Feminist movements have long debated the effectiveness of academic conferences and writing versus the need for immediate political action.⁽²⁾ This debate took on a life of its own in South Africa when apartheid finally ended. Once feminist thinkers and political activists began discussions around the future of South African feminism and gender equality, the differences between their agendas seemed to drastically outweigh the similarities. Although the diversity of peoples at these initial meetings is noteworthy, and in itself warrants celebration, the differences also divided the feminist groups of the time. This CAI paper argues that the presence of feminist divisions heavily influenced political feminist agendas in South Africa. A consensus about gender equality in South Africa was not prioritised during or soon after apartheid’s end and consequently, patriarchal discourses have prevailed nationally. Jacob Zuma’s much publicised 2006 rape trial illustrates the argument.

The Women and Gender Conference of 1991

South African apartheid Government’s racial policies made it difficult for feminist activists and academics of different races to assemble and discuss shared opinions about oppression and gender inequality. The first notable gathering of South African feminists was the Women and Gender Conference in Durban in 1991, after the official disbandment of apartheid. Though publicised as an opportunity for all feminists to meet and discuss ideas surrounding gender equality, the celebrations were short-lived.

Some of the attendees expressed grievances about the tone and nature of the papers that were presented by white academics. The disputed papers were largely discussions about black women’s struggles. Although well intended, the papers invoked in black attendees feelings of having been “invited primarily to witness exhibitions of hegemonic wisdom and to endorse whatever diagnoses and proposals academically established feminists had to offer.”⁽³⁾ The black gender activists at the conference believed that the white presenters of these papers had little experience of the things they were discussing. Jennifer Wilkinson argues ⁽⁴⁾ that white academics were not able to acknowledge the depth of Apartheid’s influence on the production of knowledge and the predominance of prevalent discourses.

When these grievances were voiced, organisers stipulated that the conference was to take place within an ‘academic’ forum. Objections to the tone of the conference were, therefore, simply seen as misplaced ‘political’ issues that were rendered irrelevant by the nature of the particular conference.⁽⁵⁾ The academic ‘tone’ that was defended at the conference was the same tone prevalent at the prestigious tertiary institutions in the country that many of the white speakers at the conference attended.

Despite their good intentions, the white academics were guilty of marginalising black presenters and attendees. Their ideas about the nature of non-white gender issues were based on the feminist schools of thought they had been exposed to, which were largely imbedded in Western philosophies such as Kantian rationalism and liberal ideas of individualism.⁽⁶⁾ Their approach disregarded the multi-layered forms of oppression experienced by women of colour in South Africa, who were not only discriminated against based on their skin colour, but also based on their gender.⁽⁷⁾ Very little was resolved during the Durban Women and Gender conference, due to the attendees’ different ideas of what oppression meant.

When the South African Constitution and Bill of Rights was rewritten in 1992, the Women’s National Coalition (WNO) was introduced, mainly thanks to African National Congress’ Women’s League (ANCWL) efforts.⁽⁸⁾ Despite the disparity among gender activists and academics, they agreed that women and gender issues would not receive the attention they deserved in the new constitution without women presenting a united front and a clear feminist agenda.

Although many changes in state legislation regarding gender equality have been achieved, the effectiveness of such legislation has been minimal.⁽⁹⁾ The WNO ensured that South Africa’s constitution is one of the world’s most gender-sensitive, yet sadly the country still produces “the worst figures of gender-based violence for a country not at war.”⁽¹⁰⁾ These figures are partly due to the continuation of dominant patriarchal discourses that were not addressed when gender equality discussions started in 1991.

Jacob Zuma’s rape trial

The idea that women’s experiences of ‘womanhood’ are determined by their racial and cultural contextual positions underpinned the Durban 1991 divide amongst South African feminists. However, this simultaneously facilitated independent black feminism and public exploration of their experiences and viewpoints, as voiced by themselves. Unfortunately, related culturally specific discourses have thwarted the pursuit of basic gender equality in several instances. For example, Jacob Zuma, Deputy President of South Africa in 2006, was accused of rape in the same year, then elected President in 2009. Zuma defended his actions (sex with the plaintiff) by arguing that the tradition of his isiZulu culture,⁽¹¹⁾ deems it necessary to sleep with a woman if she is aroused (he allegedly believed she was).⁽¹²⁾ He further stated that once intercourse was initiated, it had to be completed, as not doing so would be the equivalent of rape.⁽¹³⁾ Although a perplexing defence to most, the judge presiding over the case found Zuma ‘not guilty’ and believed ‘Kwezi’ (the plaintiff) to be lying.

Gender activists and academics were appalled by the manner in which the trial was handled.⁽¹⁴⁾ The dominance of the patriarchal norms at play could not be denied. The continued strengths of these norms are partly due to the historical lack of united feminist challenge. Arguably, apartheid is to blame for the feminist divides which thwarted uniform challenges of partriarchal discourses in South Africa and hence facilitated Zuma’s freedom and continued national political support. Feminists everywhere were deeply disappointed, however, with the judge’s unashamed display of partisanism, sexism and other –isms, an ill-boding combination of ‘culture’ and politics and an international embarrassment for many politicians, feminists and non-Zuma supporters in general.

Zuma’s rape trial brought the real strength of patriarchal norms to the public eye. Those who supported Zuma’s innocence brazenly protested Kwezi’s accusations outside the Johannesburg high court. Lisa Vetten, prominent South African feminist academic and activist, describes how Zuma participated in singing ‘Umshini wami’ (‘bring me my machine gun’) with his supporters at the end of the first day of his trial.⁽¹⁵⁾ Vetten connects this reference to a gun to the symbolic power bestowed on the male penis. Despite the culturally specific defence of the song’s meaning, it seems a disturbing praise of violence and threat of rape within the context of the rape trial.⁽¹⁶⁾

Sheila Meintjes argues that the trial also revealed the belief, held by various cultural groups, that women exist to serve men and that women are not equal to men, especially in cases of gender-based violence.⁽¹⁷⁾ Zuma defended his actions as having been the way that women in Kwezi’s ‘situation’ expect him to act. This argument holds the woman responsible to not act in a way that justifies the male response of sexual intercourse. The cultural norms Zuma claimed to subscribe to, resemble “cross-cultural masculine norms.”⁽¹⁸⁾ Although Zuma wished to explain his actions as customary practice, the practice of ‘traditional’ norms echoes basic patriarchal principles.⁽¹⁹⁾

The idea that women are responsible for men’s sexual behaviour underpinned the case, argues Moffett through an in-depth analysis of the kinds of questions that Zuma was not asked in court.⁽²⁰⁾ He was not asked to present evidence of his HIV status and questions about his history of sexual violence and harassment of women were also omitted. The plaintiff, however, had to suffer extended queries into her past sexual experiences, the sexual violence she claimed to suffer and her HIV status. Kwezi’s previous claims of being raped were used as tools to question the sincerity of her accusations against Zuma. If attention were drawn to the sexual abuse she had suffered before this case, however, the court may have been more understanding of Kwezi’s mental state before and during the case,⁽²¹⁾ and why she did not cry out for help, or immediately call the police.

Concluding remarks

In the aftermath of apartheid’s dominance over all peoples and ways of life, celebrating and defending one’s cultural identity is important. Although a discussion of cultural imperialism and hegemonic influences was beyond the scope of this paper, these issues remain problematic. Questioning the cultural basis of Zuma’s alleged innocence is arguably just another manifestation of hegemonic principles. However, women’s rights and equality will remain a secondary priority, if not a myth, if discriminative cultural discourses are allowed to prevail. Feminists involved in all things South African, from academic forums, business coalitions and community groups, to small and large scale women’s rights movements, must continue promoting the feminist agenda so that gender equality may become part of people’s everyday lives. Gender equality doesn’t mean the end of culture, it means change on every level, and for that, women have to keep working.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Julie-Anne Lothian through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Gender Issues Unit (gender.issues@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Wilkinson, J. R. 2002. South African women and the ties that bind. In P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux (eds.) Philosophy from Africa: Second edition. Oxford University Press, pp. 343.
(3) Lewis, D. 1996. The politics of feminism in South Africa. In M. J. Daymond (ed.) South African Feminisms: Writing, theory, and criticism 1990 – 1994. Garland Publishing, pp. 94.
(4) Wilkinson, J. R. 2002. South African women and the ties that bind. In P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux (eds.) Philosophy from Africa: Second edition. Oxford University Press, pp. 343.
(5) Lewis, D. 1996. The politics of feminism in South Africa. In M. J. Daymond (ed.) South African Feminisms: Writing, theory, and criticism 1990 – 1994. Garland Publishing, pp. 94.
(6) Wilkinson, J., R., 2002. ‘South African women and the ties that bind’. In P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux, (eds.) Philosophy from Africa: Second Edition. Oxfrod University Press, p. 355.
(7) Ibid, p. 353.
(8) Ibid, p. 345.
(9) Lisa Vetten, 'Violence against women in South Africa' in State of the Nation: 2007, Human Sciences Research Council.
(10) Moffett, H., 2009. Sexual violence, civil society and the new constitution. In H. Britton, et al. (ed.) Women’s Activism in South Africa: Working Across Divides. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, p. 155.
(11) Lisa Vetten, 'Violence against women in South Africa' in Sate of The Nation: 2007, Human Sciences Research Council.
(12) Moffett, H., 2009. Sexual violence, civil society and the new constitution. In H. Britton, et al. (ed.) Women’s Activism in South Africa: Working Across Divides. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, p. 173.
(13) Lisa Vetten, 'Violence against women in South Africa' in Sate of The Nation: 2007. Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC).
(14) Ibid, p. 175.
(15) Vetten, L. 'Violence against women in South Africa' in Sate of The Nation: 2007. Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC).
(16) Ibid.
(17) Meintjes, S. 2009. Gender equality by design: The case of the Commission on Gender Equality. In H. Britton, et al. (eds.) Women’s activism in South Africa: Working across divides. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, p. 77.
(18) Vetten, L. 'Violence against women in South Africa' in Sate of The Nation: 2007. Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC).
(19) Ibid.
(20) Moffett, H. 2009. Sexual Violence, civil society and the new constitution. In H. Britton, et al. (eds.) Women’s activism in South Africa: Working across divides. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp. 155-184.
(21) Ibid.

Written by Julie-Anne Lothian ⁽¹⁾