global population. On the other, critics suggest that such measures have grave social and environmental consequences, undermining local food security and creating severe suffering amongst rural populations, with Saudi Arabia’s planned leasing of Ethiopian land being a case in point.(22) However, as Verhoeven and Woertz argue, the reality is that remarkably “little actual investment seems to have transpired.”(23) Food (in)security looks set to continue dominating development discourses and media headlines. For GCC countries, sustainable, predictable and affordable food imports are seen as critical to their security. However, the domestic food security needs of African countries must be prioritised first if land grabs are not to open a Pandora’s Box of human suffering and environmental degradation that intensify pre-existing land conflicts and exacerbate latent unrest. The true challenge is for GCC agro-investment to respond sympathetically and intelligently to local African needs, in terms of both food and infrastructure.

A regional approach to countering piracy

As a food/goods importer and energy exporter, the Gulf is heavily reliant on safe supply routes. Maritime security, particularly around the Horn of Africa, which connects the Arabian Peninsula with Africa and Asia, is therefore of acute concern to GCC countries. Just as Qatar and Saudi Arabia are exerting their influence on Africa’s landmass, the UAE is making its presence felt in the maritime environment. At the 2nd UAE Counter-Piracy Conference held in Dubai at the end of June 2012, the importance of public-private partnerships was emphasised together with the need for a regional response to tackling maritime insecurity off Somalia, backed up by programmes that strengthen local communities.(24) Beyond the standard rhetoric, the UAE is undertaking a number of concrete projects. For example, as part of a joint French-UAE initiative, 31 Somali judges and prosecutors will travel to the UAE for training in holding piracy trials.(25) Furthermore, the UAE pledged US$ 1 million to help upgrade the capabilities of Somalia’s naval forces and coast guard,(26) and the formation of a joint GCC counter-piracy force to protect shipping lanes around the Horn of Africa has also been raised.(27) Developments such as these suggest the UAE’s desire to be seen as a key ally in the international fight against piracy. Indeed, the utilisation of the GCC’s existing insider knowledge of Somalia’s clan structure and long-standing social, economic and cultural links could potentially enhance not only current (generally Western dominated) counter-piracy activities in the region, but also be employed in countering other unlawful maritime activities such as trafficking and terrorism.

Conclusion

The role the GCC plays in Africa is one that defies simplistic explanations and assumptions. Although a policy of ‘double standards’ seems evident – for example, tangible external support for Islamists on the one hand, counter-piracy/terrorism cooperation, on the other. In essence, GCC’s influence in Africa is centred on its own (and the West’s) pragmatic security needs. Traditionally focused on the North African sphere, new conflicts – some the unforeseen consequences of the Arab Spring – have provided the GCC with opportunities to extend and consolidate their reach whether militarily (by continuing to arm Libyan rebels) or politically (by funding Islamist parties such as Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda)(28). However, it is the GCC’s ability and willingness to engage with non-state (and state) actors that are opposed to and actively seek to undermine Western and US hegemony in a variety of environments from Mali to Somalia that could potentially initiate conflict resolution through Gulf-led mediation.

This paper has attempted to illustrate the multi-dimensional nature of the GCC’s involvement in Africa. From championing regime change in North Africa, and supporting armed groups elsewhere, to playing a proactive role in counter-piracy measures and engaging in controversial land deals, the Gulf, like other powers, is ‘scrambling’ for Africa. The hybrid, powerful trio of trade, arms and religion remains just as potent and just as self-serving as it always has done. The problem, and it is an acute one, remains how best to channel these diverse forms of influence into ways that benefit the continent as a whole rather than just foreign and domestic elites.

Written by Alison Brettle ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Contact Alison Brettle through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Conflict and Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) This paper focuses mainly on those countries that constitute the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and United Arab Emirates (UAE).
(3) ‘Early humans’ route out of Africa ‘confirmed’’, BBC News, 2 November 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(4) Hasan, Y., 1984. “The Historical Roots of Afro-Arab Relations”, in Haseb, K. (ed), The Arabs and Africa, Croon Helm: London, for the Centre for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, Lebanon.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Mazrui, A., 1984. The Semitic Impact on Black Africa: Arab and Jewish Cultural Influences. Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 13, pp. 3-8.
(7) Akinsanya, A., ‘Afro-Arab Relations and North Africa’, A paper presented at the Regional Integration in Africa: Bridging the North-Sub-Saharan Divide Conference, Cairo, Egypt, 5-7 November 2010.
(8) Salem, O. and Shaheen, S., ‘GCC backs military strikes in Libya’, The National, 22 March 2011, http://www.thenational.ae.
(9) ‘Gaddafi forces ‘intercept arms from Qatar’’, Al Jazeera, 5 July 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(10) Bougha, R., ‘Gaddafi’s plot to kill Saudi king in Morocco revealed’, Arabstoday, 2 February 2012, http://www.arabstoday.net.
(11) Vela, J., ‘Exclusive: Arab states arm rebels as UN talks of Syrian civil war’, The Independent, 13 June 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk.
(12) ‘The rise of Qatar: The Pygmy with the punch of a giant’, The Economist, 5 November 2011, http://www.economist.com.
(13) Maestri, E., 2012. “The Gulf in the Southern Mediterranean”, in Tocci, N. et al (eds). Ideational and Material Power in the Mediterranean: The Role of Turkey and the Guld Cooperation Council, Mediterranean Paper Series 2012, The German Marshall Fund of the United States.
(14) Ibid.
(15) Maxwell, J., ‘What is Qatar doing in Libya?’, ThinkAfricaPress, 7 March 2012, http://thinkafricapress.com.
(16) ‘Re: Canard Enchaîné, Qatar in northern Mali and Algeria’, The Moor Next Door, 10 June 2012, http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com.
(17) ‘QRC unveils $500,000 plan to rescue Malian refugees’, Gulf Times, 27 June 2012, http://www.gulf-times.com.
(18) Tilford, R., ‘Qatar suspected of supporting al-Qaeda in Mali’, Examiner, 30 June 2012, http://www.examiner.com.
(19) Valdini, C., ‘Four GCC countries rank amongst world’s 10 fattest nations’, Arabian Business, 4 July 2012, http://www.arabianbusiness.com.
(20) Woertz, E., 2012. Arab Food, Water and the Big Gulf Landgrab that Wasn’t. The Brown Journal of World Affairs.
(21) ‘Ethiopia drought: UK pledges £38m in food aid’, BBC News, 3 July 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(22) ‘Ethiopia forces thousands off land – Human Rights Watch’, BBC News, 17 January 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(23) Verhoeven, H. and Woertz, E., ‘Mirage in the desert: The myth of Africa’s land grab’, CNN, 5 July 2012, http://edition.cnn.com.
(24) ‘Focus on Human Cost of Maritime Piracy and Need for Regional Solution’, The Maritime Executive, 28 June 2012, http://maritime-executive.com.
(25) ‘Somali judges learn to prosecute pirates’, Naftrade, 9 July 2012, http://www.naftrade.com.
(26) Sambidge, A., ‘UAE pledges $1m to Somali piracy battle’, ArabianBusiness.com, 29 June 2012, http://www.arabianbusiness.com.
(27) Mustafa, A., ‘UAE Navy chief seeks GCC alliance on piracy’, The National, 5 July 2012, http://www.thenational.ae.
(28) Beaumont, P., ‘How Qatar is taking on the world’, The Guardian, 7 July 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk.