As the Arab Spring awaits the outcomes of the elections in Egypt and the unrest in Syria, the world media has once again turned its attention toward Iran’s controversial nuclear ambitions. As the slowly recovering global economy is holding its breath in fear of a surge in oil prices in the event of the disruption of oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, little attention is being given to sub-Saharan Africa. However, with Muammar Gadhafi off the throne in Libya after 41 years in power, President José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola and President Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea have taken over as the current longest serving African leaders with their more than 32 years in power.⁽²⁾

Fuelled by record-high prices of natural resources and widespread Chinese investments, sub-Saharan countries such as Angola, Ghana and Equatorial Guinea seem to have escaped many of the consequences of the credit crises threatening to curb economic growth in the United States and Europe. Much of Africa’s growth has been fuelled by the steady increase of global commodity prices, most notably that of crude oil. However, as we enter 2012, one can observe signs of unrest in important oil-producing countries such as Nigeria and Angola.

This CAI paper discusses whether the on-going unrest and political and social tensions in countries such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola can force their leaders to introduce a fairer distribution of wealth, and whether it has the potential to spark a sub-Saharan Spring. Particular attention is given to the role of commodities in funding public finance as well as in fuelling an emerging public discontent.

Emerging public discontent

In Nigeria, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) 6th largest and Africa’s top producer of crude oil,⁽³⁾ unrest is already taking its toll. Despite its vast oil resources, more than half of its population lives in poverty. As in many African countries, the oil revenues have been shared by few people, which, in 2004, fuelled the start of an uprising in the Niger Delta in which activists began a violent campaign against the country’s oil infrastructure. Ironically, despite its status as Africa’s largest producer, Nigeria has a limited refining capacity and is, therefore, reliant on imported fuel.⁽⁴⁾ Now, the strikes and civil unrest, which occurred in response to the removal of Nigeria’s long-standing fuel subsidy on 1 January 2012, have already cost Nigeria billions of dollars in lost revenues, while its politicians fear a strike in the oil industry, a sector which accounts for 80% of Nigeria’s state revenues.⁽⁵⁾

The decision by the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) to end fuel subsidies was therefore not well received by the public. Although the Government has pointed out that cutting the fuel subsidies will raise close to US$ 8 billion a year for funds earmarked for urgently needed investment in infrastructure,⁽⁶⁾ the withdrawal has doubled the pump price of fuel. This has made fuel an unaffordable commodity for an increasing share of the population, inspiring thousands of people to take part in demonstrations and strike action. As the comprehensive industrial action has led to violent clashes between police forces and protesters, causing several causalities, Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan announced an immediate drop in the cost of fuel of around 30%.⁽⁷⁾ It is, however, still uncertain whether this will be sufficient to curb the public discontent. The political crisis is further complicated by on-going sectarian violence between religious groups. To date, Nigerian officials have estimated that more than 90,000 people are on the move because of inter-religious violence and clashes between Islamic groups and the country’s Christians.⁽⁸⁾ As the Islamic extremist group, Boko Haram, steps up its violent campaign, there are certainly dark skies on the horizon for Nigeria’s politicians.

Tensions have also been visible in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the 8 December re-election of President Kabila despite major and widespread irregularities and being described by observers from the European Union and the Carter Centre as “lacking credibility,” was followed by unrest.⁽⁹⁾ Since then, more than 20 people have been killed by the security forces after opposition leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, declared himself president.⁽¹⁰⁾ Despite the DRC having some of the world’s largest deposits of minerals such as tin and coltan, indispensable in production of electronics such as computers and cell phones,⁽¹¹⁾ decades of conflict and corruption have led the country into a daunting struggle to cope with illegal mining carried out by various criminal groups. According to the United Nations (UN), coltan has been essential to financing the civil war (1998-2003), and despite the DRC hosting the UN’s largest peacekeeping mission, army and militia violence is still prevalent in the eastern part of the country.⁽¹²⁾ A tightening of America’s trade rules has led to a virtual stand-still in the highly profitable mining industry in the region. According to The Economist, the collapsing economy in this traditionally volatile part of the country is threatening to contribute to a revival of the militia groups which are reported to have been responsible for an uprising costing 5 million lives in the last 15 years.⁽¹³⁾

Angola, Africa’s second largest oil producer (17th in the world),⁽¹⁴⁾ is another country striving to cope with the legacy of its 27-year old civil war that ended in 2002. Despite vast oil resources, the country is one of the world’s poorest, with the majority of the population living on US$1 a day.⁽¹⁵⁾ Although President Jose Eduardo dos Santos did, through his 2008 landslide election victory, establish himself as one of the longest serving leaders in the world, his reforms to enhance presidential powers has not only angeredhe main opposition and attracted fierce criticism from international watchdog group, Human Rights Watch, among others.⁽¹⁶⁾ In addition to poverty and human rights violations, a decade-long separatist conflict simmers in the region of Cabinda, home to most of the country’s oil wealth. Facing a Parliamentary election in late 2012, Angola’s rulers are under fierce pressure to show progress and create hope for a better future for a heavily armed population.

The dilemma of increasing commodity prices

Due to the continuous and stable high demand for oil and minerals such as bauxite, uranium, gold, platinum, cobalt, diamonds, chromium, manganese, coal, and phosphates, many sub-Saharan African countries have enjoyed positive growth rates in recent years and find themselves in a favourable international position as we enter 2012. However, despite economic growth, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) model using country weights in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), shows that the poverty level in sub-Saharan Africa remains close to 50%.⁽¹⁷⁾

Even though the sub-Saharan states have benefitted from increasing demand for commodities and Chinese investments in the region, poverty remains a hindrance for social development. Although such economic reforms as cutting back on costly subsidies is sound economic practice in the long run, as it encourages investment in domestic production, the political costs might prove higher than expected. According to the World Bank, if food prices continue to rise at their current level, they will reach the 2008 peak.⁽¹⁸⁾ In countries where more than half of the population lives on less than US$2 a day, this will create a difficult situation for the poorest and potentially push millions of others into poverty. Although high prices are boosting growth of commodity exporters, side effects following the increasing costs of food and fuel in particular, have the potential for creating a tough dilemma for many Africa leaders.

Unlike the states in North Africa, a large number of sub-Saharan African countries did not reach an end to their post-colonial civil wars until recent decades. With the horrors of war still fresh in the minds of many, the threshold for supporting full scale military uprisings, such as that witnessed in Libya, appears somehow unrealistic. However, as seen in the Arab Spring, revolutionary ideas can spread quickly between diverse countries and societies, making the art of political and social forecasting virtually impossible. Moreover, with the perceived illegitimacy of the colonial inherited borders of Africa, the foundation for spill-over effects constitutes an apparent risk in sub-Saharan Africa, making political uncertainty and unrest increasingly regional, rather than solely national, issues.

Although violent clashes and elements of domestic instability have not scared away Chinese and Western companies from seeking access to the precious minerals found in African mines, increased criticism has been raised against the highly beneficial long-term leases of extraction rights awarded to foreign private and public companies. This has been particularly evident in Zambia, where analysts explain the change of Government in September 2011 as an evident expression of scepticism and discontent with the Chinese involvement in the region.⁽¹⁹⁾ Particularly for China, a country highly dependent on stable supplies of commodities to continue its growth, instability beyond the current level could not only create trouble for its industrial production, but also contribute to further driving up prices on the global market.

Concluding remarks

In the Arab Spring, popular access to modern technology, most notably mobile phones and social media, was held as a key factor for the revolutions’ successes. As economic growth enables more people to have access to independent information and new technologies of communication become increasingly available in the South, the general population will be increasingly better informed about what is taking place both on the continent as well as on a global scale. Despite this, rising prices of food and commodities are making it increasingly challenging for many to improve their personal situation, particularly as jobs remain scarce and few benefit from the wealth of their country’s natural resources.⁽²⁰⁾

So far, we have only seen sporadic outbreaks of violence and unrest, however, as the general public gains access to an increasing amount of information, there are likely to be calls for enhanced accountability and democratic reforms. Moreover, as decades of what appears to be institutionalised corruption have already discredited the legitimacy of many rulers, the question is raised: Will the leaders of sub-Saharan Africa be able to provide their populations a larger and fairer share of the revenues of their countries’ natural resources, or will we see a return of the 2008 Food Crisis which could spark a Sub Saharan Spring?

Notes
(1) Contact Anders Brudevoll through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Africa Watch Unit (africawatch@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) August, O., ‘A sub-Saharan spring? - North Africa’s spirit of protest will spread south’, The Economist, 17 November 2011, http://www.economist.com.
(3) Bala-Gbogbo, E., ‘OPEC May Reassess Oil Demand After Japan Quake, Nigeria Says’, Bloomberg, 16 March 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com
(4) ‘Nigeria fuel prices: Talks fail to reach agreement’, BBC Africa, 14 January 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(5) Bala-Gbogbo, E., ‘Nigeria’s oil revenue rose 46% to $59 billion in 2010 on Improved Security’, Bloomberg, 14 April 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com.
(6) Trembath, B., ‘Nigeria oil union threatens the government’, ABC News, 13 January 2012, http://www.abc.net.
(7) ‘Strike-hit Nigeria 'to drop price of petrol'’, BBC Africa, 16 January 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(8) ‘Nigeria Boko Haram clashes: 'Thousands flee Damaturu', BBC Africa, 28 December 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(9) ‘Observers question DRC election credibility’, Al Jazeera, 11 December 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com.
(10) International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org.
(11) Vesperini, H., ‘Congo’s coltan rush’, BBC News, 1 August 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk
(12) ‘Democratic Republic of Congo profile’, BBC, 10 January 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(13) McVeigh, T., ‘Congo's militias mobilising again, leading peace activist warns’, The Guardian, 29 October 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(14) CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov.
(15) ‘Angola profile’, BBC, 19 July 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(16) Ibid.
(17) ‘Global Economic Trends’, Economy Watch, 30 June 2011, http://www.economywatch.com.
(18) World Bank Food Price Watch, http://www.worldbank.org.
(19) French, H., ‘In Africa, an Election Reveals Skepticism of Chinese Involvement’, The Atlantic, 29 September 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com.
(20) ‘A sub-Saharan spring? - North Africa’s spirit of protest will spread south’, The Economist, 17 November 2011, http://www.economist.com.

Written by Anders Brudevoll ⁽¹⁾