To the President of the Republic of South Africa
May it Please You
You deemed it expedient to appoint a Commission of Inquiry into alleged arms transactions between one Eli Wazan and other related matters, with the terms of reference set out in the Report that follows.
The Commission has commenced its task to the best of its abilities.
We, the undersigned members of the Commission, have the honour to present to you the Commission's First Report, together with its Recommendations, and the Appendices to the First Report, which are contained in Volume Two.
Signed:
Mr Justice E Cameron
Chairperson
Advocate I V Maleka
Mr L N Nathan
15 June 1995
I INTRODUCTION
1.2 Commission's terms of reference
1.3 Focus of Commission's first sessions and of first report
1.4 Commission's philosophical and political approach
1.5 Completion of Commission's mandate: future process
1.5.1 Arms trade policy
1.5.2 Other, similar', transactions
II THE OPERATION OF THE COMMISSION
2.2 Parties and their representatives
2.3 Open proceedings: the Commission's approach
2.4 Privilege against self-incrimination: invocation by Armscor officials
2.5 Indemnity from prosecution for
2.6.1 Complexity of issues and bulk of documentation; quasi-judicial nature of proceedings
2.6.2 Open sittings: impact on efficacy and duration of Commission
III SETTING: ARMSCOR
3.1 Introduction: international arms trade
3.2.1 Armscor: structure and line responsibility
3.2.2 SANDF Stock Sales and Armscor - the log pamphlet
3.2.3 Corporate reporting and controls within Armscor
3.2.4 End User Certificates (EUCs)
IV DETERMINATION OF FACTS: INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY
4.1 Synopsis of main characters
4.1.1 Mr M T S Vermaak
4.1.2 Mr Elias Wazan
4.1.3 Mr Michael Steenberg
4.1.4 Prince Anwar F Al-Shaalan
4.1.5 Mr Joseph der Hovsepian
4.1.6 Mr P C Smith
4.1.7 Mr Deon Bronkhorst
4.3 1993 and before: the Vinland Saga and preceding shipments
4.4 Preceding shipments: similarities and patterns
4.5 The Vinland Saga, 1993: knowledge and accountability
4.5.1 Vermaak's diary and state of knowledge in 1993
4.5.2 Vermaak's Yemen solicitation on behalf of Wazan
4.5.3 FOB shipments and the Armscor draft bill of lading
4.5.4 Steenberg's bills of lading and the Eldor Roos episode
4.5.5 January, 1994 - Vermaak's knowledge that the first consignment supposedly ended up in Jordan
4.5.6 The Lebanese Christian Militia as a supposed end user
4.6 The Arktis Pioneer shipment, 1994 - overview of developments
4.6.1 Vermaak and Wazan: the $50 000 'repayment'
4.6.2 Vermaak and Wazan: the new EUC requirement
4.6.3 Vermaak and the Prince: the Yemen deal falls through, and Lebanon re-appears
4.6.4 Vermaak keeps Wazan fully informed
4.6.5 Yemen is supposedly cancelled; Wazan gets details of the shipment
4.6.6 Steenberg becomes the 'offeror' in a deal with the Prince
4.6.7 Steenberg's 'offer' corresponds with existing offers
4.6.8 Steenberg's 'offer' - the Prince's view
4.6.9 The deal was never off 53 4.6.10 End user clearance proceeds in South Africa
4.6.11 Steenberg's three categories of end user certificates
4.6.12 Bills of lading
4.7 The Arktis Pioneer - knowledge and accountability
4.7.1 21 June, 1994 - 'Johan [van Dyk] will now clear Lebanon with Foreign Affairs'
4.7.2 August, 1994 - 'So , tell me, where is the ship going to this time, Michael?'
4.7.3 Post-debacle events
4.7.4 The poker game: Wazan, Vermaak, Steenberg and Hovsepian
4.8 Overview As to Individual Accountability for the Debacle
4.8.1 Vermaak
4.8.2 Vermaak's subordinates: Bronkhorst
4.8.3 van Dyk and DFA
4.8.4 Vermaak's immediate superiors: Savides and Smith
V MAIN FINDING: INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ILLEGAL ARMS SHIPMENTS
5.1.1 Summary of main finding
5.1.2 Normative framework
5.2.1 Country classification
5.2.2 Weapons classification
5.2.3 Classification of Lebanon
5.2.4 Armscor sales to Lebanon
5.2.5 The civil war in Lebanon
5.2.6 Assessment
5.2.7 Accountability
5.3.1 Introduction
5.3.2 Background
5.3.3 Assessment
5.3.4 Armscor policy on marketing agents and contacts
5.3.5 Bona fides of the Lebanon intermediaries
5.4.1 Introduction
5.4.2 The risk of free-on-board shipments
5.4.3 Documentation concerning port of discharge
5.5 Diversion of previous shipments to Lebanon
5.5.1 Introduction
5.5.2 The Jordan debacle
5.5.3 The Yugoslavia debacle
5.5.4 The Belgian debacle
5.6 Organisational practice and culture
5.6.1 Vermaak's department
5.6.2 Quotations to clients
5.6.3 Management accountability
5.6.4 Organisational culture
5.7 Evidence of a responsible approach to arms exports
5.7.1 Introduction
5.7.2 Country classification
5.7.3 Control
5.7.4 Diversion of arms
5.7.5 New policy and procedures
5.8.1 Institutional disregard
5.8.2 Applicability of main finding
5.8.3 The context of apartheid and the arms embargo
VI FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT
6.3 Payment of $159 825 to Wazan
6.3.1 Background
6.3.2 Finding
6.4 Payment of $50 000 to Wazan
6.4.1 Background
6.4.2 Finding
6.5 Payment of $102,455 to Wazan
6.5.1 Background
6.5.2 Price reduction and payment to Wazan
6.5.3 Finding
6.6.1 The mechanics of the scam
6.6.2 Armscor's submissions
6.6.3 Vermaak's submissions
VII CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.3.1 Country and weapons criteria
7.3.2 Decision-making
7.3.3 Separation of functions
7.4 Transparency and accountability
7.6 Individual Armscor employees