African insurgencies are unique in that they traditionally follow many different ideological, political and ethnic trends. In order to achieve success in Africa, insurgent groups must meet a variety of political, social and material requirements. An insurgency in its most basic form is any strategy directed at obtaining political objectives and utilised by a weaker non-ruling group within a state.⁽²⁾ This CAI paper describes the benefits of foreign assistance in conducting a successful African insurgency.

External means for success

The condition and needs of each insurgency vary with the geopolitical landscape in which the movement struggles. All insurgencies face the challenge of offsetting the state’s superior material, military and political strength. In order to succeed, the weaker insurgency must rely on intangible assets while developing its strength.⁽³⁾ The insurgency’s weakness in assets forces it to rely on the political willingness of the insurgents to sacrifice themselves for the cause and to endure protracted irregular warfare.⁽⁴⁾ The insurgent’s immediate victory can simply be defined as winning by surviving.⁽⁵⁾ Yet, the long term success of an insurgency is often contingent upon its ability to court external assistance.⁽⁶⁾

The insurgency’s real and perceived strength against the state is dramatically redefined by the assistance of an external state. Insurgencies often act as a means of proxy warfare between countries where direct conflict is considered too dangerous or undesirable.⁽⁷⁾ The conflict may act to serve the interest of a foreign government in many ways but most often in securing future resources or regional alliances.⁽⁸⁾ The insurgency benefits from foreign assistance in the form of financial resources, political support, military material/training, and direct military support.

The value of external assistance in African insurgencies cannot be overstated. Foreign assistance can cause a powerful shift in the status quo between insurgent-government forces. The secession of South Sudan from Sudan was successful due to a superior insurgent strategy and the ability to garner powerful foreign support. The United States (US) contributed over US$ 20 million in surplus military equipment to South Sudan while condemning the Sudanese Government.⁽⁹⁾ This combination of military support and political legitimacy helped to create South Sudan. The value of foreign assistance is also clearly evident in the Congo. The direct military support from Rwanda and Uganda helped Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a relatively weak insurgent leader, to quickly overthrow the Mobutu regime and become president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1997.⁽¹⁰⁾ Yet, when President Kabila stopped supporting the needs of Rwanda and Uganda, the two countries withdrew assistance and attempted to depose the now non-compliant president.⁽¹¹⁾ President Kabila retained power only by receiving foreign intervention from Zimbabwe and Angola.⁽¹²⁾ A counter example is the recent decrease in the March 23 Movement’s ability to operate in the DRC and its current negotiation attempts for a ceasefire.⁽¹³⁾ This has occurred under increased foreign pressure stopping military aid to Rwanda and any other state suspected of supporting the M23 insurgency.⁽¹⁴⁾ This illustrates that often an insurgency’s strength can be artificially bolstered by a foreign state and that dependency on the assistance can have dramatic repercussions if removed.

Insurgencies must attempt to be self-reliant by generating funds in order to sustain their movements. An insurgency that cannot fund its operations becomes subject to the funding state’s geopolitical needs, which may shift at any moment causing disaster for the insurgency.⁽¹⁵⁾ The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) headed by Dr. Jonas Savimbi was able to successfully fund its activities by controlling diamond mining in Angola and smuggling the diamonds out. A very conservative estimate is that UNITA produced on average US$ 80-150 million per year from its mining interests and other illegal activities.⁽¹⁶⁾ Yet, from 1992-1993 De Beers, a large South African diamond corporation, purchased around US$ 500-800 million in diamonds from UNITA.⁽¹⁷⁾ This increased revenue had a powerful effect on Angola’s civil war by allowing UNITA to seize and control more than half of Angola’s national territory by the end of 1993.⁽¹⁸⁾ While UNITA may not have won Angola’s civil war it did succeed in gaining political power by negotiating a peace accord that placed UNITA leaders in prominent government positions and assimilating its insurgents into the regular state army.⁽¹⁹⁾

An insurgency can utilise foreign intervention to succeed in gaining its political aspirations without obtaining a strategic military victory over the state. The increased prevalence of intervention forces in African conflicts have demonstrated that an insurgency can benefit from peace missions by gaining political power within the state government. This is accomplished by the United Nations and African Union’s requirement for inclusive conflict resolution.⁽²⁰⁾ As such, a relatively weak non-ruling party can succeed in obtaining national political status and becoming legitimatised without having to militarily overthrow the state. The Burundi Civil War demonstrated this when at its conclusion in 2005 the former Chairman of the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), a Hutu insurgent group, was elected president and signed a peace deal allowing for the inclusion of Hutu insurgents into the Tutsi-dominated government and Burundi National Army.⁽²¹⁾

Foreign assistance can also come in the form of providing safe havens for insurgent groups. This can be manifested in the foreign state allowing or being apathetic to insurgent groups crossing their international borders or remaining inside the country. The availability of sanctuaries for an insurgency is equally as important as funding in sustaining an insurgent movement. The foreign sanctuaries offer a staging area for attacks, a base for training and recruitment, and a safe haven for leadership and troops to rest.⁽²²⁾ The safe foreign country allows the insurgents to better control the pace of the insurgency, limit losses and dictate the engagements while being able to remain unreachable by the conventional units of the enemy state.⁽²³⁾ The lack of a safe frontline haven on the other hand places insurgent units at risk of attack and forces constant manoeuvring, which is not conducive to resting troops or organising massed offensives.

The use of foreign frontline sanctuaries has played a strategic role in supporting a number of insurgent groups. The African National Congress (ANC) militant wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), utilised Mozambique as a training and staging area for its attacks on the South African Government and its evasion of the highly trained South African security forces.⁽²⁴⁾ In recent times, Sudanese rebel groups have successfully navigated the border regions of Sudan, frequently crossing into neighbouring South Sudan to evade government forces.

Concluding remarks

Insurgencies require many human and material factors in order to succeed. The operational strategy, available resources and geopolitical and physical terrain all heavily affect the outcome of the insurgency. Paramount to all other requirements, external assistance must be considered as the primary determining factor for the overall success. The benefits of foreign financial, political and military assistance offer insurgencies a route to belie their own deficits. Ultimately, foreign assistance shifts the power ratio in favour of the insurgent and leads to successful insurgencies more than any other factor.

Written by Ryan M. Barnett (1)

NOTES:

(1) Ryan Barnett is a Research Associate with CAI. Contact Ryan through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Conflict & Terrorism unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) Metz, S. and Millen, R., 2004. Insurgency and counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Re-conceptualizing threat and response. Strategic Studies Institute.
(3) Record, J., 2006. External assistance: Enabler of insurgent success. Parameters, 36(3), pp. 36-49.
(4) Mack, A., 1975. Why big nations lose small wars: The politic of asymmetric conflict. World Politics, 27, pp. 175-200.
(5) Record, J., 2006. External assistance: enabler of insurgent success. Parameters, 36(3), pp. 36-49.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Van Der Spuy, C., ‘Lessons learned from African insurgencies: Implications for South African army intelligence’, SA Army Intelligence Formation, August 2012.
(8) Arreguin-Toft, I., 2005. How the weak win wars: a theory of asymmetric conflict. Cambridge University Press: New York.
(9) Hamilton, R., ‘U.S. played key role in Southern Sudan's long journey to independence’, The Atlantic, 9 July 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com.
(10) Byman, D., et al., ‘Trends in outside support for insurgent movements’, Office of Transnaitonal Issue,s National Security Research Division (NSRD), http://www.rand.org.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Rono, M., ‘M23's decline raises hopes of DR Congo peace’, BBC, 4 November 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(14) Smith, D., ‘US blocks military aid to Rwanda over alleged backing of M23 child soldiers’, The Atlantic, 5 October 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com.
(15) Byman, D., et al., ‘Trends in outside support for insurgent movements’, Office of Transnaitonal Issue,s National Security Research Division (NSRD), http://www.rand.org.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Lewis, L., ‘Angola diamond mining and war’, Trade and Environment Database, 14 June 1997, http://www1.american.edu.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Byman, D., et al., ‘Trends in outside support for insurgent movements’, Office of Transnaitonal Issue,s National Security Research Division (NSRD), http://www.rand.org.
(20) Jordaan, E. and Baker, D., 2010. South Africa and contemporary counter-insurgency. Juta Academic: Westminster, USA.
(21) ‘Burundi Civil War’, Global Security, 4 November 2013, http://www.globalsecurity.org.
(22) Byman, D., et al., ‘Trends in outside support for insurgent movements’, Office of Transnaitonal Issue,s National Security Research Division (NSRD), http://www.rand.org.
(23) Ibid.
(24) Ibid.