The political landscape of Africa in 2011 was largely defined by the protests in North Africa, which eventually led to the overthrow of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. Pictures and televised images of Gaddafi’s lifeless body and the humiliating trial of Mubarak signalled a nuanced dimension of political governance in the Maghreb (and the Arab world) and its likely impact on a wider democratic revolution across Africa. In Tunisia and Egypt, free and fair Parliamentary elections have been held, further strengthening the nexus between active citizens’ response and the establishment of a democratic culture. While the so-called ‘Arab spring revolution’ is yet to be fully replicated in sub-Saharan Africa, subsequent protests, albeit with varied results, in Senegal, Uganda, Burkina Faso and lately, Nigeria, all point to a new paradigm of citizens’ activism and call for accountability. Although societal dynamics differ in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, both regions experience a similar fundamental deficiency of the structure of governance, which in turn provides a fertile ground for revolt – peaceful or violent.

Against this background, this CAI paper examines the factors that are likely to shape the course of governance in Africa in 2012.

The current shape of governance in Africa

The ‘African Governance Report’ aptly captured the state of governance on the continent. It noted that “Democratic culture has yet to be institutionalised, as vestiges of authoritarianism threaten the democratic process and the politics of consociationalism and politics of accommodation are not yet rooted in the polity. Thus, political tension, conflict and crises are emerging patterns of electoral politics in Africa.”⁽²⁾ The attitude to good governance on the continent leaves much to be desired. With very few exceptions, the majority of the countries in Africa continue to grapple with different forms of authoritarianism. Angola, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Sudan are ruled by leaders whose actions indicate the intention to govern perpetually. In these countries, elections have become a means of ‘legitimising’ despotic regimes. As Onyango-Obobo observed, of the 17 presidential elections held in Africa in 2011, only four (Zambia, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Seychelles) could be deemed as truly free and fair.⁽³⁾ This is indeed a sad commentary on the state of governance in Africa.

Continental and regional instruments aimed at entrenching the norms of good governance are more observed in breach than in conformity. Although there have been marked improvements in the way African countries and regional organisations respond to violations of the tenets of constitutional democracy, the enforcement mechanisms are still largely deficient. This is further weakened by the inability of member states to always reach some form of unanimity on how to condemn serial violators. The split in the ranks of African Union (AU) member states on the Ivorian and Libyan crises are the most recent examples.⁽⁴⁾ In spite of the worrying state of governance across the continent, some African states have made commendable efforts at strengthening the pillars of democratic governance. Ghana, Mauritius, Cape Verde, South Africa, Botswana and Sao Tome are notable examples.

The current dynamics of the global economy, especially as they relate to the rise of Asian emerging powers and the consideration of Africa as “the next big investment destination,”⁽⁵⁾ have brought the issue of African governance into sharp focus. According to a recent poll conducted by the London-based Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), more than one in two institutional investors see Africa as the most attractive region to invest in the next decade.⁽⁶⁾ African economies have done relatively well in the past decade. Between 2000 and 2008, African economies grew at an average rate of 4.9%.⁽⁷⁾ According to the ‘African Economic Outlook Report (2011)’, Africa’s average growth rate is expected to accelerate to 5.8% in 2012.⁽⁸⁾ This is a positive sign, since it reflects the potential of the continent to play a more meaningful role in the global economy. However, good governance deficit is a diminutive factor because it essentially limits the prospect of real development. The ‘World Economic Forum 2011-2012 Global Competitiveness Report’ highlights the impact of poor governance on the competitiveness of African economies.⁽⁹⁾ The report notes that although some countries in sub-Saharan Africa have made progress in terms of political and economic reforms, issues such as rampant corruption, falling standard of education and health and mismanagement remain huge obstacles.

Will 2012 be any different?

The question of whether or not the dynamics of African governance will change in 2012 is best assessed within the context of certain variables. The first of these variables is an active continental/regional response to breach of democratic governance. In this regard the question is: to what extent can the AU and other sub-regional organisations strictly enforce the principles of democracy and good governance? As Dersso notes, this will largely depend on critical issues such as the requisite legal and political powers of the AU to scrutinise democratisation and enforce compliance and give direct instructions to errant member states; and the possession of the technical capacity to initiate and support democratic reforms and the specifics of sanctions against defaulting states.⁽¹⁰⁾ Since the AU remains a mere intergovernmental institution, as real powers are held by member states, it lacks the capacity to initiate and enforce the fundamentals of good governance and democratisation across the continent. The key test is whether member states, pursuant of the declaration of 2012 as “the year of shared values,”⁽¹¹⁾ will transfer real powers to the institution.

The second variable is the nature of the consequences of the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, especially as they relate to the enthronement of democratic governance. The extent to which the successfully held Parliamentary elections in Egypt and Tunisia will in the short to medium term translate to genuine democratisation and good governance can provide instructive lessons for other Africans. Such empirical proof can further embolden civil society across the continent to press for democratisation and good governance in their respective countries.

The third, which is linked to the second variable, relates to how civil society can establish broader networks and nuanced strategy for addressing the need for good governance. Events in the Maghreb have shown the importance of building a broad coalition of activists to engage in a sustained agitation for good governance. This should also include transnational networks, aimed at the horizontal sharing of strategies and ideas on how to actualise democratic governance.

The fourth variable relates to whether or not the international community (especially Western Governments) will be sincere enough to criticise and impose stringent sanctions on African dictators who also happen to be their allies. The same tone of criticism and the measure and extent of actions directed at the likes of Robert Mugabe, Omar Al Bashir and Isaias Afewerki, should be similarly applied to allies such as Yoweri Museveni, Meles Zenawi and Abdoulaye Wade (just to mention a few).

The fifth variable deals with the readiness of democratic African states to become more vocal against their errant peers. Within and outside the AU and sub-regional organisation structures, countries like South Africa, Botswana, Ghana and Cape Verde, should act like pressure groups, demanding for quality governance. Where such demand is not met, these countries should not hesitate to act outside the framework of the oft-general position of not taking any meaningful action against impunity.

Conclusion

Quality governance is an indispensable element of Africa’s quest for a more meaningful role in global realpolitik. The current shape of governance on the continent inspires little sanguinity. Electoral rigging, manipulation of the constitution, rampant corruption and serious violations of fundamental rights have all become the features of many so-called ‘democracies’ in Africa. The process of entrenching good governance principles on the continent is by no means an easy process; however, it is essential to begin taking these principles seriously. The revolutions in the Maghreb signify the extent to which citizens can effect change. Whether or not the events in the Maghreb in 2011 will spill over to 2012 and thus mark the beginning of a wider democratic revolution on the continent will depend on the variables discussed above.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Babatunde Fagbayibo through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Africa Watch Unit (africa.watch@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Economic Commission for Africa, African Governance Report II, 2009. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
(3) Onyango-Obobo, C., ‘Africa: 78% of elections in 2011 ended in dispute’, 27 January 2011, http://www.africanews.com.
(4) Fagbayibo, B., ‘The Libyan revolution: Thoughts on a post-Ghaddafi era of African integration’, Consultancy Africa Intelligence, 16 September 2011, http://www.consultancyafrica.com.
(5) ‘Africa set to be the next big investment destination’, Mail & Guardian Online, 18 May 2011, http://mg.co.za.
(6) Waki, N. and Sulaiman, T., ‘Africa most attractive investment destination – poll’, Reuters, 25 January 2012, http://www.reuters.com.
(7) ‘Africa’s pulse: An analysis of issues shaping Africa’s economic future Vol. 3’, World Bank, April 2011, https://blogs.worldbank.org.
(8) ‘Africa is recovering but there are risks’, African Economic Outlook, http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org.
(9) ‘The global competitiveness report 2011-2012’, The World Economic Forum (WEF), http://reports.weforum.org.
(10) Dersso, S., ‘Lessons from North African uprisings for 2012 as AU’s year of ‘shared values’, 16 January 2012, http://www.issafrica.org.
(11) ‘Brainstorming the year of shared values’, African Union, 24 August 2011, http://au.int.

Written by Babatunde Fagbayibo (1)