Date: 15/04/2005
Source: Department of Foreign Affairs
Title: A Pahad: Foreign Affairs Dept Budget Vote 2005/2006


Input by Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad to the Department of Foreign Affairs Budget Vote, Cape Town

Deputy Speaker,
Honourable Members,
Ministers and Deputy Ministers,
Members of the Diplomatic Corps,
Distinguished Guests,

The ANC in its January 2004 Election Manifesto stated that we will strive to;

1. Improve co-operation among countries of the South to ensure peace and equitable global relations.

2. We will dedicate more resources to ensure that we contribute more effectively to the efforts on our continent to prevent and urgently resolve conflict.

We are therefore happy to note that

The UN Secretary General’s Panel Report " A more secure world our shared responsibility" concluded that

"Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a chance to develop. Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding ground for other threats, including civil conflict. Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their government help poor countries to defeat poverty and diseases by meeting the MDGs."

Sadly as the Minister has indicated the continent most effected by underdevelopment is Africa.

It is on the African continent that we most clearly see the connection between underdevelopment and conflict.

An examination of Sub Saharan African countries engaged in conflict or recently emerged from armed conflict reveals a startling pattern of low per capita income, absolute poverty low life expectancy, low levels of FDI, low levels of ODA and high levels of indebtedness.

Deputy Chairperson

It is important to note that most of the countries in Africa that have had conflicts are rich in resources and strategically situated.

What happens or does not happen in these countries has negative effects, inter alia, economic collapse, destruction of infrastructure, impoverishment of the people, the creation of millions of refugees, environmental degradation and instability, not only in the countries in conflict but also on the neighbours and the whole of Africa.

This explains why we concentrate so much effort on conflict resolution and peace keeping. Let me deal with some of our efforts.

Democratic Republic of Congo

* Sun City Talks
* Pretoria Agreement
* End of the conflicts and the establishment of a Transitional Government

Today preparations for the July 2005 elections continue to be a priority. However the elections might be postponed to December 2005 due to logistical and financial problems.

For many years peace and stability continued to be threatened by the activities of the Rwandan ex-Far and Interhamwe elements in the DRC. All attempts to deal with these negative forces peacefully failed.

The African Union therefore decided to deploy 6,000 to 7,000 troops to forcefully disarm the ex-FAR/Interahamwe in the Eastern DRC.

On 25 February 2005 serious clashes took place between the UN peacekeepers and armed militias in the eastern part of the DRC resulting in the death of many of the militias. After the militias killed nine members of the UN peace keeping force, at last the decision was taken to take a more aggressive posture against the militias.

South African peacekeeping troops in the DRC have been involved in an offensive against local militias in the Ituri region, and a South African battalion of 850 soldiers has also joined around 3000 UN troops in one of the most risky parts of the country.

All South Africans must be proud of the efforts of our military personnel in the DRC.

The new aggressive posture of the UN forces and the threat by the AU to forcibly disarm the negative forces had very positive consequences.

South Africa’s role re the re-integration of the army

Key departments namely, DHA, DPSA, DPLG, DFA, DOD, SAPS and the IEC are engaging their DRC counterparts on a series of issues, including governance and administration. These departments deployed personnel in the DRC.

We remain confident that we are on course.

Burundi

* Since the signing of the Arusha Accord in 1998, initially under the facilitation of former President Nyerere and subsequently under former President Mandela and currently under Deputy President Jacob Zuma the political situation has stabilised
* A number of cease-fire agreements are holding
* The Transitional government that was ushered in on 1 November 2001 has managed to hold the country and institutions together.

In terms of the new constitution, for the next five years, the Legislative Assembly will be made up of 60% Hutus and 40 percent Tutsis. This compromise ethnic balance is both enshrined in the interim constitution as well as the Arusha agreement.

Thirty percent of the seats will be reserved for women and 3% for the minority known as the Twa.

* The elections were to be held on 1 October 2004, and a six months extension was granted to the transitional structures to carry on the necessary preparations. We expect that a date for the elections will be announced soon.

Sudan

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord ended a 27 year war and marks the start of the six-month Pre-Interim Period (January – July 2005) during which the SPLM has to assemble and constitute a government for South Sudan and nominate members to form part of central government in Khartoum. This is to be followed by an Interim Period (July 2005 – July 2011) in which the SPLM has to govern in South Sudan, with a high degree of autonomy; and participate in central government in Khartoum in a comprehensive and effective manner.

* Civil war in Darfur
* South African troops’ role
* South Africa is the Chair of the AU Committee on Reconstruction of Sudan

The Department of Foreign Affairs, together with the University of South Africa (UNISA) are co-hosting the training programme for the SPLM cadres.

Western Sahara

The UN has been seized with this issue for many years.

On 24 September 2004, Morocco rejected the argument that the conflict was a dimension of decolonisation, and presents it as a dispute between Algeria and Morocco. It rejected the Baker Plan and the motion of self-determination for the Sahrawi people, reneged on the agreements signed with the Polisario Front and relentlessly pointed to "the responsibility of Algeria" in the genesis of the conflict and its persistence, in order to demonstrate the "direct implication" of its and their "custodianship" over the Polisario.

Once Morocco rejected the UN efforts to a solution South Africa proceeded to recognise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). In this respect, South Africa has officially established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level.

South Africa’s decision to recognise the SADR, is in recognition of the right of the Sahrawis to self determination, an inalienable right that is contained in the Charter of the UN. South Africa has now taken the decision "in the light of Morocco not accepting the settlement Plan to which it had agreed to for many years", and that "it also now does not accept the essential elements of the Peace Plan. The decision to grant recognition to the SADR should be seen within this context.

Cote d’Ivoire

The current crisis in Cote d'Ivoire began a decade ago.

There was an attempted coup d'etat in September 2002, which resulted in the division of the country into two parts, with the South controlled by the Government and the North by the rebel forces, the Forces Nouvelles. In January 2003, the various political forces including the Government concluded an agreement at Linas Marcoussis, France.

Before this, the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, had also been involved in sustained efforts to help resolve the problems of Cote d'Ivoire. The UN subsequently joined ECOWAS. The UN Secretary General, acting in co-operation with the then Chairperson of ECOWAS convened a meeting in Accra, Ghana at the end of July 2004. This meeting set deadlines for the implementation of various measures to expedite the peace process in Cote d'Ivoire.

Two-and-a-half months after Accra III, the UN SG expressed serious concern at the failure of the Ivorian parties to meet the deadlines contained in the Accra III Agreement.

Following the November 2004 government attacks against the Forces Nouvelles the situation in Cote d'Ivoire seemed to move even further away from a resolution of the crisis, as the crisis deepened the Chairperson of the African Union, HE President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, asked HE President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa to act as the Mediator of the AU to expedite the Ivorian peace process.

President Mbeki accordingly visited Abidjan on 9 November 2004, even as this city was in the grip of a serious security crisis.

President Mbeki had to provide his own security.

That sense of urgency continues to inform the activities of the AU Mediation.

As is normal in any situation of protracted conflict, as in Cote d'Ivoire, deep-seated mistrust among the Ivorian leaders continues to bedevil the advance towards the resolution of the Ivorian crisis.

We operate on the basis of the principle and practice of inclusion rather than exclusion.

This is especially important given that the ideology and practice of exclusion lie at the heart of the Ivorian crisis.

A significant proportion of this population, of different generations, originates from the neighbouring countries. As has happened in many other countries everywhere else in the world, in conditions of relative socio-economic hardship, xenophobic tensions arise.

The fundamental and long-term solution of the Ivorian crisis requires that Cote d'Ivoire should successfully address a whole range of matters, including issues that bear on nationality, political rights, the land question, and co