First Report of the Commission


I. Introduction


1.1 Origin of Commission

On Sunday 18 September 1994, the Afrikaans Sunday newspaper,Rapport, reported that `a massive arsenal' of South African weapons - tens of thousands of AK 47 rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition - had been shipped from Port Elizabeth to the `terror-contaminated' Middle East. The weapons emanated from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The supplier was the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor), operating as the sales arm of the SANDF. The report quoted allegations that the weapons were destined for the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), for use against Israel: the report's suggestion was that the new African National Congress-led government was seeking to bolster its old ally, the PLO. This was despite the official stand of Armscor that the arms shipment had occurred within government prescriptions, and that the export was in fact destined for the government of Lebanon.

Subsequent press reports revealed that the consignment had been headed for Yemen, but had been turned away at one of that country's ports. Armscor arranged for the return of the ship to South Africa, where its cargo was unloaded at Port Elizabeth and transferred to SANDF storage. (The ownership of the shipment, and related financial matters, are currently disputed in legal proceedings between various of the parties.)

Rapport's disclosure provoked a public storm in South Africa. World media attention focused on the activities of Armscor, and on South Africa's alleged role in supplying arms to dubious purchasers. The Minister of Defence, Mr J Modise, called on Armscor to furnish a report on the events. After receiving the report, and within twelve days of the original disclosure, he requested the Minister of Justice, Mr A M Omar, to appoint an independent commission to investigate the issue. This Commission was the result.

1.2 Commission's terms of reference

The President appointed the Commission on 14 October 1994 (Government Notice R 1801, Government Gazette 16035) with the following terms of reference:

  1. To inquire into, consider and report on -

    1. all aspects and surrounding circumstances of the transaction/s between Armscor and one Eli Wazan for the sale of weapons as well as arms components and related materials;

    2. the facts relating to the said transaction/s as well as details of other arms deals, and other transactions relating to arms components and related material, during the period 2 February 1990 to date hereof with a view to the identification of any possible similarities between such other deals and transactions and the transaction/s referred to in paragraph (a) above; (c) the identity of all persons, parties and/or countries involved in such transactions and their antecedents;

    3. whether there was any connection between such transactions and any other matter;

    4. whether such transactions violated (a) any law and/or (b) any international embargo;

    5. whether prima facie evidence exists indicating that any person committed:

      1. a criminal offence; and

      2. serious misconduct, negligence or impropriety.

  2. To comment - in the context of South Africa's national and international obligations and responsibilities - on the appropriateness of:

    1. South Africa's current trade policy with regard to weapons and components with reference to weapons and related materials; and

    2. decision-making processes with regard to such trade.

    3. to submit an interim report (and further interim reports) as soon as possible.

1.3 Focus of Commission's first sessions and of first report

The incident that led to the Commission's appointment became known in the proceedings as `the Wazan debacle' or `the AK 47 debacle' and was referred to in these terms in a letter dated 13 October 1994 from Armscor's managing director, Mr T J de Waal, to the Minister of Defence. These terms reflected not only the chief content of the controversial cargo and the identity of the international arms dealer who played a pivotal role in organising the transaction, but also the fact that the incident had severe consequences for Armscor and for the country's international image.

In the work of the Commission, the terms of reference were grouped into three `legs': the Wazan debacle; other, `similar' transactions from 2 February 1990; and the question of arms trade policy. The Wazan debacle inevitably became the primary focus of attention. The parties agreed that evidence and argument should concentrate on `leg one', and that the Commission should first produce a report on this issue before turning to the other two aspects.

In practice, it did not prove possible to maintain a watertight separation between the AK 47 debacle and other transactions Wazan had concluded with or on behalf of Armscor. The AK 47 deal could be understood only if its antecedents in other transactions were at least in part appreciated. Similarly, some understanding of, and some comment upon, arms trade policy current at the time of the transaction lie at the heart of our findings and conclusions on the debacle itself.

None the less, this report deals primarily with the Wazan AK 47 transaction. Our proposed further programme in seeking to fulfil our mandate is set out below [Section 1.5].

1.4 Commission's philosophical and political approach

The Commission undertook its investigation, and has written this report, from an avowed philosophical and political perspective. This perspective is set out fully below [Section 5.1.2]. In essence:

1.5 Completion of Commission's mandate: future process

The Commission has yet to address leg two (other transactions `similar' to the Wazan AK 47 transaction) and leg three (arms trade policy) under its terms of reference.

1.5.1 Arms trade policy

In early March 1995, while the Commission was still examining the AK 47 debacle, the Cabinet appointed a Committee to formulate a comprehensive strategy in regard to the arms industry, including an arms trade policy. The Cabinet Committee's task is to devise a new comprehensive policy framework in regard to the arms industry and the control of the arms trade.

The Commission's task under paragraph two of its terms of reference, by contrast, is not to formulate a new arms trade policy for the country, but to comment on arms trade policy, practices and decision-making processes current at the time of its appointment. This task is complementary to that of the Cabinet Committee. The Committee has indicated that the Commission's comments on the appropriateness of the trade policy which gave rise to the Wazan incident may prove very useful to the Cabinet Committee (letter dated 13 March 1995 to the Commission from Professor G J Gerwel, Director-General in the Office of the President).

The Commission's task regarding these matters is thus of great public interest and importance. The Commission has consequently decided to undertake its policy inquiry in a participatory and open manner.

The Commission has accordingly invited interested parties and members of the public to submit written presentations on various aspects of arms trade policy and decision-making. These presentations will be made available, on request, to the media and interested parties.

Between Monday 19 and Friday 30 June, the Commission proposes to convene a public hearing in Cape Town, at a venue at or near to Parliament, to hear oral contributions and debate on the written submissions.

The Commission has released a list of topics as a guideline to parties wishing to make submissions. This is contained inAppendix One of this Report.

1.5.2 Other, similar', transactions

The broad object underlying the Commission's `second leg' is to determine whether violation of any law or international embargo occurred, or whether there is prima facie evidence of criminal conduct, or serious misconduct, negligence or impropriety, with regard to arms transactions similar to the Wazan debacle.

From the outset, certain parties expressed concern about the breadth of these terms of reference. It would clearly be impractical for the Commission to review all arms transfers over the past five years. A thorough investigation of even a select number of transactions would be impractical. The Commission indicated that it proposed to give the parties a specific indication of what the Commission will request them to focus on in regard to the second leg, so that the inquiry will not be too diffuse or unduly protracted. The Commission will shortly announce its proposal on how to deal with this leg of its inquiry.


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