On 13 April 2011, BRIC officially became known as BRICS, when the Republic of South Africa formally joined the bloc of influential emerging-market nations of the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India and the Federative Republic of Brazil.⁽²⁾ The term BRIC originally referred to the four largest and fastest growing economies of the new world order,⁽³⁾ but South Africa’s inclusion has caused widespread belief that the bloc has now evolved from being the brainchild of a Goldman Sachs economist, to a legitimate international actor on the global stage.⁽⁴⁾

However, is South Africa’s inclusion simply a business decision or is the country regarded as a bona fide member of the bloc? The following discussion aims to determine whether or not the BRIC states see South Africa as their equal and looks into South Africa’s actions and influence in two key organisations on the international stage – the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

South Africa - A legitimising choice

States today are no longer classified according to their core-adjacent or peripheral economic status. In reality, the United States of America’s (US) position of power is no longer predetermined, and the influences of the emerging markets are becoming more noticeable in international affairs. This became especially evident following the global recession, when the BRIC states were not derailed quite as severely as had been expected, while developed states fell to their knees.⁽⁵⁾ The distribution of power in this new world order thus seems to depend on a state’s number of friends rather than the number of dollars in their central bank.

This was a prevailing thought for the move by BRIC to invite South Africa to join their fold. Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill, who coined the term BRIC in 2001,⁽⁶⁾ agrees with this sentiment,⁽⁷⁾ saying that South Africa’s inclusion into BRIC was most likely for an in-road to the continent. This does not only mean access to Africa’s natural resources and relatively un-touched markets, but would also give the developing world more of a say in the global affairs as a result of their massive share of both global population and total economic growth.⁽⁸⁾ Thus, South Africa’s inclusion in BRICS has resulted in the formation of a legitimate counter-balance to the developed world, allowing an economic concept based on comparable economic performance to evolve into a powerful political alliance, which carries the support of the developing world.⁽⁹⁾

BRICS as a political voice

The BRICS states reiterated their call for the reform of international organisations such as the UNSC and the IMF in an official statement following the Third BRICS Summit in April 2011, saying these organisations should better reflect the increasing multi-polarity and interdependence of the modern world.⁽¹⁰⁾ In an interesting turn of events, the year 2011 finds all five of the BRICS states in possession of a seat at the UNSC table, albeit some with a more powerful vote than others.⁽¹¹⁾ This presents a valuable opportunity for the BRICS states to work closely together on issues of peace and security,⁽¹²⁾ while simultaneously allowing the voices of the developing world to be heard.

However, South Africa is on a relative tight-rope. It has publicly stated its prioritisation of African interests,⁽¹³⁾ but do these interests take precedence over BRICS obligations? Between 1 January 2011 and 17 April 2011, the UNSC passed a total of 16 resolutions, of which South Africa’s votes corresponded with those of its bloc members in all cases save one. On 17 March Security Council Resolution 1973, which dealt with the situation in Libya Arab Jamahiriya, was passed by the UNSC with a total of ten yes votes, zero no votes and five abstentions. The resolution resulted in the decision by the UNSC to institute a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, as well as authorised the use of ‘all necessary measures’ to protect the lives of the Libyan civilians targeted by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and his allied forces. The four of the five abstaining votes were cast by Brazil, China, India and Russia.⁽¹⁴⁾ In a media statement after the vote, it was revealed that China had opted to abstain, and thus not veto the resolution, in consideration of the wishes of the Arab League and the African Union, who described the resolution as being of great importance.⁽¹⁵⁾

It is important to realise that the UNSC vote on resolution 1973 took place almost a full month before the official inclusion of South Africa into BRICS. This is significant because it highlights a show of faith on the part of the other BRICS members in the decisions and obligations of South Africa on behalf of the African Continent, even before they received a full briefing of the situation⁽¹⁶⁾ or had officially become members of the bloc. This acts as testament of the original four BRICS states’ belief in South Africa’s measure of political power on both the African continent and with regard to African interests.

BRICS’ craved economic clout

Another opportunity for the BRICS to work together to further the plight of the developing world is to secure the position of managing director (MD) of the institution responsible for the stability of the international economy, the IMF. Subsequently, the BRICS released a combined statement quite soon after the departure of former IMF head Dominique Strauss-Khan, calling for the abandonment of an ‘obsolete, unwritten convention’⁽¹⁷⁾ that requires the head of the IMF be European, and reminded all those concerned of the statements made in 2007 regarding Strauss-Khan being the final European IMF head for the foreseeable future.⁽¹⁸⁾ However, the BRICS have not yet managed to agree on a suitable candidate.

While Russia has chosen to remain loyal to its region, favouring Kazak Grigory Marchenko,⁽¹⁹⁾ Brazil is suspicious of Mexican candidate Agustin Carstens for fears of losing its role as the ‘Latin American regional powerbroker.’⁽²⁰⁾ China and India are not likely to agree on India’s preferred candidate, Montek Singh Ahluwalia,⁽²¹⁾ given that both states are strategic rivals on the Asian continent, while South Africa requested Brazil’s support for Trevor Manuel.⁽²²⁾ Manuel has, however, announced his decision not to stand for the position.⁽²³⁾

The failure so far on the behalf of the BRICS to identify a mutually acceptable candidate hints at the rivalries, divisions, and mutual suspicions masked by promises of solidarity with the developing world.⁽²⁴⁾ This, however, could have been an opportunity for South Africa to become indispensable to the bloc. Should Manuel have decided to proceed with his candidacy for the top IMF position, he would have been the most obvious choice for BRICS, given there are no immediate objections or grievances to his nomination. Manuel would have stood in good stead for the position as his unique understanding of rapid economic development gained during his years as South African finance minister.

Concluding remarks

In review of the evidence presented above, South Africa's invitation to join the BRICS was most likely a geopolitically motivated decision. However, despite South Africa's dwarfed economic and population size in comparison to its new found 'partners', in only six months it has proved it is worthy of bloc membership though its actions in the UNSC. Secondly, if South Africa had managed to secure Manuel at the helm of the IMF, South Africa's bargaining power both on the continent and as a member of BRICS would no doubt have increased infinitely. South Africa is therefore most definitely being taken seriously by its BRICS counterparts.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Megan Erasmus through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Asia Dimension Unit ( asiadimension@consultancyafrica.com This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it ).
(2) ‘Sanya Declaration on BRICS’, Statement issued by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 13 April 2011, http://www.info.gov.za.
(3) Wilson, D. and Purushothaman, R., ‘Dreaming with BRICs: The path to 2050’, Goldman Sachs Group Economic Paper 99, 2003, http://www2.goldmansachs.com.
(4) Bauer, N., ‘BRICS preview: What will South Africa gain?’, Business Day, 13 April 2011, http://www.businessday.co.za.
(5) O’Neill, J., ‘Why it would be wrong to write off the BRICs’, Financial Times, 5 January 2009, http://www.ft.com.
(6) Wilson, D. and Purushothaman, R., ‘Dreaming with BRICs: The path to 2050’, Goldman Sachs Group Economic Paper 99, 2003, http://www2.goldmansachs.com.
(7) Herview, S., ‘South Africa gains entry to BRIC club’, Guardian, 19 April 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(8) ‘Sanya Declaration on BRICS’, Statement issued by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 13 April 2011, http://www.info.gov.za; ‘BRICS Summit gives bigger say to emerging economies’, People’s Daily Online, 18 April 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn.
(9) Creamer, T., ‘BRICS gets political’, Creamer Media, 22 April 2011, https://www.polity.org.za.
(10) ‘Sanya Declaration on BRICS’, Statement issued by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 13 April 2011, http://www.info.gov.za.
(11) Russia and China hold permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council which grants them veto power, while South Africa, India and Brazil concurrently hold an elected non-permanent seat for 2011.
(12) ‘Sanya Declaration on BRICS’, Statement issued by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 13 April 2011, http://www.info.gov.za.
(13) ‘South Africa takes up its Seat in the United Nations Security Council’, Media briefing, Embassy of the Republic of South Africa in Washington, D.C., 5 January 2011, http://saembassy.og.
(14) ‘Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) voting record’, United Nations Dag Hammarskjold Library, 17 March 2011, http://unbisnet.un.org.
(15) ‘Security Council approves no-fly zone over Libya, authorising all necessary measures to protect civilians, by Vote of 10 in favour with 5 abstentions’, United Nations Department of Public Information, 17 March 2011, http://www.un.org.
(16) ‘Statement by South African President Jacob Zuma during the joint press conference by BRICS Heads of State at the Third BRICS summit, Sanya, Hainan Island, People's Republic of China’, The Presidency, 14 April 2011, http://www.info.gov.za.
(17) ‘BRIC statement on selection of IMF chief’, Reuters, 24 May 2011, http://www.reuters.com.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Beattie, A., ‘Developing countries fail on IMF consensus’, Financial Times: Global Insight, 30 March 2011, http://www.ft.com.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Ibid.
(22) ‘South Africa woos Brazil for IMF Support’, China Daily, 3 June 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn.
(23) ‘Manuel not vying for IMF head’, BuaNews Online, 10 June 2011, http://www.buanews.gov.za.
(24) Beattie, A., ‘Developing countries fail on IMF consensus’, Financial Times: Global Insight, 30 March 2011, http://www.ft.com.

Written by Megan Erasmus ⁽¹⁾