In December 2009, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 1907 (2009), imposing an arms embargo and targeted sanctions on Eritrea.⁽²⁾ This was the latest and most forceful attempt by the international community to induce the cooperation of an increasingly intransigent regime. In particular, the UNSC accused Eritrea of exacerbating instability in Somalia, by funding radical insurgent groups, and of failing to withdraw its forces after a border clash with Djibouti in 2008.⁽³⁾ These actions are indicative of recent trends. In the decade following the violent border war against Ethiopia (1998-2000), Eritrea has become one of the world’s most isolated states. Its self-imposed marginalisation is the product of an entrenched feeling of victimisation,⁽⁴⁾ but is also attributable to the longstanding rivalry with Ethiopia and the leadership’s need to justify its enormous military expenditures.⁽⁵⁾ These factors have contributed to Eritrea’s belligerent foreign policy in what was already a volatile region.

It is unquestionable that the international community should take active steps to deter Eritrea from behaving as a spoiler. Nonetheless, the ideal course of action is still debated. On one hand, critics argue that the penalties included in resolution 1907 could prove ineffective and potentially counterproductive.⁽⁶⁾ On the other hand, in the 14 months since the resolution came into force, the Eritrean leadership has taken reconciliatory measures and expressed its willingness to cooperate.⁽⁷⁾ This is partly attributable to the targeted nature of the sanctions, which threaten high-profile individuals. Yet credit should also be extended to new mediators, such as Turkey and Qatar, which enjoy greater legitimacy in Asmara.⁽⁸⁾ It is still too early to definitively conclude that Eritrea is mending its ways: President Issayas Afewerki is prone to sudden and frequent policy reversals.⁽⁹⁾ But, whatever happens, resolution 1907 has succeeded in opening up a space for dialogue that did not previously exist.

An isolated spoiler

The roots of Eritrea’s present foreign policy can be found in the war for independence, which lasted from 1961 to 1991. In this long and imbalanced conflict, a spirit of “self-sacrifice for the greater good” motivated Eritrean separatists to endure untold deprivations in order to fend off Ethiopia’s overwhelming military might.⁽¹⁰⁾ Upon independence in 1993, the shared experience of the “heroic struggle” was instrumental in forging national solidarity.⁽¹¹⁾ The victory also ensured the population’s long-term allegiance to Afewerki, leader of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF).

Initially, Eritrea’s new president was internationally recognised as a model for a new generation of African leaders.⁽¹²⁾ This image would not last long. In 1998, a border dispute with Ethiopia (triggered by Eritrean incursions)⁽¹³⁾ rapidly degenerated into a violent war that would last for two years, claiming the lives of 70,000-120,000 soldiers on both sides.⁽¹⁴⁾ Staring in the face of an Ethiopian victory, Afewerki agreed to the peace terms proposed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).⁽¹⁵⁾ The parties agreed to allow a United Nations (UN) Boundary Commission to adjudicate, accepting that its rulings would be “final and binding.”⁽¹⁶⁾ In 2002, the Commission declared that the village of Badme, the focus of the quarrel, would belong to Eritrea.⁽¹⁷⁾ Even though Ethiopia was compensated with some territory, Badme carried enormous symbolic value due to the thousands of lives lost to capture it.⁽¹⁸⁾ Consequently, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi dismissed the Commission’s decision as “unacceptable.”⁽¹⁹⁾ The fact that the international community never intervened to enforce the ruling incensed the Eritrean leadership, and fuelled suspicions that the UN and the newly formed African Union (AU) were biased towards Ethiopia.⁽²⁰⁾

This “betrayal” inflicted by the world upon a small fledgling nation greatly enhanced the leadership’s feeling of victimisation.⁽²¹⁾ It also provided a justification for increasing military spending and conducting belligerent actions in the region: the message was that Eritrea would safeguard its own survival. Since it could not attack Ethiopia directly, the regime began funding several insurgent groups opposed to the Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia.⁽²²⁾

Although the rivalry with Ethiopia continues to frame the regime’s foreign policy and covert operations, this is only part of the picture: Eritrea’s overtly aggressive acts in the region should be understood through a domestic lens. To entrench his hold over the country, Afewerki has gradually consolidated his power by strengthening the army and implementing increasingly repressive measures. With 200,000 regular soldiers and 250,000 conscripts, tiny Eritrea is the world’s most militarised country.⁽²³⁾ Military service, for an indeterminate period of time, is mandatory for all citizens.⁽²⁴⁾ Most of Eritrea’s meagre resources are diverted towards this extensive defence machinery at the expense of social services.⁽²⁵⁾ In the process, Eritrea has become a police state: movements between cities are monitored closely and borders are heavily patrolled by troops with ‘shoot-to-kill’ orders.⁽²⁶⁾

The political sphere has also been restricted over time: Afewerki used the ever-present Ethiopian threat as a pretext to postpone elections indefinitely and to stifle political opposition.⁽²⁷⁾ Eritrea is the worst place in the world to be a journalist, as there is no privately-owned media.⁽²⁸⁾ At the same time, the regime has heavily regulated foreign investment and humanitarian assistance to prevent “Western interference”⁽²⁹⁾ and to ensure food self-sufficiency.⁽³⁰⁾ Due to these autarchic policies and the frequent droughts that plague the country, up to 66% of the population is believed to be undernourished.⁽³¹⁾

Nearly two decades after independence, a permanent state of emergency endures: Afewerki continues to demand unwavering discipline and self-sacrifice from his people in name of the “struggle”. In order to justify the hardships and to preserve its own power, the regime relies upon a continuous climate of low-level hostility.⁽³²⁾ If plausible threats do not exist, they must be constructed, leading to aggressive acts like the 2008 border conflict with Djibouti. This combination of a bellicose foreign policy and authoritarian domestic practices has turned Eritrea into a pariah state.

Resolution 1907

The Eritrean regime views the TFG as an Ethiopian proxy and, consequently, has refused to recognise its legitimacy.⁽³³⁾ The Monitoring Group on Somalia (SMG), an independent group of experts, has traced Eritrean support for opposition to the TFG as far back as 2006.⁽³⁴⁾ Over the years, Eritrea was directly involved in creating the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) and providing military, political, financial, and diplomatic support to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Hizbul Islam, and al-Shabaab.⁽³⁵⁾ Eritrea has also funded armed groups active in Ethiopia, such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).⁽³⁶⁾ While Afewerki’s regime routinely denies these covert operations, there has been overwhelming evidence linking Asmara directly to the insurgent groups.⁽³⁷⁾

As a result of its destabilising role in Somalia and the wider region, Eritrea has faced mounting international pressure. In May 2009, the AU, backed by members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), urged the UNSC to punish Eritrea’s behaviour by imposing sanctions.⁽³⁸⁾ This was the first time that the continental body invoked such measures against a member state.⁽³⁹⁾ Eritrea suspended its membership in retaliation, thus further isolating itself.⁽⁴⁰⁾ In December 2009, the UNSC passed resolution 1907 (2009), thereby imposing a two-way arms embargo (banning sales to and from Eritrea) and empowering the Council to inflict asset freezes and travel restrictions upon designated individuals.⁽⁴¹⁾ The resolution also pressed Eritrea to “cease all efforts to destabilise or overthrow” the TFG, and to immediately withdraw its troops from disputed territories along the border with Djibouti.⁽⁴²⁾

The case for targeted sanctions

Although it was generally accepted that Eritrea’s actions had to be punished, experts disagreed about whether sanctions would be the best tool to induce compliance in this particular case. Citing failures in North Korea and Myanmar, critics dismissed sanctions as a counterproductive “go-to foreign policy gadget.”⁽⁴³⁾ UN diplomats opposed to the resolution expressed fears that it would exacerbate Afewerki’s sense of isolation and reinforce his ties to insurgents and other pariah states.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Moreover, the imposition of the arms embargo was met with scepticism: after all, the decade-long embargo on Somalia has yielded few results.⁽⁴⁵⁾

These are valid criticisms. Admittedly, the arms embargo is likely to prove largely symbolic unless effective enforcement measures are brought to bear upon Eritrea and its allies, which include Sudan and Iran. Yet targeted measures that affect individuals, such as travel bans and asset freezes, have the potential to induce greater cooperation from the regime. Even though there are currently no Eritreans designated in the list maintained by the UN Sanctions Committee on Somalia and Eritrea,⁽⁴⁶⁾ high-profile figures in Afewerki’s regime are threatened. As early as mid-2009, the SMG recommended the designations of Colonel Te’ame Goitom, Eritrea’s intelligence chief, Yemane Gebreab, the Head of Political Affairs and a close advisor to the President, and Public Information Minister Ali Abdu Ahmed.⁽⁴⁷⁾ The recently expanded Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (SEMG) is currently investigating Eritrea’s compliance with resolution 1907,⁽⁴⁸⁾ and their report due in mid-2011 could confirm the involvement of these and other senior figures.

While the ultimate designation of Eritrean Government officials is unlikely due to the power politics of the UNSC,⁽⁴⁹⁾ it appears that the threat of possible penalties has induced a more reconciliatory Eritrean foreign policy. The current message from Asmara is that Afewerki is “willing to give diplomacy a chance.”⁽⁵⁰⁾ This was recognised by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in a June 2010 report, where he praised Eritrea for its “recent constructive engagement with its neighbours and the international community.”⁽⁵¹⁾ In January 2011, Eritrea ended its self-imposed exile from the AU and re-opened its mission in Addis Ababa.⁽⁵²⁾

The regime’s actions transcend rhetoric: there has been increased (albeit tentative) compliance with the terms of resolution 1907. In its 2010 report, only three months after the resolution came into force, the SMG observed that Eritrea had scaled down military support to al-Shabaab.⁽⁵³⁾ Moreover, Eritrea allowed a visit from the UN Sanctions Committee to Asmara, participated in the International Contact Group Conference on Somalia (Istanbul Conference), and engaged in regional mediation efforts concerning its border dispute with Djibouti.⁽⁵⁴⁾ Clearly, these actions need to be substantiated by verifiable and consistent compliance on the ground. However, there are indications that even Eritrea’s secluded leadership is susceptible to potential material restrictions and public shaming.

Notwithstanding these encouraging results, sanctions are only part of the picture. Eritrea’s apparent re-engagement is also attributable to the entry of two new mediators upon the scene: Turkey and Qatar. Both countries have expanded their presence in their “wider neighbourhood,” investing considerable resources to facilitate dialogue among antagonists. They command greater legitimacy than Western “imperialists” in the region, and have so far succeeded where many others failed. Turkey has taken an active role in Somalia, and its diplomatic pressure was instrumental in ensuring Eritrea’s participation at the Istanbul Conference.⁽⁵⁵⁾ Qatar has firmly established itself as a peacemaker in the region, hosting the ongoing Darfur peace negotiations and brokering a rebel-Government truce in Yemen in 2008.⁽⁵⁶⁾ In 2010, both Djibouti and Eritrea agreed to its arbitration of their border dispute, and to the deployment of Qatari peacekeepers along the contested border.⁽⁵⁷⁾

Concluding remarks

It is still too early to confirm the effectiveness of resolution 1907, or to definitively conclude that Eritrea will become a diligent participant in regional peace-building efforts. In fact, the odds are against this outcome. Nonetheless, recent events suggest that targeted sanctions and constructive engagement by the international community have shifted the incentives of Eritrea’s leaders. Most importantly, the threat of sanctions has succeeded in creating an unexpected opportunity for constructive dialogue.

Whatever the outcome of this process, long-term peace and stability in the region will still be contingent upon a credible rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. After all, Eritrea has not been the sole spoiler in the region: Ethiopia is also responsible for projecting its national security imperatives upon Somalia.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Normalisation of relations will remain a distant possibility without regime change in either Addis Ababa or Asmara, due to the mutual distrust of the current leaders,⁽⁵⁹⁾ but Eritrea’s compliance with resolution 1907 and its formal recognition of the TFG could open the door to the possibility of reconciliation. In time, this could pave the way for future agreements to resolve longstanding issues, such as ownership over Badme and the flow of Ethiopian goods through Eritrean ports.

By mid-2011, investigations by independent groups and the UN will provide a clearer picture of Eritrea’s compliance with the sanctions, and of the leadership’s true intentions. Afewerki is now at a crossroads: he can steer his country towards greater integration with the world, or push it further into the periphery. Yet the road taken by Eritrea will also depend upon the diplomatic skill of third-party mediators. Discussions are likely to be protracted, difficult, and frustrating, but it is vital for the international community to remain actively engaged.⁽⁶⁰⁾ The costs of failure are elevated: this small state has already demonstrated that it can have a disproportionate impact in destabilising the region.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Edoardo Collevecchio through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Conflict and Terrorism Unit (conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) ‘Press release: Security Council imposes sanctions on Eritrea’, UN Department of Public Information, 23 December 2009, http://www.un.org.
(3) Ibid.
(4) ‘Sanctions on Eritrea: Latest chapter in a long history of injustice’, E-Smart, 24 December 2009, http://eritrean-smart.org.
(5) Rawlence, B., ‘Eritrea: slender land, giant prison’, Human Rights Watch, 8 May 2009, http://www.hrw.org.
(6) McLure, J., ‘Don’t sanction dictators’, Foreign Policy, 10 July 2009, http://experts.foreignpolicy.com.
(7) ‘Praising Eritrea’s engagement with neighbours, Ban urges compliance’, UN News Centre, 28 June 2010, http://www.un.org.
(8) ‘Qatar talks help Asmara in from cold’, Oxford Analytica, 4 June 2010, http://www.oxan.com.
(9) ‘Opposing Issayas’, Africa Confidential, 14 May 2010, http://www.africa-confidential.com.
(10) Wrong, M., 2005. I didn’t do it for you. London: Harper Perennial.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) ‘Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission’, UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, 13 April 2002, http://www.un.org.
(14) ‘Armed Conflicts Report: Ethiopia-Eritrea’, Ploughshares, February 2002, http://www.ploughshares.ca.
(15) Wrong, M., 2005. I didn’t do it for you. London: Harper Perennial.
(16) ‘Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: Statement by the Commission’, Permanent Court of Arbitration, 27 November 2006, http://www.pca-cpa.org.
(17) ‘Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission’, UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, 13 April 2002, http://www.un.org.
(18) ‘Ethiopia’s war strategy’, BBC News, 19 May 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(19) Wrong, M., 2005. I didn’t do it for you. London: Harper Perennial.
(20) ‘Eritrea: the siege state’, International Crisis Group, 21 September 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org.
(21) ‘Sanctions on Eritrea: Latest chapter in a long history of injustice’, E-Smart, 24 December 2009, http://eritrean-smart.org.
(22) ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008) (S/2010/91)’, UN Security Council, 10 March 2010, http://www.reliefweb.int.
(23) ‘Dangers and dilemmas in the Horn of Africa’, Africa Confidential, 11 September 2009, http://www.africa-confidential.com.
(24) Rawlence, B., ‘Eritrea: Slender land, giant prison’, Human Rights Watch, 8 May 2009, http://www.hrw.org.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Myers, N., ‘Africa’s North Korea’, Foreign Policy, July/August 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(27) Rawlence, B., ‘Eritrea: Slender land, giant prison’, Human Rights Watch, 8 May 2009, http://www.hrw.org.
(28) ‘Eritrea’, Reporters without Borders, 16 April 2009, http://en.rsf.org.
(29) Rawlence, B., ‘Eritrea: Slender land, giant prison’, Human Rights Watch, 8 May 2009, http://www.hrw.org.
(30) Harter, P., ‘Eritrea’s controversial push to feed itself’, BBC News, 24 December 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(31) Ibid.
(32) Rawlence, B., ‘Eritrea: Slender land, giant prison’, Human Rights Watch, 8 May 2009, http://www.hrw.org.
(33) ‘Dangers and dilemmas in the Horn of Africa’, Africa Confidential, 11 September 2009, http://www.africa-confidential.com.
(34) ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008) (S/2010/91)’, UN Security Council, 10 March 2010, http://www.reliefweb.int.
(35) Ibid.
(36) Ibid.
(37) ‘Blaming the USA’, Africa Confidential, 14 May 2010, http://www.africa-confidential.com.
(38) ‘AU calls for sanctions on Eritrea’, BBC News, 23 May 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk
(39) Worsnip, P., ‘UN Council set to slap sanctions on Eritrea’, Reuters News Agency, 23 December 2009, http://www.reuters.com.
(40) ‘The African Union: Short of cash and teeth’, The Economist, 27 January 2011, http://www.economist.com.
(41) Worsnip, P., ‘UN Council set to slap sanctions on Eritrea’, Reuters News Agency, 23 December 2009, http://www.reuters.com.
(42) ‘Resolution 1907 (2009): Peace and security in Africa’, UN Security Council, 23 December 2009, http://www.un.org.
(43) McLure, J., ‘Don’t sanction dictators’, Foreign Policy, 10 July 2009, http://experts.foreignpolicy.com.
(44) ‘Target Asmara’, Africa Confidential, 5 March 2010, http://www.africa-confidential.com.
(45) McLure, J., ‘Don’t sanction dictators’, Foreign Policy, 10 July 2009, http://experts.foreignpolicy.com.
(46) ‘Somalia/Eritrea: Updated list of individuals and entities’, UN Security Council, 27 September 2010, http://www.un.org.
(47) ‘Target Asmara’, Africa Confidential, 5 March 2010, http://www.africa-confidential.com.
(48) ‘Resolution 1916 (2010)’, UN Security Council, 19 March 2010, http://www.un.org.
(49) ‘Opposing Issayas’, Africa Confidential, 14 May 2010, http://www.africa-confidential.com.
(50) Ibid.
(51) ‘Praising Eritrea’s engagement with neighbours, Ban urges compliance’, UN News Centre, 28 June 2010, http://www.un.org.
(52) ‘Eritrea reopens African Union mission’, Voice of America, 19 January 2011, http://www.voanews.com.
(53) ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008) (S/2010/91)’, UN Security Council, 10 March 2010, http://www.reliefweb.int.
(54) ‘Praising Eritrea’s engagement with neighbours, Ban urges compliance’, UN News Centre, 28 June 2010, http://www.un.org.
(55) ‘Turkey holds tripartite meeting with Somalia, Eritrea’, World Bulletin, 23 May 2010, http://www.worldbulletin.net.
(56) ‘Qatar talks help Asmara in from cold’, Oxford Analytica, 4 June 2010, http://www.oxan.com.
(57) Ibid.
(58) ‘Eritrea: the siege state’, International Crisis Group, 21 September 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org.
(59) ‘Ethiopia’s war strategy’, BBC News, 19 May 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(60) ‘Eritrea: the siege state’, International Crisis Group, 21 September 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org.

Written by Edoardo Collevecchio ⁽¹⁾