All is clearly not well in President Yoweri Museveni’s Uganda. On 18 June 2013, the BBC aired an interview with Ugandan army general, David Sejusa, accusing the president of “playing god” and creating a “political monarchy” in order to hold on to power.⁽²⁾ The statement was Sejusa’s first since he left the country following the emergence of a leaked letter in which he asked the Internal Security Organisation to investigate an assassination plot against top military leaders opposing the president’s plan to have his son, Brigadier Muhoozi Kainerugaba, succeed him. The two leading newspapers that published the letter were subsequently raided by police on 20 May 2013 and forcibly shut down for 11 days.⁽³⁾

The Sejusa story has stirred up intense debate in Uganda and prompted an early focus on the 2016 elections. It is also indicative of the two main features of the current political discourse in the country – the emergence of a rare debate concerning who and what will come after Museveni and the increasingly authoritarian measures applied by his regime to silence its critics. At the same time, the country’s soaring corruption is causing growing unrest among Ugandans, and public protests against the failure of government policies are being organised. As Museveni, in power since 1986 and currently well into his fourth presidential term, ponders the prospects of running for a fifth term in 2016, his rule is seemingly under increasing stress as critical voices are raised, underlining the need for change.

This CAI paper critically analyses the prospects for opposition politics and political change in Uganda ahead of the 2016 elections. By outlining the strategies applied by the regime to mounting criticism and formation of an effective opposition, it is contended that the regime is becoming increasingly authoritarian in its attempts to narrow the space for political change. It is further argued that while opposition parties remain weak, the main source of opposition currently stems from within the ruling party itself as well as from various civil society actors – a situation that provides both challenges and opportunities to the reopening of the space for democratic politics in Uganda. 

Narrowing the space for change

In the context of political uncertainty and rising public distrust, Museveni’s government has displayed increasing authoritarian tendencies towards the opposition. As documented by various international organisations, such as Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group, the government has steadily tightened a noose around the media, the formal political opposition and civil society.⁽⁴⁾

Notwithstanding the forced closing of the country’s largest independent newspaper, the Daily Monitor, and the popular tabloid, the Red Pepper, following the Sejusa letter, independent journalists frequently face harassment and intimidation when reporting on issues such as corruption, the military, or the first family.⁽⁵⁾ Indeed, some commentators have interpreted the current erosion of media freedom as a sign that Museveni will not tolerate an independent and potentially critical media ahead of the 2016 elections.⁽⁶⁾

The political opposition, both outside and within the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), has been met with increasing intolerance. A number of members of parliament (MPs) have faced police interrogations for criticising government policy,⁽⁷⁾ whilst the NRM is currently trying to exclude four of its own MPs on grounds of speaking out against Museveni and corruption.⁽⁸⁾ Dissent is therefore combated through what seems to be a dual strategy of, on the one hand, legal restrictions, and on the other hand, intimidation, arbitrary arrests and sheer force, carried out by the police and security forces. A proposed law on public meetings, the Public Order Management Bill of 2011, for example, suggests the requirement of police authorisation of any ‘public meeting’ – defined as a gathering of three or more people in a public place – where political matters are discussed.⁽⁹⁾

In April 2012, the Attorney General declared the Action for Change (A4C) group, a group organising protests against corruption and rising food and fuel prices, illegal and banned all their activities.⁽¹⁰⁾ In the wake of the 2011 elections, the group’s ‘Walk to Work’ protests, headed by leading opposition figure and loser of the presidential elections, Kizza Besigye, were violently battled by the police, leading to the death of several protesters and the repeated ‘preventative’ house arrest of Besigye. On 20 June 2013, the story repeated itself as the police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse a planned gathering in downtown Kampala called by the city’s major Erias Lukwago – another vocal critic of the government. At least two people were reportedly shot, Besigye arrested once again, and Lukwago taken to hospital with injuries sustained in the chaos.⁽¹¹⁾

Government officials and authorities also continuously obstruct actors within civil society. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working on sensitive issues, such as human rights, governance, land, and oil, are particularly targeted in this respect. According to Human Rights Watch, the array of tactics and methods deployed to “intimidate and obstruct the work of NGOs in certain sectors” range from “closing meetings, reprimanding NGOs for their work, and demanding retractions or apologies, as well as occasional resort to threats, harassment, physical violence and heavy-handed bureaucratic interference to impede the registration and operations of NGOs.”⁽¹²⁾

Perhaps not surprisingly, the on-going crackdown on the opposition and narrowing of the space for democratic politics and debate is typically justified in the name of peace, stability and economic development. Hence, critics of the government are now being labelled “economic saboteurs” and “dangerous to the peace and order of Uganda.”⁽¹³⁾ However, even as the space for change seems to be narrowing along the road towards the 2016 elections, the convincing force of these arguments seems to be waning in the minds of many Ugandans, providing the opposition with a potentially strong source of legitimacy and support.

Opposition from within

Despite the introduction of multiparty competition in 2005, the formal political opposition and party system beyond the NRM remains weak, divided and lacking in alternative political vision. This has been particularly so since the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), the main threat to the NRM in the last two elections, entered a period of consolidation following the removal of its leader and three-times presidential candidate, Besigye.⁽¹⁴⁾

From a general perspective, the opening up of space for political opposition through the introduction of multipartyism was actually instrumental to Museveni’s strategy to remain in office. Most importantly, it was used in a political trade-off for the lifting of presidential term limits, but it also silenced critics within the NRM of the old ‘no-party’ system, and pleased international bodies and donor countries pushing for liberal democratic reforms. According to Paul Omach, political scientist at Makerere University in Kampala, “Museveni knew very well that he could safely open up the political space because the newly-established opposition would not be able to operate effectively, given the president’s extra-parliamentary ways to retain his hold on power.”⁽¹⁵⁾ The shift to multiparty democracy might also have been a way for the government to undermine the substantive opposition provided by parliament during the no-party era, and replace it with a formal-legal or ‘thin’ form of democracy – supported by a donor community primarily interested in pursuing neoliberal reforms in recipient countries – in which the executive branch could assert a higher degree of control.⁽¹⁶⁾

Museveni’s ‘extra-parliamentary ways’, mainly including an extensive (and expensive) network of patronage relations and the frequent utilisation of the state’s security forces to stifle opposition, provided him with safe victories in the 2006 and 2011 elections. This has effectively undermined the formation of a strong and credible political opposition – and with it, the prospects for political change through electoral competition. These developments have in turn resulted in two important characteristics of the current political situation in Uganda.

First, the political opposition has taken to the streets and organised massive public protests, such as the ‘Walk to Work’ protests (against rising costs of living) and, more recently, the ‘Black Monday’ movement (against corruption). Although repeatedly obstructed by the regime, the protests have managed to aggregate the critical voice of large parts of the Ugandan population and highlight some of the most crucial failures of government policy. By making government appear vulnerable and not entirely in control, the street protests have also contributed to a growing political awareness among Ugandans.⁽¹⁷⁾ However, it is important to note that this is not a cohesive political movement, but rather a predominantly person-oriented popular unrest, based on discontent with government policy.

Second, the most potent parliamentary opposition now appears to be coming from within the NRM itself. Considering the large majority of NRM MPs, the ninth parliament has proven to be surprisingly self-confident and independent. The intake of a number of young first-term NRM MPs, determined to take an independent stand on issues such as fighting corruption, improving service delivery and strengthening accountability, has stirred up significant debate.⁽¹⁸⁾ Following a number of clashes between parliament and the executive, involving, for example, the passing of a bill concerning the management of Uganda’s oil industry and the suspicious death of a vocal parliamentarian, Museveni eventually warned that the military could intervene in order to prevent the current “bad politics” in parliament from continuing.⁽¹⁹⁾ The threat of a military coup d’état, along with the punishment and disciplining of a number of ‘rebel’ MPs, testifies to the perceived dangers of increased parliamentary resistance and internal NRM frictions to Museveni’s rule, and the continued consolidation of power in the hands of the government.

But Museveni is also facing trouble from other, traditionally loyal, sections of his ruling apparatus. As evidenced by the Sejusa story, frustration is growing within the army, with older leaders feeling pushed out by their younger counterparts, led by Kainerugaba.⁽²⁰⁾ Furthermore, former Vice President Gilbert Bukenya has announced his intention to challenge Museveni in 2016, either in the NRM primaries or as an independent candidate. Should Sejusa and Bukenya leave the party, they are likely to take a number of important actors with them, and considerably weaken the support for Museveni and the NRM.

The opposition is acutely aware of the necessity of utilising these frictions to achieve any political change in 2016. In a recent report by the joint opposition parties it was concluded that even if all anti-NRM forces work together, “they cannot cause regime change without allying with other key national and international actors” and that these would have to include “emerging voices of reason, goodwill and progress” within the army and police, as well as progressives inside the NRM.⁽²¹⁾ Considering the weakness of opposition and the nearly complete dominance of the NRM in Ugandan politics, no matter how loud the street protests get, the prospects for substantial political change depend largely on developments within the ruling party itself.

Civil society as a source of change and debate

If the formal opposition is weak and scattered, forces within civil society remain all the more vibrant and outspoken. There is a tendency for progressive political debate and general momentum for change to increasingly take place in forums outside formal political institutions – on the streets for example. Most symbolic of this trend is probably the resignation of long-term opposition leader, Besigye, from his position as President of the FDC in order to fully engage in the organisation of public protests through the activist groups A4C and For God and My Country, both of which have subsequently been banned by the government. The Black Monday protests, led by an alliance of NGOs urging supporters to wear black clothing on Mondays as a rejection of spiralling corruption,⁽²²⁾ is another example. As further testimony to the broad engagement for change within civil society, a number of influential religious leaders have also raised their voices against current political developments, by, for example, calling for the reinstatement of presidential term limits.

On the one hand, the rising momentum of critical voices within civil society clearly suggests that a broad popular movement for change is gathering strength. These actors have managed to aggregate and channel the frustration felt by many Ugandans in a way that the formal political opposition has not. Consequently, the most important feature of the forces of opposition in civil society is their ability to open up the space for debate and act as a vehicle for the sounding of citizens’ voice.

On the other hand, however, the prospects for these movements to bring about real political change and hold the government to account should not be overestimated. Museveni’s hold on the country and capacity to crack down on dissenting voices remains strong and the formal channels of accountability are largely obstructed. Voice without accountability rather resembles shouting in a void. In the long run, while a vibrant civil society is vital to the future of democracy in Uganda, the spatial sliding of opposition politics away from formal political institutions of the state, might risk undermining the social contract between citizens and the state, and potentially erode popular trust and confidence in democratic institutions and processes. Nevertheless, as things stand, civil society stands out as the principal realm for the voicing of popular discontent and advocacy for political change.

Concluding remarks

In 2016, it will be thirty years since Museveni himself cautioned against the dangers of holding on to power too long. In his 1986 book What is Africa’s problem?, he wrote that “the problem of Africa in general and Uganda in particular is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power.”⁽²³⁾ Ironically, he now seems to embody the ultimate confirmation of his own thesis. Whether he decides to go for a fifth term or not, there are significant indications that the force of his old merits of bringing peace and stability to Uganda is no longer convincing to broad sections of the electorate. As one resident of the northern Arua district put it: “It is a peace that strangles you. Peace that comes like a prison. It chokes you without killing you.”⁽²⁴⁾ Mounting public protests along with internal frictions in the NRM and security forces suggest that the 2016 elections will be a critical moment for the country.

So far, Museveni has managed to control the opposition and narrow the space for change. He also enjoys important support from key foreign actors, mainly due to Uganda’s involvement in the African Union mission to Somalia. But if the brewing discontent continues to spread, and internal cleavages continue to unfold, Museveni’s hold on power might very well come under serious threat. The character and outcome of the 2016 elections, then, will largely depend on the ability of the opposition and broader political establishment to channel the popular movement for change through institutions of the electoral process. But the road towards 2016 is still long, and considering the intensity of the political debate in the country, much will likely to happen along the way.

Written by Fredrik Bruhn ⁽¹⁾

NOTES:

(1) Fredrik Bruhn is a political analyst focused on democratisation, accountability and development politics. Contact Fredrik through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Elections & Democracy Unit ( elections.democracy@concultancyafrica.com). Edited by Liezl Stretton.
(2) ‘Uganda's David Sejusa: 'Oppose Museveni's monarchy'’, BBC, 18 June 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(3) ‘Ugandan police raid newspaper over Museveni succession letter’, Reuters, 20 May 2013, http://www.reuters.com.
(4) ‘Curtailing criticism: Intimidation and obstruction of civil society in Uganda’, Human Rights Watch, August 2012, http://www.hrw.org; ‘Uganda: No resolution to growing tensions’, International Crisis Group, Africa Report No 187, 5 April 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org.
(5) Klosterboer, B. and Kasasira, R., ‘Uganda: Media closures cause chilling effect’, Think Africa Press, 3 June 2013, http://thinkafricapress.com.
(6) Burnett, M., ‘Repressing rights while talking law in Uganda’, Human Rights Watch, 24 May 2013, http://www.hrw.org.
(7) Burnett, M., ‘Uganda: Museveni’s 10,000 days in power’, Think Africa Press, 18 June 2013, http://thinkafricapress.com.
(8) Tran, M., ‘Has Yoweri Museveni outstayed his welcome as Ugandan president?’, The Guardian, 29 May 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(9) ‘Public Order Management Bill amended’, New Vision, 16 May 2013, http://www.newvision.co.ug.
(10) ‘Uganda bans activist group ahead of protest’, BBC, 4 April 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
(11) ‘Two shot in city chaos as Besigye is arrested’, Daily Monitor, 21 June 2013, http://www.monitor.co.ug.
(12) ‘Curtailing criticism: Intimidation and obstruction of civil society in Uganda’, Human Rights Watch, August 2012, http://www.hrw.org.
(13) Burnett, M., ‘Uganda: Museveni’s 10,000 days in power’, Think Africa Press, 18 June 2013, http://thinkafricapress.com.
(14) Downie, R., ‘Politics and protest in Uganda’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 20 February 2013, http://csis.org.
(15) Schenkel, M., ‘Uganda’s Museveni keeps opposition on a tight leash’, Good Governance Africa, http://gga.org.
(16) Keating, M.F., 2010. Can democratization undermine democracy? Economic and political reform in Uganda. Democratization, 18(2), 415-442.
(17) Schenkel, M., ‘Uganda’s Museveni keeps opposition on a tight leash’, Good Governance Africa, http://gga.org.
(18) Peluse, R., ‘Uganda's “bad politics”: Museveni, the military and an assertive parliament’, Think Africa Press, 1 February 2013, http://thinkafricapress.com.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Obegi, B., ‘M7 + 2016: The uncertain formula for Uganda’s succession’, Democracy in Africa, 11 June 2013, http://democracyinafrica.org.
(21) ‘Opposition targets UPDF, Police’, The Observer, 9 June 2013, http://www.observer.ug.
(22) Downie, R., ‘Politics and protest in Uganda’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 20 February 2013, http://csis.org.
(23) Ross, W., ‘Would Uganda's Museveni recognise his former self?’, BBC, 7 May 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(24) ‘National reconciliation and transitional justice audit’, Refugee Law Project, Brief 4: Arua District, 2011-2012, http://www.beyondjuba.org.