Only six African states participated in the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) held in March at The Hague, Netherlands, which was attended by 53 leaders from around the world in order to draw attention at the highest possible level for the need to secure nuclear material and prevent nuclear terrorism.

Part 1 of this paper analysed Africa’s participation and the disparate commitments at the 2014 NSS that will expose disconcerting gaps in global nuclear security despite burgeoning nuclear energy ambitions on the continent. Part 2 explores the country-specific nuclear security progress reports submitted to the 2014 NSS by each of the African participants since the 2012 NSS.

Highlights in African reports to the 2014 NSS

Of the six participating African countries at the 2014 NSS, namely Algeria, Egypt, Gabon, Nigeria, Morocco and South Africa, only two, Algeria and Morocco, pledged their commitment to a far-reaching multilateral declaration titled Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation.⁽²⁾ Nevertheless, some achievements were made by each of the African participants since the 2012 NSS.

The following highlights, in essence some of the notable achievements made by each of the African participants since the 2012 NSS, are based on country specific nuclear security progress reports submitted at the 2014 NSS.

Algeria: Algeria’s national legal progress includes an amendment to the Algerian penal code to criminalise malicious use of radioactive materials and acts of nuclear terrorism related to the ICSANT.⁽³) Algeria worked with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to organise a regional workshop in October 2013 on nuclear forensics as well as on implementing an Integrated Nuclear Security and Support Plan (INSSP).⁽⁴⁾ Algeria signed four joint statements at the 2014 NSS including those related to the protection of radioactive material, nuclear forensics, and nuclear security training. This was an increase from the one gift basket Algeria joined at the 2012 NSS related to nuclear security training. Given Algeria’s current nuclear installations ⁽⁵⁾ and desire to introduce a nuclear power plant into the energy grid by 2022, continued efforts at improving nuclear security and establishing a strong prevention system against nuclear terrorism is crucial. Financial and technical support for potential energy projects will likely come from abroad, which may indicate Algeria’s developing relationship with the IAEA and continued participation in the NSS process. Algeria has previously expressed its conviction that international cooperation on nuclear energy is critical to implement a nuclear power programme.⁽⁶⁾

Egypt: Egypt did not turn in a country progress report to the 2014 NSS or the 2012 NSS.⁽⁷⁾ It is unclear if the country’s current political situation has impeded this process. Though present at the 2014 NSS, Egypt stormed out of the 2013 NPT preparatory meeting in New York in protest of what it deemed to be a failure to implement the 1995 caveat ⁽⁸⁾ to the NPT’s indefinite extension, which sought to establish a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ).⁽⁹⁾ Nevertheless, Egypt is known to be establishing an independent authority to control nuclear materials.⁽¹⁰⁾ Since 2006, Egypt has discussed the potential establishment of a nuclear power programme, though that discussion remains largely on hold due to continual political unrest and shifting governance.⁽¹¹⁾ Egypt signed the joint statement, A Comprehensive Approach to Nuclear Security, calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. This is a slight increase in NSS multinational collaboration, as it did not join any gift baskets at the 2012 NSS.

Gabon: In 2013, Gabon wrote into law the creation of the Gabonese Agency of Nuclear Safety and Security, which is intended to establish rules for protection of nuclear material and radioactive sources.⁽¹²⁾ Gabon recognised in its report to the 2014 NSS that it did not make any progress in two areas of importance to the NSS including support for nuclear security-related international initiatives and contribution to minimisation of sensitive nuclear materials. As a large uranium and oil exporter, Gabon, like other nuclear ambitious African states such as Nigeria and South Africa, has strong existing ties to the US, Australia, Europe, and Japan. These existing relationships alongside its civil nuclear power interests likely indicate its continued participation in the NSS process, though the national progress report seems to fall short of substantial achievement since 2012. Gabon did not participate in any joint statements in 2014 or any gift baskets in 2012.

Morocco: Morocco appears to have embraced the NSS process more so than other African attendees, likely because of its nuclear power ambitions and acknowledged need of international energy support. Morocco currently receives 95% of its energy resources from abroad.⁽¹³⁾ Morocco participated in nine joint statements,⁽¹⁴⁾ the most of any African participants and an increase from the previous year’s five gift baskets. Morocco is developing an INSSP with the IAEA and submitted to parliament a law to form the legal framework to establish an independent nuclear and radiation safety and security agency for inspection of nuclear and radiological facilities.⁽¹⁵⁾ It is not clear who will undertake the inspections. Morocco is also drafting a law on export and import control system for dual-use products. As a founding member of the Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), an international partnership of 85 nations ⁽¹⁶⁾ working to implement shared nuclear security principles, Morocco will continue to chair the GICNT Response and Mitigation Workgroup until 2015. Morocco has hosted several different events since the 2012 NSS, and a sub-regional workshop for French-speaking African countries in Marrakech during December 2013 aimed at introducing African participants to the importance of an INSSP.

Nigeria: Nigeria’s country report to the 2014 NSS stated that it has produced the Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Bill intended to establish national obligations under international treaties and is awaiting passage by the National Assembly.⁽¹⁷⁾ At the 2012 Seoul NSS, Nigeria pledged to create a Nuclear Security Centre, which it established in 2013. Nigeria also worked with the IAEA, as per the agency’s recommendation in the INSSP which was finalised in 2010, to establish a National Design Basis Threat Assessment (DBT).⁽¹⁸⁾ Lastly, Nigeria has been cooperating with China and the US to convert its highly-enriched uranium (HEU) research reactor, the NIRR-1, to low enriched uranium (LEU), in order to reduce the proliferation risks associated with HEU. Nigeria has made a strong bid for nuclear power generated electricity, and has actively worked with the IAEA on this possibility. Nigeria has completed a self-evaluation exercise in accordance with the IAEA’s Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR), the same “milestones” approach the IAEA similarly completed in South Africa,⁽¹⁹⁾ which is designed to assist countries in developing a nuclear infrastructure. Nigeria did not sign any joint statements at the 2014 NSS, a decrease from the single gift basket related to NSS outreach it joined at the 2012 NSS.

South Africa: South Africa produced a shorter-than-expected progress report at the 2014 NSS that highlighted its Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) mission with the IAEA from February 2013, assessing the country’s readiness for energy expansion. South Africa signed only one joint statement, the Comprehensive Approach to Nuclear Security mentioned above, which called for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.⁽²⁰⁾ This is an increase from the 2012 NSS in which South Africa did not join any gift baskets.⁽²¹⁾ Its report also stated that the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA) and the IAEA had developed a mobile hot cell facility for developing countries to safely store high activity radioactive sources.⁽²²⁾ South Africa’s country progress report took on a more rigid tone than previously and reiterated that in 2011 South Africa had agreed to ship 6.3kg⁽²³⁾ of its US-origin HEU reactor fuel to the US and had not decided to eliminate either its South African-origin spent reactor fuel or the HEU left over from its nuclear weapons programme. This is estimated at roughly 400-600kg as no official figure exists.⁽²⁴⁾ Taking the issue further at the 2014 NSS, South Africa’s International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane indicated in an interview that South Africa should not be denied its inalienable right to use either HEU or LEU in peaceful applications and that the “informal” NSS should be wrapped up by the 2016 NSS.⁽²⁵⁾ Democratic South Africa’s perceived right to HEU has been a point of contention in the past and may be an indicator of the reason for President Jacob Zuma’s absence at the 2014 NSS.

Conclusion

The six participating African states made clear at the 2014 NSS that despite regional threats and economic hardship, they maintain a vested interest in inhibiting nuclear terrorism and increasing nuclear security. However, all but two African countries at the 2014 NSS opted to leave loopholes in global nuclear security governance by shirking measures for a legally-binding international architecture and writing guidelines into their national law by pledging their commitment to the far-reaching multilateral 2014 NSS declaration discussed in Part 1 of this paper. This reluctance appears to hinge on issues of sovereignty and self-reliance, amid the challenge for superpowers to speed up nuclear disarmament. But it will likely undermine African support for initiatives aimed at preventing the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear terrorism. Moreover, it is likely to result in polarising the global efforts aimed at making the world a safer place. African leaders should avoid self-reliance in nuclear development in Africa and act responsibly to curb international threats.

Click here to read part 1 of this discussion paper.

Written by Dominique Gilbert and Donald Stewart ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1)Dominique Gilbert is the Research Manager of the Counter-Proliferation unit at Consultancy Africa Intelligence (CAI). Donald Stewart is a Research Associate with CAI with a particular interest in nonproliferation and terrorism. Contact Dominique and Donald through CAI's Counter-Proliferation unit ( counter.proliferation@consultancyafrica.com). Edited by Kate Morgan.
(2) ‘Strengthening nuclear security implementation’, 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, March 2014, https://www.nss2014.com.
(3) ‘National progress report: Algeria’, Nuclear Security Summit 2014, March 2014, https://www.nss2014.com.
(4) INSSP is designed by the IAEA in consultation with the hosting state to tailor a security plan that fits the state’s specific needs, see http://www-ns.iaea.org.
(5) Algeria currently operates the Nur Research Reactor, a light water moderated, pool type reactor built in 1989, as well as the Es-Salem Reactor, a heavy water moderated, tank type reactor built in 1992. Algeria also started operation in 1999 on the Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Pilot Plant aimed at the development of rod and plate type nuclear fuel elements, see http://www-pub.iaea.org.
(6) Meftah, B., ‘Outlook of nuclear energy in Algeria’, IAEA, http://www-pub.iaea.org.
(7) ‘The Nuclear Security Summit: Progress report’, 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, July 2013, http://www.armscontrol.org.
(8) Rydell, R.,‘Toward a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone’, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), March 2011, http://www.un.org.
(9) Nebehay, S., ‘US regrets Egypt walk-out at nuclear talks’, Reuters, April 2013, http://uk.reuters.com.
(10) Broodyrk, A. and Edge, S., ‘International nuclear security: Why Africa must make its voice heard’, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), March 2014, http://www.issafrica.org.
(11) ‘Country Profile: Egypt’, Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 2013, see http://www.nti.org.
(12) ‘National progress report: Gabon’, Nuclear Security Summit 2014, March 2014, https://www.nss2014.com.
(13) Tabet, M., ‘Overview of nuclear infrastructure development in Morocco’, IAEA, April 2013, http://www.iaea.org.
(14) Morocco’s participation in joint statements included those related to nuclear security training and support centers, contributions of GICNT to enhancing nuclear security, enhancing radiological security, strengthening nuclear security implementation, and forensics in nuclear security, among others. Most of these statements were signed by a wide array of international partners as well as Western powers like the US and the UK.
(15) ‘Draft law 142-12, related to nuclear and radiation safety and security and the creation of the agency responsible for ensuring the control’, Kingdom of Morocco, undated, http://www.sgg.gov.ma.
(16) Eight African countries are members of the GICNT including Cote d’Ivoire, Cape Verde, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Seychelles, and Zambia, see http://www.state.gov.
(17) ‘National progress report: Nigeria’, Nuclear Security Summit 2014, March 2014, https://www.nss2014.com.
(18) DBTs are designed to provide an assessment of the attributes of potential insider or external adversaries who might attempt unauthorised removal of nuclear material or sabotage, see http://www-ns.iaea.org.
(19) ‘IAEA reviews South Africa’s nuclear infrastructure for expansion,’ IAEA, February 2013, http://www.iaea.org.
(20) ‘In larger security: A comprehensive approach to nuclear security,’ 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, March 2014, https://www.nss2014.com.
(21) ‘In larger security: A comprehensive approach to nuclear security,’ 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, March 2014, http://pgstest.files.wordpress.com.
(22) ‘National Report of the Republic of South Africa,’ 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, March 2014, https://www.nss2014.com.
(23) NNSA announces return of US-origin highly enriched uranium spent fuel from South Africa,’ National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), August 2011, http://nnsa.energy.gov.
(24) ‘South Africa profile,’ Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), http://isis-online.org.
(25) ‘Min Maite Nkoana-Mashabane NSS Interview,’ DIRCO, 3 April 2014, https://www.youtube.com.