"There are risks of action, and there are risks of inaction," the spokesperson said in London, as Blair came under pressure to explain why he ignored the warning that the US-led conflict would make it easier for terrorists to get hold of weapons of mass destruction.
The revelation came out of a 57-page report Thursday by the Intelligence and Security Committee, a cross-party parliamentary panel that oversees the work of Britain's intelligence agencies.
It was primarily looking into allegations, aired in a BBC radio report in May that a September 2002 dossier on Iraq and weapons of mass destruction had been "sexed up" in order to sell the war to a skeptical British public.
It said that an assessment in February by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which brings together British intelligence chiefs, concluded there was no evidence that Iraq had funneled chemical or biological weapons to al-Qaeda.
But it added: "The JIC assessed that al-Qaeda and associated groups continued to represent by far the greatest terrorist threat to Western interests, and that threat would be heightened by military action against Iraq".
"The JIC assessed that any collapse of the Iraqi regime would increase the risk of chemical and biological warfare technology or agents finding their way into the hands of terrorists, not necessarily al-Qaeda".
The revelation put new pressure on Blair ahead of the resumption Monday of a judicial inquiry into the suicide of July of Ministry of Defence weapons expert and former UN arms inspector David Kelly.
Kelly was exposed by the ministry as the anonymous source of the BBC report in May, which called into question the key claim of the September dossier - that Iraq could deploy chemical or biological weapons in just 45 minutes.
In its findings Thursday, the Intelligence and Security Committee, a panel of eight MPs and a peer, all Blair appointees, concluded that the dossier was not embellished, and that British intelligence had not been subject to undue political pressure.
Briefing reporters Friday, Blair's spokesperson said Prime Ministers were "elected to lead," and that that meant making tough decisions.
"When you are dealing with issues of terrorism, issues of weapons of mass destruction, that is clearly not a precise science," the spokesperson said.
"It can't be".
"These are obviously subjective judgments. We are not talking about risk-free options - and terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction are not alternatives," he said.
"It's not a question of either-or. Both are a threat," he added.
He said the JIC, in its February document, was not looking into the merits of war, or weighing the risks of action or inaction.
"They produce assessments," he said.
"It's for politicians to make decisions".
Blair took a skeptical Britain into the US-led to oust Saddam Hussein on the argument that if his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction was not stopped, terrorists were more liable to acquire such deadly devices.
Robin Cook, who quit Blair's cabinet in protest over the war, said news that British intelligence had warned Blair of terrorist implications had left the government in a "desperate position".
"I have always thought Tony Blair was so convinced of the case for war that he was not sufficiently skeptical in asking tough questions about any evidence that supported his prejudice," he said. – Sapa-AFP.
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