Date: 16/03/2011
Source: The Brazilian Government
Title: BR: Pimentel: Address by the Brazilian Ambassador to South Africa, On Brazil’s perspective of Bric and South Africa’s membership, Pretoria

Thanks to The African-Asian Society for the invitation to share a few thoughts about “Brazil’s perspective (or my interpretation of Brazil’s perspective) of BRIC and South Africa’s membership”.

INTRO

History is filled with interregnums, but people living during those times rarely realize that changes are on their way. Admitting to the need for change is not the most common human trait, and the more power one has, the less interested she/he will be in changing things.

Someone has said that we live in an “age of uncertainties”. One of the most striking characteristics of the ongoing upheaval on Northern Africa is that it has not been predicted by anyone. Climate related tragedies have become commonplace, and although global warming can be measured, many governments are still reluctant to assume the political and financial consequences of these phenomena. The rigid structure of the Cold War gave way, after the fall of the Berlin wall, to a number of conflicting theories, from Fukuyama’s end of history to Huntington’s clash of civilizations. Both those essays were written in 1992; little did we know, at that time, that the world would become so much more complicated.

The war on Irak and the economic collapse of 2008 further eroded the international world order and made it clear that new rules and new political actors are needed if we want the system to work properly. So far, however, no adequate response has been given by the powers and organizations that should lead the way. The signs of something new are undisputable, but doubts remain about its scope, depth and direction. There is an ongoing shift in the economic balance, though a slow one, benefiting the countries of the South. But the main players do not seem to be at the driver’s seat. It rather looks as if they are being led by circumstances towards a new order, since they do not seem to have a vision for the future that could guide this process of change.
Brazil is what is generally called a middle-income developing country. It does not have the power to substantially alter the way the international system functions, but it is so closely integrated in the international cogwheel that it suffers with every malfunction in the world engines, just as it can benefit when they work well. Because of historical and geographical factors, because of the contributions it has made to regional and international stability, and because of the potential it has to contribute even more, Brazil feels qualified to participate in the making of world rules, the rules that all countries will abide by in the 21st century, and so we Brazilians raise our voices whenever possible to democratically defend our principles and our interests. Experience has shown, however, that our voice is better heard when it is part of a tuneful chorus.

From a diplomatic viewpoint, a series of questions emerge when a country like mine examines the current worldwide state of affairs. Are the international system and its structures of governance really undergoing a period of real and profound changes? What objectives should guide the establishment of new structures? Would it be realistic to contemplate a scenario in which the desire for higher levels of inclusion would be reconciled with the need for efficient and rapid results? Could new structures of governance provide the adequate combination of transparency, legitimacy, and efficiency to address the multiple challenges facing the international community today?

What we see is that current shifts in the distribution of wealth are not necessarily bringing about corresponding changes at the world governance level. From the United Nations to the international financial institutions, all global organizations face an urgent need to be updated and made to conform to the new realities. These reforms lag behind for several reasons, including the fact that traditional powers continue to behave in outmoded ways. The mismatch between the emerging power structure, in which new actors become more influential, and the traditional framework of global governance intensify the challenges to the legitimacy and efficacy of forums such as the United Nations, the G-7 (or G-8), and international financial organizations. These forums were designed to accommodate a geopolitical configuration that no longer exists and, in many cases, are unable to respond to present challenges.

One could argue that the world community does not have any experience in reshaping international institutions in the absence of the political circumstances that follow major conflicts. Given the current world situation, tangible results seem to be achieved more easily by arrangements involving countries with specific goals or common agendas. That is the reasoning behind emerging minilateral frameworks such as the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), and many others, like, for instance, the BASIC (where Brazil, South Africa, India and China meet to cooperate in international negotiations regarding the environment, climate change and related topics).

The theme that brought me here today is the BRICS, but first allow me to make a few considerations about its older cousin, the IBSA. Learning about the first can shed a light on what the other is and what it is not.

IBSA

IBSA was borne by the recognition of the need for a cooperation framework operating independently of developed countries’ preconceptions. The series of United Nations conferences held throughout the 90’s and into the beginning of the 21st century – on social development, human rights, gender and sustainable development, amongst others – highlighted the convergence of views shared by many developing countries, and the desirability of increasing the level of coordination between them.

Trade talks also provided an important trigger for the consolidation of a new kind of South-South cooperation, as exemplified by IBSA. This was particularly evident during the World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting held in Cancun, Mexico, in 2003. In that meeting, developing countries conducted themselves with a new sense of assertiveness, especially through the work of the G-20, of which all three IBSA countries are members. No longer was the trade agenda to be set solely by the US and Europe; the G-20 demanded that it reflect developing countries’ interests.

Another aspect of the creation of IBSA which cannot be forgotten is former President Thabo Mbeki’s proposal to organize something akin to a G-8 of the South. This proposal was presented by the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nkosozana Dlamini Zuma, to the Brazilian Minister, Celso Amorim, during President Lula’s inauguration for his first mandate, in 2003. Minister Amorim immediately took to the idea but, fearing that the inclusion of a large number of countries could undermine the efficiency of the group, proposed that it be kept small.

The idea of bringing together India, Brazil and South Africa was a natural extension of this line of thinking. To ensure the cohesion of the group, there should be a natural convergence amongst its members. And that is precisely what you find in IBSA, composed of three democratic, multi-ethnic countries, with a strong presence in their respective regions.

Being a diplomatic instrument, emphasis was placed, from IBSA’s inception, on political coordination. The 3 IBSA countries share, to a large extent, a common world view, and of what needs to be done to promote peace and development. IBSA, accordingly, provides a Forum to debate such matters, and enables its members to speak with one voice on a variety of important issues on the international agenda.

From early on, however, it also became clear that there was a significant degree of interest in each of the three countries with respect to the expertise developed in the other countries in a variety of areas, such as science and technology, energy, trade, social development and health, amongst others. This desire to learn from each other led to the creation of 16 sectoral working groups. It also led to the creation of civil society fora, bringing together parliamentarians, academics, journalists, business leaders, and gender equality experts.

A fundamental component of IBSA is its Trust Fund, aimed at contributing towards poverty and hunger alleviation in developing countries. The India, Brazil and South Africa Fund for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund) has been internationally recognized as an example of innovative South – South cooperation. In Guinea Bissau, the Fund has financed a project aimed at increasing and diversifying fruit cultivation and production, the introduction of short-cycle animal husbandry and the improvement of cashew production. In Haiti, the Fund supports a project designed to strengthen peace in the violence-prone Carrefour Feuilles zone through the collection of solid waste. Several other projects are currently in the Fund’s pipeline: strengthening infrastructure and capacity to combat HIV/AIDS in Burundi; refurbishment of healthcare infrastructure in Cape Verde; empowering children and adolescents with special needs, in Cambodia; irrigation of Nam San River Basin in Laos; building and equipping a 1,000 square meter multi-purpose sports complex in Ramallah; rehabilitation of a hospital in Gaza, plus three other projects in Palestine and in Sudan (one North, one South).

Other IBSA achievements which should be noted include the increase in trade flows between the 3 countries, which reached the US$ 15 billion mark last year (from US$ 3,8 billion in 2004). On some specific issues, IBSA has also proved useful to its members, as was the case with Brazil’s and South Africa’s support for the decision of IAEA Board of Governors to approve the India Specific Safeguards Agreement and the decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to adjust its guidelines to enable full civil nuclear cooperation between India and the international community, for which Prime-Minister Manmohan Singh has expressed his gratitude.

And yet, it is clear that several remaining challenges will continue to require IBSA’s close attention in the foreseeable future. The three countries set up high stakes when they took upon themselves the challenge of becoming a model for South – South cooperation. Notwithstanding the usefulness of the many exchanges that have been promoted at the Government and civil society levels, much still needs to be done in each of the 3 countries to increase awareness about the social and cultural characteristics, and the internal challenges that each of the IBSA partners face.

To this end, transport connectivity is and will remain a key factor, given its centrality in providing the means for increased people-to-people contact. The 3 partners have been working to expand the number of transport routes but, given that progress on this front requires not only the good will of governments, but also the initiative of commercial airlines, much work still needs to be done in order to achieve what is needed.

It is evident from the priority that the political leadership in all three countries attributes to IBSA that this is an initiative that has proved its worth to its members, and that has acquired the degree of permanence that is identified with State Policies. I would sustain that IBSA has a message to the world, inasmuch it combines elements of pragmatism against a background of dreams of a better world – and we all need a vision, we cannot move on like robots, we need a dream. So I believe that IBSA will remain alive alongside other minilateral groupings, to provide inspiration for those seeking to develop innovative forms of cooperation with a view to ensuring the affirmation of developing countries’ interests.

Building IBSA is a lifetime job. It is a symbol for the South, and a nucleus for dialogue, through which three very determined emerging countries can set up the basis for further cooperation in multiple other international forums.

BRICS

BRICS had a different genesis from most other political and diplomatic forums. Instead of originating as a draft at some creative diplomat’s desk, one can say that it was brought up from the market. The acronym BRIC was coined by Jim O’Neill, chief economist at the investment bank Goldman Sachs, in an article published in November 2001, under the title “Building better global economic BRICs”. O’Neill remarked that room should be made for Brazil, Russia, India and China in order to allow more effective global policymaking. In 2003, a new essay, by Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, also from Goldman Sachs, titled “Dreaming with BRICs: the path to 2050”, further developed the argument, which fundamentally was a way of telling investors to “start buying”. It was a no brainer. Brazil, Russia, India and China together account for 40% of the world’s population, 25.9% of its geographic area, and 40% of global GDP, and if their evolution should maintain its impetus these countries can become collectively bigger than the G8 by 2035.

The Brazilian Foreign Service started toying with the idea of institutionalizing BRIC early in the Lula government. But it was only in September 23, 2006 that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the four countries met, at the margins of the 61st General Assembly of the United Nations, to discuss the possibilities of creating a mechanism of diplomatic cooperation. It took three more years for the Heads of State to hold their first formal summit, in June 16, 2009, at Yekaterinburg, Russia. By that time, the world financial crisis was hitting hard the economies of most countries in the world, but those of the four BRICs remained rather sound.

There are two points I would like to stress, which are important, in my view, to understand what BRIC is all about. First, it was preceded by a long diplomatic incubation. It is essentially a diplomatic entity, which will debate international issues according to diplomacy’s best practices. Second, the grouping resulted of a growing awareness that the four countries need to play a greater and more visible role in the management of international economic affairs. Consequently, the first item in BRIC’s agenda is, and presumably will be for some time yet, the global economic and financial systems, including trade, credit, capital movement, currency flows, and of course the millennium development goals. That is a clear priority, though by no means the only item in the grouping’s agenda.

The mechanism held its second summit on April 14 and 15, 2010, in Brasilia. The Brazilian Government hosted both the IBSA and the BRICS summits back to back, and invited South Africa to participate at the BRIC business forum, as well as the formal banquet that marked the end of both events.

When they convene again, this coming month of April in Beijing, there will be a fifth BRIC at the table. On December last year, Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane announced publicly that South Africa had been invited to join the group, and she qualified the invitation as a “Christmas gift”. The Minister’s spontaneity will certainly be a welcome addition to BRICS’ conclaves. Her remark conveyed a natural satisfaction with the favorable conclusion of a long diplomatic effort by the Zuma government, in general, and especially by DIRCO. Her joy is easy to understand.

What is not as easy to absorb is the ill humor with which South Africa’s accession to the group was interpreted by some analysts in this country. They pondered on the reasons why South Africa had been invited and could not find the answers, so they concluded that it had been “a political decision”. That really amazed me. It is like criticizing a football player for scoring a goal, a stand up comedian for telling a joke, or a banker for charging interests on his loans. Diplomatic services do precisely that, politics of an international nature, and that is what BRICS is all about, international politics.

Africa’s role in the current process of change in global governance structures has been present for a long time in the considerations of the Brazilian foreign policy. This is a huge and very complex continent, characterized by great diversity. Some countries, like South Africa, are among the emerging ones, while others face the challenges of low or stagnant indexes of economic activity compounded by deep social challenges. Virtually all countries in Africa present social inequalities as well as tensions.

From the Brazilian point of view, bringing in a representative of the African continent was a natural consequence also of our perception of the world and of ourselves. Brazilians consider Brazil as the largest African country outside of Africa. Our culture and our way of living have been deeply influenced by million of Africans who were brought to Brazil, mostly as slaves, before independence from Portugal and the proclamation of the Republic. Now we feel that we should pay back Africa for all it has done for us. So when we think about how a new and better world should be, we envisage a situation in which the African continent would be no longer left out, but rather would have a seat in every international body that can contribute to the emergence of a changing global reality. A present reality that needs to be changed is precisely the African one, another is the way the world perceives Africa. The need for these imperative changes will obtain a much wider international exposure if Africans sit at the negotiating table, participating on an equal footing with the other group members.

Another great fuss was made over the question whether South Africa can legitimately claim to speak for the entire continent. In Brazil, we think it can. Based on the political stability that its democratic system makes possible, on the experience it has accumulated at the African Union, SADC and SACU, as well as at international organizations where we share many important interests, and also on a history of hard realities overcome through civilized debate and conciliation, we think South Africa is ready to be a very good representative of the African continent. Presumably it will not be easy, and Minister Nkoana-Mashabane may soon find out that, more than a gift, entrance in BRIC is a heavy responsibility. But, from the Brazilian perspective, South Africa is quite capable to shoulder its load.

It is curious to notice that those who contested South Africa’s entry were also quite quick in denying BRICS any major importance as a political forum. They argue that internal divergences in BRICS will break their thrust. They go on to describe BRICS as an artificial concoction, and they argue that their diversity should ultimately keep them going on separate tracks. And it is quite true that BRICS are not a natural fit. They have not evolved from a military alliance, do not have a common culture, nor do they have a common foe, as the G7 used to have. They have no treaty obligations to bind them, and do not participate at a formal political or an economic bloc. They are not an alternative to the Western world. They are definitely not an alliance, or even an organization in the traditional sense. The BRICS do not present themselves as an entity aiming at any sort of supranational character, or as having uniform positions on all issues. No international group could claim such an absolute coincidence.

However, the BRICS have shown that they can act like a team when it comes to their interests on the world stage. There is a consensus that no single country or even a group of countries can successfully handle the challenges the world is now facing. BRICS can add a valuable contribution by being a guardian of not only their own interests, but also the interests of the developing world. It is undeniable that each one of the BRICS have differences in their focus and objectives in several issues. But interactions within the framework of BRICS can provide the five countries a platform to coordinate and cooperate with each other.

It is relevant to underline that when the G8 and the G5 dialogue, the BRICS are on both sides of the table. At the same time they share an interest in economic stability and in the expansion of commerce, without unjustified barriers to trade or investment.

The rising importance of coordinated initiatives by the BRIC countries is already visible in many areas of international financial relations. As the G20 rose to replace the G7 (or G8), BRIC governments came together as a new element in the multiple geometries of international gatherings. BRIC Finance Ministers met for the first time in São Paulo, in November 2008, and have been holding regular meetings since then. In the G20-IMF/World Bank areas, governance reform is and will continue to be a priority. Consolidation of the G20 as the premier forum for economic and financial affairs also remains at the very top of the BRICS agenda. It has been said that the financial world has changed more in the last 18 months than in the last 50 years. The BRICS firgerprints can be found in several of f these changes, such as the IMF quota reform.

The United Nations stands out as one timely topic for BRICS action, since the Organization is the only political space that incorporates every system of values. There is a broad consensus among BRICS that it is fundamental to reform the UN, including its Security Council, so as not to further erode its authority.

The BRICS have plenty of space for intra-five cooperation as well. Access to natural resources, with its economic and geo-strategic consequences, has become one of the crucial topics in international relations. The BRICS have considerable stakes in these matters, since two of its members, Russia and Brazil, are among the largest world energy suppliers, and two other, China and India, are among the largest consumers. The same could be said, mutatis mutandis, about the question of food security. Debates within BRICS could become as relevant, perhaps even more relevant than those among the G7.

Science, technology and innovation offers another ample field for cooperation. The BRICS have plenty to learn from each others’ experiences. In the area of alternative energy sources, they are well equipped to come up with renewable, environmentally friendly energies that drastically reduce gas emissions.

CONCLUSION

The new world order is a work in progress. Those of us who do not have a crystal ball do not know how the world will be by the end of the 21st century. But there are meaningful trends that make it possible to work with a few probable scenarios.

The perspective for continuing unipolarity is losing ground, since the US appears not to be in a position to implement solutions and achieve its aims without the support of other members of the international community in most issues of global interest. On the other hand, the US is still the essential power of the system and surely considerable risks would ensue should it retreat or detach itself from global governance.

Other actors are playing ever larger roles in the international arena. NGOs, private enterprises, and even some individuals and foundations now have global reach. One would imagine that emerging structures of governance will accommodate a growing influence of non-state actors, but, judging from what we see in today’s world, the role of States and the concept of sovereignty are here to stay.

More than ever, States have responsibilities over economy and finance, and peace and security. These are two sets of priorities that will be part of international relations in the foreseeable future.

Regarding economic matters, the acknowledgement that the financial G-20 has more legitimacy and efficacy than the G-8 is really a step in the right direction.

Global governance institutionalization in the domain of peace and security cannot be discussed without close consideration of the efficacy of the UN Security Council and the prospects for its reform. The UNSC incapacity of effectively handling current threats leads to fears of its expeditious loss of relevance. This would pose a real threat to world peace and security, for the Security Council is irreplaceable due to the international consensus regarding its legal authority. Consequently, a UNSC reform is necessary to ensure that its decisions are recognized not only as legally binding, but also as politically legitimate.

Underlying this debate lies the question of how the US’s relative decline and the Chinese rise will play out, or whether cooperation or competition will prevail.

In looking at the future, it seems that the key factors to be taken into account as we try to asses tendencies in the international system would be, on the one hand, the relationship between cooperation and competition elements, and, in the other, the presence or absence of a sense of global responsibility in traditional and emerging powers. Countries with a world view are presently called to incorporate in their foreign agenda not only responses to challenges that affect them, but also to problems that no longer bother them.

The relevance and continuity of IBSA and BRICS are connected with the country members’ ability to promote cooperation not only for their own benefit, but for the rest of the developing world as well. And that seems to be possible only if those groupings cooperate to promote more legitimate mechanisms of governance. That is the challenge that IBSA and BRICS will have to meet.